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Abstract 
This thesis addresses the paradox of capitalist market reform being introduced by a 
politically undefeated communist state in China. It does so by developing an historical 
account of the Chinese polity’s relationship with the modern world. Chapter one offers 
a critique of existing explanations; these tend to focus narrowly on the immediate 
circumstances surrounding the decision to reform and thereby eschew analysis of the 
specific dynamics of the Chinese Revolution. In so doing, they also ignore its origins 
within the welter of contradictions arising from the process of capitalist 
internationalization, giving no causal efficacy to ‘the international’ in explaining this 
dramatic social transformation. In response to this neglect, chapter two invokes Leon 
Trotsky’s ‘theory of uneven and combined development’ as an alternative approach to 
the study of social contradictions within and amongst societies across the longue durée. 
This approach is then applied to the Chinese case in three steps, which consider, 
successively, the impact of British colonialism on the Qing dynasty, the emergence of a 
Chinese nationalism, and the specificities of Maoism. 
Chapter three shows how British imperialism integrated Qing China into the 
capitalist world by revolutionising global finance and imposing ‘free trade’ through 
military force. This capitalist penetration of a tributary state created a unique amalgam 
of social relations that inhibited China’s ability to ‘catch up’ with the advanced 
capitalist powers. Focusing on how these processes and pressures fostered a 
transformation in social consciousness, chapter four then outlines the emergence of a 
‘national imagination’ amongst a new stratum of intellectuals outside of the traditional 
scholar-gentry ruling class. These layers turned to anti-imperialism, but also found their 
own country deficient in the face of colonialism and longed for a mythical restoration of 
‘lost’ Chinese power. The Russian Revolution dramatically raised the horizons of these 
new, modern Chinese, but also exposed a deep tension between internationalist and 
nationalist responses to the crisis of colonial capitalism. Chapter five outlines the role of 
national patriotism in the authoritarian decay of the communist project, arguing that 
Maoism represented a complementary amalgam of Soviet Stalinism with Chinese 
nationalism. This nationalism, however, resulted in tense relations with the Soviet 
Union after 1949 as China’s elite rejected its tutelage. Chinese communists desired 
‘national salvation’ and, once Soviet-style planning failed to achieve it, they took the 
‘capitalist road’ to build a strong nation-state. 
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Existing explanations of Chinese economic reform overlook this concatenation 
of local and global processes across the longue durée. The thesis shows, however, that 
this ‘methodological nationalism’ results in a failure to give sufficient weight to the 
real-world political nationalism that underpinned market reform. The theory of uneven 
and combined development answers this absence by placing Chinese development in 
the global setting. Its dialectical account of history rejects the view that sees ‘cultural 
analysis’ as an alternative to class based explanation, but rather treats nation, culture, 
ideology and class as essential moments in the uneven and combined reproduction of 
the world system.  
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Introduction 
Describing reform and opening as the 
importation and development of capitalism and 
viewing the main danger of peaceful evolution as 
coming from the economic field are leftist 
manifestations 
Deng Xiaoping 
 
As we can see now in retrospect, the strength of 
the global socialist challenge to capitalism was 
that of the weakness of its opponent 
Eric Hobsbawm  
 
Having survived into the second decade of the twenty-first century, China’s ‘state 
socialism’ has an enigmatic quality. Its one-party political system – with social 
organisations that penetrate deep into the fabric of mass society, and a political culture 
which utilises the aesthetic of socialism and class struggle as a source of ideological 
legitimacy – recalls a bygone era. It awakens thoughts of a time when Marxist-Leninist 
regimes contested the Pax-Americana by putting vast geographical regions and entire 
peoples outside the reaches of the international capitalist system. However, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) made its final peace with the global market place in the early 
1990s after the decisive intervention of Deng Xiaoping. In the now famous ‘Southern 
Inspection Tour’, where he visited China’s geographically enclosed experiments in 
capitalist markets, the ‘Special Economic Zones’ (SEZs), Deng heaped praise on the 
reform effort. Drawing on one of Mao’s favourite allegories to claim the mantle of 
Chinese communism for his efforts, he insisted reform must not be ‘like a woman with 
bound feet’, but should ‘stride boldly forward’ for several decades to come (cited in 
Baum 1996, 342). Deng had come out of retirement to mount this aggressive 
intervention into the party, which concluded with the agreement to dismantle the 
country’s central planning infrastructure at the Fourteenth Party Congress in October 
1992. Supporting this new course was made a condition of entering the leadership and 
dissidents were duly purged. This was nothing less than a bold attack on the 
conservative faction of the ruling party that had been invigorated by the crushing of the 
Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Indeed, the general crisis of ‘state socialism’ 
loomed large over the CCP’s radical turn. After the failed August Coup and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Deng insisted that only the introduction of aggressive 
capitalist measures could save the CCP from suffering the fate of the Russian party 
(Zhao 1993, 742 – 743). For China, however, the decision to dismantle planning was 
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also the culmination of a longer process of development. Deng was urging the CCP to 
continue and deepen the country’s existing experiment with ‘market socialism’ – 
indeed, to fully embrace the logic of the policies they had pioneered. The contradictory 
unity between, on the one hand, the hope and aspiration that the post-Mao reform era 
had encouraged, and, on the other, the economic antagonisms that it had opened up, was 
in fact a critical motor of the Tiananmen protests. The crackdown only momentarily 
strengthened opponents of economic reform, because ultimately command planning 
could not achieve the party’s national development goals. It was, therefore, only on the 
political level that the status quo properly endured. 
Deng’s individual personality has become identified with the post-Mao reform 
era with some justification. He was, after all, attacked by the party radicals of the 1960s 
as an ‘arch-unrepentant capitalist-roader’ (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2008, 379) due 
to his preparedness to countenance market reform. However, he was only one amongst a 
group that drafted market-based proposals for China’s economic reconstruction after the 
catastrophe of the Great Leap Forward.1 For his efforts, he was purged from the 
leadership of the CCP, along with numerous other party leaders and officials, during the 
hysteria of the Cultural Revolution. As China’s most senior political figure, Deng was 
rehabilitated after Mao’s death to usher in a new course in the country’s history. The 
Third Plenum of the Central Committee in December 1978 is held in high esteem in 
today’s China. For it is seen as a great turning point, equivalent to 1911 or 1949, where 
the nation decisively set upon a new course: decollectivizing agriculture, establishing 
‘Special Economic Zones’ (SEZs) with rules of governance favourable to private 
enterprise and investment, opening up to foreign trade, and loosening central control of 
small industries to generate competition (Goodman 2002, 90, 92 – 94). The effect of 
these changes was to create two over-lapping economies existing in a contradictory 
inter-relationship; one was based on the central planning apparatus, the other responded 
to the imperatives of profit and loss in the new market economy (Main and Hughes 
2012, 422 – 428). The decision to dismantle the former in favour of the latter, was 
hastened by the global conjuncture, but also reflected the economic dynamism that 
capitalist markets had introduced into the sclerotic command economy. The experience 
of China’s near abroad also provided a further source of legitimacy and impetus for the 
turn to capitalist development. On the ‘Southern Tour’, Deng expressed the hope that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 These included veterans, such as Chen Yun, Bo Yibo, Peng Zhen and Li Xiannian, and a younger 
generation of leaders, Zhao Ziyang, Hu Yaobang and Wan Li (Goodman 2002, 91). 
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Guangdong province would soon catch up with the ‘Four Little Dragons’ of East Asia: 
Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong (Baum 1996, 342). Speaking in more 
theoretical terms, in 1988, he had similarly endorsed the model of ‘neo-authoritarian’ 
capitalist development, i.e. with a dictatorial state overseeing a private enterprise 
economy (MacFarquhar 1997b, 505) – a position consistent with his support for the 
repression of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Even at the foundation of reform, 
in November 1978, Deng visited Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, just weeks 
before announcing his new economic order. Lee Kuan Yew, the ‘founding father’ of 
Singapore, would later reflect on the historic significance of Deng’s visit to his country. 
He argued that it represented the moment the leader of the world’s most populous 
‘socialist country’ realised that the communist project had failed:    
Deng Xiaoping started this in 1978. He visited Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and 
Singapore in November 1978. I think that visit shocked him because he expected 
three backward cities. Instead he saw three modern cities and he knew that 
communism – the politics of the iron rice bowl – did not work. So, at the end of 
December, he announced his open door policy. He started free trade zones and 
from there, they extended it and extended it. Now they have joined the WTO 
and the whole country is a free trade zone (cited in Lorenz and Hoyng 2005). 
 
Lee’s comments on the evolution of Deng’s thinking away from communism may well 
hold true, but the nature of political discourse within the PRC makes this difficult to 
judge with certainty. Debates always took place within clearly defined parameters for 
legitimate discussion, and all policy had to be cloaked in the language of Marxist-
Leninism. The fact that Deng never renounced the goal of communism and denied the 
capitalist logic of market reform illustrates this. ‘Market reforms need not be surnamed 
capitalism’, he insisted in 1992, ‘socialism has markets too. Plans and markets are 
stepping stones… to universal prosperity and richness’ (cited in Baum 1996, 342). Yet 
the position that Deng and others took throughout the reform period had an ideological 
cohesiveness. A shared set of assumptions was operating beneath the formal, 
‘discursive’ justifications for policy evolution in both the pre and post-Mao eras. These 
motivations, however, did not necessarily imply either a conscious desire to ‘take the 
capitalist road’ or a real conviction in socialist transformation. To illustrate this, 
consider how the foremost figure amongst Deng’s opponents in 1992 was Chen Yun, a 
fellow veteran of the Long March and, as such, part of China’s Maoist aristocracy. 
Having declined Deng’s invitation to join the tour of the SEZs (Baum 1996, 340), he 
and thirty-five other senior party members urged the party to rein in market reform in 
	   9	  
February, arguing the party should ‘correct promptly the direction of development that 
has deviated from the socialist path’ (Zhao 1993, 754 – 755). Leaving aside the 
Marxist-Leninist language – which all leaders of the CCP drew upon when a question 
was disputed – Chen had no history as a radical leftist within the party. He was a key 
figure that pushed for Deng’s rehabilitation after Mao’s death and supported the market 
reform programme launched in 1978. Moreover, Chen had not only been one of the 
advocates of market reform in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward, he had also 
successfully won the Eighth Congress of the CCP to this perspective in 1956 (Solinger 
1993, 13 – 26). It was only the personal intervention of Mao that actually aborted this 
early attempt at market reform. Chen’s own political history therefore brings to light 
some of the complexity surrounding why the CCP elite turned from command planning 
to capitalist development. It poses the need for a critical enquiry into the goals of the 
Chinese Revolution; to appraise the question of what the Chinese communists really 
stood for, what needs their goals were formed in response to, and how they intended to 
deliver these aims once in power. It is normally argued, in both official histories and in 
much of the scholarly literature, that ‘the opening’ or kaifang was a pragmatic adaption 
to reality after the traumatic experience of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution. The aborted decision of the CCP to embark on market reform in 1956, 
however, problematizes this assumption. For it appears to show that after the trauma of 
‘two lost decades’ of Maoist development, the party, in some respects, simply returned 
to what they were planning to do had it not been for the personal intervention of the 
preeminent leader. 
Once market reform is recognised as the restoration of an earlier strategy, then 
one has to ask whether the Maoist programme in the Great Leap Forward was seeking 
to achieve a different goal to the 1956 reform agenda, or merely proposed different 
methods in pursuit of the same goal. I believe a strong case can be made that a common 
goal has underpinned the actions of CCP leaders throughout both the Maoist (1956-
1976) and reform (post-1978) eras. Policy-making in the PRC has been consistently 
founded on the basic desire to make China a strong and powerful nation and, in this 
way, to recover the prestige and standing of the people after the ‘century of 
humiliation’. The split within the CCP is therefore arguably best understood as 
involving two varieties of nationalism: a messianic, millenarian nationalist ideology, 
and a cautious, pragmatic, and paternalistic one. To explain why the leaders of an 
undefeated communist party pursued a course of capitalist market reform, one therefore 
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needs to understand what made the search for the country’s ‘national salvation’, i.e. the 
quest to restore the polity to a position of wealth and prestige in the international 
system, so absolutely paramount for the Chinese communists. In short, what made 
‘nationalism trump socialism’ as the aim of their state-building efforts? To answer this 
question, I propose extending the scope of the analysis beyond the normal confines of 
sociological explanations for Chinese market reform. Existing theoretical approaches 
overwhelmingly focus their attention on the internal workings and dynamics of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). This inevitably neglects (i) the global contradictions 
out of which Chinese nationalism emerged imbued with a particular militancy, and (ii) 
the long-maturing properties of Chinese society that were conducive to Maoism. As an 
alternative framework, I apply Leon Trotsky’s ‘theory of uneven and combined 
development’ as an approach to the study of social contradictions within and amongst 
societies across la longue durée (Trotsky 1924; 1967a; 1974; 1978; 2005). With this 
framework one can locate the causes of the Chinese Revolution as lying in the same 
wrenching crisis of colonial capitalism that spawned the Russian Revolution, and show 
how Maoism adopted the political and organisational form of Soviet Stalinism yet also 
assimilated it to its native nationalism.  
The thesis develops its argument across the following stages. Chapter one offers 
a critique of existing explanations, arguing these tend to focus narrowly on the 
immediate circumstances surrounding the decision to reform. This, in turn, eschews 
analysis of the Chinese Revolution and its long-term ‘conditioning effect’ on the 
country’s cultural, social, political and economic development after 1949. Chapter two 
outlines Trotsky’s ‘theory of uneven and combined development’. I locate this 
sociological approach within the tradition of longue durée historiography and show how 
– by treating social change as an outcome of concrete, intersecting ‘local’ and ‘global’ 
processes – it pushes the scholar to uncover the specific properties of social 
development that produce change. Chapter three shows how British imperialism 
integrated Qing China into the capitalist world by revolutionising global finance and 
imposing ‘free trade’ through military force. This capitalist penetration of a tributary 
state created a unique amalgam of social relations that inhibited China’s ability to ‘catch 
up’ with the advanced capitalist powers. ‘Combined development’ therefore took the 
form of a semi-colonial enslavement that made China quite different from the ‘late 
modernising’ powers of Eurasia, Russia and Japan. Focusing on how these processes 
and pressures fostered a transformation in social consciousness, chapter four then 
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outlines the emergence of a ‘national imagination’ amongst a new stratum of 
intellectuals. Significantly, this layer was outside of the traditional scholar-gentry ruling 
class and attacked their failure to modernise the country. The ‘new Chinese’ were 
militantly anti-imperialist, but also considered their country badly deficient vis-à-vis the 
West and imagined a future restoration of China’s ‘lost’ power. Imperial China’s 
decline soon pushed them to radical conclusions. The Russian Revolution dramatically 
raised the horizons of these modern Chinese, but also exposed a deep tension between 
internationalist and nationalist responses to the crisis of colonial capitalism. Chapter 
five outlines the role of national patriotism in the authoritarian decay of the communist 
project, arguing that Maoism represented a complementary amalgam of Soviet 
Stalinism with Chinese nationalism. This nationalism, however, resulted in tense 
relations with the Soviet Union after 1949 as China’s elite rejected its tutelage. China’s 
communists all desired ‘national salvation’, but they found themselves divided between 
the messianic and pragmatic traditions of the country’s nationalism. After the 
experiments with a Maoist form of statist development, they made the pragmatic turn to 
state-capitalism in order to build a strong nation-state. 
The thesis contributes to debates in International Relations and International 
Historical Sociology on the role of ‘the international’ in social transformation, and 
builds upon Marxist attempts to incorporate a theory of international processes into 
historical materialism. It advances critical theoretical approaches to Chinese studies 
through engagement with these debates and complements existing attempts to develop 
non-eurocentric accounts of modern Asian development.   
	  
1 
Broadening horizons? Tracing global lineages  
of development in China’s turn to ‘market socialism’ 
What do people want from the Communist Party?  
First to be liberated, and second to be made rich 
Deng Xiaoping 
 
If today we still do not set about the task of improving the 
socialist system, people will ask why it cannot solve problems 
that its capitalist counterpart can 
Deng Xiaoping   
 
1.1 Deng Xiaoping in historical perspective  
The quotes from Deng Xiaoping above have become immortalised utterances in modern 
day China. For scholars, they encapsulate the political ethos of the reform era, and for 
China’s citizenry they have been absorbed into the popular imagination as the modern 
day justification for one-party rule. The significance attached to these comments is 
justified; by deconstructing and contextualising them, they tell us something about the 
line of reasoning that pushed China’s leaders towards the development of a capitalist, 
free market economy. First, we have the central legitimising narrative of the Chinese 
Revolution: that it was a struggle to liberate China from the repeated, humiliating 
incursions on its independence made by colonial powers, and that this would, in turn, 
create the institutional conditions, in the form of a strong state, capable of delivering 
economic prosperity. Second, one can see the developmental pressure that came to be 
felt by the leaders of the ‘state socialist’ economies in the 1970s and 1980s.2 Deng was 
acutely aware that the ‘socialist countries’ had not been able to deliver the levels of 
development that were being achieved in the capitalist world. Yet, the Chinese people 
expected the PRC to ‘solve the problems that its capitalist counterparts can’. In both 
comments there is an anterior assumption taken for granted; that these tasks fell to the 
Chinese nation – i.e. it is absolutely assumed that the national community is the 
principal agency of social development. This brief excursus into how the CCP 
leadership legitimised the reform programme is useful to undertake before we analyse 
the sociological explanations of kaifang. It helps us to establish more precisely exactly 
what we need to explain. Arguably, to understand Deng’s vision and motives we need 
to trace their sociological origins in China’s past:   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 The second quote is from August 1980. See appendix for sources of beginning-of-chapter quotes. 
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• How did China’s relationship with the global capitalist system condition the motives 
and forces of significance in its revolutions of 1911 and 1949? And what 
significance did this have for the legitimising narratives of the PRC?  
• What form did the emergence of Chinese ‘nation-ness’ take and why has the search 
for national dignity been so central for China’s aspiring modernisers?  
• What fuelled the turn to ‘state socialism’, how did it relate to the rising tide of 
nationalism and anti-colonial struggle, and why did it prove to be an unviable 
instrument for the national modernisation that post-colonial states desired?   
Each of these questions poses an extension of analysis outwards – to develop an 
understanding of the complex ways that capitalist modernity has shaped the world –, 
and backwards, towards uncovering the long-maturing lineages of development that 
have fashioned modern-day China. Posing the question in these terms almost ipso facto 
opens up a difference of approach to the existing literature, which tends to focus 
narrowly on the post-1949 PRC state and its domestic properties. To say so, is not to 
disparage the contribution that Sinologists have made to our understanding of the 
reform era, which, as we will see, has been rich in empirical detail and wide-ranging in 
its intellectual scope, but rather to emphasise the explanatory potential of looking at 
China’s reforms in ‘the longer view’. This temporal extension of the analysis also 
extends the scope of the spatial analysis too. Prior to 1979 the PRC had a highly 
autarchic economy and its political and cultural life was kept equally well hidden by the 
borders of the authoritarian party state. There is therefore a degree of logic in limiting 
analysis of the global arena to a purely geopolitical terrain, if one only looks at the post-
1949 era. However, the cultural and sociological process through which Maoism 
crystalized as a distinct current eminently involved a concatenation of local and global 
processes. If its distinctive history and ideological tapestry is significant to the decisions 
of CCP leaders to turn to capitalism, then one can see the way in which existing 
analyses can be built upon and developed by this alternative theoretical approach. 
In this chapter, I critique existing explanations of China’s reform era. I begin 
however by reflecting upon the impact of the Sino-Soviet split on Western scholarly 
analyses of the PRC. It led to a break with the Cold War inspired notion of the ‘Marxist-
Leninist regime’ in favour of more empirically sensitive accounts. I then move through 
each of the existing explanations of market reform: policy-analyst approaches, power-
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based theorisations, and institutional analyses. I argue that these approaches fail to 
locate elite discourses within the social and class conditions of Chinese society and are 
blighted by ‘methodological internalism’. The next section shows how the rise of 
mainstream International Political Economy (IPE) studies of China has been unable to 
address this as it lacks the conceptual tools to explain international processes amongst 
autarchic economies. A further section of the chapter looks at the contribution Chalmers 
Johnson (Johnson 1962) made to conceptualising Maoism as a form of Chinese 
nationalism. I argue that the neglect of the social and cultural qualities of the 
international milieu results in a failure to emphasise the fundamentally nationalist 
underpinning to PRC policy. By reconceptualising the ‘the international’ as ‘a lateral 
field of interactive difference and multiplicity’ (Rosenberg 2006, 328), the theory of 
uneven and combined development answers this affliction. In the final part, I locate the 
critique of existing theories within the overall argument of the thesis.    
 
1. 2 The traditional view of the Marxist-Leninist regime and its negation 
In the 1950s and 1960s accounts of the Chinese state in the Western academic literature 
had achieved a ‘broad consensus’ (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 4). The PRC was 
characterised as a typical ‘Marxist-Leninist regime’ that formed one part of the 
monolithic Soviet Empire in Eurasia (ibid). This view was heavily influenced by the 
backdrop of the Cold War and, thus, lacked the sociological ‘distance’ from ideological 
controversies of the Sinology literature that emerged in its wake. However, despite 
being shaped in its core assumptions by this political context, there was more than an 
element of truth in the conception of the ‘Eastern states’ it offered. A Marxist-Leninist 
regime was defined as a coercive, one-party state with a command economy that was 
founded on the principle of state ownership of the means of production (Barnett 1967; 
Cohen 1968; Lewis 1966; Schurmann 1966). These were all undisputable features of 
these systems. The problem emerged once it came to explaining the social physiognomy 
of the Stalinist countries; of understanding, for example, why states leaders chose the 
course they did and the contradictions and tensions these societies contained. For 
example, this group of scholars held the Marxist-Leninist regime to be ideologically 
driven, with a specific emphasis on the assumptions of Leninist orthodoxy. By 
assuming an unmediated relationship between communist doctrine and the political life 
of these states, this approach was left unable to capture the way in which leaders used 
the discursive repertoires of Marxist-Leninism instrumentally to give legitimacy to 
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actions that had undeclared motivations. This traditional, ‘Marxist-Leninist regime’ 
approach explained the Cold War as lying in the intransigence of Leninist ideology, the 
expansionism of the USSR, and the ‘madness of Stalin’ (Schlesinger 1967, 22 – 23), 
which was similarly one-sided rather than wholly wrong. Its ideological element, 
however, can be seen in how it excused American superpower imperialism from any 
responsibility for the sharpened geopolitical conflicts that emerged after 1945. In 
addition, the failure to critically appraise the power relations of the colonial capitalist 
order in the south and east meant it was unable to explain why communism was gaining 
such a wide hearing in the post-colonial world. Amongst critical scholars, the new 
global context was forcing writers that identified with the left to reappraise the hitherto 
dominant conception of the Soviet Union as a progressive power. Hannah Arendt’s The 
Origins of Totalitarianism (Arendt 1951), James Burnham’s The Managerial 
Revolution; what is happening to the world? (Burnham 1972), and George Orwell’s 
fictional, but highly political, 1984 (Orwell 1983), were all attempts to come to terms 
with the significance of ‘left authoritarianism’ for the progressive project, but were all 
too easily co-opted by ideologues of the Cold War (Brzezinski 1956; Friedrich 1954; 
Wittfogel 1957, 137 – 148, 423 – 427; Wolfe 1956). As writers that sympathised with 
the project of the left broadly defined, Arendt et al differed from the mainstream by not 
assuming an unmediated relationship between Marxist doctrine and Soviet Stalinism. 
Yet, their sociological accounts suffered, nonetheless, from a similar conceptual 
problem. These scholars tended to eschew analysis of the social contradictions, within 
and amongst these societies, which represented sources of instability out of which 
change could occur. Despite Arendt, for example, holding these states to be in a 
perpetual state of upheaval, change and ideological ferment – with Soviet 
industrialisation and the Great Purges seen as the consummate examples of this -, these 
aspects were assumed to be instrumental to the stability of totalitarianism (Arendt 
1951). 
China’s experience thereby confirmed the general problem with these 
approaches that they did not anticipate change, let alone a move to a market economy. 
In the mainstream scholarship, the Chinese Revolution was labelled another example of 
Soviet imperialism. The PRC was cast as a puppet state that would act as a base of 
operations for further expansion of the Soviet Empire into Asia. The outbreak of the 
Korean War in a matter of months after the communist seizure of power in China 
appeared to confirm this overall narrative and expectation (Feis 1957; McNeill and 
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Affairs 1953; Rees 1988). Contradiction was, therefore, seen as running along a single 
line, i.e. between Western democracy and Soviet communism. Ideological conflict is 
therefore seen as the source of geopolitical tensions. The tensions within the Eastern 
bloc, and internally within these still socially stratified societies, were consequently 
excluded from the analysis. This narrative effectively pushed the agency of the Chinese 
people to one side; as the question of why, and under what conditions, they flocked to 
the banner of communism was left badly occluded. In contrast, Arendt’s more critical 
disposition could be seen in her reaction to Mao’s rise to power. Publication of The 
Origins of Totalitarianism directly coincided with the Chinese Revolution, but she was 
actually cautious about ascribing the ‘totalitarian’ label to the regime, seeing in aspects 
of Mao’s writings a reticence to impose a completely monolithic, totalitarian order 
(Baehr 2010, 268 – 271). Contemporary writers have pointed out the poor empirical 
grounds that underpinned this assessment (Baehr 2010, 271) and even resuscitated the 
notion of totalitarianism to cover the fully Maoist era, i.e. the Great Leap Forward to the 
Cultural Revolution (Baehr 2010, 274 – 281). However, the peculiarities of these two, 
distinctively Maoist, moments in China’s history, illustrate the inherent problems with 
Arendt’s concept, which entirely failed to address specificities in social development. 
Arendt even argued that India and China were both ripe for totalitarianism due to their 
vast populations and cultural history (Baehr 2010, 269). ‘…The chances of totalitarian 
rule are frighteningly good’, she wrote, ‘in the lands of traditional Oriental despotism’ 
with ‘inexhaustible material to feed the power accumulating and man-destroying 
machinery of total domination’ (cited in ibid). This illiberal formula was not derived 
from Cold War ideology, but, nonetheless, used an overtly eurocentric reasoning that 
exhibited the same tendency to deny the ability of the Chinese people to found a 
progressive state.  
It was this failure to see peculiarities in development as a feature of a complex 
and diverse world order, which was pregnant with potential conflict and instability, that 
left this intellectual paradigm in scholarship vulnerable to refutation by the tensions in 
the Eastern bloc seen in the late 1950s. There was, first of all, the Hungarian Revolution 
of 1956 that returned ousted communist party leader, Imre Nagy, to power. His threat to 
pull the country out of the Warsaw Pact led to a Soviet invasion and the crushing the 
mass movement. This illustrated the potential tensions between Marxist-Leninist 
regimes that considered themselves nationally sovereign and the colonial-style of rule 
that was practiced by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. These potential national 
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antagonisms had also come to light during the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, but they did not 
feature in the traditional theoretical paradigm in the Western scholarship, which held the 
Eastern bloc to be monolithically pro-Soviet and, thus, geopolitically stable. Regimes, 
like those governed by Tito and Mao, where communists had come to power in 
revolutions and created a one-party system, rather than have it imposed by Soviet tanks, 
were always likely to be more defensive of their sovereign independence – not only in 
military and political terms, but also in their choice of economic policy. This was 
confirmed in the second major crisis of the late 1950s, the Sino-Soviet split, which grew 
so serious that the Soviet Union withdrew economic aid in 1960 (see Whiting 1987). 
Given the two regimes were run by dictatorial elites whose power depended on their 
own nation-state – or, in the case of the Soviet Union, a Russian-dominated supra-
national state –, then their ‘internationalism’ was necessarily limited to the episodic 
geopolitical arrangements of ‘realism’ in international relations. To account for these 
tensions a concrete analysis of these nationally specific regimes was needed. In contrast, 
the traditional paradigm the ‘Marxist-Leninist’ features were assumed to render 
unimportant subtle divergences from the ‘norm’. This meant the model was 
simultaneously static in time, as it did not anticipate change, and static in space, for it 
did not recognise difference. This obscured the social and historical unevenness of the 
Eastern bloc and also brings into question the overall account of global development on 
which it was methodologically predicated. For just as there was no explanation for why 
communist ideology appeared to hold a considerable allure in the south and east, neither 
was any account ventured for the flowering of the nationalities that gave impetus to 
political nationalism. If the latter was important in the Sino-Soviet split, and played a 
role in CCP policy making per se, then one needs a general account of its relationship 
to Stalinism. In other words, we need to ask whether ‘state socialism’ was simply 
‘nationalism in disguise’ with the supranational forms that it took essentially colonial. 
This is familiar territory for the discipline of International Relations (IR). As is 
well known, its dominant paradigm, realism, argues that self-interested nations are the 
building blocs of the world order. Consequently, the Sino-Soviet split led scholars to 
retrench into mainstream realist theory. However, the new turn required a great deal of 
intellectual acrobatics from those who had once held the unity of the communist bloc to 
be basically immutable. Now the same scholars, pointing empirically to tensions that 
emerged between the Soviet Union and PRC during the Korean War in the early 1950s, 
suddenly held the breakdown of Sino-Soviet relations to have been inevitable and 
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predictable (Floyd 1964; Gittings 1968; Griffith 1964; Strong 1965). As Benjamin 
Schwartz pointed out at the time this transformation in intellectual positions involved a 
‘fraudulent’ use of ‘hindsight’:   
To maintain that it should have been obvious that [the] ideological authority of 
Moscow was not real and would not endure is to engage in what might be called 
fraudulent hindsight. To be sure, some of those who insisted most fanatically on 
the monolithic solidity of the bloc were prepared to say that ‘some day’ this 
solidity might collapse, but they were equally insistent that this some day was so 
far off that it should not be allowed to intrude as a real consideration (Schwartz 
1968, 33).  
 
In this way, the Sino-Soviet split led to mainstream IR retreating to a position that was 
much more accustomed to orthodox realist theorising (Brar 1986). In both its classical 
(Morgenthau and Thompson 1985) and neo- realist (Waltz 1954; Waltz 1979; Waltz 
1986) incarnations, realism sees international politics as an arena in which force, and 
the threat of force, provides the organising logic for the competing states. Neither sees 
ideological influences and class structures as relevant to international relations. Waltz 
specifically saw incorporating these dimensions as ‘reductionism’ and attempted to 
theorise the specifically geopolitical impulses on state decision making (Waltz 1979). 
The Sino-Soviet split involved considerable ‘doctrinal’ argument over Marxist-Leninist 
orthodoxy and realist analysis had the merit of recognising that this was purely 
instrumental to a power struggle amongst nations (Gittings 1968; Griffith 1964; Floyd 
1964; H. Schwartz 1964). Some scholars took the rejection of ‘reductionism’ to a 
particular extreme, arguing that the PRC and Soviet Union both constituted power-
seeking empires occupying a geopolitical space that made them historically continuous 
with their dynastic, imperial antecedents (H. Schwartz 1964, 236; Strong 1965, 42). 
There were several problems with this approach that inhibited the ability of realists to 
understand the Cold War and its ‘sudden’ end in 1989. Firstly, by excluding socio-
economic structure from any causally significant role in international relations, this 
omitted from analysis the basic economic antagonism between ‘East’ and ‘West’: the 
simple fact that global capital was excluded from the bureaucratically planned and 
autarchic economies of the Soviet states (Saull 2001; Saull 2007). Secondly, it was 
inferred from the military balance of forces within Europe that the Soviet Union would 
not voluntarily withdraw from a position of bi-polarity, making Gorbachev’s 
abandonment of the ‘Brezhnev doctrine’ simply inexplicable within the assumptions of 
the theory (Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994). Thirdly, and most significantly for this 
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thesis, the reification of the historically specific, modern properties of international 
relations – anarchy and sovereign nationhood – into timeless properties of development 
(Rosenberg 1994) naturalised into a supposed ‘essence’ the very phenomenon that 
needed to be sociologically explained. To put it more concretely, if the Sino-Soviet split 
was inevitable due to timeless national antagonisms, then no historical explanation of 
Chinese nationalism, or the various forms that it took in different phases of PRC policy, 
was necessary.  
Taken together these points underscore how impoverishing for sociological 
analysis it is, to erect an insurmountable barrier between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ 
aspects of social transformation. The way in which China’s ‘local’ development choices 
during the Great Leap Forward immediately undermined both theoretical accounts of 
Eastern bloc international relations and the prevalent understanding of the domestic 
regime illustrates this. It had been assumed that the combination of a fanatical ideology, 
a strict social hierarchy, police terror, extreme centralisation, and the near-universal 
replication of these features amongst all the Eastern states, engendered stability; not 
only in the relationship between rulers and ruled, but also in the bloc’s international 
solidity. However, the chaos seen in China from 1956 to 1976 showed that the 
relationship between ‘leaders, beliefs and institutions in a Marxist-Leninist regime’ 
could become ‘crisis-ridden’ (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 6). The Sino-Soviet split 
confirmed the organic connectivity between global patterns of change – e.g. socio-
economic competition, the cross-fertilisation of productive techniques and ideologies, 
and the realm of geopolitical statecraft – and the responses to these conditions within 
individual communities. The latter then feedback into the wider-system to reconstitute 
the overall structure of ‘combined development’ and thereby establish new conditions 
for other actors. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, i.e. the ‘Maoist 
phase’ of China’s development, exemplify this ‘differential connectivity’ of 
intersocietal relations, for they illustrate how the PRC had been shaped by the Russian 
Revolution, but was using a Stalinist state structure for a novel development strategy. 
This suggests an approach that sees how actors utilise the variety of resources – 
intellectual as well as material – provided by the global political economy as an 
immanent part of their own historically specific attempts at social development. 
Sinologists from the 1960s onwards saw the traditional concept of the ‘Marxist-
Leninist’ regime as an obfuscating categorisation. Instead they developed empirically 
sensitive accounts of China’s history and modern-day development (Johnson 1962; Pye 
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1968; Schurmann 1966; Solomon 1971). However, in reaction to the way that ‘the 
international’ had previously served to obscure the historically specific, this came at the 
expense of abandoning the global element in social change. Rather than see 
international processes as constitutive of the peculiar development trajectories 
undertaken by nation-states, it was largely dropped from analyses. Theoretical 
explanations of market reform exemplified this tendency to ‘methodological 
internalism’ and left behind the global element of social change. Let us now consider 
each of them in turn.  
 
1.3 Explaining Chinese economic reform: (i) a process driven by ideology?  
One group of scholars illustrated the general turn to empirical sensitivity by focusing on 
the policy process and the contested ideological assumptions in which its debates were 
ground. Given this focus, before proceeding any further, it is useful to delineate the 
different phases of PRC economic policy: (i) the period of economic recovery after the 
seizure of power that involved a new united front with the patriotic bourgeoisie, and 
thus upheld some private property rights, from 1949 to 1953; (ii) Soviet emulation and 
the creation of a command planning infrastructure during the First Five Year Plan, from 
1953 to 1957; (iii) the ‘overtly Maoist phase’,3 involving the catastrophe of the Great 
Leap Forward of 1958 to 1961, the period of reconstruction in its aftermath, and the 
political crisis of the Cultural Revolution that finally concluded in 1976; (iv) the turn to 
market economic reform in December 1978; and, finally, (v) the decision to completely 
dismantle the planning infrastructure following Deng’s ‘Southern Tour’ in October 
1992. ‘Policy-analyst’ scholars have correctly understood these stages to be rationalize-
able and involving logically coherent choices that were rooted in shared, as well as 
contested, intellectual assumptions (Barnett 1967; Harding 1981; Lewis 1966; Solinger 
1984). Amongst these scholars was Dorothy Solinger, who brought to light the abortive 
market reforms proposals drafted by Chen Yun and approved by the party in 1956 
(Solinger 1993, 13 – 26) that I discussed in the introduction (see pp. 8 – 9). The Great 
Leap Forward led to the abandonment of these measures and would prove to be an 
economic and social catastrophe for the Chinese people. Put in terms of the evolution of 
these positions over time, then one can see why this group of scholars understood the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3 The turn to rural collectivization from 1956 to 1958, culminating in the creation of vast ‘communes’, 
overlaps the transition from soviet industrialization to the Great Leap Forward. It was Mao’s personal 
project and his alternative to the use of market incentives in agriculture that had been agreed by the CCP 
in 1956.   
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process in ideological terms; explaining the dispute in terms of a ‘two-line struggle’ 
over CCP policy, one favouring market reform, the other advocating a Maoist policy. 
To appraise whether these scholars were right to do so, requires a brief summary of the 
so-called Great Leap Forward, and its ideological assumptions, which I will return to in 
more detail in chapter five.  
The Great Leap saw the central planning apparatus effectively dismantled and 
power decentralised to local bureaucracies, most important of which – given the 
overwhelmingly rural nature of the economy – were the new elite of the agricultural 
‘communes’. This layer was instructed to use traditional methods, which did not depend 
upon capital investment, to meet absurdly unrealistic targets for industrial output and 
undertake large-scale irrigation projects. Chaos ensued as projects were pursued with 
little input from engineers, as the planning ministries were made impotent. Such a sharp 
reduction in the labour-inputs available to agriculture had a catastrophic result, as one of 
the most serious manmade famines in human history plagued rural China. The policies 
were under-pinned by the view that the mass mobilisation of unskilled labour could 
deliver rapid economic progress through fanatical appeals to sacrifice that would raise 
the absolute rate of exploitation. It might appear difficult to reconcile the bleak outcome 
with seeing the policy process as explicable in rational terms. However, to say that one 
can understand it, i.e. explain it, within certain conditions and traditions of thought, 
does not imply giving any normative value to the policy. Its messianic elements were 
rooted in the political outlook and vocabularies of the New Culture Movement radicals 
(see chapter five). Technocratic expertise was spurned in favour of mobilisation, giving 
the policy a patently cultish sensibility. However, it might have been possible to apply 
some of the principles of the Great Leap in a way that did not result in economic 
catastrophe. Had it not been for the absurd target setting and the attack on planning, it is 
plausible to argue that the use of labour-intensive methods may have generated a 
sufficient rural surplus to fund industrial investment. Indeed, both sides of the policy 
debate in the PRC recognised that the simple importation of Soviet command planning 
in the Chinese context was highly problematic because its rural hardship was so severe 
there was little surplus for the state to appropriate. It was in this context that Chen 
argued for providing material, market incentives for the peasants to increase rural 
productivity, but Mao rejected this in favour of ‘ideological’ incentives, i.e. exhorting 
the people to sacrifice for the ‘common good’ of the nation. By identifying this schism, 
the ‘policy-analyst’ approach advanced the scholarly understanding of Chinese reform 
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by bringing to light these empirical nuances and shifts in implementation. It drew out 
the real issues in a debate that on occasion defied all rational discourse.    
The approach is less convincing, however, as a sociological explanation of 
market reform. ‘Policy-analyst’ scholars accounted for change in economic policy by 
simply treating them as ideological choices, expressing different visions of the future 
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 12). Solinger argued ‘the controversy’ was rooted in 
‘conflicting ideals within the philosophy of Marxism’ that resulted in different positions 
on the use of state and markets to deliver social change (Solinger 1984, 6). She 
identified three axes of policy preference in the CCP, those who sought to preserve 
equity, those who wanted stability, and those who were productivity-orientated 
(Solinger 1984, 6).4 Despite the considerable empirical insights of this literature, this 
had a number of serious weaknesses as a theoretical account. Firstly, this approach 
largely took at face value the arguments made by the different trends in the CCP. For 
instance, it was accepted that valuing an equitable division of resources was an 
operative part of policy formulation for a section of the CCP leadership. This ignored 
how the centralisation of political and economic power by the party-state created an 
inequitable division of resources based on bureaucratic privilege. All CCP leaders 
accepted the monopoly on power claimed by the party without which this type of 
economic structure could not exist. It therefore seems implausible to argue that equity 
was primary in their political reasoning. Secondly, and related to the need to analyse the 
economic structure, the approach offered no account of the relationship between the 
ideological trends cited and the material history and conditions of Chinese society. This 
would involve illustrating how these ideas related to the bureaucracy of command 
planning, i.e. whether there was a social constituency within society favourable to one 
or other perspective. Thirdly, there was no historical account of Marxism – which was 
treated as a abstract and generic philosophy and set of values that politicians might 
choose to draw on, rather than a diverse body of thought, often defined by its national 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4 The rise of institutional theory, which I will come onto below, did push ‘ideology’ based analysts to 
revise aspects of their approach in recognition of this need to sociologically contextualise the doctrinal 
disputes. Exemplifying this shift, Solinger revised her argument in the 1990s, linking the ‘three-lines’ to 
divergent ‘ideological bases, social interests, power resources, incentives, and motivations of the 
concerned parties’ (Solinger 1993, 226). This led her to identify the three categories afresh: as ‘marketer-
prone economic actors’ and politicians that were benefiting materially from reform; ‘the bureaucratic line 
or tendency’ that values stability and have vested, rentier interests within the state; and the ‘leftist’ 
orthodox Maoist critiques of market reform per se (ibid). This emphasis on the sociological conditions for 
political decision-making represented a substantial improvement on a purely ideological approach.  
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traditions (Russian Marxism, Austro-Marxism, etc.). As such, the core ideas of 
distinctively Chinese communism, and its origins within the global post-1917 radical 
left, were not appraised. Fourthly, the competitive pressures on CCP leaders were also 
excluded, perhaps because they were taken for granted. Leaders of the PRC were 
conscious of the nation’s underdevelopment and desired to ‘catch up’ with the more 
advanced economic powers, such as the Soviet Union and the richest capitalist nations. 
For example, speaking at the Supreme State Conference in January 1958, Mao argued, 
‘I see this nation of ours has a great future… we shall catch up with Britain in about 
fifteen years… now our enthusiasm had been aroused. Ours is an ardent nation now 
swept by a burning tide’ (cited in Scott 2007, 38). These remarks reveal shared 
assumptions across both ‘lines’ that were not recognised by ‘policy analyst’ scholars: 
namely, that (i) a geopolitical pressure for industrial progress existed in spite of the 
autarchic nature of the economy, and (ii) elite political discourse within the PRC had an 
overt nationalist underpinning. For, while the means were disputed, a clear consensus 
existed over the goal: to make China a strong and powerful nation within a competitive 
international system of nation-states. Taken together these criticisms point to the need 
for a materialist account of Chinese economic reform that locates the origins of the 
country’s political nationalism in the differential properties of capitalist 
internationalisation, incorporating economic structure, geopolitical compulsions, and 
the diffusion of cultural and political traditions, into a single analytical framework.   
 
1.4 Explaining Chinese economic reform: (ii) was Mao-in-Command?  
Policy-analyst scholars were right to uncover the cohesiveness and explicability of the 
shifts in economic strategy, but failed to locate them within the structural conditions 
confronted by the political process. As a result of this neglect, they were left open to the 
criticism that they saw Chinese leaders’ differing views as the source of the ideological 
conflict. This might have been plausible were it not for the pronounced tendency of 
most CCP leaders to zigzag between sides. Scholars that emphasised this policy 
inconsistency of Chinese leaders advanced an alternative theoretical framework for 
market reform that saw the struggle for power as primary.  Grounding this approach 
empirically, they succeeded in undermining the view that there were two clearly 
opposed, consistent trends with alternative visions for the Chinese nation. As such, it 
took aim at the official explanation of the Cultural Revolution, which sees it as a two-
line struggle between ‘rightists’, around Liu Shaoqi, and ‘leftists’ headed by Mao and 
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the Cultural Revolution Group, and policy-analyst approaches that mirrored these 
formulations and looked for consistency in policy. Instead the tribal-like factions 
formed around personal-ties, the use of intra-bureaucratic political-machines and a 
special role for Mao as the dominant leader, were, they argued, the principal features of 
political life in the PRC (P. H. Chang 1978; MacFarquhar 1974; 1983; 1997a; 2011; 
Pye 1968; 1981; Teiwes 1984). The Cultural Revolution was central to this set of 
claims, for it saw Mao engage in an aggressive purge of opponents within the party, and 
it is therefore useful to briefly digress the political background to this split within the 
core leadership.  
After the Great Leap, a section of the CCP leadership recognised that a more 
technically competent approach was needed that restored central oversight and 
reintroduced material incentives for output. Liu and Deng introduced measures that 
weakened the commune system by reducing work team sizes to more manageable units 
and prioritising agrarian output above all else. In some areas the famine was so severe 
the state permitted an impromptu return to family farming (J. K. Fairbank and Goldman 
2006, 411). At a CCP Central Work Conference to discuss rural policy in March 1961, 
Deng came armed with statistical surveys that showed the dash to collectivisation had 
been undertaken too quickly and without sufficient preparation (Goodman 2002, 66). 
Mao actually accepted these findings. However, his prestige was seriously damaged by 
the failure of the Great Leap Forward, and the sense that opponents within the 
leadership were pursuing an alternative agenda fuelled his slide into the paranoid purges 
of the Cultural Revolution. A Central Work Conference in February 1962 failed to 
agree proposals of prior commissions that had been organised by Deng and Liu 
(Goodman 2002, 68). This is not surprising given that they were entirely antithetical to 
the Great Leap strategy: 
Economics not politics was emphasized as the motor of development. Modern 
technology, if necessary from abroad, was to be a new driving force; and 
gradual, capital-led investment was to replace mass mobilization. Communes 
were to be made smaller, with the basic accounting unit reverting to the 
production team—the equivalent of the small co-operatives established (for the 
most part) in the second half of 1955. Education was to reemphasize quality, and 
expertise was to be valued once again (Goodman 2002, 66 – 67). 
 
Not only does this suggest that the political differences were genuine, it also illustrates 
how policy evolution took the form of ‘crisis management’, responding to the economic 
consequences of the Great Leap in conditions of extreme underdevelopment and 
	   25	  
bureaucratic autarky. However, this is not to understate the extent of the inconsistencies 
and shifts in position amongst the elite. Mao was especially prone to shift eclectically, 
as illustrated by his acceptance of the partial retrenchment of the commune system. The 
‘two-line struggle’ formula does imply that both sides were engaged in principled 
disputes with ‘elite politics understood as a struggle between two clearly opposed 
conceptions of society and related policy programmes’ (Teiwes 1984: 5). This is 
difficult to square with the seemingly incoherent nature of much elite discourse. During 
the Great Leap Forward, for example, after the new, poorly educated local bureaucratic 
elite had led the initial ‘mass movement’ in the countryside, a debate erupted within the 
party over whether communism could be achieved in a matter of years, with Chen 
Boda, who would become a member of the Cultural Revolution Group, even arguing for 
the immediate abolition of money (Teiwes and Sun 1999, 127 – 129). Mao took a 
middle position of ‘fifteen years’ but, at this stage in the Great Leap when it was 
beginning to run out of control, he erred to ‘the right’ and declined to make this official 
policy (ibid). Despite the time expended on these kinds of ‘theoretical’ controversies, 
they were plainly not aligned to the substantive political aims and goals of these leaders, 
but were about legitimising power and control.  
The empirical analyses that ‘power-analyst’ scholars have made lead us to 
question the real and practical commitment that Chinese leaders had to one or other of 
the ‘two lines’. The evidence for this position was always strong, and it has grown more 
so since Roderick MacFarquhar completed his exhaustive trilogy on the origins of the 
Cultural Revolution (MacFarquhar 1974; 1983; 1997a). He showed that very few 
leaders remained committed to either one of the so-called ‘two lines’, suggesting that 
their positions were conditional on non-ideological factional interests, and often used 
instrumentally to gain short-term leverage over rivals: 
…The Cultural Revolution is…[normally considered] a long-term struggle 
between two lines… But a careful examination of the evidence suggests that 
neither Mao nor Liu was consistent; that Mao and Liu were not always 
opponents… The Cultural Revolution was rooted in both principled and 
personal disputes (MacFarquhar 1974, 2 – 3). 
 
As a result of this fluidity between personalities, factions, and favoured policies, the 
policy outcomes involved episodic unity between forces with divergent interests and 
motivations. Lucien Pye argued that these ‘factions rarely if ever represent clearly 
defined institutional, geographical or generational interest’ (Pye 1981, 7). Instead they 
involve relationships built on trust, loyalties, common foes and career interests, and 
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observed ‘no fixed rules in the relationship between policy and factional politics’ (Pye 
1981, 12). It seems likely that political organisations with no democratic mechanisms 
will always result in these machinations. Aspiring individuals are likely to refrain from 
openly stating positions that contravene the central line, because it risks sabotaging their 
access to the levers of power. Similarly, a one-party system that has no democratic 
mechanisms will also tend towards the dictatorship of the single leader. In these states, a 
functional relationship between the bureaucracy and the despot emerges on patron-
client lies; each bureaucrat is dependent on the goodwill of those above them and the 
dictator is similarly dependent on the continued support of the bureaucracy. Mao had 
such a dictatorial authority in the state, and even before taking power he dominated the 
CCP after 1935. Frederick Teiwes argued correctly that Mao was ‘the unchallenged 
pivot of elite politics – a dominant leader’ (Teiwes 1984, 5). Criticism of Mao in the 
CCP was impermissible, so he was indeed the ‘factor to which all others had to adjust’ 
and the only ‘figure [who] could attempt a Cultural Revolution’ (Teiwes 1984, 42). 
Consequently, Mao’s death becomes a factor in itself in the turn to the reform era, as it 
created the space for a new leadership, or, rather, a new ‘pivotal elite leader’ in the form 
of Deng, able to pursue a new political direction. In this way, these scholars identified 
real elements of the political process within the PRC. However, this ‘power-analysis’ 
also shows that ideology and culture imbued the life of the state, whose core 
organisational and political features were shaped by the assumptions of Russian ‘state 
socialism’. This suggests the diffusion of Bolshevism into the polity, and its relationship 
to native discourses, had an enduring cultural influence on state power. However, the 
‘power analyst’ scholarship neglected to appraise these origins, because they claimed 
ideology had no causally significant role.  
In the existing literature, the power and policy narratives are treated as polar 
opposites in a manner that seems entirely unnecessary. It is perfectly possible to 
recognise the sociologically significant consequences of a regime with a single, 
unchallengeable leader, and the existence of a genuine schism over the political 
direction of the PRC. This theoretical polarity also obscures how the two positions 
suffer from similar weaknesses; both focus wholly on the actions and statements of 
leaders at the expense of social conditions formed through a historical process; neither 
locates the distinctive strategies of Mao and Deng within the overall context of 
differential but interactive social development. In other words, they exclude ‘the 
international’ from their accounts, even though the split within the Eastern bloc and the 
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drive to ‘catch up’ industrially with advanced capitalist powers expressed a geopolitical 
logic of competition that the CCP responded to through the prism of political 
nationalism. This latter point – the organic nationalism that underpinned CCP policy – 
is also surprisingly absent from these perspectives. It perhaps reflects the extent to 
which ‘nation-ness’ is often taken for granted in sociology such that it becomes omitted 
as a causally significant factor. Similarly excluded from these analyses is the longer 
historical process that shaped the state-building efforts of PRC leaders. This is 
particularly apparent within the ‘power approach’- for it fails to ask how the Chinese 
communists came to found a state with a single, un-challengeable leader. If they 
adapted this model from the political and organisational principles pioneered in Stalin’s 
Soviet Union, then one needs to ask what modifications did the structure undergo when 
transplanted to Chinese conditions and used for nationalist ends. I argue in chapter six a 
feature of this differential appropriation is seen in how Mao occupied a different 
position in relation to the central apparatus than Stalin. Whereas Stalin was dependent 
on the apparatus to impose despotism on a revolutionary democratic movement, Mao 
had an existing cult of personality during the struggle for power. This put him in an 
external relationship to the central bureaucracy, which he grew suspicious of after the 
Hundred Flowers campaign, and thus launched the Great Leap and the Cultural 
Revolution. Market reform therefore correlates closely with the re-establishment of 
central state authority after his death.  
A twin-error committed by both the power and policy approaches lies in their 
failure to offer a theorisation of how this bureaucratic structure conditioned the political 
process. As we shall now see, this absence of contextualisation was recognised with the 
rise of ‘institutional analysis’, and a rich array of sociological analysis of the state 
resulted. However, the literature was impaired by its tendency to focus on the formal, 
legal institutional relations at the expense of class analysis. Meanwhile, the international 
terrain, where it warranted mention at all, was simply understood as a potential political 
and economic resource, which could be exploited by reform-minded politicians; and 
not, that is, as a significant dimension of the social world in its own right, even though 
the institutional terrain was framed by cultural discourses inherently bound up with the 
modern world.   
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1.5 Explaining Chinese economic reform: (iii) the lost promise of the institutional turn  
The post-79 reform programme had provided western China scholars with greater 
access to Chinese state structures. Even so, as late as the mid-1990s research was still 
largely confined to those state bureaucracies concerned with Chinese industry and 
economic management (Lieberthal 1992, 1 – 4). Applying institutional analysis, 
Sinologists developed the concept of ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ to describe the 
complexity of a system that aggressively centralises power in a political monopoly, but 
simultaneously requires such diverse managerial units that this power then diffuses 
across a multi-layered system (Lieberthal 1992; Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; 
Lampton 1992; Shirk 1992; Shirk 1993). Power and policy approaches were ‘top 
down’, insofar as the actions of leading political figures were treated as the fundamental 
element of the equation when explaining the reform era.  In contrast, the institutional 
approach introduced a new level of analysis – the rules, resources, and interest groups 
of the Chinese state bureaucracies. These strata represented concentrations of social 
power capable of conditioning the options available to political leaders and thereby 
shaping the policy process. According to institutional theory, state structures needed to 
be studied at three dimensions of analysis; value integration, the structural distribution 
of rules and authority, and the processes of decision-making and policy implementation 
(Lieberthal 1992, 6). By investigating concretely the rules and authority within the state 
they highlighted the influence of diverse managerial bureaucracies (Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg 1988; Lieberthal 1992; Shirk 1992; Shirk 1993). Procedurally, these interest 
groups won more power over decision-making and implementation in the reform era as 
a reaction to the purges and mobilisations of the Cultural Revolution (Lieberthal 1992, 6 
– 9). This saw the restoration of power to the central bureaucracy away from the local, 
rural elites that bore much of the responsibility for the Great Leap Forward. This change 
in state power relations illustrates how, in a bureaucratic system of centralised political 
and economic power, it becomes particularly important to manage the diverse, 
potentially antagonistic, social groups within the state: 
The fragmented authoritarianism model… did not present the centre as helpless, 
the bureaucracies as unable to cooperate or the locales as all-powerful… It did 
seek to identify the causes of fragmentation… among various bureaucratic units, 
the types of resources and strategies that provide leverage in the bargaining that 
evidently characterises much decision making, and the incentives of individuals 
in various units, in order to get a better grasp on the ways that bureaucratic 
structure… affect… policy formulation, decision making and policy 
implementation (Lieberthal 1992, 10).  
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This suggested a move towards a reciprocal analysis of the relationship between the 
bureaucratic structure and elite political discourse. How, that is, the PRC created a 
ruling class that had access to cultural capital, e.g., education, official title, and 
managerial privileges, and a position of power over subordinates to whom they were not 
accountable. This privileged position was conditional on membership or affiliation with 
the ruling party, creating a patron-client relationship favourable to corruption, nepotism 
and factional intrigue. Given the party-state was built on top-down lines this made their 
status conditional on the support of those above them, fostering loyalty to the state. In a 
communist one-party state, a strict system of stratification with different identities 
exists, starting with urban-rural registered workers, who are unskilled, moving through 
technical proficient strata defined by an employment line, and at the top of which lie the 
‘cadre identity’ of party officials:  
Cadres were those on the official nomenclature list and payroll system, and 
enjoyed certain privileges in salary, housing, welfare and services that the 
masses did not. As allocation of resources by ownership was replaced by central 
planning, obtaining the status and the identity of cadres was honourable and 
admirable, and permitted career advancement and moving upward in the 
hierarchically organised centralized political structure of the party-state 
apparatus. Cadres were classified in a hierarchical order into ranks which were 
associated with their positions, responsibilities, salaries, and privileges. A 
cadre’s rank was associated with salary levels, welfare and privileges, and such 
cadre identity was permanent, even after retirement. Cadres were the elite of the 
party-state (Guo 2012, 4123). 
 
Class analysis is therefore arguably central to understanding how social power was 
organised within the PRC, or the other Eastern bloc states where economic and political 
control was similarly fused. However, institutional scholars tended to eschew social 
analysis of elite power. Instead they primarily focused on the legal ties that determined 
the constitutional relationship between the CCP and the managerial bureaucracy. A 
failure to account for the informal, and culturally mediated, mechanisms of social power 
remained a central weakness of the institutional literature. Indeed, Lieberthal appeared 
to concede this in the introduction to a compendium of essays that applied the approach 
published in 1992:  
 
There is also little consideration of the relations of state and society. The various 
chapters include careful analysis of the relations among top leaders, key staff 
organs, and various bureaucratic units... [and] address the issue of relations 
between local government units and various enterprises. The focus here is 
explicitly on the political system and its internal dynamics, however, not on the 
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relations between this system and the larger Chinese population (Lieberthal 
1992, 29).   
 
Susan Shirk typified this general theoretical weakness (Shirk 1992; 1993). She argued 
the CCP existed in a ‘principal-agent’ relationship to the state, i.e. in contract law terms 
adapted by institutional theorists, the state was delegated power to act on behalf of the 
ruling party (ibid). At the constitutional, legal level, this was, of course, quite correct. 
The CCP is enshrined with supreme authority over the state and nation and, thus, any 
power the state holds is, by definition, ‘delegated’ by the party. However, observing this 
distinction is arguably of limited use, for party membership conditioned access to the 
bureaucracy at every level and, therefore, intra-bureaucratic antagonisms were ipso 
facto intra-party antagonisms. For example, Mao’s dramatic turn against the central 
bureaucracy after 1957 led to a struggle within both the party and the state, which 
brought him into conflict with the pragmatic and technically minded section of the 
ruling communist party leadership.  
In contrast, for Shirk the distinction between the leadership of the CCP and the 
managerial elite was the cornerstone of her explanation of Chinese reform (Shirk 1993). 
State bureaucratic units were seen as a conservative obstacle to reform owing to their 
rentier interests. Once this was coupled with the principle of consensus decision-making 
in economic policy, i.e. of reaching agreement across bureaucratic units, she argued that 
the institutional structure had a paralysing affect on state capacity to reform (Shirk 
1993). For Shirk the ability to overcome this intransigence lay wholly with the CCP 
leadership: if united around reform the leadership could drive through its proposals 
regardless, but divided it succumbed to paralysis (Shirk 1993, 60 – 64). Shirk outlined 
this correlation of forces in rich empirical detail, illustrating how reformist leaders had 
to ‘shake up’, so to speak, bureaucratic units during the arguments over the ‘tax-for-
profit’ changes in the early 1980s (Shirk 1993, 221 – 224). Essentially this argument 
concerned the impact of market forces on state owned enterprises. The less competitive 
amongst them reacted against measures that would end the redistribution of capital from 
the more productive units, thereby giving rise to intra-bureaucratic tension (ibid). Shirk 
tended to imply that market reform should not have been successful in light of these 
constraints. ‘Introducing a market through a bureaucracy, especially one operating 
under… consensus’, she argued, ‘is extremely difficult’, and with this ‘conservative 
bias’ the ‘political challenge of economic reform becomes formidable’ (Shirk 1993, 
126). Reform-minded politicians and their chosen policies pursued in conflict with the 
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bureaucracy were therefore seen as central to the success of reform. Shirk even coined 
the term, ‘political entrepreneurs’, to capture their special role in the process (ibid). 
Kenneth Lieberthal concurred too, writing that ‘the importance of policy content versus 
bureaucratic institutionalisation… is evident time and again’ and ‘no institutional 
relations in themselves seriously constrain the options available to top leaders’ 
(Lieberthal 1992, 16). Reflecting on the role of Deng’s celebrity in the ‘Southern Tour’ 
could easily lead one to draw this conclusion. Deng’s ‘political entrepreneurship’ – 
including overt appeals to public opinion to put pressure on the party – ensured a swift 
and dramatic turn to market reform after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (see Baum 
1996, 341 – 356 ). This elides, however, the real correlation of forces. Deng’s was not 
‘one man against the rest’, but was supported by and depended on key allies within the 
state.  
A nexus of intersecting elements met at the conjuncture of Winter-Spring 1992 
that were conducive to radical change: (i) for CCP members the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union was shocking, traumatic and threatening, creating external pressure for 
reform; (ii) the fragile post-Tiananmen environment in China posed the need for the 
ruling party to re-establish its political authority through a developmental agenda; and 
(iii) a complex alignment of pro-reform forces emerged within the structure of the state. 
Each of these factors poses problems with the ‘political entrepreneurs’ approach, for 
they locate reform within an historical intersection of sociological processes. 
Significantly, market reform had already created considerable forces within the 
bureaucracy that saw it as means to secure national power. Deng arranged for key PLA 
generals to pressure Jiang Zemin to make a dramatic U-turn in favour of the reform 
agenda, which effectively used ‘unauthorised military support to settle a civilian debate 
about the role of the market’ (Wang and Zheng 2008, 104). Given the crucial role of the 
PLA in the Tiananmen massacre, the military had assumed a similar position of power 
to that which they enjoyed after restoring order in the Cultural Revolution. It illustrates 
the central role the implicit threat of force can play within a dictatorial system heavily 
dependent on coercive force. Moreover, Deng also mobilised the pro-reform economic 
interest groups in the ‘Southern Tour’ and, in a sense, the industrial progress that it 
revealed showcased to the nation the emergence of a new ruling elite. It was this new, 
capitalist class, and market-orientated officialdom, that, he implied, would lead China to 
a prosperous future. To party officials the message was a simple one: if they embraced 
these changes and did so with decisiveness they would stabilise their political 
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dictatorship. A social and class analysis with a ‘global’ lens incorporates this 
concatenation of forces that pushed China on the capitalist road. Market reform can thus 
be rearticulated as a process of combined social development. 
The missing element of institutional theory that Lieberthal conceded, ‘the 
relations between this system and the larger Chinese population’ (Lieberthal 1992, 29), 
similarly underlines the overall ‘methodological internalism’ that characterised all the 
market reform approaches. The focus on the formal, legal structure at the expense of 
state-society relations complemented the exclusion of the intersocietal, i.e. the 
geopolitical, cultural and ideological influences of the wider world. As we shall now 
see, a possible answer to this neglect emerged with the rise of International Political 
Economy (IPE) over the last two decades. A vast literature emerged with a specific 
emphasis in China, reflecting the country’s growing importance in the global economy. 
These scholars explicitly challenged the ‘internalism’ of the existing literature but they 
tended to conceive of ‘the international’ purely in terms of economic exchanges within 
global markets. As a result, the wholly domestic explanations of why China set upon the 
path of market reform were tacitly accepted.  
 
1.6 Explaining Chinese economic reform: (iv) the rise of International Political 
Economy (IPE)  
The methodological ‘insularity’ of western scholarship on China is, in part, to be 
expected given that the state pursued a policy of economic self-sufficiency on the lines 
of bureaucratic planning. The few visitors that arrived in China after the revolution 
encountered what must have seemed to them to be an entirely different world to that 
which they had known: a distinctively ‘Sinified’ vision of communism imbued with the 
emotional imagery of the recent peasant war, a fervently nationalist social 
consciousness binding people and state, and an extreme level of economic 
impoverishment. Even Soviet advisors, who naturally identified with the regime to 
some degree, underwent a severe culture shock when they arrived in the 1950s. Tasked 
with improving the economy, they were shocked at the poverty of village life; one 
accounts recalls how, on their first visit to the Manchurian countryside, they were 
dismayed that the peasants had no clothes, ate together out of one common pot, and had 
never seen a bar of soap before (Westad 1998, 127). Soviet support in the 1950s would 
prove crucial to establishing out of these impoverished conditions the core elements of 
an industrial base and a rudimentary improvement in basic living standards. In this 
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sense, the Sino-Soviet relation reshaped Chinese life to a considerable degree and 
illustrated how political relations could feed into processes of economic transformation 
within the domestic sphere. However, as I will now discuss, mainstream IPE tends to 
treat international processes in terms of the relationship between state and markets, and 
this poses obvious limits in its explanatory utility within bureaucratic, autarchic states.       
China’s economic transformation has led to a mushrooming of IPE literature 
that has appraised the global economic context for the changes seen in the reform era, 
including IPE scholars turning to China, and Sinologists looking to IPE (Breslin, 2007; 
Chin 2007; Cumings 1989; Economy 1999; Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990; Howell 
1993; Lanteigne 2005; Moore 2002; Pearson 1991; Pearson 1999; Pearson 2001; Shirk 
1994; Shirk 1996; Shirk 2007; Stubbs 2007; Zweig 2002; Zweig and Chen 2007; Chen 
2007). Three broad stages in this literature can be seen. Firstly, scholars considered how 
integration in global markets affected the decisions of domestic political and economic 
actors (Barnett 1981; Howell 1993; Pearson 1991; Shirk 1994; Shirk 1996). A second 
stage saw researchers give greater conceptual emphasis to how the international 
political economy structured the reform process, opening up and restricting possible 
political-economic outcomes (Cumings 1989; Moore 2002; Zweig 2002). Finally, a 
third stage had seen research concerns move on to the perspectival question of how 
China’s extraordinary pace of economic development could reshape the global economy 
itself (Chŏng 2006; Lanteigne 2005; Shirk 2007; Stubbs 2007). In this body of 
literature, therefore, the historical puzzle question – of why China reformed when it did 
and what pressures from the outside world were involved – remained occluded. The 
reason for this is simply and, in a sense, obvious, for it required an account of the rise 
and fall of ‘state socialism’ in the twentieth century, rather than a conceptualisation of 
the relationship between states and markets.  
To illustrate this intellectual orientation, consider the four questions David 
Zweig and Chen Zhimin list in their introduction China’s Reforms and International 
Political Economy:  
1. Have external forces, particularly global markets, U.S hegemonic pressure, 
the global structure of power, international regimes and organisations, the 
regional political economy, and overseas Chinese, shaped China’s position 
within the global polity and economy and affected the way China deals with the 
world economy?  
2. Have Chinese leaders and foreign policy makers internalised the norms and 
values of the global economic order so that these norms affect state behaviour 
and diplomatic activity? Or, is China merely engaged in “strategic adaptation,” 
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whereby it appears to adopt global norms, while defending sovereignty at all 
costs?  
3. Perhaps economy reform has been driven by elites who recognised the need 
for reform, greater market regulation, and deeper engagement with the global 
economy, as well as domestic market forces and/or local elite interests, rather 
than external forces… But if reform is internally driven, compliance and what 
the World Bank calls “deepening,” should be central to China’s own strategy of 
development, rather than something the external world… has imposed on 
China… China on its own will deepen the reform process as it sees it is in its 
national interest to do so.  
4. Finally, who are the key players in China in this process of globalisation? 
(Zweig and Chen 2007, 3 – 4, emphasis added). 
 
As an overall description of the literature, this encapsulates how IPE scholars have 
tended to look at the ‘why question’ of China’s transformation. In point three, Zweig 
and Chen only reticently imply acceptance of one or other of the domestically 
grounded, political-leader-led explanations, but their remark is revealing because they 
are concerned to avoid the suggestion that reform was imposed on China by external 
forces, such as the international institutions like the IMF or the United States. This 
concern to avoid such an ‘external imposition approach’ has dominated the literature 
and is founded on an incontrovertible empirical fact: it was Chinese leaders, not those in 
Washington or elsewhere, who took the decision to reform. However, they arrived at 
these conclusions by comprehending the development challenge that China faced 
relationally, in reference to the global order. Moreover, if one looks at these changes in 
the longue durée, then it is possible to see the reform era as part of a struggle of Chinese 
actors for power and recognition in the modern world. To make this shift, however, a 
different, more social conception of the international political economy is needed that 
breaks free of the rigid constraints that mainstream approaches impose. Scholars 
looking at China’s global economic relations have utilised the concept of 
‘internationalization’, which refers to changes in the international economy to which 
domestic polities and elites have to adjust, and is defined technically: ‘the processes 
generated by underlying shifts in transaction costs that produce observable flows of 
goods, services and capital’ (Frieden and Rogowski 1996, 4). A simpler, indeed more 
abstract, alternative to this narrowly economic concept is needed if we are to account 
for the contradictory relations that gave rise to the ‘culture shock’ of Soviet advisors in 
the China of the 1950s. In this thesis, I treat ‘the international’ as a site of interaction 
between societies that adds qualities – such as diplomatic relations and interspersing of 
cultural narratives – that are not found in domestic societies alone, yet nonetheless form 
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part of their social reproduction (Rosenberg 2006). Economic relations are, therefore, 
but one dimension of this site of intersocietal interaction.   
Sinologists that applied the concept of internationalisation have continued to 
insist on the entirely domestic origins of China’s turn to market reform. Shirk, for 
example, accepted that ‘once the wall between China and the international economy 
was lowered internationalisation exerted a powerful influence on the reform process’ 
(Shirk 1996, 187). Yet she also argued that it did not determine the scope and character 
of reform, but simply created new openings and possibilities for China’s reform-minded 
‘political entrepreneurs’ (Shirk 1996, 207). Even when increasing attention is paid to 
the international context for the decisions taken by China’s leaders the unrestrained 
nature of their decision-making is continually emphasised. In their study of China’s 
participation in the keystone international economic organisations (KIEOs), for 
example, Harold Jacobsen and Michel Oksenberg argue China’s ‘policies were chosen 
by the leaders of China and were not forced upon them by the KIEOs’ (Jacobson and 
Oksenberg 1990, 168). Similarly, Margaret Pearson argues that most policy changes 
during the 1980s and 1990s ‘were made readily and at the initiative of Chinese 
policymakers, who seemed convinced of their benefits’ (Pearson 1999, 175). One can 
see from these remarks how the fear of lost agency has inhibited the literature. An 
essentially straw-man argument – that to ascribe any causally significant role to ‘the 
international’ milieu – will deny the Chinese origins of the process, has meant that the 
overall problématique has not been addressed through a global lens. Thomas Moore has 
aptly termed this the ‘all-or-nothing’ approach: ‘either international-level variables 
determine domestic outcomes or they are largely dismissed analytically’ (Moore 2002, 
39). This involves a three-step process. First, establish the assumption that any external 
influence should be defined in terms of control and coercion (Moore 2002, 42). Second, 
show foreign coercion was not present (ibid). And, third, conclude an internationally 
informed sociological way irrelevant to the field of study (ibid). In contrast, Moore’s 
own analysis showed how international structures, specifically, the international trading 
system and its legal basis, impacted on Chinese industries at a microeconomic level to 
elicit processes of reorganisation (Moore 2002). These processes occurred under the 
radar of political leaders (whose decisions other scholars saw as paramount) yet still 
shaped the policy process. Moore, it should be noted, also equated international 
interaction with global markets, but he nonetheless destabilised dominant theoretical 
assumptions. 
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A more radical alternative to the concept of internationalisation is needed if we 
are to locate China’s search for ‘national salvation’ within the global contradictions that 
brought the communists to power. Posed in these terms the question transcends the 
recognition, important, as it is, that Deng was impressed by the developmental model he 
saw in Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand in 1978, and entreats us to consider the 
sociological sources of China’s nationalist agenda. This actually challenges a 
cornerstone assumption of the reform era: that China was closed, autarchic, and, then, as 
a result of changes in its domestic policy and leadership, ‘opened’ to the world. Chinese 
leaders employed the phrase, kaifang, or ‘opening up’ and it reflected how China’s 
political and social evolution after 1949 was, in most respects, secretive and parochial. 
Indeed, in part, it represented an attempt to shield the polity from the destructive forces 
the outside world had imposed on the country in its ‘century of humiliation’, yet was 
simultaneously a device of despotic rule. Even in the three decades after 1949 China 
and its leaders still felt the convulsions and pressures of the modern world. Moreover, 
as James Townsend argued some two decades ago there were in truth ‘many openings’: 
The opening of China has always been a kaleidoscope event, yielding different 
images with every twist of the viewer’s lens. Most Americans have focused on 
the recent open foreign policy, seeing a dramatic reversal of China’s Maoist 
isolation followed rapidly by expanding exchanges with the West – especially 
the United States – with positive benefits on balance for all concerned. The same 
opening appears different from other viewpoints. Observers in Beijing or 
Guangzhou, Taipei or Hong Kong, Tokyo or Moscow, Seoul or Pyongyang, 
Hanoi or Jakarta may see an opening that began earlier or later, that looks East 
as well as West, that has domestic as well as foreign dimensions, and that is less 
benign in its implications. A turn to a different historical focus reveals another 
opening in the mid-nineteenth century, to some the real ‘opening of China’ and 
of greater historical import than the present one. The years in between have their 
openings as well, at the turn of the century, during and after the May Fourth 
Movement of 1919, and in the 1950s. One can see these as distinct images or let 
them blur together in a continuous, if erratic, process. Or one can look further 
into China’s past for earlier openings to the non-Chinese world. More questions 
arise as the images change. Was China ever really closed? Who opened the door 
and for what purposes? How does the current opening compare to earlier ones? 
Is it driven by internal or external forces? What goods, ideas, peoples, or even 
armies have passed or will pass through the opening – in which direction?  
(Townsend 1991, 387 – 388, emphasis in original). 
 
In this erudite passage, Townsend envisions a series of ‘openings’ – each can, as he puts 
it, be understood in their own terms as a distinct image, or seen as a continuous and 
dynamic process. In the following chapters, I follow the spirit of these remarks closely, 
seeking to locate the turn to market reform as a distinctive historical outcome of the 
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‘many openings’ of China. It is beyond question, I believe, that the country’s integration 
into the colonial capitalist order was ‘the real “opening of China” and of greater 
historical import than the present one’ (Townsend 1991, 387). For it is through this 
process – simultaneously, brutal, exploitative, racialized, yet also inspiring, educating, 
and, most of all, change-making – that a national consciousness emerged capable of 
imagining a future destiny in which China’s standing is realigned with its imperial past. 
Twentieth century ‘state socialism’ tended to rise to power in polities shaped by a 
militantly nationalist consciousness – often, as in China’s case, quite unfavourable to a 
democratic form of anti-capitalism. In chapter five, I argue the proliferation of new 
national sensibilities globally, arising amidst the collapse of the old colonial empires, 
was able to connect in a particularly complementary manner to the ethos of ‘state 
socialism’ as it was pioneered in Stalin’s Russia. In the last section of this chapter, I 
look at the contribution Chalmers Johnson (Johnson 1962) made to our understanding 
of the origins of Maoism. This moves the argument beyond the failings of the major 
explanations of market reform, but, by illustrating the organic nationalism of Chinese 
communism in its moment of rapid political advance (1937 to 1945), Johnson 
highlighted a key feature of the regime formed after 1949.  
 
1.7 Maoism and ‘national salvation’: the contribution of Chalmers Johnson 
In this chapter, I have intimated through a process of critique that ‘national salvation’ or 
jiuguo was a founding principle of the PRC. This position follows closely Johnson’s 
Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power; the Emergence of Revolutionary China 
that showed how jiuguo formed a pre-eminent part of the anti-Japanese war (Johnson 
1962). Johnson’s analysis contained ambiguities on the role of nationalism in PRC 
policy-making after the revolution, but his account of the overt nationalism the 
communists utilised in their rise to power was and remains apposite. He showed how 
CCP propaganda amongst the peasants continually emphasised the need to 
‘exterminate’ the occupiers and freely adopted the patriotic terminology of political 
nationalism (Johnson 1962, 4). These ideological vexations were, as he put it, 
‘remarkably free of a communist quality’ (ibid). Basing his study on reports compiled 
by Japanese officers that described the repeated attacks of the resistance movement, 
Johnson’s book brought this national peasant movement to life. Communist success in 
the civil war with the Kuomintang was almost entirely dependent on their role leading 
the anti-colonial struggle in the north of the country, resulting in a dramatic reversal of 
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their pre-war fortunes, which had seen them close to annihilation by Kuomintang 
forces. Johnson argued that due to its substantive programme of independence from 
foreign domination and a strong and powerful nation state to defend the country, and its 
use of national myology, the ‘communist rise to power in China should be understood 
as a species of nationalist movement’ (Johnson 1962, xi). This shifted the role of the 
party away from the assumptions of orthodox Leninism, i.e. the party as the leader of a 
class subject, the proletariat, to the head of a, ‘war-energized, radical nationalist 
movement’ and, as such, the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the CCP was transformed 
into a ‘myth serving the newly created Chinese state’ (Johnson 1962, ix). Johnson drew 
out the distinction between the triumph of the communist parties in China and 
Yugoslavia, where they came to the head of popular national movements that bestowed 
them with political legitimacy, and the satellite regimes imposed by Soviet tanks. The 
latter acted as little more than colonial aggressors – and therefore antagonised the 
national spirit of the occupied countries –, whereas the Chinese party were synonymous 
with national liberation (Johnson 1962, 176 – 187). This led to the fusion of 
communism with nationalism:  
… Communism and nationalism were fused in wartime China and Yugoslavia 
as a result of the identification of the CCP and YCP, respectively, with the 
resistance movement of the two countries – movements that the communist 
parties themselves were not primarily responsible for setting in motion. The 
result of this fusion was the creation of communist nation-state that were not 
subordinate to the Soviet Union, specifically for the traditional party allegiance 
to Moscow counted for less than the national unity created between the 
agricultural masses and the party by their close cooperation in wartime (Johnson 
1962, 8). 
 
I take a very similar approach to Chinese communism in this thesis, but I situate the 
emergence of the national sensibility within a longue durée analysis of China’s 
relationship to the modern world. In chapter four I locate the imagined ‘awakening’ of 
national consciousness in a specific moment of ‘combined social development’ in the 
1890s. Johnson recognises the existence of the process within the urban areas prior to 
Japanese colonisation (Johnson 1962, 21 – 25), but argues that this national identity 
only crystalized for the great mass of the Chinese peasantry after 1937. Japanese 
‘mopping up’ operations in rural areas inspired the spontaneous growth of resistance 
organisations even prior to CCP agitation, but they identified with and later joined the 
CCP-led movement (Johnson 1962, 2, 85, 31 – 70). This fostered a new mode of living 
and shared sense of identity amongst the peasantry: 
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The feeling of belonging and of having a stake in government that grew up in 
this period was entirely novel for the Chinese masses; and it brought with it an 
exhilarating sense of self determination (Johnson 1962, 3). 
 
I locate this urban-rural differentiation within an analysis of the rise and fall of colonial 
capitalism as it was experienced within the Chinese polity and, in part, this simply 
augments Johnson’s position. However, I give greater emphasis to the type of political 
nationalism that emerged within urban areas after the first Sino-Japanese War. Many of 
these literate, modernising urban intellectuals turned to the banner of communism, and 
arguments within the CCP after the revolution arguably expressed tensions in the New 
Culture Movement between messianic and pragmatic discourses. Reflecting this lack of 
attention to the precise form that Chinese nationalism assumes in Mao’s hands, 
Johnson’s analysis is also plagued by ambiguity over the role of communist ideology in 
PRC policy-making. It expresses the fact that he does not offer an appraisal of the 
specific impact of ‘state socialism’ – and the combined development of the China’s 
revolution with its Russian relation – on CCP policy. For example, Johnson recognises 
that ‘communist ideology serves as the theoretical expression’ of Chinese nationalism, 
but suggests that Marxist-Leninist doctrine ‘prescribes policy for the Chinese’ nation 
(Johnson 1962, 184). This somewhat bewildering formulation has to be seen in the 
context of Johnson writing back in 1962 – when the political splits and ruptures of ‘state 
socialism’ were only slowly becoming clear – and the methodological underpinning to 
Johnson’s work. Sociological functionalism provided this underpinning and led Johnson 
to argue that within certain conditions Marxist-Leninism could answer the functional 
need of nationalism within a polity to establish a strong state with a national myth 
(Johnson 1962, 21). As such, once this need was met, then policy could be determined 
by the doctrine. If this were adopted as an explanation of market-reform it would 
therefore suffer from the same problems as the ‘policy-analyst’ approach that I critiqued 
in 2.3. A historical materialist account of the origins of Chinese nation-ness can, in 
contrast, locate it within the sociological conditions created by the crisis of colonial 
capitalism. Furthermore, I argue that Maoism represented a complementary fusion of 
Chinese nationalism with Soviet Stalinism. PRC state formation thereby reflected its 
combined development with the Soviet Union – and its planning infrastructure 
exhibited scleroses typical of the Eastern bloc states –, but the search for a specifically 
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Chinese road to development was driven by jiuguo and ultimately resulted in the 
1978/79 reforms. 
 
1.8 Reconceptualising Chinese economic reform as a search for jiuguo  
This review of the existing theoretical accounts of market reform has illustrated the 
sociological problems that arise from a focus on purely proximate forms of causation. 
Methodological internalism might appear justified by the autarchic character of Chinese 
economic development in the early PRC. However, this argument can only be plausibly 
sustained if the object of study is conceived purely in terms of China’s development 
after 1949. The Chinese Revolution was certainly a dramatic watershed, an ‘epochal 
moment’, so to speak, however, the ideological and cultural assumptions of the new 
regime – and the impoverished economic landscape they inherited – emerged through 
China’s many openings with the wider world. To explain why the search for jiuguo 
assumed such centrality for Chinese communism that they ultimately adopted a 
capitalist economic strategy, then one arguably needs to move through three 
sociological steps, which might be summarised as ‘class’, ‘nation’ and ‘socialism’. In 
other words, one needs to account for several overlapping processes: (i) the sources of 
China’s extreme economic paucity, locating it within the colonial capitalist order that 
the polity was integrated in during the late eighteenth century; (ii) the origins of Chinese 
nationalism and the historical forces that conditioned its particularly radical form; and 
(iii) the failure of ‘state socialism’ to achieve the national salvation that Chinese elites 
desired. Each of these ‘images’, as Townsend put it, form moments in the moving 
picture that is China’s interaction with the modern world. I explicate these overlapping 
historical interactions through an application of the theory of uneven and combined 
development. In the next chapter, I outline this theoretical foundation.   
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2 
Theorising capitalist modernity: uneven  
and combined development in the longue durée  
The class struggle… is a struggle for the rough and material 
things, without which there is nothing fine and spiritual. 
Nevertheless these latter are present in the class struggle as 
something other than mere booty, which falls to the victor. 
They are present as confidence, as courage, as humour, as 
cunning, as steadfastness in this struggle, and they reach  
far back into the mists of time. They will, ever and  
anon, call every victory which has ever been  
won by the rulers into question.  
Walter Benjamin 
2. 1 Introducing uneven and combined development  
In the previous chapter, I showed how theories of Chinese economic reform have been 
locked in the confines of ‘causal proximity’ and accordingly excluded both intersocietal 
processes and long-maturing social contradictions. A theory is therefore needed that 
helps one to dig deeper, socially and temporally, into the peculiarities of Chinese 
development. I argue below that this spatial extension of the analysis to the global 
terrain requires a temporal deepening of our purview further back in time. Chinese 
communism and the one-party nature of the PRC state are, for example, taken for 
granted in existing approaches, their origins left un-excavated and a typical Marxist-
Leninist nature assumed. Yet, it should be obvious that the origins of communism were 
certainly not ‘local’ to the Chinese polity but global, and how Chinese actors concretely 
internalised this ideology was, amongst other factors, causally significant to the 
economic choices made in the late 1970s. I explore this conceptual theme in this 
chapter, explaining how uneven and combined development offers an account of the 
cumulative interactions amongst many societies – taking place across the longue durée 
– that produce seemingly ‘paradoxical’ outcomes such as China’s capitalist reform 
programme. Trotsky’s concept of uneven and combined development (Trotsky 1967a; 
1978; 2005) has been the subject of vigorous debate in recent years, inspired by the 
claim of Justin Rosenberg that it can constitute the conceptual core to a theory of ‘the 
international’ for historical sociology (Rosenberg 2005; Rosenberg 2006; Rosenberg 
2007; Rosenberg 2010). Yet the relationship between the theory of uneven and 
combined development, the ‘narrative strategy’ in sociology, and longue durée 
historiography has yet to be properly broached. As I show below, my focus on these 
aspects is based upon a broad agreement with Rosenberg’s account of uneven and 
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combined development as a property of social change per se. I argue a holistic, flexible 
approach to this idea allows greater scope for its historical particularisation, and a 
clearer identification of its various ‘sub-set’ typographies. 
In Trotsky’s most developed understanding of uneven and combined 
development, The History of the Russian Revolution, volume 1 (Trotsky 1967a, 21 – 
32), he introduced theoretical explanations as they were relevant to the historical 
argument. This is sometimes referred to as a ‘narrative strategy’ and, below, I first 
defend this approach against its critics. If theoretically grounded, i.e., if one is seeking 
to uncover deeper processes of social change that are not immediately apparent in 
observation (M. Archer et al. 1998; Bhaskar 1975; 1998; Sayer 1992; Sayer 1998), then 
the narrative strategy helps us to conceptualise the concrete determinations of social 
development as they are manifested in history. In the pages below, I locate this within a 
dialectical, ‘internal relations’ approach to the Marxist method, one emphasising the 
need to excavate the variety of social mechanisms and mental-conceptions present 
within concrete historical changes (Ollman 2003; D. Sayer 1987). I show how this 
methodology was central to Trotsky’s own conception of uneven and combined 
development (Trotsky 1967a; 1978; 2005). I go on to argue that agency and 
contingency are fundamental to ‘combined social development’, because the diversity 
of social processes that become concentrated in unique ways within a polity must give 
rise to partially ‘indeterminate’ outcomes. This then poses a question between the 
conjuncture, where social processes concretely ‘combine’ together, and the cumulative 
dimensions of social change across the longue durée. Engaging with the debate between 
Bourdieu and Hobsbawm I argue that uneven and combined development offers a 
useful synergy of longue durée and contingency-focused approaches. In the final two 
sections, I return to the contemporary debates on uneven and combined development 
and eurocentrism to illustrate the significance of this approach to concrete examples of 
historical change. 
 
2.2 In defence of a theoretically-informed ‘narrative strategy’  
Theda Skocpol’s work on social revolution (Skocpol 1979) was widely acclaimed for 
combining historical sensitivity with generalizable sociological claims about the nature 
of revolution per se. But it was also roundly criticised for not assigning any causal 
efficacy to the role of ideology. In one of the best known of these critiques, William 
Sewell drew a distinction between two forms of sociological strategy, a focus on 
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‘narrative’ description and a ‘hierarchical’ chain of causation, and argued that 
notwithstanding the lacuna of ideological causality, Skocpol had succeed in avoiding 
the allure of these mistaken approaches. Marxism was, he argued, such a ‘hierarchal’ 
approach: 
All serious analysts agree that the causes of revolutions are complex. But in the 
face of this complexity they usually employ one of two strategies: a 
“hierarchical” strategy of asserting the primacy of some type of cause over the 
others, or a “narrative” strategy of trying to recount the course of the revolution 
in some semblance of its real complexity. The trouble with both the usual 
strategies is that they are, literally, insufficiently analytical. The narrative 
strategy discusses different causal features of the revolutionary process only as 
they make themselves felt in the unfolding of the story. Consequently, causes 
tend to get lost in a muddle of narrative detail and are never separated out 
sufficiently to make their autonomous dynamics clear. The problem with the 
hierarchical strategy is that while it successfully specifies the causal dynamics of 
one factor, it tends to subordinate the roles of other factors, either treating them 
only as background (as most studies of revolution have done with the problem 
of the international setting) or conflating them with the chosen causal factor. 
Here the obvious example is the way that Marxist theories of revolution have 
tended to view the state as simply an expression of class power, rather than as a 
distinctive institution with its own interests and dynamics (Sewell 1985, 57 – 
58). 
 
Sewell’s observations and Skocpol’s original theory challenged traditional conceptions 
of historical materialism. To her credit, Skocpol emphasised transnational forms of 
causality, even though this was largely limited to the logic of geopolitical competition 
amongst states. It, thus, gave the geopolitical process a genuine causal efficacy rather 
than relegating it to simply a background that might or might not be relevant to the 
decision-making process amongst domestic actors. Skocpol would also identify with 
Sewell’s further claim that Marxist theories of revolution conflate such geopolitical or 
‘state-determined’ processes with the causal factor that predominates within its chosen 
theoretical ‘hierarchy’ – namely, class power. Sewell argued that Skocpol’s had 
succeeded in taking the conceptual strengths of causal-hierarchy approaches and 
combining it with the strengths of the narrative method, ‘its emphasis on ‘sequence, 
conjuncture, and contingency’ (Sewell 1985, 58). These were the broad contours of 
Skocpol’s attempted synthesis, but the problem with her conceptual armoury was that 
the general conditions she identified for social revolution were far too prescriptive. In 
broad terms, she argued that the combination of (i) ‘relatively isolated peasant 
communities’, (ii) suffering under the hardship of absentee landlordism, and (iii) 
confronting a bureaucratic state that was falling behind geopolitically vis-à-vis more 
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powerful polities, were the common causal conditions in the Chinese, Russian and 
French Revolution, and, by way of inference, general conditions of social revolution per 
se (Sewell 1985, 57; Skocpol 1979, 19). These were highly prescriptive conditions that 
left the theory open to refutation should a social revolution occur in the absence of these 
conditions. Sure enough, in the year that States and Social Revolution was published, 
1979, the Iranian Revolution erupted, which transformed the nature of state-society 
relations within the polity, despite the absence of all Skocpol’s three conditions for 
social revolution.   
Skocpol’s reaction was to highlight the role of ideological determination in the 
Iranian special case, and this ‘Iranian exceptionalism’ seriously undermined the 
apparent theoretical generality with which her original claims had been cast (Matin 
forthcoming). But the more pressing methodological problem was the very narrow 
ascriptions of the concepts that she had applied. Kamran Matin has recently made this 
point in relation to Skocpol’s wholly geopolitical notion of ‘the international’ (ibid). He 
argues that Skocpol, following Weber’s claim that nation-states should be treated as 
organic wholes and thus legitimate objects of comparative analysis, identified ‘the 
international’ milieu with geopolitical competition between states, and so excluded 
forms of cultural and social diffusion amongst them (ibid). Contrastingly, Matin argues, 
that in their essence, international processes are mutually constitutive of domestic 
properties, as there is no society that exists outside a set of causally significant relations 
with other societies (ibid). ‘The international’ therefore needs to be recast in terms that 
include all forms of intersocietal processes and the sociological presupposition of 
‘society in the singular’ accordingly discarded in favour of a dynamic conception of 
intersocietal processes.  
Matin’s point can be further extended and developed to respond to the criticism 
that Sewell makes of traditional ‘hierarchical’ forms of explanation. For there is actually 
a vision of historical materialism that much more closely resembles the ‘narrative 
strategy’ that Sewell had counter-posed to it. Matin’s intimation is that Skocpol’s 
concepts are at once too narrow – for they exclude intersocietal processes not included 
under the rubric of geopolitics – and too broad, for they lack the sensitivity to 
concreteness required to explain the Iranian Revolution. This critical response contrasts 
to the one that Sewell gives, but it is arguably posed sharply by the general terms in 
which he casts his own ‘ideological’ addendum to Skocpol’s theory. Sewell’s answer to 
her eliding of the ideological dimensions of revolution was to reinsert it, but without 
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upsetting the structuralist assumptions of the core theoretical paradigm. He noted how 
Skocpol ‘surreptitiously’ incorporated ideology by registering the sequential variation in 
the ‘world historical context’ – i.e. the changes in global narratives – that had 
characterised the epochs of the French, Russian and Chinese Revolutions (Sewell 1985, 
59). For Sewell this implicit registering of ideological causality had to be given its own 
independent causal significance (ibid). Yet, the description he proceeded to give of the 
role of ideology was such that it pre-supposed a mutually constitutive relationship 
between several evolving social forms. The logical independence Sewell assigned to it, 
is, therefore, highly questionable:   
Ideology must be seen neither as the mere reflex of material class relations nor 
as mere ‘ideas’ which ‘intellectuals’ hold about society. Rather, ideologies 
inform the structure of institutions, the nature of social cooperation and conflict, 
and the attitudes and predispositions of the population. All social relations are at 
the same time ideological relations (Sewell 1985, 61).   
 
If, however, Sewell is right and ideology has this all pervasive quality in the fabric of 
material life, it is difficult to sustain any conceptualisation that grants it a logical 
independence or, as he put it, its ‘own autonomous dynamics’ (Sewell 1985, 58). 
Rather, these discourses need to be studied in their historical reality as concrete 
processes invariably ‘inter-meshed’ with the social and class aspects of human 
interaction. Rather than subsume the ideological to class, it was Marx, no less, that 
suggested sensitivity to the totality of concrete processes was crucial to social theory. 
‘The concrete is concrete’, he wrote, in a now well known passage, for ‘it is the 
concentration of many determinations, hence the unity of the diverse’ (Marx 1973, 101). 
Consequently, Marx advocated a movement from the abstract to the concrete, for it was 
with concepts that we made sense of these ‘many determinations’. The aim of this 
abstraction, however, was ultimately to construct a moving picture of the ‘real relations’ 
in the concrete historical process. Far from reducing the concrete to epiphenomenal 
expressions of abstract categories (the path of ‘vulgar Marxism’), it was the very 
complexity and diversity of human life that led Marx to make his concepts elastic and 
flexible enough to incorporate a penumbra of diverse temporalities (Ollman 2003; D. 
Sayer 1987). He has often been derided since for inconsistency, even sloppiness, for 
doing so, but this method arguably reflected the genuine ‘messiness’ of historical 
change. Marx would thus surely concur with Sewell ‘that all social relations are at the 
same time ideological relations’ (Sewell 1985, 61), but it was precisely this inter-
connectedness that led him to reject the construction of closed and universal 
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typographies in his theories (D. Sayer 1987, 21). Instead he saw ideological forms as 
inherently bound up – ‘internally related’ – with the process of social reproduction 
(Ollman 2003; D. Sayer 1987).  
This ‘internal-relations’ perspective leads us down the pathway of the narrative 
strategy, albeit one that is theoretically informed, which Sewell rejects. The merits of 
such an approach can be seen in studying the perplexities of the Iranian Revolution. For 
the causal role that ideology plays in a world historic event like this will arguably not 
depend on the ‘autonomous dynamics’ of ideology as such (Sewell 1985, 58), but its 
actual, substantive form; i.e., how it is crystalized into the minds of participants and 
concentrated in living political forces, movements and programmes. It might appear 
obvious to say so, but different ideologies have a differing impact on social and political 
life, rather than exhibiting the same causal property of ‘ideological determination’. In 
the Iranian case, indeed, one has to radically distinguish different concrete ideologies – 
for example, amongst the Islamist supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini and the various 
communist actors – including their differing relationships to competing social classes, 
in order to capture the complex historical story of the revolution. Sewell might well 
argue in response that social theorists always set themselves the task of moving from 
the general to the particular, and no two instances of a phenomenon are ever the same. 
True as this is, the point remains that ideology can have no autonomous role in concrete 
historical processes, inevitably involving a variety of different factors, let alone be 
assumed to have broadly similar effects across different contexts. A more radical break 
with structuralism towards a historically concrete, ‘unity of many determinations’, 
perspective is necessary, if, that is, one is to avoid the narrow, and quickly refuted, 
theoretical predictions that Skocpol’s comparative approach ultimately succumbed to.  
 
2.3 The Marxist method: conceptualizing ‘lawfulness’ in historical processes   
This focus on historical narrative might appear curious given the criticisms I made in 
chapter 1 of the tendency to ‘causal proximity’ in existing approaches to Chinese 
economic reform. But a theoretical emphasis on the peculiarities of social development 
need not imply the constraining of the remit of historical discovery to merely the 
surface-level of events and processes. On the contrary, the role of theory can actually be 
extended deeper, not to attempt to draw prescriptive predictions from empirical 
observations of past occurrences in the manner that Skocpol ultimately did, but to 
theorise the causal properties and inter-locking interests and conflicts within a social 
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structure. Marxism has long been derided for its determinism and invoking of ‘laws of 
history’, but there is concept of lawfulness within this extraordinarily broad school of 
thought, one augmented and developed by the critical realist philosophy in the late 
twentieth century (M. Archer et al. 1998; Bhaskar 1975; 1998; Sayer 1992; 1998), in 
which a concern for theorising necessities is complementary to recognising 
contingencies. There is a method indeed of integrating contingency into our 
explanations in such a way that it allows us to simultaneously explain the ways in which 
the lives of people, and all the institutions such as states that we create through 
historical time, are structured in ways outside of our individual control by multiple 
networks of social relations. Before I move onto the theory of uneven and combined 
development, I need to briefly reprise the broad contours of this conception of the 
Marxist method, as one sensitive to contingency as well as necessity.  One of the 
important contributions Roy Bhaskar made in the 1970s was to challenge the positivist 
monopoly on ‘science-ism’ by rejecting the probabilistic notion of law. All explanatory 
or ‘scientific’ theories, be they concerned with the natural or social world, he argued, 
implicitly start from the assumption that events and processes are not spontaneous but 
are produced by natural and social forces (Bhaskar 1975, 146). He proceeded to argue 
that recurring patterns of phenomena showed the need to investigate the generative 
properties giving rise to the pattern and did not in any way constitute ‘lawful’ processes 
in their own right (Bhaskar 1975, 63 – 78). The role of theory is to understand and 
capture these generative mechanisms that constitute the operative relations of social and 
natural structure (Bhaskar 1975, 64). This formulation of the Marxist method is 
sensitive to the specific fusion of mechanisms, events and actions, which determine 
conjunctural developments. It also means that contingency is seen as fundamental to 
social change, because in these conjunctures different mechanisms will intersect 
contingently, thus ruling out the very possibility of determinism.  
The dialectical character of this view is given by the way in which necessity and 
contingency are understood to inter-relate; both are seen as essential moments in the 
‘organised anarchy’ that characterises human reproduction. Moreover and equally, the 
mechanisms are also seen as conditional on the existence of the social structure in 
which they operate. Marxism, indeed, is famous for its laws of capitalism, but naturally 
enough Marx did not see these as timeless, for he argued that properties within the 
social structure fostering an expansion of labour simultaneously created a class with the 
interests and social power that, potentially at least, made capitalism transient. Whether 
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this would be the case was, of course, dependent upon politics, and this illustrates not 
only how human agency adds a very special contingency to the social process, but also 
how social structures enable as well as constrain our actions. Capitalist social relations 
create the material possibility of a classless society; whether the world’s workers 
collectively utilise these conditions in this way is quite another question. This does not 
mean, however, that the economic base is subject to ‘laws’ and all conscious activity is 
‘contingent’. Indeed, a more social concept of the necessities that are generative within 
a historical structure reveals the existence of constraining elements in the fabric of 
human culture that may otherwise be occluded. Consider, for example, the necessity 
involved in the production of personal identity. Real people, born in real places, are 
ascribed an identity (a name, ethnicity, etc) merely as a result of the spatial location and 
their kinship relations. Although we are conscious, although we have intentionality, we 
cannot ‘escape’ the historical reality of our own birth, nor the way the world may treat 
us as a result. The necessity involved in the reproduction of identity is essential to the 
notion of ‘otherness’ often discussed in IR, normally using concepts of inside/outside 
relations, but, curiously, it is never viewed as a necessity. If we treat it as so, with the 
‘historical’ caveat, i.e. the recognition of the temporal and social relativity of the ‘law’, 
then we capture the constrained feeling governing how we experience identity, and 
make the ‘necessity’ conditional on our cultural circumstances. One consequence is that 
modern racism, for example, could be treated as irreducible to the ‘economic’ but still 
internally related to the host of culturally mediated power relations found in capitalist 
epochs, such as colonial empire.  
This theoretically informed narrative strategy introduces sociological causes ‘as 
they make themselves felt in the unfolding of the story’ (Sewell 1985, 58), but, in doing 
so, also seeks to travel beneath the events prominent in a narrative, to ask how structural 
properties of a society conditioned, in enabling and constraining ways, the causally 
significant actions. In this way, a search for the ‘real relations’ of a process can be at 
once ‘abstract’, requiring the testing and reformulation of conceptual typographies, and 
resolutely concrete. Given this sensitivity to historical specificity, the concepts are not 
logically deduced from a set of abstract assumptions, because their utility is continually 
tested against historical development. They thus have an intrinsic ‘historicity’ as 
specific properties of a given phase of human development. In short, they only hold true 
for as long as the historical relations to which they refer exist (Ollman 2003, 67 – 69). 
Yet, Marx also did not reject ‘transhistorical’ categories. Notions of human labour for 
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example, as opposed to distinctively capitalist labour relations, plainly provided an 
underpinning to his enquiries, but, he only afforded them substantive analytical utility 
once they were historically concretised (D. Sayer 1987, 21). It was this theoretical and 
historical relativity that led Marx to reject the kind of ‘exclusive, unambiguous, closed 
and universal’ definitions of positivism (ibid). His concepts were much more elastic, 
admitting the possibility of multiple usages in differing contexts with concretisations 
thus modifying the general properties to enrich a historical explanation (ibid). These, 
then, are the broad methodological contours of a theoretically informed narrative 
strategy that is sensitive to the role of both contingency and necessity. But it is arguably 
only with uneven and combined development that one can show how contingency forms 
an irreducible moment of all combined social development.  
 
2.4 The theory of uneven and combined development  
Trotsky first articulated the idea of uneven and combined development to conceptualise 
the contradictory impact of capitalist modernisation on underdeveloped states in the 
periphery of the global system, particularly his native Russia (Trotsky 1967a; 1978; 
2005). The peculiarities of early twentieth century Russia, with its juxtaposition of an 
archaic, absolutist state, semi-feudal backwardness and rapid industrial modernisation, 
posed the need for a dialectical formulation of the historical process that resulted in the 
fusing together of archaic and modern patterns of social development (Trotsky 1967a, 
21 – 32). Trotsky’s innovative approach to this problem sought to incorporate these 
contradictory elements into the remit of social theory, by arguing that they arose 
necessarily from the multilinear dimensions of historical development. ‘The 
development of historically backward nations’, he argued,  ‘leads necessarily to a 
peculiar combination of different stages in the historic process’ and thus their evolution 
‘acquires a planless, complex, combined character’ (Trotsky 1967a, 23). Unevenness 
referred to the asynchronous form taken by global social development – the great 
diversity that existed in the human form with geographically dispersed polities and 
regions developing in different ways, eliciting variation in the pace of technical and 
social progress. Combination denoted the interactive process that set in when these 
forms interrelated – giving rise to outcomes such as the one Trotsky studied in Russia, 
where a single society fused together divergent social and cultural forms. Lawfulness 
referred to the necessity of this process, because in human history it could be no other 
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way: when diverse social agents and processes interacted they invariably produced 
concretely distinctive trajectories of development.  
This established the conceptual framework with which Trotsky understood 
Russia’s late development, allowing him to carefully weave together its diverse lineages 
and situate the life of the domestic polity firmly in the contradictions of global history. 
The subtle processes of cultural and intellectual diffusion from outside combined with 
the harder imperatives of geopolitical and economic competition (the ‘whip of external 
necessity’ as he called it). These influences and pressures intersected with the nation’s 
domestic culture, along with its class and state structure. The uneven and combined 
development ‘from afar’ helped to reproduce and accelerate it ‘within’ the sovereign 
bounds of the territorial state. Spatially concentrated industrial urbanisation took place 
against a backdrop of appalling misery and backwardness in the country, where ‘peasant 
land cultivation as a whole remained... at the level of the seventeenth century’ (Trotsky 
1967a, 27). Trotsky thus excavated Russia’s unique path dependence within the 
contours of global history, which crucially included the recognition that different social 
property forms could become juxtaposed within a single state formation. In this way, he 
challenged the ‘pedantic schematism’ (Trotsky 1967a, 23) of those ‘stadial’ or stage-ist 
modes of production analyses that held Russia to be ‘feudal’, rather than undertaking a 
contradictory form of accelerated capitalist development.  The implications of this were 
not localised to the Russian polity alone. Trotsky himself extrapolated the concept 
outwards, embracing the entire periphery of late capitalist development (Trotsky 1974, 
15 – 16). In Trotsky’s application of the concept, however, the ‘combination’ tended to 
denote, specifically, the impact and outcomes produced by capitalist internationalisation 
(ibid). This allowed him to conceptualise the contradictory dynamics of capitalist 
globalisation and, indeed, he was surely right to do so. Neither contemporaries of 
Trotsky nor scholars today would downplay, let alone deny, the enormous impact of 
capitalist social relations on the pace and form of development in every corner of the 
world. But combined development also had explanatory utility for the study of pre-
capitalist modes of production. Indeed, Trotsky’s work arguably added a new premise 
to historical materialist investigation, which saw human development as necessarily 
involving a series of multilinear interactions amongst many societies. This has been the 
primary claim of Rosenberg (Rosenberg 2005; 2006; 2007; 2010), who has extended 
the concept of combined development backwards temporally through time – thereby 
also raising it to a higher level of abstraction conceptually. For international theory this 
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makes it possible to use uneven and combined development as the explanans for an 
historical account of the emergence of ‘the international’, defined as dispersed but 
interactive political communities (Rosenberg 2010). Many have argued this departs too 
far from its original meaning (Ashman 2006; Ashman 2009; Neil Davidson 2006a; Neil 
Davidson 2006b; Smith 2006), even though it largely follows the logic of Trotsky’s 
own claim that ‘unevenness is the most general law of the historic process’ out of which 
combination, i.e. causally significant forms of social interaction, then arises (Trotsky 
1967a, 23). For Marx transhistorical concepts acted as premises for more historical 
analysis, and there is no reason why we cannot also work with combined development 
at different levels of abstraction and concretisation. Reification of the social process will 
only set in should we forget Sayer’s point that categories will acquire substantive 
analytical utility only in their historically specific form (D. Sayer 1987, 21). The 
positive implication of working with uneven and combined development as a basic 
presupposition is that it allows us to integrate world historical processes per se into 
sociological analysis without subsuming difference and particularity into universal, and 
misleading, general variables. Robert Nisbet once argued that it was impossible to take 
humanity as the subject and object of the notion of development, for it is too ‘diverse, 
multiple and particular’ (cited in Rosenberg 2006, 333). But, as Rosenberg has argued, 
this position only stands if we already hold in our minds the assumption that 
development is unilinear and not uneven. By adding the properties of unevenness and 
combination in abstracto, then the ‘diverse, multiple and particular’ – the variety of 
cultural and social forms in world history – cease to be externalities to the concept of 
development (ibid). Quite the opposite, they are now understood as internally related to 
the patterns of global change, thereby arising through the multiple, dispersed but 
interactive properties of this reconceived view of development.  
The dialectical character of the analysis (unevenness > interaction > particularity 
> unevenness) suggests that social-historical necessities lead to emergent, particular 
social forms. But to elicit particularity – the diverse historical examples of 
developmental and cultural forms – there must be a powerful element of contingency. 
Wars, revolutions, state formation, to take the classical subject matter of historical 
sociology by way of example, all involve struggles between social groups, the precise 
outcome of which cannot be pre-determined. Defending the lawful character of 
unevenness, Rosenberg writes, ‘...The concrete pattern of socio-cultural diversity is 
contingent’, but, ‘the fact of the diversity is not’ (Rosenberg 2006, 317). It derives, he 
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suggests, from the social necessity of unevenness in historical development. Rosenberg 
does not appear to mean merely that the pattern of social cultural diversity is conditional 
on wider social forces – one possible interpretation of the term ‘contingency’. Rather, 
he appears to be putting forward the more interesting idea that the contingent 
arrangement of social forces arises out of the necessarily uneven and combined nature 
of development, resulting in social-historical particularity. In short, it must be the case 
that when diverse social forms interact, the co-operation, conflict and intellectual 
exchange this interaction involves, results in particular outcomes that cannot be entirely 
known in advance and are therefore ‘contingent’. Crucial to this is the notion of 
plurality or ‘more than one’, for the contingent nature of ‘combination’ arises from the 
fact there are numerous agencies whose interaction has an unpredictable dimension 
(Cooper 2013). This more socially sensitive account of political change thus encourages 
an encompassing view of agency, one that asks questions about the role played by those 
at the foot of social hierarchies as well as those at the head of them, and is concerned to 
understand the variety of actors whose conflicts and co-operation ‘combines’ in 
historical change.   
A critical reflection on this anterior assumption – the plurality of interlocking 
agencies – has a particular pertinence to understanding China’s unusual relationship 
with capitalist modernity. For the Imperial Chinese polity was for most periods of its 
life significantly more developed in technological and social terms than its European 
rivals, yet it was not able to generate its own capitalist transformation. The recurring 
class struggles between merchants, industrialists and officialdom, not to mention the 
spirit of rebellion amongst peasant communities, tended to be resolved to the advantage 
of the bureaucracy, even in the face of political, i.e. dynastic, change. The capitalistic (if 
not capitalist) activity of China’s entrepreneurial classes, thus, continually fell afoul of 
the ruling class at the apex of the state who absorbed surpluses that might otherwise 
have been invested in production. The class struggles between these actors, however, 
particularly at moments when the empire was engulfed by crises, could in principle 
have been resolved in favour of nascent capitalists. If this occurred then the already 
existing technical and social conditions for capitalism may have yet led to it being 
unleashed upon the Chinese polity first. Reflecting on these alternative possibilities 
provides a richer insight into the outcome, as it allows one to assume the vantage point 
of actors that pushed for an alternative perspective, and see how their failed struggles 
form one dimension of the real, living history. 
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2.5 ‘Combination’ as an indeterminate site of social interaction and conflict  
In this outline, then, social-historical ‘combination’ is seen as a site of struggle and 
conflict, cultural renewal, artistic creativity, and other such practices, which combine 
together to give rise to these criss-crossing development pathways. How should one 
deal, however, with the possible objection that this understanding of agency within the 
process of ‘combined development’ errs towards voluntarism, despite the emphasis that 
was initially given to the conditional necessities within social structures? One possible 
answer is to recognise the inherently social character of our agency. This means that we 
should see human activity as something that can only exist within and through social 
relations. Structure can then be conceived as a terrain of opportunities and risks for 
individual agents that conditions, but does not wholly determine, our activity. The 
‘causal power of things’ is actually expressed by our social reproduction; for our 
activity continually takes advantage of the causal power of social structure and in the 
process reproduces and transforms it in different ways (Sayer 1992, 116). Similarly, 
laws within the social structure are ‘activated’ by, indeed can only exist through, the 
daily practice of creative, transforming human agencies (ibid). The effects of laws 
operating in any one historical conjuncture are mediated by this activity. Such effects 
may even be unique, but to understand this novelty, we need theory to shed light on the 
‘constitutive structures’ that inter-relate in the course of our active reproduction (ibid). 
If agency is seen in this way as inherently social, then theories that treat society as a 
sum of independent parts (e.g. the atomistic conception of society in liberalism) need to 
be rejected in favour of an approach that treats structure and agency as internally 
related, and therefore analyses the material and social structures that are ever-present 
dimensions to our activity. On these foundations, structure and agency can be conceived 
not as polar opposites but as interlocking aspects of human reproduction. As Bhaskar 
puts it, all our intentional activity pre-supposes the ‘prior existence of social forms’ and 
vice-versa:    
...Conscious human activity consists in work on given objects and cannot be 
conceived as occurring in their absence... For all activity pre-supposes the prior 
existence of social forms. Thus consider saying, making and doing as 
characteristic modalities of human agency. People cannot communicate except 
by utilizing media, produce except by applying themselves to materials which 
are already formed, or act save in some or other context. Speech requires 
language; making materials; action conditions; agency resources; activity rules. 
Even spontaneity has as its necessary condition the pre-existence of a social 
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form with (or by means of) which the spontaneous act is performed. Thus if the 
social cannot be reduced to (and is not the product of) the individual it is equally 
clear that society is a pre-condition for any intentional human act at all (Bhaskar 
1998, 37, emphasis in original).   
 
‘The social’ is conceived here in plural terms, i.e. encompassing language, resources, 
rules and all the dimensions of human existence. Beyond the work of Bhaskar, this 
agency-sensitive vision of historical materialism can also be rooted in Marx and Engels’ 
method, particularly as they outlined it in The German Ideology. ‘Social being and 
social consciousness’ was, they argued, the very ‘essence of the materialistic conception 
of history’, one grounded in the assumption that ‘definite individuals who are 
productively active in a definite way enter into definite social and political relations’ 
(Marx 1969, 24). Accordingly, it was ‘empirical observation’ that ‘must in each 
separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification or speculation, 
the connection of the social and political structure with production’ (ibid). The political 
was not seen merely as an epiphenomenal expression of economic relations, in which 
differentiation between political forms is unimportant. Rather, the emphasis was put 
upon the crucial role of empirically informed, concrete historical analysis to draw out 
these ‘definite relations’. Their criticism of idealism in this famous passage was 
certainly stringent, but they also insisted ‘this phenomena’ of ideology ‘arises just as 
much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does 
from their physical life-process’ (Marx 1969, 25). These imagined ideological forms, 
however mystifying their representation of the dynamics of human life might be, 
nonetheless formed part of the cumulative, historical reproduction of societies, and thus 
their empirical connections to social and productive relations required careful study. 
Time and again Marx and Engels emphasised how social consciousness is internally 
related to the production of human life. They insisted it is ‘interwoven with the material 
activity and the material intercourse of men’ (Marx 1969, 24 – 25) and that ‘the 
phantoms formed in the human brain are… sublimates of their material-life process, 
which is empirically verifiable and bound to empirical premises’ (emphasis added Marx 
1969, 25). This social consciousness has no ‘semblance of independence’, ‘no history, 
no development’ (ibid) separate from the dynamic, evolving reproduction of human life. 
Terms that recur repeatedly, ‘real life’, ‘real history’, ‘the actual life-process’ (Marx 
1969, 24 – 26), reflect the foundational premises of their investigation, as a study of the 
interaction between humanity and nature that sought to incorporate all forms of 
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economic, cultural, social and political reproduction. The emphasis throughout these 
passages is therefore plainly on the social content of agency – the fact that it can only 
exist through and within the natural and social structures of material life. Yet at the 
same time it is the practical activity and consciousness of human labour that infuses ‘the 
actual life-process’ with a dynamic and evolving content, making it subject to continual 
change.  
In this understanding of historical materialism the concepts we form to make 
sense of the world should be dialectical concepts; that is, capable of accounting for the 
qualities of change, transformation, and contradiction we repeatedly find in the 
historical process (Ollman 2003). This means that the most abstract of concepts in 
Marxism have the peculiar quality of being both ‘lawful’, i.e. necessary, properties of 
human development and simultaneously also question begging about the concrete 
historical form the abstract conceptualization assumes in a certain time and place. Marx 
and Engels used their idea of the ‘double relationship’ in this way, as a grounding 
presupposition for historical analysis that helps us ask the right questions about 
historical stages of development.5 The ‘production of life’, they argued, ‘appears as a 
double-relationship’, one that is at once social and natural, involving relationships of 
co-operation with other individuals in order to harness the material resources provided 
by the natural world (Marx 1969, 31). Precisely because social and natural relations are 
subject to change, the question enquirers have to answer empirically is the historical 
properties of this double-relationship, a reality that is ‘ever taking on new forms’ (Marx 
1969, 31 – 32). In the same vein, it is equally possible to use uneven and combined 
development at a more general level of analysis, albeit not as general a level as the 
‘double relationship’, in order to inform just such an empirically sensitive mode of 
enquiry. Articulated in general terms, the concept can help us to ask the right questions 
about the precise form taken by the proliferating patterns of social interaction 
(‘combination’) that arise when dispersed societies interact with one another. While this 
might sound abstract, if this presupposition had underpinned explanations of Chinese 
economic reform, it seems unlikely that ‘the international’ would have remained a 
lacuna. For had this foundation been present researchers would have ‘asked the right 
questions’ about the impact of China’s interactions with the modern world on its latter-
day drive to market reform. Like all concepts, the extent to which it retains its utility 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5 Thanks to Kerem Nisancioglu for stressing upon me the importance of this conception of Marx’s 
method of abstraction for the theory of uneven and combined development.   
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will depend on whether intersocietal relations continue to exist in the actual life-process. 
In late capitalism these processes have certainly assumed a particular significance, one 
that is repeatedly throwing up new and distinctive cultural amalgams among the 
dispersed states that are integrated in anarchic and unstable ways by the world market. 
To avoid reifying one’s concepts it is naturally necessary to remain conscious of the 
way that these historically novel characteristics overlay and give meaning to the more 
pre-suppositional (‘abstract’) categories.  
In this social account of agency, the ‘social agents’ encompass all the diverse 
entities formed across space and time by collective human activities. From the modern 
territorial state, to trans-national corporations, urban conurbations, and, if one looks 
backwards temporally, to the geopolitical communities of the classical civilisations, and 
the first sedentary communities, we see how human social interaction produces a 
shifting and transforming array of historical actors in international politics. Critically 
extending the idea of uneven and combined development in the manner Rosenberg has 
suggested arguably gives us a theorisation of the indeterminacy of outcome that 
multiple interactions between social agents must entail. The approach also insists that 
we cannot understand any individual ‘social form’ without conceptualising the ways in 
which they interact through space and time with others. This reconfiguration in our 
conceptualization of development consequently unseats traditional perspectives that 
tend to explain, sometimes implicitly, other times explicitly, the formation of social 
hierarchy only via ‘domestic’ processes. No longer seen as a process of domestic 
development alone, the form a given hierarchy takes will reflect its interaction – 
competition, conflict and scientific and technological exchange – with global processes. 
In this regard, and to summarise this stage of the argument, there is no ‘pre-interactive 
moment’ in the life of a historical community; from its earliest genesis any one specific 
polity will be subject to the pressures and influences of the outside world.  
 
2.6 Moments of rupture and/or the longue durée?  
It would be remiss of us to not now reflect upon the processes by which that multiplicity 
of actors living in the ‘moment of combination’ arrives there. In literal, indeed obvious, 
terms the answer is, of course, history, and the difficulty it poses for agent-led accounts 
is its seemingly determinate nature. History, after all, is surely the greatest of all 
necessities, for the simply reason that once it has happened it cannot be changed. 
Despite the banality of this epistemological fact there lies buried within it a perplexing 
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question for social theorists concerned with historical transformation. Namely, how may 
we integrate the conjunctural – its events, moments, actions – and, more generally 
speaking, the sheer ephemerality of all our lived experiences, with the persistent, long-
maturing and evolving causes, whose existence cannot be plausibly doubted? In the 
work of Eric Hobsbawm (Hobsbawm 1977; 1989; 1990; 1994; 2007; 2010) and the 
Annales school of French post-war historians (Braudel 1960; Braudel 1982; Braudel 
1996; L. Febvre 1982; L. P. V. Febvre, Burke, and Folca 1973) the emphasis was put 
upon the latter dimensions of the historical process. That is, the evolutionary 
development – at varying tempos but always across periods of time beyond the episodic 
– of the most powerful causes of social transformation. In his classical advocacy of 
longue durée historiography, Fernand Braudel spoke of how our immediate, sensuous 
experiences were overlain by realities accumulated across the span of time, whose 
precise physiognomy was often opaque, difficult to conceptualise, yet, nonetheless, had 
profound causal efficacy in the historical process: 
… Social duration, those multiple and contradictory timespans of the lives of 
men, is not only the substance of the past but also the stuff of present social life. 
The dialectic of duration forcefully points out the importance and utility of 
history for the social sciences. Nothing at the center of social reality is more 
significant than the living, continuous tension between the moment and the span 
of time. Whether a question concerns the past or the here-and-now, a clear 
awareness of this plurality of social time is necessary for a common [social 
science] methodology (Braudel 1960, 3 – 4). 
 
Consider our earlier discussion of ‘personal identity as historical necessity’ (p. 48) in 
the context of Braudel’s eloquent formulation, the ‘living, continuous tension between 
the moment and the span of time’ (ibid), and we can visualise how even in the current 
moment the past continues to impose itself on how we make sense of who we are and 
the world we live in. But if the pressures of the past can be felt at the level of personal 
experience, identity, even psychology, then imagine the power of collectively 
constructed and reconstructed narratives and social forces. One of the features of 
Russian society that gave it such instability in late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries was the way in which narratives of feudal authority were undermined by the 
social and ideological impact of modernisation, yet, paradoxically, it was the Tsarist 
state that drove modernisation forward to strengthen its coercive power. Social forms 
historically and ideologically rooted in the longue durée of Eurasian feudalism were 
torn apart by the logic of defending its geopolitical and social power in the context of 
the competitive pressures of the capitalist epoch. Understanding how these historical 
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temporalities endured across decades, which had seen a myriad of more partial and 
episodic forms of change, has been a particular concern of longue durée historiography 
and their work poses challenges for agency-led social theory. Marx is famously and 
repeatedly quoted as arguing that ‘we make history but not in conditions of our own 
making’, suggesting a simple and unproblematic distinction between historically 
inherited conditions and conscious actions. But a closer reading of his original 
formulation shows how he was keenly aware of the ‘sticky quality’ that ideas had on the 
minds of actors, even when they were transforming historical conditions in novel ways:  
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do 
not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances 
directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all 
dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. And just as 
they seem to be engaged with revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating 
something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary 
crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service, and 
borrow from them names, battle cries, and costumes in order to present this new 
scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed 
language (emphasis added Marx 1969, 398). 
 
Marx’s object of analysis was, of course, the great period of European state formation in 
which national mythologies provided a supposedly timeless source of ideological 
legitimacy to the distinctively modern process of state building. Methodologically, the 
‘weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living’ formula also evocatively suggests a 
lack of individual consent, recognising that forms of social consciousness emerge 
collectively out of shared historical experience. We are more than likely therefore to 
draw upon a ‘time-honoured disguise’ and ‘borrowed language’ to make sense of new 
social structures and render them meaningful to our existing collective subjectivity. 
Understanding this mediation between freedom and necessity at the level of ideas does 
not imply a one-way causal determination from structure to social consciousness, but 
rather emphasises their inner-reciprocity in the actual life-process. The French 
philosopher Pierre Bourdieu has made a similar point when discussing the ‘the 
paradoxes of objective meaning without subjective intention’ (Bourdieu 1992, 62) and 
his solution is to see this discourse as an emergent quality of the habitus – the socially 
constituted relationships and environments we form in the material life-process: 
 
The habitus, a product of history, produces individual and collective practices - 
more history - in accordance with the schemes generated by history. It ensures 
the active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in the 
form of schemes of perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee the 
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'correctness' of practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than all 
formal rules and explicit norms (Bourdieu 1992, 54).  
 
For Bourdieu the contradiction of the habitus lies in how our actions are intentional 
without us being fully conscious of all the processes that lead to us acting the way we 
do. This means that unilinear explanations will implicitly give the habitus a common 
cohesiveness and ‘consciousness’ that in practice it lacks. Nonetheless, social practices 
will have a degree of ‘correctness’ insofar as they have to draw upon shared rules and 
experiences within the habitus to be intelligible by the groups that relate to them (ibid). 
The attractiveness of ‘pure objectivism’, or forms of teleology that see historical change 
as the flowering of an already present and unchanging inner-essence, thus lies in the 
way in which they appear to accord with the capacity of social activity to ‘project the 
past into the future’ (ibid).6 Our enduring capacity to resurrect archaic narratives in 
order to give meaning to our social circumstances certainly requires an explanation of 
how these endure in spite of the contingencies one finds in combined development. It 
also poses the question of how far-reaching social transformation is achieved across 
time and space: is the conjunctural or habitus responsible for this, or do genuinely 
epoch-shifting social changes actually take place across the longue durée?  
Longue durée historiography is often identified with determinist approaches to 
social reproduction, because the institutions and social structures the theory highlights 
normally endure far beyond the lives of conscious human individuals. However, longue 
durée scholarship is actually divided between the figures of Lucien Febvre, who erred 
heavily towards voluntarism, emphasising the discursive construction of paradigms that 
achieved a certain fixity in the minds of participants across entire epochs (L. Febvre 
1982), and Braudel who was an avowed determinist (see Burke 1990, 40). ‘When I 
think of the individual’, the latter wrote quite emphatically, ‘I am inclined to see him 
imprisoned within a destiny in which he himself has little hand’ (cited in ibid). Perhaps 
surprisingly given his sensitivity to the more sensual aspects of history, Braudel even 
heaped praise upon Nikolai Kondratiev’s mechanical schematisation of capitalist 
development, going so far as to urge the ‘correlative’ methodology be extended to 
embrace theoretical thinking about political institutions, sciences, and civilizations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6 In Bourdieu’s words, ‘because the habitus is an infinite capacity for generating products - thoughts, 
perceptions, expressions and actions - whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated 
conditions of its production, the conditioned and conditional freedom it provides is as remote from 
creation of unpredictable novelty as it is from simple mechanical reproduction of the original 
conditioning’ (Bourdieu 1992, 55). 
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(Braudel 1960, 5). In neither Kondratiev nor Braudel is there a sense of the possibility 
of varying outcomes as social forms interact, co-determining one another’s societies and 
thus giving rise to new development trajectories. Kondratiev, for instance, emphasised 
how technological discoveries gave impetus to capitalist development across the longue 
durée and when these benefits were exhausted they gave way to a similarly extended 
period of stagnation (Kondratiev 1984). Leaving aside the empirical evidence he drew 
upon, as a theoretical claim this lacks plausibility, due to the simple reason that the 
extent to which a set of technological discoveries benefits the capital accumulation 
process is subject to concrete mediation, depending, amongst other things, on the nature 
of the discoveries. Yet more implausible still is Braudel’s argument that a cyclical, 
correlative methodology of might be extended to studies of evolving forms of human 
consciousness (Braudel 1960, 5); for there are, surely, no such ‘cycles’ in the complex 
evolution of social thought. 
Bourdieu takes a position that stands between Braudel and Febvre. He argues 
there are moments of ‘grand historic rupture’ that produce tectonic shifts in the plates of 
social change across a number of generations and are also partially universal insofar as 
their effects are felt globally (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 67). These take place 
within the habitus as a vision of the social that is an inherently historical product and 
site of social activity. In the words of Hobsbawm, ‘the habitus fills the space between 
historical structure and human agency, between conscious action and historic 
determination or, to use the classical Marxian terms, it brings together ‘base’ and 
‘superstructure’ (Hobsbawm 2007, 3). The great turning points in global history, 1968 – 
whose significance fascinated Bourdieu -, 1917, 1848, et al, can each be categorised in 
this way as moments of ‘grand historic rupture’. Interestingly, Hobsbawm, a longue 
durée scholar par excellence, actually criticised this as a theorisation of social change. 
He argued that all the elements of the habitus conspire to reproduce existing modes of 
life and, in contrast, transformative processes actually take place across a longer span of 
time (ibid). Hobsbawm cites the enormity of the transformations of the nineteenth 
century or the still on going technological and social changes introduced in the post-war 
period as examples of social changes to which actors in the habitus largely adapt to 
rather than actively foster (ibid). In his historical writing more generally Hobsbawm’s 
vision of the longue durée does appear to have inclined him to a degree of fatalism in 
his understanding of historical transformation. The account he offers of the inter-war 
years, for example, affords little room for the contingent possibilities in the diverse sites 
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of social struggle that could have shifted the terrain of political momentum away from 
the advancing forces of fascism towards more liberatory currents (Hobsbawm 1994: 54 
- 85). Hobsbawm’s claim that the ‘extraordinary and growing acceleration of social 
change since the middle of the twentieth century is by far the most important historical 
phenomenon of our times’, which ‘runs in parallel to the traditional history of events in 
politics, culture, the arts’ (Hobsbawm 2007, 3) is wonderfully suggestive and 
challenging. But his conclusion that ‘historians in the year 3000… will pay far more 
attention to it than to the wars, massacres and revolutions of that century’ (ibid) seems a 
little farfetched. Bourdieu, after all, is surely right that there are moments of rupture of 
such intensity that they condition the terrain of history decades into the future. Simply 
to imagine how different what we call the ‘post-war years’ would have been had the 
Second World War concluded differently underlines the efficacy of conjunctural 
developments for historical change. Perhaps even the archaic Tsarist monarchy might 
have successfully adapted to modernity had more conciliatory tendencies dominated the 
young workers’ movement and been confronted by a more intelligent royal court. It is 
due to these conjunctural, agent-led processes that a vision of ‘social-historical 
combination’ offers a valuable synthesis, one which recognises how political and social 
actors are historical products of multiple development trajectories in the longue durée, 
but also have a genuine transformative ability to remake their social relations in new 
and novel ways, forging afresh novel development pathways.    
Trotsky, indeed, was a historian of the longue durée before the term had even 
entered the scholarly vocabulary but is, alas, rarely credited for it. Peter Burke’s 
remarks typify this intellectual blind spot in the academic community. He notes how 
‘the distinction between the short and the long term had of course been common enough 
in the historian’s vocabulary, as in ordinary language’ before The Mediterranean 
(Burke 1990, 42). But he insists no less that it remains, ‘Braudel’s personal achievement 
to have combined the study of la longue durée with that of the complex interaction 
between the environment, the economy, society, politics, culture and events’ (ibid). 
Replace the word ‘Braudel’ with ‘Trotsky’ and Burke could easily be describing the 
methodology he employed in The History of the Russian Revolution. This fact that 
underlines not only the way Trotsky has for a long time been unjustly shunned in 
academic circles, but also the extraordinary originality of that work. Published some 
seventeen years earlier to The Mediterranean it wove together long-evolving 
dimensions of the real life-process to explain the revolutionary climax of 1917 as a 
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crescendo of maturing contradictions. Indeed, the opening pages are particularly 
remarkable for the sheer expansiveness of the historical narrative (Trotsky 1967b, 21 – 
32). Braudel’s notion of the ‘organic but contradictory unity between the moment and 
the span of time’ – echoes the manner in which Trotsky discusses the ‘peculiarities of 
Russian development’ as a patchwork of diffuse but interactive cultural, geographical, 
social and economic processes, which had given Russia its specific character and, by the 
turn of the century, its deep, structural instability (ibid). Although the process he set out 
to explain was apparently local and conjunctural, the sociological distinctiveness of the 
Russian Revolution was seen as a feature of its long-term historical evolution within the 
international milieu. Russia, said Trotsky, ‘stood not only geographically, but also 
socially and historically, between Europe and Asia’ (Trotsky 1967b, 21 – 22). Even the 
early formation of the Tsarist state was shaped by the Mongol Empire’s (‘Tartar Yoke’) 
defensive alliance with Russian princes (ibid). This reflected the nation’s historical 
position as a bridgehead between East and West – both metaphorically in its culture and 
physically in its geography. ‘The West was a more threatening foe’, but ‘also a teacher’, 
and thus Russia continually drew upon techniques borrowed from the West in order to 
compete with its rivals (Trotsky 1967b, 21 – 22 ). It was these competitive pressures 
that led Russia’s rulers to attempt rapid industrialisation to survive intensified 
geopolitical and economic competition, which, in turn, gave rise to a small but highly 
concentrated working class, whose political radicalisation would ultimately make them 
one of the principal foes of Tsarism. While we are likely to recoil at some of the more 
overtly eurocentric formulations Trotsky uses, the methodology itself suggests a critical 
universalism, one appreciative of cultural differences and, equally, of cultural 
interactions. But, crucially, one can see in Trotsky’s approach the way in which the 
concept of ‘combination’ incorporates both the long-maturing historical experiences 
that concentrate within a polity through its relations with ‘the outside’ and the 
conjunctural struggles and interactions of actors to remake the future; as the past 
provides resources – ideologically and culturally as well as materially – upon which 
future trajectories of social development can be forged.   
As this illustrates, Trotsky’s notion of combined development and his 
application of it to Russia provides an alternative way of conceptualising the long and 
short durations. ‘Combination’ within and amongst states and actors, can be seen as a 
site of social struggle, interaction, ingenuity, creativity, and, ultimately, contingency, 
but also simultaneously and ‘dialectically’ understood as non-spontaneous. Social 
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actors are conscious and active subjects of history, but they are also ‘objects’ of it too: 
i.e. the products of experiences taking place across the longue durée. The genealogy of 
the past continues to impose itself on our socially constructed understanding of the 
present moment. Conceptualised in these terms, the theory of uneven and combined 
development not only offers an approach to the social contradictions that arise when 
diverse communities interact with one another across the terrain of human existence; it 
also provides a synthesis of conjunctural, agent-led forms of historiography – its focus 
on the particular, the contingent, the distinctive – with longue durée analyses. It 
therefore equally draws upon the strengths of the latter: a focus on theorising the social 
structure, tracing the evolution of processes across the longer span of time, and a 
particular concern, a la internal relations approaches per se, to integrate diverse cultural, 
geographical and social determinations into a concrete, historical analysis of social 
transformations. 
 
2.7 Beyond eurocentrism via social-historical combination  
I have now established the broad contours of the conceptual framework: a theoretically 
informed narrative strategy sensitive to the concrete and differential patterns of social 
development; an account of agency as bound up with the reproduction and 
transformation of social structure; and a resulting synergy of longue durée and 
conjunctural forms of historical analysis. I now want to argue that these theoretical 
foundations can also offer a non-eurocentric approach to historical development. This 
can be achieved if we conceptualise uneven and combined development backwards 
through time, allowing us to draw out the causal efficacy of ‘the international’ terrain 
(and thus of ‘the East’) on the historical processes that gave rise to capitalist modernity 
(J. M. Hobson 2011a; Matin 2012). This ‘redeeming’ of ‘the universal’ (Matin 2012) 
with a framework that treats cultural differences and peculiarities as emergent properties 
of intersocietal interaction, is particularly important in the Chinese setting. For China 
stands at the heart of the imagined Western narratives of ‘the Orient’ and the central 
conceptual form this took: the notion of ‘Asiatic despotism’ as a description of the 
Imperial state (Hegel, Hegel, and Sibree 2010, 161; Jones 1964; Marx and Engels 1968, 
13 – 16; Mill 1871, 8; Montesquieu et al. 1989, 283 – 285; Weber 1959).7 These 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7 Here, Weber stands apart, for his work grappled with the real history of China’s development in relation 
to the West. But his focus on the Confucian ‘mentality’ as the principle explanans nonetheless echoed 
eurocentric assumptions, even though he recognised the causal significance of the interaction of this 
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Western impressions of China appeared to be confirmed by ‘the century of humiliation’ 
and the nature of the collapse of Imperial China in 1911, which I discuss in chapter 
three. The revolution of 1911 had none of the ‘typical’ features of social revolution, i.e., 
bitter struggles amongst competing forces culminating in the violent overthrow of the 
old order. While the revolution of 1949 would have these qualities, in 1911 the Imperial 
state appeared to be simply exhausted and hollowed out, beset, indeed, by the 
centrifugal pressures that had been unleashed by its interaction with global capitalism. 
What better confirmation could there be, then, for the traditional Eurocentric imagery? 
Did this not confirm that China was indeed a polity marred by developmental sclerosis 
under an absolutist system with no regard for the virtues of free enterprise, and was this 
not after all the root cause of its failure to rise to the competitive challenge of the West? 
No one could deny that the Chinese elite and their system of rule were overwhelmed by 
the power of colonial capitalism in the nineteenth century, but the notions of ‘Asiatic 
despotism’ could not explain the specific historical contours of this collapse and instead 
subsumed these into a mythical and timeless image of a stagnant, archaic civilisation.  
Theorists of Chinese communism stood in a curious relationship to the 
eurocentrism of classical Western political thought. On the one hand, they super-
imposed the Western concept of feudalism onto Imperial China and so denied its state 
formation and property relations any distinctive qualities as such (Mao 1939; Yan 1955; 
Zhang). Yet, on the other hand, reflecting the impulses of the anti-traditionalism of the 
New Culture Movement (Lin 1979), they saw Confucianism as a decaying cultural 
remnant of the old order. This structure was not only to be dismantled, but those who 
appeared to be sympathetic to this worldview, or were simply labelled as such, were 
harshly repressed. Thus, Mao wrote in On New Democracy (Mao 1939; Yan 1955; 
Zhang) that defenders of the old system: 
…Include all those who advocate the worship of Confucius, the study of the 
Confucian canon, the old ethical code and the old ideas in opposition to the new 
culture and new ideas (Mao 2003).  
 
CCP ideologues also shared the eurocentric assumption that Confucianism was to blame 
for China’s stagnation, and attempts to break free from this cultural legacy provided a 
key justification for the carnage of the Cultural Revolution, expressed most explicitly in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘consciousness‘ with the polity’s political economy. He wrote, ‘To be sure, the basic characteristics of the 
“mentality”… were deeply co-determined by political and economic destinies. Yet, in view of their 
autonomous laws, one can hardly fail to ascribe to these attitudes effects strongly counteractive to 
capitalist development’ (Weber 1959, 249).   
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Mao’s encouragement of the Red Guards to destroy ‘the four olds’, ‘old customs, old 
culture, old habits, and old ideas’ (cited in MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2008, 113). 
Whereas Western eurocentrism had posited a radical differentiation between East and 
West, Chinese communism posited sameness insofar as they identified an apparent 
feudalistic essence to social reaction across the modern world, whose suppression was 
essential to the power of the communist order. But this, in turn, existed in an 
uncomfortable tension to the nationalistic melange of their theory, as they lavished 
praise on the timeless, heroic qualities of China’s people.  
Classical European eurocentrism was implicitly based upon the idea that had the 
West ‘arrived’ sooner then this would have simply hastened the demise of the 
Confucian order (Hegel, Hegel, and Sibree 2010, 161; Jones 1964; Marx and Engels 
1968, 13 – 16; Mill 1871, 8; Montesquieu et al. 1989, 283 – 285; Weber 1959). This 
ignores the dramatic, and relatively ‘belated’, shift in power relations in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, which was nearly three hundred years after the arrival of 
Portuguese sea traders in 1514. For most of its life China had thought of itself to be the 
centre of the world and this was not an entirely imagined sensibility, but reflected the 
real technical and social achievements of the polity and its political standing in Asia. 
Many inventions often associated with the development of capitalism in the West, 
actually found their way to Europe via the Silk Roads and libraries of the Islamic world 
(Anderson 1974; Hobson 2004; 2011). Viewed in historical retrospective Imperial 
China was never fully ‘isolated’ from the West, but had differing periods of intense and 
retrenched interaction with Eurasia across its long history. Given this achievement a 
variety of comparative approaches have been concerned to explain the genuine puzzle 
question of why a highly developed social system such as Imperial China was never 
able to move beyond a predominantly agricultural society and realise industrial 
capitalist development on the scale of the West (Anderson 1974, 462 – 549; Banaji 
2011, 27 – 31; Brenner and Isett 2002; Deutscher 1984; Elvin 1973; Feuerwerker 1980; 
1984; Hamilton 1984; Huang 1991; Isaacs 1961, 1 – 34; Moore 1967, 162 – 187; 
Skocpol 1979, 67 – 80; Weber 1968).    
The search for a non-eurocentric account of capitalist modernity is to this day 
largely predicated upon the criticism Skocpol levelled at the eurocentric research 
agenda in the late 1970s. She argued there was a pronounced tendency within Western 
sociological accounts of modernity to assume that European development was at once 
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endogenous, i.e., eschewing transnational influences and processes from the genesis of 
capitalism, and universal, i.e., irresistibly global in its impact:  
…All conceptions of modernizing processes necessarily take off from the 
Western experience, because that is where the commercial-industrial and 
national revolutions originated. However, the theoretical approaches that have 
been dominant until recently… have generalised too specifically from the 
apparent logic of English development in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. Especially, modernization has been conceived as a dynamic internal 
to a nation… The assumption has typically been that every nation, perhaps 
stimulated by the example or influence of earlier developing societies, would 
sooner or later undergo a more or less compressed version of the same kind of 
fundamental transformation… (emphasis added Skocpol 1979, 19). 
 
Consequently, reflecting her concern to break free of this eurocentrism, Skocpol 
attempted to move ‘from East to West’, i.e. draw a comparison with the revolutions in 
France and Russia in light of the more contemporary Chinese experience, reject the idea 
that ‘received social scientific characterisations’ such as feudalism have a universal 
applicability and look at ‘the specific interrelations of class and state structure and the 
complex interplay over time of domestic and international developments’ (Skocpol 
1979, xiii). Skocpol’s original point, however, arguably remained question begging. She 
had correctly argued that modernization should not be ‘conceived as a dynamic internal 
to the nation’ and noted the danger of assuming a general stadial pattern of 
development inductively inferred from the English experience. But this posed a 
question around whether English modernization itself needed to be seen as one 
dimension to a wider set of geopolitical and social processes, and, if so, then the causal 
efficacy of the Eurasian peoples’ interaction across polities could be integrated into an 
account of capitalism’s origins. As I noted initially in this chapter, Skocpol’s approach 
was significant for incorporating geopolitical causality, but by restricting the notion of 
‘the international’ to this alone, it neglected the social processes that diffused across the 
totality of human development, thereby ipso facto excluding the technical and social 
achievements of the Imperial Chinese polity from any causal role in the origins of 
capitalism. If such processes can be shown to exist they present problems for 
comparative accounts of the origins of capitalism per se. Even seen in its own terms, 
comparative analyses of capitalism’s genesis suffer from a lack of comparable cases; for 
if Europe was culturally, institutionally, geographically and geopolitically divergent 
from China, then it is not possible to ‘test’ which of these factors was the most 
important (M. Mann 1986, 1:502). Given industrial capitalism was indeed spatially 
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located first in Europe, then any analysis that focuses on comparison between Europe 
and the outside world is likely to fall back into implicitly eurocentric claims. 
Overcoming eurocentrism and developing a richer account of the diverse processes that 
fostered what we call ‘global capitalism’, arguably requires a more radical break with 
the comparative method. Put simply, no culture was ‘autonomous’ and only subject to 
domestic causes and so the cases to be compared had a causal impact on one another 
which undermines the comparison (M. Mann 1986, 1:503). If the development pathway 
undertaken by Europe was co-determined by its relations to the wider world, then 
transnational causes, which cannot be subjected to comparative analysis in the narrow 
sense, have to be integrated into the theory. Skocpol expressed this problem for the 
comparative method, but a social conception of ‘the international’ was required to 
resolve it, one that rejected the idea national polities were logically independent and 
rather saw their development as subject to reciprocal interrelation.  
Attempts to move beyond the comparative method narrowly conceived have 
sought to integrate the transnational dimension by recognising that it plays a 
constitutive role in the development of the specific qualities of the individual national 
polity. Philip McMichael proposed a methodology of ‘incorporated comparison’ in this 
vein, arguing that researchers needed to ‘ground units of analysis in world historical 
processes’ (McMichael 1990, 385). Similar assumptions have also encouraged the turn 
to uneven and combined development amongst non-eurocentric scholars who see it as 
providing a theorisation of their own claim that there was ‘no pre-interaction’ capitalist 
England, which was not subject to global processes (Hobson 2011; Matin 2012; 2013). 
Of these two approaches uneven and combined development involves the stronger set of 
sociological claims encapsulated by the idea such social interaction is a lawful property 
of social development. Seen in these terms the theory of uneven and combined 
development anticipates and internalises into the bounds of the conceptual framework, 
the peculiarity, difference and contingency, normally seen as ‘external’ addenda ‘added 
in’ to the analysis at a purely empirical, non-theoretical level. The explanatory benefits 
of this conceptualization can be illustrated by reflecting upon the social and historical 
basis for the rise of Orientalist assumptions in the West during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. These ascriptions of Chinese civilisation tended to naturalise 
differences into timeless ethnic, racial or geographical conditions of divergence rather 
than the historically specific dimensions of development that had fostered differential 
patterns. Montesquieu, for instance, contrasted Chinese ‘despotism’ to Europe’s ‘spirit 
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of liberty’ that was ‘so resistant to subjugation’ it had encouraged the formation of a 
plurality of freely competing states (cited in Anderson 1976: 465). Europe was seen as 
powerful due to its ‘liberty’, China as weak due to its ‘despotism’ and this divergence 
was explained by their geographies – with China’s ‘extreme servitude’ seen as a feature 
of its supposedly impoverished landscape (ibid). Eurocentric arguments nearly always 
tend towards this essentializing of development into the timelessly defined qualities of a 
people. Yet, they also, in their own way, curiously express the ideological consequences 
of unevenness in human development. Indeed, while Montesquieu was simply wrong 
about China’s impoverished geography, a more social line of enquiry, one sensitive to 
historical difference, can open up a means of integrating geographical differentiation 
into an account of sociological divergence. Vast geographical regions stood between 
China and Europe – to the southwest were the Himalayas, to the north the vast relatively 
unpopulated terrain of Mongolia and Russia, and on its eastern flank stood the Pacific. 
These great distances separating Europe from East Asia and their respective 
geographies did shape their experience of social development and crucially served to 
‘otherize’ cultural perceptions of East and West on either side. Orientalist imagery 
became interwoven into the ideology of the West in the late eighteenth century. 
Accelerated interchange with the outside world was complemented by genuine social 
advance, resulting in narratives of racial supremacy in Europe. But even these distorting 
ideological dispositions illustrated an anterior reality. Namely that social unevenness, 
i.e. the dispersion of humanity across the globe, gave rise to divergent patterns of 
development that were expressed in competing claims to cultural universality. The rise 
of Orientalism is therefore a quintessential moment of combined development in its 
narrative form; a clash of irreconcilable worldviews, emerging from different locales, 
but that now meet in conditions of accelerated social interaction.   
 
2.8 Understanding China: the variety of forms of social-historical combination 
Running through this chapter has been a concern for a social account of combined 
development capable of internalising in its conceptual orbit the diverse cultural, 
ideological, and political processes that foster peculiar pathways of historical 
development. This more general casting of the methodology, as a conceptual framework 
for historically specific investigation of intersocietal processes, naturally has 
implications for the debate on uneven and combined development. And indeed so too 
does the case study of China itself, for if causally significant forms of intersocietal 
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interaction can be shown to exist in the social physiognomy of the Chinese Empire 
under, for example, the Song dynasty in the tenth to thirteenth centuries, then it will 
represent a challenge to more narrowly conceived ascriptions of uneven and combined 
development as a phenomenon rooted exclusively in the international expansion of the 
capitalist mode of production (Ashman 2006; Ashman 2009; Allinson and Anievas 
2009; Callinicos 2009a; Davidson 2006; 2009). Those who have argued that uneven and 
combined development has this more general quality as a dialectical property of social 
development (Matin 2007; 2012; Rosenberg 2006; 2007; 2010) could therefore usefully 
explore China’s pre-modern history, particularly given the ‘semi-hegemonic’ role it 
played in Asia across the centuries. While my theorisation of uneven and combined 
development very much falls into the transhistorical combination wing of the debate, 
the temporal range of the case study – China’s interaction with the forces of capitalist 
modernity – is not sufficiently wide enough to throw new light on the specific argument 
over the existence of ‘pre-capitalist’ forms of social-historical combination. 
Nonetheless, the form of China’s interaction with capitalist modernity does indeed 
suggest the need for a broadening out and refining of the theoretical typographies of the 
concept. For most of its long period of interaction with capitalism, China experienced 
very little of the ‘sudden, intensive industrialization and urbanization’ that Davidson 
takes as the sine qua non of combined development, even citing 1920s China as an 
example (Davidson 2009, 15). Davidson does acknowledge the difference between 
Russia and China, arguing the latter was ‘still more backward’ and ‘had been had been 
broken by imperialist pressure but… instead of being colonized’ was ‘allowed to 
disintegrate while the agents of foreign capital established areas of industrialization 
under the protection of… local warlords’ (Davidson 2009, 14). Arguably, however, the 
radical extent of the differentiation between the rapid, successful industrialisation of 
Tsarist Russia from around the 1880s, and the primitive and sclerotic expansion in 
China right up until the 1930s (see pp. 106 – 107), puts a great strain on Davidson’s 
desire to narrow the remit of ‘combination’ to a specific moment of industrial 
modernisation in underdeveloped societies. The narrowness of the concept risks 
apportioning ‘sameness’ in the face of peculiarity, whereas a more general ascription 
informs a more historical investigation. This echoes our original discussion of Skocpol 
and underlines how more general concepts can help inform more historical lines of 
enquiry.  
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This more theoretically open-ended conception of social-historical combination, 
discarding exclusive and narrow definitions, can help us to explore the specific contours 
of historical peculiarity in China. Combined development in China gave rise to 
hybridity in social and cultural forms, the contours of which would prove hugely 
consequential to the revolution. To be clear, situating uneven and combined 
development at a higher level of abstraction in this way does not close off discussion of 
its distinctive forms that it takes, but simply sees these as part of an overarching, more 
general conception of the social process per se. To refer again to the locus classicus 
articulation of the idea, we can see that for Trotsky too the concept operated at different 
levels of historical generality and particularisation. Indeed, it is possible to develop a 
brief taxonomy of different forms the concept took in his original work, which illustrate 
the way his theoretical categories were flexible enough to deal with concrete 
complexities.8 Unevenness operated at three levels. Firstly, there was the unevenness of 
Eurasian development that produced differentiated but interacting polities and thus 
Russia ‘stood not only geographically, but also socially and historically, between 
Europe and Asia’ (Trotsky 1967b, 22). Secondly, there was the internal social 
unevenness of a polity; such as, the developmental disequilibrium that Trotsky 
described in the sway that the country held over the town in feudal Russia (Trotsky 
1967b, 25). Thirdly, there were the unique cultural characteristics of a polity; e.g. what 
he called ‘the incompleteness’ of Russian feudalism that gave it a peculiar character in 
relation to Western Europe (Trotsky 1967b, 22). Trotsky operationalized each of these 
features of uneven development in his analysis; they were seen as co-existing historical 
moments woven into, indeed ‘underpinning’, the historical narrative. The dialectical 
character of the framework lies, however, in the way these dimensions presuppose not 
only one another but also the kinds of processes that Trotsky referred to under the rubric 
of ‘combined development’. Here too a three-part distinction can be drawn indicating 
the inclusive nature of the methodology. Firstly, combined development referred to 
rapid, but differentiating ‘catch up’. This involved the non-repetition of stages of 
technical development achieved by competitor states because their emerging rivals 
could potentially draw upon existing scientific achievements; ‘the privilege of historical 
backwardness’ (Trotsky 1967b, 22). Secondly, there was a combination of events and 
processes arising from the interaction amongst locales each with their own temporality, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8 Thanks to Justin Rosenberg for drawing out the significance of these distinctions in discussion. 
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i.e., their own cultures, institutions and historical experiences; ‘a drawing together of 
different stages of the journey, a combining of separate steps’ (Trotsky 1967b, 23). 
Thirdly, there was the fusion of cultural and economic forms to create peculiar 
developmental outcomes; ‘an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms’ 
(Trotsky 1967b, 23). Lastly, the ‘whip of external necessity’, the term Trotsky used to 
discuss the geopolitical compulsion on polities to ‘catch up’ with the more advanced 
states in the system, straddles these distinctions between unevenness and combination. 
For it describes the pressures that exist within a geopolitically divided world with a 
plurality of state-like entities (unevenness) that are each engaged in acts of competition 
that co-determine their various pathways of social development (combination).  
All of these aspects are emphasised by one or other of the contemporary 
interpretations, but, arguably, it is only the more general conception that can integrate 
them into a coherent whole and see them as distinctive parts of a single framework. On 
this reading, Trotsky clearly implies that combination arises ineluctably out of the fact 
of unevenness; for the dispersion of polities gives rise to interaction and conflict 
amongst them. Posed in these terms the issue in the contemporary debate is over how 
exactly capitalism modifies these processes: i.e., whether combination becomes ‘active 
and causal’ only within the capitalist mode (Allinson and Anievas 2009). Our answer 
will depend on whether we think ‘the whip of external necessity’ (Trotsky 1967b, 23) is 
an exclusive property of capitalism (Allinson and Anievas 2009) or not (Rosenberg 
2006). Trotsky argued that capitalism ‘prepares and in a certain sense realizes the 
universality’ of human development, but in a manner that simultaneously increases its 
planless and complex character (Trotsky 1967b, 22 – 23). At first sight, then, this 
appears to follow closely the argument of Allinson and Anievas, because Trotsky’s 
chosen formula of ‘universality’ implies the world system only takes on an active and 
causal relationship to ‘domestic’ properties of social development with capitalism. But, 
if this is so, then we are left with the perplexing question of how a social formation of 
any kind could give rise to descriptive and latent forms of interaction without having 
active and causal properties: for the descriptive qualities must be conditional on social 
causes. This conception of ‘universality’ can only be rendered consistent with Trotsky’s 
other articulations of uneven and combined development, therefore, if we see ‘capitalist 
combination’ as an intensification of the interconnected yet ‘planless’ properties of 
development. Capitalist transformation accelerates interaction to such a degree that it 
universalises awareness of living in interlocking communities within a single world. 
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This is the ‘global village’ of sporting competitions, international organisations, 
transport and communication systems, as well as commodity markets and production 
networks, which so fascinated globalisation theorists in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Nonetheless, novel as much of this is, pre-capitalist systems arguably still harbour 
forms of inter-polity competition, even though the imperatives to ‘catch up’ are 
mediated unconsciously across a longer span of time (Hobson 2011). A corollary of this 
argument is that Trotsky’s claim that theories of the ‘repetition of historical stages’ 
emerged in observations of ‘pre-capitalistic cultures’ and the early capitalist powers 
(Trotsky 1967b, 22) should not be read as endorsing these approaches, but as 
contextualising their one-sidedness. While they had a partial utility, their limitations, 
which were always present owing to the fact they ascribed an unmediated universality 
to multilinear social processes, became particularly distorting once the most universal 
system human society had ever known, modern capitalism, still exhibited the ‘anarchic’ 
characteristics seen in pre-modern social development. In short, capitalism had 
thoroughly altered global economic life by universalising markets and the imperatives 
of industrial capital, but this had, paradoxically, intensified the complexity, diversity 
and sheer anarchy of human social development.  
This conception of the idea consequently puts the emphasis firmly on combined 
development: those criss-crossing development pathways amongst social agencies 
whose cultural, social, and economic relations intersect to produce change. These 
processes of interaction make up the singular and differentiated system of ‘the 
international’. To understand a single cog within it one needs to trace the series of 
interactive processes to which it is subjected across time and space, and which the 
single cog can, in turn, modify and change. It is the contradictory nature of this inter-
relation that gives rise to such diversity in forms of life, state, and economy, which, 
have ultimately transpired, historically speaking at least, to accelerate unevenness in 
social development. Accordingly, a theoretically informed narrative strategy is required 
to unpick these complexities of social change. It is this task, of tracing China’s 
contradictory and crisis-ridden interaction with capitalist modernity – a process that 
fostered such a peculiar pattern of social development – to which I shall now turn. 
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3 
From late developer to imperialist hegemon: Britain 
ensnares China in the new realities of global capitalism 
China offers an enchanting picture of what the whole world 
might become, if the laws of the empire were to become the 
laws of all nations. Go to Peking! Gaze upon the mightiest of 
mortals; he is the true and perfect image of heaven  
Pierre Poivre 
 
There is no sin to which they are not prone, no  
crime which is not common among them 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau  
 
3.1 China in the Western imagination and the rise of Britain 
Such is the backlash against the eurocentrism perceived, with more than a little 
justification, to have intellectual origins rooted in the Enlightenment, that the early 
modern embrace of ‘China’ in the Western scholarly imagination can all too easily be 
forgotten. Indeed, it was initially the position of Poivre and not Rousseau (both above) 
that dominated the scholarly discourse. The ‘cult of China’ (Clarke 1997, 37 – 53), as it 
became called, produced fantastic claims that ‘now appear a trifle ludicrous’ (Cameron 
1989, 290), but were nonetheless logical enough seen in the context of the assumptions 
that imbued post-Renaissance Western philosophy. The great ‘schematizers’, who 
believed a rational and moral order could be established through proper philosophical 
design, were fascinated by a civilization that appeared to practice what they had only 
preached and in doing so, especially given Imperial China’s longevity and cultural 
sophistication, affirmed their basic righteousness. ‘The Chinese have perfected moral 
science’, wrote Voltaire, and their ‘missionaries should be sent to us to teach us the aim 
and practice of natural theology’ (cited in Cameron 1989, 290). It is easy to look upon 
such claims with a certain derision and identify their ignorance of China’s real history, 
institutional life and culture, but this imagery of the Confucian Kingdom within 
intellectual consciousness grew out of the more direct and conscious encounter between 
Western Europe and China, which began with the Mongol conquest of Eurasia and 
accelerated after the landing of Portuguese ships on the East Asian coast. The Western 
Enlightenment is today so often held in low regard for its notions of ethnic superiority 
and dangerously ‘instrumental’ understanding of rationality, but the initially positive 
reception afforded to Chinese culture and the outlandish claims made for its 
philosophical achievements, shed light on a too frequently forgotten reality. This was a 
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time when a social consciousness emerged in Europe seeking a more complete sense of 
the world – its diverse geographies, cultures and dispersed inhabitants – and whose 
repertoires of intellectual thought were shifting accordingly. How could this process 
develop if not through a series of evolving and piecemeal representations? Explorers 
developed closer representations of territories and peoples far afield, communicated 
them by the written word and they consequently entered into the collective imagination 
of actors trying to apprehend the newly revealed world (Withers 2007, 111). The 
difficulty, of course, is that these new voices reflected not only European scholars’ 
cultural inquisitiveness, but also the global extension of its leading states’ power. This 
dramatic intensification of combined development would lay bare the antagonism 
between the universal cultural claims of ‘the New Europe’ and the traditional structures 
of the ancient Eurasian empires.  
Rousseau, Poivre and Voltaire took radically different positions on China and 
this reflected a genuine intellectual schism in Enlightenment thought. The shift, 
however, towards Sino-phobia paralleled changes in the global political economy. In 
this sense, whether positively or negatively conceived, or whether they were 
straightforwardly false or simply imperfect impressions, the cultural dispositions that 
offered divergent representations tell us more about the changes underway in Western 
Europe at the time than the actual physiognomy of Imperial China. It was a troubling 
reality that more radical critiques of absolutism, such as the one that Rousseau 
advanced, easily became bound up with discourses of supremacy. Here, then, the darker 
side of the European Enlightenment reason manifested itself in the creation of the 
ahistorical essentialisms of race, civilisation, property and ‘man’.  
Britain more than any other state would contribute to the globalisation of both 
the positive and negative aspects of capitalist modernity. The industrial revolution gave 
the British state a commercial primacy in the international market place but this 
dramatic growth in its competitiveness was juxtaposed in a complex relation to a shift in 
its public discourse away from the old dichotomy between heathen and Christian and 
towards racialized notions of ‘the other’ (Wheeler 2000). Indeed, it is impossible to 
escape the fact that Britain’s global turn to empire took legitimacy from this new, 
indeed ‘modern’, idea of a hierarchy of racial species with the white British man 
standing at the top. Perhaps fittingly, then, it was the Scottish scholar David Hume who 
gave one of the most naked expressions of the new racist worldview. ‘I am apt to 
suspect the negroes’, he wrote, ‘and in general all the other species of men… to be 
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naturally inferior to whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion 
than white, nor any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious 
manufactures, no arts, no sciences’ (cited in Wheeler 2000, 186). The genesis of racism 
negated the possibility of realising the radical universalism to which the Enlightenment 
aspired and the discourse connected quite organically to the colonial extension of 
British power. Nonetheless, it should be observed, of course, that Imperial Chinese 
assumptions also presupposed the cultural and ethnic superiority of the Confucian state 
over all other peoples, and, in this sense, the clash between these two polities, which 
was to prove so fateful to their development, was a conflict between two antagonistic 
conceptions of the world. Britain was pioneering capitalism built on the jurisprudence 
of private property rights, the rule of law, and commercial expansion; this economic-
institutional structure was territorialized, either by imposing colonial administration, or 
by encouraging the creation of sovereign states via the subtleties of competitive 
geopolitical pressures (and thereby resulting in modern diplomacy). Imperial China, in 
contrast, valued the supposed harmony of the agrarian economy, afforded no sacrosanct 
right to private ownership in land, industry or commerce, and conceived of international 
relations simply in terms of the tributary relations connecting China to the other Asian 
states. 
It is this ‘clash of fundamentalisms’ (Ali 2003) – the crisis-ridden ‘combination’ 
of two radically different worldviews and attendant forms of socioeconomic system – 
that I wish to explore in this chapter. From the outset I situate the analysis firmly in the 
‘condition of combined social development’ on the international stage, thus seeing 
global relations as an eminent part of China’s specificity. I first consider the Chinese 
tributary class structure in the context of debates on the origins of capitalism, giving 
particular emphasis to Britain’s role as a ‘late developer’ that drew upon the social 
achievements of the Confucian system. I then investigate the specific class structure 
established by the Qing dynasty after its seizure of power in 1644. These new overlords 
modified the agrarian property system and rendered the command economy structurally 
dependent on markets and inter-regional trade. The exhaustion of the scope for 
economic expansion within this system created endogenous tendencies to social crisis in 
the late Qing polity. In the last section, I look at how these existing patterns of 
commercialisation within the tributary class structure became interwoven with the rise 
of British capitalism and its financialization of international trade, making the late-Qing 
crisis a product of this interchange that incorporated China into the new realities of 
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global capitalism. My focus in this chapter is thus the transformation of its class 
structure. I show how a post-tributary colonial-capitalist economy was established that 
transformed the Qing state into a hollowed out shell unable to secure the interests of 
domestic capital within a capitalist system. In the following chapter, I trace how these 
changes structured the terrain on which a national consciousness emerged, and gave it a 
distinctively anti-colonial colouration.    
 
3.2 Britain as late-developer: technological achievements of Imperial China    
In the classical Marxist canon the theory of the so-called ‘Asiatic mode of production’ 
was an attempt to understand the class structures of non-European states. It acts as a 
nomenclature weaving together the scattered observations Marx and Engels made on the 
nature of pre-capitalist societies in Asia. The most thorough critique of this notion 
remains one of the two lengthy appendices Perry Anderson included in Lineages of the 
Absolutist State, in which he observed the differential qualities of the class structures in 
pre-modern Asia, and so rejected the claim that a universal mode of production with 
common features and dynamics existed across these polities (Anderson 1974, 462 – 
549). He also located the concept firmly within the tradition of post-Enlightenment 
Eurocentrism, showing how Marx and Engels tended to concur with the prevalent but 
wrong view that these polities were static, unchanging and suffering from a stagnation 
which made them incapable of forging new development pathways (Anderson 1974, 
462 – 477). Two elements stand at the core of this problematic ascription of pre-
capitalist Asia. Firstly, Marx and Engels believed, incorrectly, that communal property 
relations existed on the land with only the despotic state extracting surpluses via taxes 
on peasant production (Anderson 1974, 473 – 477). Secondly, the accordant absence of 
a strong aristocracy and their displacement by this stultifying bureaucracy was thought 
to negate the very possibility of a dynamic and evolving civil society (ibid). The latter 
rendered these states technologically backward and incapable of generating their own 
modernity (Anderson 1974, 476 – 477). Despite the strength of Anderson’s criticisms, 
the Asiatic mode is still to this day seen by some as a component of a multilinear 
conception of history (K. Anderson 2010, 155 – 157). Even if we leave to one side the 
overtly eurocentric tone of their discussions of Asia ultimately Marx and Engels did not 
have access to the historical evidence that we now do, which has revealed the relative 
dependency of Western modernity on the technological, scientific and institutional 
achievements of the Asian polities and the diversity found in their social property 
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relations. This new evidence challenges not only the spatial universality of the Asiatic 
mode – i.e. the ascription of a singular mode of production to all these polities - but also 
the temporal universality, i.e. the claim that the class structure remained relatively 
unchanging. For my purposes, this temporal differentiation is particularly important. It 
narrows the orbit of the study to the specific qualities of the social structure under the 
Qing dynasty, rather than attempting to find a ‘general’ ascription of class relations for 
the lifetime of the Imperial Chinese state. Given my explanatory concerns I need to 
study how the interaction of the Qing state with international markets and capitalist 
geopolitics gave birth to a ‘combined social formation’ that provided the terrain for the 
conflicts ending in the Chinese Revolution. Before I come onto this, some initial 
observations on China’s technological achievements can help us to dislodge the claim 
that this was a social structure beset by permanent stagnation. 
Imperial China was an advanced and pioneering developer for much of its two 
thousand year history and when the northwest corner of Europe began the economic and 
social transformations that Marxists have since termed ‘the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism’, they drew upon the technical achievements of Chinese culture. Viewed in 
the longue durée China’s technological and social progress had only relatively recently 
fallen behind Europe. In his original critique of the concept of an Asiatic mode, Perry 
Anderson listed out these accomplishments one after the other and the impressive 
number – further augmented by more recent historiography – speaks volumes about the 
historic productive strength of the Imperial Chinese economy. Metallurgy was generally 
highly advanced. Techniques for casting iron that the Chinese were using in the fifth 
century BC would not became widely adopted in Europe until the later Middle Ages 
and the Chinese also pioneered steel production from the second century BC onwards 
(Anderson 1974, 522). This provided the material foundation for early forms of 
intensive agriculture. The move from a largely wooden plough to one made entirely of 
heavy cast iron took place under the Han dynasty in the second century BC (Anderson 
1974, 522). The wheelbarrow was discovered in the third century AD – a millennium 
prior to its arrival in Europe (ibid). Silk was produced from the earliest origins of its 
history and porcelain production became highly refined by the fifth century AD (ibid). 
Technologies we commonly associate with the breakthroughs of Renaissance Europe – 
the firearm, magnetic compass, and mechanical clock – were invented in China during 
the eleventh century (Anderson 1974, 529). The early breakthrough in iron production 
also precipitated other inventions in manufacture (Hobson 2004, 52). By the Song 
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dynasty Imperial China produced a veritable array of iron products: knives, hatchets, 
chisels, drill bits, hammers and mallets, ploughshares, spades and shovels, wheelbarrow 
axles, wheels, horseshoes, cooking pots and pans, kettles, bells, chains for suspension 
bridges, armoured gates and watchtowers, bridges, printing frames and type, hinges, 
locks, stoves, lamps, nails, needles, pins, boilers, cymbals and drum fittings (ibid). 
Indeed, the Song period between the ninth and twelfth centuries is widely recognised as 
a high point for China’s social development (the ‘Song Industrial Revolution’) 
establishing many of the pre-requisites for modern capitalism. 
Anderson’s analysis was far ahead of its time, and strikingly rich for a mere 
‘appendix’, but it was, nevertheless, implicitly rooted in the comparative method insofar 
as he tended to see modernisation as a race that China had until recently led. Left open, 
then, was the question of intersocietal causality and, specifically, whether states that 
successfully fostered capitalist modernisation took advantage of China’s earlier 
accomplishments. In the Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation (Hobson 2004) and his 
more recent intervention into the debates on uneven and combined development 
(Hobson 2011), John Hobson has argued that early modern England benefited from a 
‘privilege of backwardness’, because it adapted China’s innovations, rather than having 
to endogenously generate these discoveries afresh: 
…Some of these ideas and inventions were brought back directly… (e.g. the 
iron mouldboard plough and the rotary winnowing machine), while others, such 
as seed-drills and the horse-drawn hoe, crop-rotation methods, ideas about the 
steam engine, coal and blast furnaces, iron and steel production methods, 
various techniques for cotton manufacturing and many others, were often 
learned from the Chinese manuals that flooded into Europe during the 
Enlightenment (Hobson 2011, 164 – 165). 
 
In short, this was a textbook example of combined development leading to emulation 
and ‘catch up’, resulting in a ‘leapfrogging of stages’ as Britain established a global 
economic and political supremacy that far exceeded China’s. Hobson is even bold 
enough to claim that this was not an unconscious process, but, rather, Chinese levels of 
development were positively aspired to by British elites (Hobson 2004, 192). He thus 
has an interesting take on the ‘cult of China’, arguing it was a typical example of the 
intellectual fascination with a leading state often found in polities trying to catch up 
(Hobson 2004, 195 – 197). The Enlightenment is thus seen as ‘essentially 
schizophrenic’, for while its discourses were crucial to the genesis of modern racism, 
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i.e. the moment when ‘race’ enters the popular lexicon as a political concept, it was 
influenced by Eastern ideas (Hobson 2004, 194).  
I agree with much of Hobson’s argument. In particular he is right to highlight 
the shift in public discourse in the West towards highly racialized narratives between 
the 1760s and 1780s (ibid). The decline of ‘the China cult’, justifications for the slave 
trade and the white colonisation of North America stand at the epicentre of this cultural 
transformation (Wheeler 2000). The industrial revolution formed the backdrop to this 
process, providing a material foundation for optimism for the ‘white man’s future’, now 
‘burdened’ with a ‘civilizing mission’ amongst ‘uncultured’ global polities. This shift 
towards racial narratives was novel, even though it had anterior, genealogical origins in 
the Catholic justifications for the Spanish conquest of the Americas, the slave trade, 
which had begun in its transatlantic form some two centuries earlier, and, similarly, 
with all pre-modern narratives of ethnic supremacy (Hobson 2004, 165 – 168, 197 – 
198; Wheeler 2000). There is always, however, a danger that once sociologists 
challenge a deeply pervasive error they push their corrective argument too far in the 
other direction, losing sight of the germ of truth which even the eurocentric imagery 
might contain. And this is the risk of Hobson’s tendency to suggest there might be 
wholly Eastern origins to Western capitalist modernity. Or, to put it more justly, his 
tendency to eschew conceptualisation of the causal interactions across Eurasia as a 
whole, and, thus, inevitably emphasis only one, non-European, dimension to the story. 
Certainly, the figure of Confucius is wrongly overlooked as an influence on the 
Enlightenment, but the fact remains these scholars drew upon a plurality of intellectual 
traditions from the West as well as the East. But it is Hobson’s most important 
argument and set of empirical insights which are ultimately question begging as a 
rounded explanation of the origins of capitalism. Once the technological dependency of 
the Industrial Revolution on Chinese science has been proven, it poses sharply the 
question of why these technologies were utilised for capitalist economic ends in Britain 
in the second half of the eighteenth century and not in China under the Song dynasty 
seven centuries earlier. Hobson rightly seeks to recast the questions we ask about this 
differentiation away from any standpoint that might imply an explanation rooted in 
timeless cultural qualities (Hobson 2004, 295 – 301). But one arguably needs to weave 
together the dynamic inter-relation of East and West in their combined development 
that together – neither wholly one side nor the other – gave birth to capitalism. While 
this question is outside the remit of my study, some observations on it will be necessary 
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to draw out the role that British capitalism played in establishing the crisis-ridden 
conditions for Chinese modernity.  
Hobson’s argument represents a particular challenge to the dominant Marxist 
conception of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. This is, of course, Robert 
Brenner’s claim that the creation of a class of free labourers whose access to the land 
was mediated by the market, i.e. who were forced to sell their labour power to 
landholders, and the corresponding interest these land owners had to raise productivity 
on the land to generate surplus value, played the decisive role in the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism in sixteenth century England (Brenner 1977; Brenner 1997). In 
short, Brenner argued, it was a specific form of social property relations on the land in 
England and not a broader sociological transformation of the global economy that 
created the conditions for the ascent of capital. Indeed, he was very explicit that he not 
only posited a crucial role for the transformation of property relations in agrarian 
England, but the decisive one (Brenner 1977). He, thus, rejected as ‘neo-Smithian 
Marxism’ (ibid) the commercialisation thesis that had highlighted how the 
unprecedented expansion of maritime trade in the sixteenth century generated vast 
deposits of wealth for mercantile capitalists (Sweezy 1954; Wallerstein 2011). 
Brenner’s almost openly ‘anglocentric’ (Heller 2011, 90) account did not therefore 
apportion causal significance for capitalist transformation to the social processes 
highlighted by Hobson and others: the role of commerce, trade and technology transfer 
from East to West. Nonetheless, as a theoretical claim that apportions primacy to one 
dimension of the social structure – the mode of exploitation on the land – it does expose 
Hobson’s failure to appraise the relative significance of the factors he highlights. For 
instance, in the Eastern Origins Hobson praises the economic development of the Song 
era for its plethora of productive improvements and technological ingenuity, but these 
are not then discussed as factors in the post-Song period. Instead different indicators – 
the continued role of China in world trade, the choice not to engage in empire building, 
and the strength of its manufacturing – are used to underline Asia’s relative strength vis-
à-vis the West (Hobson 2004, 61 – 73). This eclecticism badly undermines Hobson’s 
core empirical argument, for it means that he fails to acknowledge a simple historical 
reality: the dynasties that followed Song rule displayed none of its technological-
industrial dynamism in spite of their commercial prosperity and international trading 
links (Anderson 1974, 534). While Brenner in contrast offers an eminently falsifiable 
set of theoretical claims, it is not tenable to exclude as insignificant to the emergence of 
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capitalism such a plethora of historical processes (trade, commerce, colonialism, 
slavery, mercantilism, revolution, state formation, etc.). In my view, these various 
dimensions need to be integrated conceptually as interlocking, i.e. ‘internally related’, 
aspects of combined social development. In this regard, before we discuss how China’s 
relationship to Britain shifted from the latter’s ‘privilege of backwardness’ (the first 
application given in chapter 2), to a crisis-ridden geopolitical conflict (the second of the 
three applications), it is necessary to look in more detail at the class structure of Qing 
China.   
 
3.3 The tributary system: the class structure of Qing China (1644 – 1911)   
The eurocentric notion of the Asiatic mode of production contained one important 
element of truth; namely, that the state officialdom of the Ottoman and Chinese Empires 
constituted the ruling class in the social structure. This system of social reproduction, in 
which a relatively centralised state power exacts tribute from all other social classes, has 
since been characterised as the tributary mode of production (Anderson 1996, 462 – 
550; Berktay 1987; Banaji 2011, 23 – 27; J. Haldon 1991; J. F. Haldon 1993; Gates 
1996, 1 – 41). In China, its origins lie in the Tang dynasty, which gave an expanding 
role to administrators in a bid to secure the territorial cohesion of the polity (Twitchett 
1979, 4 – 8). Across this dynasty a caste developed whose influence grew at the expense 
of the aristocracy and emerged as a new ruling class behind the nominal figurehead of 
the emperor (Anderson 1974, 524 – 526; Banaji 2011, 27 – 28; Twitchett 1979, 8 – 12). 
This bureaucracy was nominally egalitarian with entry into it determined by 
examinations in Confucian thought, but, in reality, the bureaucracy and gentry 
overlapped, for a career in officialdom required an education that only wealth could 
secure (Banaji 2011, 30 – 31; Moore 1967, 166 – 170). Taxation of agricultural crops, 
the discretionary awards of landed property to office holders, and the control of 
industrial and commercial enterprises with statist (i.e. nonmarket) methods, were the 
principal means for securing their social power, but corruption was pervasive across all 
aspects of the administration (Anderson 1974, 525 – 526; Elvin 1973, 78 – 80; Gates 
1996, 21 – 29; Needham 1956, 337). The claim that the emperor held to the ownership 
of all land was of a purely ‘doctrinal’ character (Banaji 2011, 18), and in practice land 
was alienable and legally exchanged (Anderson 1974, 527; Rowe 2002, 485). This 
distinguished China from the Ottoman tributary mode within which peasants had an 
inalienable right to work the lands of the Sultan and private land holdings were formally 
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prohibited until the seventeenth century (Nisancioglu 2012). It also contrasts with the 
inalienable right of nobles to the control of their land, albeit conditional on their 
provision of military resources to the monarch, which characterised Western European 
feudalism during the Early Middle Ages (Anderson 1974). China’s rulers had no need 
for such concessions to the gentry as the state raised taxes directly to finance its defence 
(Elvin 1973, 69). But this difference was not simply one of governance and military 
order. In pre-capitalist systems, where economic and political power overlap, it involves 
a divergence in the nature of class rule. In the Chinese tributary mode, primogeniture in 
property was prohibited, and inheritance was therefore divided equally amongst all 
sons, making it harder for the gentry to develop aristocratic-style family lineages. 
Instead it was scholarly title that guaranteed large and prosperous landholdings (J. K. 
Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 21, 83 – 85, 181). The taxation on land and commerce 
also gave the gentry-bureaucracy a rentier like relationship to economic activity, 
siphoning off surpluses at the expanse of landed and merchant interests (J. K. Fairbank 
and Goldman 2006, 181; Anderson 1974, 525). It was, of course, the state that 
coercively upheld this system and, significantly, the Confucian legal code was 
ambiguous on the status of private property. A merely negative principle – the right to 
not have one’s property stolen – was upheld, rather than an inviolable natural right to 
hold property (Isett 2006, 78 – 79; see also Anderson 1974, 543). The cultural setting 
made the latter inconceivable. The Confucian state was the opposite of an impartial 
arbiter among private interest groups; it claimed the title of moral guardianship, so was 
culturally obliged to intervene as necessary to correct egregious actions harmful to a 
stable order (Isett 2006, 79). 
In the traditional imagery, the Confucian state is seen as inherently hostile to 
commercial enterprise, but this mistook the near-absolute philosophical hostility to 
privately generated wealth with the more pragmatic reality of rulers’ interchange with 
markets. The gentry-bureaucracy created incentives for market activity when it was 
deemed necessary to increase output and restore a stable equilibrium, but then tended to 
retrench this activity once private groups were perceived to threaten their power. The 
Chinese tributary structure thus combined three interlocking elements: a customary 
economy, in which ‘households participated in production and exchange according to 
convention and institutions (rules, practices, beliefs, and so forth)’; a command 
economy based on direct taxation and the use of corvée labour; and a market economy 
in handicraft products and surplus grain, cash crops, and foreign and interregional trade 
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(Myers and Wang 2002, 563 – 564). While some have argued the latter constituted a 
petty capitalist mode of production, albeit one that was subordinated to the tributary 
mode (Gates 1996, 29 – 41), these three elements were arguably overlapping 
dimensions to the social reproduction of the Chinese tributary system. Merchants were 
only permitted to operate via the system of franchised brokers, whereby the state would 
provide licenses to allow them to trade (Gates 1996, 27 – 28). If commercial activity 
was deemed necessary to restore economic output then more licences would be 
released, but as this unleashed ‘destabilising’ concentrations of private wealth, the 
bureaucracy would then curtail the activity, with only ‘uncorrupted’ merchants 
permitted to continue (Myers and Wang 2002, 606). Time and again in Chinese history 
elite discourse had become concerned in this way with the ‘threat of disorder’ to the 
‘stable agrarian economy’ that commercial expansion posed (Myers and Wang 2002, 
606). Cultural attitudes thus overlaid class interests, providing elites with meaningful 
narratives and socially constructed imageries that solidified the status quo order. This 
dynamic interrelation between culture and material interests could be seen in how the 
bureaucratic elite was conscious of the threat pro-market policies posed for their 
position. The state would restrict industry in order to obstruct the creation of a large 
class of free labourers separated from the agrarian family unit, which was considered a 
bedrock of the social order (Myers and Wang 2002, 608 – 609). A cultural commitment 
to patriarchal forms of reproduction thus consolidated an agrarian economy in which 
peasants had direct, i.e. non-market, access to the land they cultivated with the agrarian 
peasant family the basic productive force (Brenner and Isett 2002; Isett 2006). In this 
way, the officialdom successfully hindered the emergence of competitive capitalist 
production, because the customary and market economies were subject to bureaucratic 
rents, confounding property owners’ ability to reinvest in production to drive down 
costs and create relative surplus value.  
The Chinese tributary system was not however static and unchanging. It bore 
witness to the rhythms of social upheaval and change under the exigencies of conflict as 
much as any other class structure. One needs therefore to locate the specific contours of 
the Qing state, with whose interaction with Western capitalism we are ultimately 
concerned. Under the Qing there was actually a substantial commercialisation of 
property relations on the land, but the specific form this took was such that the majority 
of peasants retained direct relations to the land, i.e. relations determined by their legal 
claims to private tenancy and smallholdings rather than via the sale of their labour 
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power on a market (Brenner and Isett 2002; Isett 2006). Whereas at the end of the 
sixteenth century a majority of Chinese peasants were legally bound to the land in a 
form of serfdom or debasement, by the close of the close of the seventeenth century 
most peasants were formally free with serfdom persisting only on the manorial lands of 
the conquest elite (Isett 2006, 50 – 51; Rowe 2002, 493 – 497). In Manchuria the 
cultural concern to sustain a distinctively Manchu ethnic hierarchy coupled with the 
increased exploitation serfdom made possible, led the Qing to proactively extend 
manorial lands in contrast to the wider pattern of commoner tenancy (Isett 2006, 50 – 
55). Importantly, it was thus contract and not status that determined the mode of labour 
recruitment for the ruling gentry-bureaucracy (Rowe 2002, 497). The Qing dynasty 
appears to have held consistently to the view that, with the exception of its own imperial 
estates, a landlord-tenant relationship was not equivalent to a master-servant one, and 
thus tenants could renegotiate their lease or leave the land when its ownership changed 
hands (Rowe 2002, 501). This commercialisation led to a form of small proprietor 
agriculture with ruling class incomes derived from taxes and rents (Rowe 2002, 499), 
but it was one in which direct access to the land meant peasants could in their majority 
avoid full dependence on the market by focusing on subsistence farming that eschewed 
market inputs and specialisation, and thereby minimised their exposure to price 
fluctuations (Isett 2006, 178 – 180). By adhering to the principle of private property in 
land the state was also able to appease local gentry and Han imperial elites by defending 
their contractual rights to surplus. Consequently, in the core commercialised regions 
large privately owned estates remained the norm (Rowe 2002, 516).  
It is normally assumed amongst Marxists that pre-capitalist forms of surplus 
extraction have an extra-economic quality, based upon hereditary status, kinship, and so 
on, rather than the thoroughly economic contractual agreements between labourers and 
property-owners in the market (Anderson 1974, 403 – 404; Teschke 2003, 53 – 56). In 
this sense, the peculiarity of Qing China can be seen in the development of a 
contractual, i.e. economic, mode of exploitation on the land, which was predominantly 
based upon tenancy and de facto recognised private property rights. It was only the 
surpluses extracted as tax by the state officialdom, either directly from commoners or as 
a proportion of the landlords’ rents, where an extra-economic form of surplus extraction 
based on status (of being ‘in’ or ‘outside’ the officialdom) reasserted itself. This 
contractual rather than status-based surplus extraction could therefore be seen as an 
example of a capitalist mode of exploitation existing within a non-capitalist tributary 
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economy, of the kind Jairus Banaji has discussed (Banaji 2011, 282). In turn, this also 
means that British-led capitalist surplus value production could later intersect with 
existing commercial forms of exploitation that were an organic part of the Qing 
tributary economy. This peculiar amalgam of economic and extra-economic modes of 
exploitation grew directly out of Qing China’s combined development with the wider 
world. The Qing (Manchu) elite was alien to the Han Chinese majority, having 
completed their conquest of Ming China in 1644. The Qing state represented an 
institutionalised amalgam of cultural forms, for the dynastic elite retained their ethnic 
identity and a degree of distance from the existing Han ruling class. Geopolitical 
combination in the form of military conflict between sedentary and nomadic peoples 
thus fed into a combined socio-historical amalgam of cultural traditions in the 
Confucian state. In the face of widespread rural uprisings in the seventeenth century the 
partial abolition of serfdom amongst the peasantry helped to consolidate Qing rule. 
Politically disempowered, the Han Chinese gentry had little choice but to accept the 
abolition of serfdom on their estates (Isett 2006, 157). Peasants were thus granted direct 
access to the land but in a ‘decidedly non-feudal’ form that accelerated its overall 
marketability (Rowe 2002, 485). Private property was key to this process, because the 
state was able to appease landowners by upholding their property claims in relation to 
the rents that tenants owed (Rowe 2002, 516). The Chinese polity had a sufficient 
tradition of private property ownership – albeit, as discussed, the right not to have 
property stolen, rather than an inviolable right – to make these moves logical in the 
context of dynastic transition and peasant uprisings, regardless of the role played by the 
wider world economy. But Qing China’s combined development with the new global 
trading system is arguably crucial to explaining the extent of the commercialisation it 
witnessed during the eighteenth century.   
European maritime trading states confronted an already highly developed polity 
in Ming and Qing China and this was reflected in their demands for its commercial 
products. Sea power provided the connecting link between divergent class structures 
that became incorporated via trade into a global division of labour and with it the 
possibility of conscious and unconscious emulation. Their distinctive histories and 
productive capacities thus encouraged their geo-economic combination, which gave 
added impetus to China’s domestic pattern of commercialisation, heightening tensions 
between different class agencies within the tributary structure. In short, Qing policies 
favourable to markets interconnected, i.e. ‘combined’, with the growth of the 
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international trading system led by European states. Canton trade with Europe grew at 
an annual rate of 4 per cent per year between 1719 and 1806 and the export trade 
provided the silver stocks that fuelled commercialisation of the domestic economy 
(Myers and Wang 2002, 587). The European discovery of the Americas allowed its 
colonists to plunder vast sums of silver in order to finance their trade deficits with the 
Asian states and thus ‘inserted themselves into a global silver-recycling loop that hinged 
on China’ (Hobson 2011, 162). Silver coins were minted in Spanish-controlled Mexico 
and between 1700 and 1830 Chinese merchants are thought to have imported some 500 
million in exchange for Chinese exports, such as silk, porcelain, tea ceramics, zinc and 
sugar (Myers and Wang 2002, 587, 627 – 628). The Chinese state minted copper coins 
and paper notes were also issued by Chinese banks with fluctuating internal exchange 
rates between the two dominations becoming an important source of instability (ibid). 
In this context the agrarian economy had to react to the realities of monetisation, 
particularly once Qing officials started to demand that taxes paid in the form of cash 
with landlords in turn requiring this of tenants (Rowe 2002, 514). It might be expected 
that these changes would encourage capitalistic forms of competition with 
concentrations of wealth reinvested in production to expand production of surplus 
value. In fact, here ‘combination’ had a different effect. It gave life and impetus to the 
commercial elements that formed one component within the pre-existing social structure 
of the Chinese tributary mode of production. As supporters of Brenner’s approach to the 
transition debate have argued this commercialisation alone does not constitute capitalist 
development, because the structural constraints upon agricultural producers within this 
system allowed them to avoid full exposure to markets (Brenner and Isett 2002; Isett 
2006).  
The Qing offered a robust defence of contractual rights to the land in terms of 
both ownership and tenancy, and, despite it correspondingly undergoing marketization, 
the subsistence-based nature of peasant life meant they had little surplus to invest in 
capital to boost output. Instead the peasantry undertook a series of labour-intensive 
steps to increase output and ensure their subsistence in the context of a strong trend 
towards population growth (Peterson 2002, 5), which was one factor behind declining 
farm size (Isett 2006, 168 – 172, 188 – 192). In these circumstances, they diversified 
their output into cash crops such as cotton, tea and sugar (Rowe 2002, 580); increased 
labour intensity by working the land harder (Isett 2006, 199 – 201); made efficient use 
of cotton and labour by turning to proto-industry in yarn and cloth production (Brenner 
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and Isett 2002, 630; Myers and Wang 2002, 611); and sent family members out to 
generate additional income as wage-labourers (Isett 2006, 170 – 171). For the great 
majority of peasants, therefore, landholdings remained small and only ten per cent of 
agricultural products were exchanged on the market (Isett 2006, 161 – 162, 170). These 
peasants lacked the capital to improve productivity and employed these methods in 
order to make the best possible use of the labour and land that they had at their disposal. 
Even wage labour was an outlet for redundant family labour not used on the farm. As 
opposed to constituting a class fully separated from the land and forced to sell their 
labour power to a capitalist landlord. Tellingly, peasants that fell into this category of 
agrarian wage-labourers made up only eight to ten per cent of the population (Isett 
2006, 170,172). Large landholders divided up land to let out plots to tenants and very 
few played a directly ‘managerial’ role on estates in the manner one would expect of 
capitalist employers (Isett 2006, 162). In short, the social relations of Qing China 
retained a decidedly tributary as opposed to capitalist character. This was not due to a 
shortage of capital to invest, which was abundant in the more prosperous Qing decades. 
Rather, the question was how it was used, i.e. whether this wealth would be invested 
into production to create relative surplus value. Obstructing this was ruling class 
interests and the economic strategies they chose, because rentier forms of appropriation 
were deeply engrained into the cultural assumptions of the Qing state. In landownership 
it was prudent to accept private property rights that Imperial elites also benefited from. 
The monopolistic organisation of the private economy was a far greater obstacle to 
nascent capitalists, not only in terms of material interests it embodied but also in its 
chosen forms of institutional regulation. Private interest groups did, however, exist that 
challenged the rentier state’s monopolisation of economic life. The question, then, is 
why these did not spiral into a force for social change, one able to push for the 
deconstruction of the command economy.   
Lineage associations – in effect, extended family groupings of elite households, 
whose connection is traceable on agnate, i.e. male, lines – had been a recurring feature 
of Imperial Chinese life because they provided an organisational insurance scheme 
against the institutionally induced threats to elite status: i.e., ‘population growth, 
partible inheritance, an examination system built to reward individual achievement 
rather than birthright, and, in the seventeenth century, wrenching political change’ 
(Rowe 2002, 531). Private associations of this order were naturally treated suspiciously 
by dynastic elites as they represented concentrations of social power at least partially 
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outside the rubric of the state. Many started their life as defence associations against tax 
payment and, if sufficiently territorially concentrated and with a degree of military 
strength, they could be successful, for although they could not challenge the power of 
the Imperial state they negotiated from a position of strength (Gates 1996, 107).  These 
associations also formed themselves into ancestral trusts – in effect an early form of 
investment vehicle – designed to expand the wealth of its members to satisfy the 
demands of multiple generations (Rowe 2002, 535). In reclaimed areas such as the Pearl 
River Delta lineage associations were able to become landlords on a remarkable scale 
(Rowe 2002, 534). Under the Qing the lineage associations in their merchant form grew 
considerably wealthy as the state developed a structural dependency on commercial 
exchange to manage inter-regional trade (Isett 2006, 251 – 253; Rowe 2002, 531). But 
the Qing did so with cultural reluctance, aware of how the resources that made these 
associations efficient could be harnessed to hoard goods to manipulate markets (Isett 
2006, 254). It has been suggested (Gates 1996, 107 – 112) that lineage associations 
represented the nascent elements of capitalist economy. But in their investment choices 
they still tended to focus on land reclamation, irrigation projects, and usury, eschewing 
direct investment in commercial and industrial sectors, except as loans to association 
members (Rowe 2002, 537). They confronted the problem that these potentially 
pioneering sectors were plagued by risks and the Qing state had no corporate law that 
could provide for some form of limited liability protection for quasi-corporate interests 
(ibid). This point can, however, be extended further because the risks that private 
entrepreneurs faced were largely based upon the hostility of the state to capitalistic 
forms of wealth generation. Permits that allowed merchant and industrial activity could 
be easily withdrawn if this was deemed to have gone so far as to be destabilising. The 
rents the elite extracted were also funnelled back into the agrarian economy, as the 
source of wealth their class position and state authority depended on. The Qing may 
have been slightly more hospitable to commercialisation than previous regimes, but it 
stopped well short of encouraging industrial progress. As in commerce, private mining 
rights required the requisite permit and these were only granted in areas that suffered 
from rural unemployment, in order to avoid creating a class of landless labourers which 
destabilised the patriarchal family unit at the core of production (Myers and Wang 
2002, 607). Cultural hostility was rooted in the form of surplus extraction that 
underpinned the existence of the bureaucracy as a class, i.e. its fusion of economic and 
political power that in turn allowed it to extract tribute by extra-economic means from 
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all social classes. The Qing did employ economic, i.e. contractual, forms of exploitation 
on the land, but it still obstructed capitalist development through its rentier surplus 
extraction from nascent private capitalists.  
This analysis suggests one needs to account for the failure of Qing 
commercialisation to generate capitalist patterns of economic development firmly 
within the class dimensions of state power. ‘The modes of production of any pre-
capitalist social formation’, wrote Perry Anderson in a dictum more than a little 
pertinent in this regard, ‘are always specified by the politico-juridical apparatus of class 
rule which enforces the extra-economic coercion peculiar to it’ (Anderson 1974, 543, 
see also 404). As a result of commercialisation, the Qing state developed a quasi-
economic form of surplus extraction rooted in private property claims, but it was 
combined in a double-relationship of exploitation with the rentier forms that were the 
sine qua non of the tributary mode of production. The failure of Qing modernisation in 
the nineteenth century, which we will come onto, reflects the cohabitation of social 
forces within the state that were committed to a specific, archaic form of surplus 
appropriation. In this context, the smaller merchant interests in the Canton system, as 
opposed to the larger combines that dominated interregional trade, suffered from rentier 
practices, leaving them open to their incorporation via credit into the British-dominated 
system of international trade. Brenner and Isett are right to emphasise the role played by 
agrarian social property relations in obstructing the development of a properly free 
market in land and labour, i.e. an agrarian capitalism (Brenner and Isett 2002; Isett 
2006). But contra the Political Marxist school (Teschke 2003; Wood 1981; 2002) who 
share this social-property approach, it might be argued that their account is insufficiently 
political, i.e. insufficiently rooted in the political-juridical apparatus of the Qing state 
and the class interests it enforced. Recall, after all, the origins of the tenant-based 
social-property relations that dominated the Qing countryside. It was the Manchu state – 
a product par excellence of combined geopolitical development in the form of war and 
conquest – that introduced this peculiar system by way of raw military power and 
without the consent of Han Chinese landlords. It was this political choice, in effect a 
class compromise that drew sharp ethnic demarcations between Manchu and Han 
manorial estates, which institutionalised a small-holder agrarian economy. The Qing 
state was, thus, an exemplary example of combined development. The invading Manchu 
army introduced this novel system of social property relations on the bulk of the land, 
but at the same time underwent a process of Sinification into the structural and cultural 
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assumptions of the Imperial state. In other words, they were ‘naturalised’ into the 
system of tributary class rule. The elite Manchu caste benefited from this system’s 
rentier form of surplus extraction, which was by its very nature ultimately hostile to the 
buccaneering ethos of free market capitalism.  
This institutional-ideological foundation of a coercive state apparatus for 
tributary class rule is perfectly described in passing by Isett even though it is ‘external’ 
to his theoretical claims: 
Yet, despite the [Qing] state’s greater reliance upon merchants to circulate grain, 
this did not signal the precipitation of a Chinese “Liberalism”… Classical 
liberalism is committed to the notion that the self-interest of the individual is 
congruent with that of the broader society; it relegates the role of the state to that 
of legal guarantor of the social relations that therefore enables the pursuit of self-
interest. Thus, the liberal social order comes into being through the seemingly 
anarchic actions of individuals who in pursuing their private economic interest 
nonetheless produce a self-regulating civil society. No such ideological claims 
or vision can be attributed to officials of the Qing state; the Qing sovereign and 
his bureaucratic staff had a very different world vision. Their function, as they 
saw it, was to create a social and political order in which human behaviour 
would come to mirror principles of moral conduct that were idealized but not yet 
realized (Isett 2006, 253, emphasis in original).   
 
These cultural features were bound up with the social reproduction of the tributary class 
system and in practice its rulers were pragmatic in relation to private interests, but they 
curtailed them sufficiently to ensure that economic life was never ‘privatised’. It is quite 
a contrast to the capitalist state, which coercively upholds the privatisation of the 
economic sphere into a depoliticised civil society. In the liberal imagination this civil 
society is made up of rational, self-interested individuals, whose pursuit of their own 
interests is mutually favourable to all. In reality, the social power of capital is veiled and 
naturalised by this supposedly ‘de-political’ nature, with politics as such therefore 
structured around the acceptance of capitalist class power. Posed in these terms, then, it 
underscores the extent of the radical transformation in class power needed to put 
capitalist development on a proper institutional footing in late Imperial China. It is little 
wonder, given the remarkable longevity the Confucian state traced for itself into time 
immemorial, that social actors who had an interest in the privatisation of economic life, 
free from the tutelage of tributary relations, struggled to even comprehend an alternative 
form of rule. The cultural production of these mental-conceptions was clearly bound-up 
with the reproduction of the tributary form of class power. As Anderson observed, the 
timeless and doctrinaire nature of Confucian teaching, which lacked any kind of notion 
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of falsification, made the polity less able to generate the kind of ‘determinate paradigms 
whose disproof could have led to theoretical upheavals within them’ important to 
Western modernity (Anderson 1974, 543). Similarly, the conditional nature of 
Confucian rule under ‘the mandate of heaven’, with only rulers that guaranteed order 
and stability considered legitimate, also made possible the process of dynastic transition 
as an outcome to war and revolution, which still left the institutionalised class structure 
intact (Myers and Wang 2002, 606). This politically constituted form of class power 
explains both the longevity of the Confucian order and the way in which conflicts that 
could have resulted in the triumph of private capitalists tended to be resolved in favour 
of the existing hierarchies of bureaucratic rule. It was only when a new set of invaders, 
this time of British provenance, brought with them a fundamentally transformative 
mode of social reproduction, that China’s domestic class structure was uprooted and 
transformed, compelled to integrate into the unequal relations of bondage of the new 
global capitalist economy.  
At this point the narrative has already excavated several properties of the uneven 
and combined development of China’s social relations with the modern world. We have 
shown:  
• Its developmental strength, which, in turn, resulted in Britain’s related ‘privilege of 
backwardness’ as it drew upon the social and technical achievements of China.  
• The combined integration of the polity into an international system of maritime 
trade from the late sixteenth century, putting it at the centre of a silver-recycling 
loop linking the New World colonies with China as the most highly developed state 
globally.  
• The conquest and Sinification of the Manchu nomads into the tributary system of 
class rule, resulting in an amalgam of cultural forms and their imposing, as a result 
of a class compromise, predominantly tenant-based property relations in agriculture. 
• The global patterns of unevenness that allowed competing claims to universal forms 
of social organisation to become juxtaposed in the global order. Insofar as in China 
this was codified into the institutional assumptions of the Confucian state as an 
apparatus of class rule, it is crucial in explaining the ‘non-genesis’ of capitalism. 
The coming conflict with Britain was thus a ‘clash of fundamentalisms’ with 
radically differentiated conceptions of international politics and institutionalised 
class relations. 
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The next turn in the argument will analyse the crises that engulfed China in eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, arguing that it was not a mere question of ‘external 
imposition’ of a new order. Conversely, a domestic crisis of Qing rule interconnected 
with its colonial ensnarement. This represented an intensified combination of global 
events and processes that, intersecting with its domestic economic decline, transformed 
its class structure and dislodged the state as an effective form of rule as the social power 
of statist-bureaucratic interests it upheld withered.  
 
3.4 The late Qing crisis as a product of combined social development  
In the Chinese tributary mode of production economic crises were manifested as crises 
of overpopulation. Economic growth was principally provided by land reclamation, the 
large-scale irrigation projects this involved, and population growth, which increased the 
labour inputs available for the expansion of the productive forces. Consequently, in the 
absence of productivity increases this economic structure was prone to result in what 
Kenneth Pomeranz has termed the ‘proto-industrial cul-de-sac’, which he argues 
afflicted the entire Old World prior to the emergence of Western industrial capitalism 
between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries:9  
… The most “fully populated” (i.e. densely populated relative to the carrying 
capacity of the land using available technologies) and economically developed 
parts of the Old World all seem to have been headed for a common “proto-
industrial” cul-de-sac, in which even with steadily increasing labour inputs, the 
spread of the best known productive practices, and growing commercialization 
making possible an ever-more efficient division of labour, production was 
barely staying ahead of population growth (Pomeranz 2000, 206 – 207). 
 
In this economic context, social crises in Imperial China were experienced as a 
Malthusian crisis of overpopulation because ‘the production of food, fibre, fuel, and 
building supplies all competed for increasingly scarce land’ (Pomeranz 2000, 207). 
These problems were aggravated further in late Qing China by the commercialisation it 
had undergone which, by developing a more integrated division of labour, had 
intensified its internal developmental unevenness. In the core of the Empire the limits of 
economic expansion via population growth and labour intensity had set in, resulting in 
rising prices for grain and soy beans (Isett 2006, 235). With these price increases 
absorbing a greater proportion of peasant incomes, the consequence was declining 
prices in cotton and related cash crops, which benefited regions like Manchuria that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9 Pomeranz defines ‘Old World’ in non-Eurocentric terms as the developed states of Eurasia, i.e. China, 
India, the Ottoman Empire, and the European polities, in contrast to the New World of the Americas.  
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predominantly produced grain, allowing them to run export surpluses (ibid). However, 
even in Manchuria productivity was falling with population growth so these price 
increases only achieved an on-going stagnation in peasant incomes (ibid). This 
distinction between a core and periphery of the Empire, which was organised into a 
division of labour via the growth in inter-regional trade, was a product of the colonial 
expansion of the Qing. They had conquered large swathes of Mongolia in the north, 
Taiwan in the East, and Xinjiang and Tibet in the West, as well as consolidated 
Manchuria as a Chinese region, which, taken together, meant that the empire had 
doubled in size compared to the Ming epoch (Peterson 2002, 7). One can see, then, how 
this combined development of a broader swathe of territory and peoples elicited an 
uneven differentiation, with regional specialisation in output and the concentration of 
wealth and power in the core commercial zones of the empire. Cities and towns were 
centres of social power and rapid urbanization occurred in tandem with the early Qing 
period of prosperity, augmenting socio-economic unevenness. The Qing dynasty 
presided over some 30 cities with populations in excess of 100,000 people, meaning its 
largest cities tended to dwarf equivalents in eighteenth century Western Europe (Ekstein 
1977, 12; Vries 1984, 262). The commodification of landed property, the decline in 
corvée labour with the partial abolition of serfdom, and the expansion of non-rural 
commercial opportunities, led to a growth in absentee landlordism as the wealthy 
flocked to these metropoles (Rowe 2002, 497). This separation of the elite from rural 
communities increased the scope for peasant rebellion, as grievances with the gentry 
were magnified by their absence from local areas. In addition, the predominantly rural 
nature of the economy, low productivity, and land scarcity, meant that urbanization 
inevitably entailed a deepening in the exploitation of the peasantry, because, without 
developing industrial forms of capital accumulation, urban life was largely sustained by 
the redistribution of agricultural surpluses.  
In short, the ‘combined’ social formation of the Qing polity was an increasingly 
complex whole with economically, culturally and politically diverse locales and agents. 
Economic decline represented a considerable challenge to Qing rulers and the empire 
was rocked by social crises in the second half of the eighteenth century. With the 
pressures of social change taking their toll, Qing ‘subjects routinely engaged in 
processes of aggressive mutual struggle over issues of food, land, water rights, market 
access, rents, wages, women, gravesites, status, and countless other scarce resources’ 
(Rowe 2002, 555). For the Qing, one of the most important signs of decay afflicted the 
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structure of patriarchy considered so important to stability. Land scarcity and population 
pressure led to a growth in female infanticide as families prioritised male offspring as 
heirs. Once coupled with the polygamy of the elite this resulted in growing numbers of 
men struggling to marry (S. Mann 2002, 449 – 451, 454 – 455; Rowe 2002, 477). This 
amalgam of social tensions created work for the legal system of the Qing state, as its 
Ministry of Punishments had to deal with a growth in interpersonal, property-related 
violence (Rowe 2002, 555 – 556). The roots of the crisis in Qing economic decline, 
however, also fermented collective social action – from food riots, to rent strikes by 
peasants and labour unrest in the commercial enterprises (Rowe 2002, 556). These 
exposed the potentially antagonistic interrelation between different kinship, local and 
ethnic identities (ibid). Indeed, the propensity for association building in the earlier 
Qing period was bound up with an increased sense of cultural plurality encapsulated by 
the rise of heterodox religious sects (Rowe 2002, 550 – 555). These socially constructed 
mental-conceptions promising salvation interconnected in complex ways with patterns 
of commercialism. Merchant diasporas, for example, promoted the expansion of plague 
god cults with week-long processions thanking the all mighty from saving the city from 
epidemics (Rowe 2002, 552). This could lead to spectacular outpouring of sacrifice 
when epidemics did strike (ibid). But the most important of these changes was the 
formation of the White Lotus societies, messianic religious associations that popularised 
a heretical version of Buddhism, predicting the imminent coming of Buddha Maitreya. 
They launched a rebellion in the 1790s in anticipation of celestial intervention, but, of 
course, it was, in reality, driven by social and economic decay (H.-F. Hung 2011, 128 – 
134). Indeed, White Lotus religious heterodoxy was only partly characterised by 
millenarianism, for their cultural identities transcended customary local bounds and 
undermined patriarchal hierarchies, with a prominent place for women as doctrinal 
transmitters and even deities, giving them a heretical zeal vis-à-vis the conformities of 
Confucianism (Rowe 2002, 554). This gave the uprising a certain anti-establishment 
character, allowing it to connect organically with anti-Manchu consciousness.    
These centrifugal pressures in the domestic sphere thus reflected the 
commercialisation and territorial expansion of the Manchu era, whose origins lay in the 
geopolitical conflicts with northern nomads that Ming China had been mired in, and the 
integration of the Qing polity into the silver-recycling loop connecting China to the 
states of Europe and the Americas. The late eighteenth century crisis of Qing rule 
therefore arose through an intersection of local, national and international processes. 
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Prior to the rapid accent of Britain as a colonial and economic power, Qing China was 
already experiencing considerable domestic social instability. One can legitimately 
ponder the counter-factual possibility that had this crisis not intersected in its temporal 
sequencing with the industrial revolution in North Western Europe, the decline of the 
Spanish Empire, and the attendant triumph of British geopolitical power, China’s fate 
may have been quite different. But, while, as I have discussed, the actors existed 
domestically that might have pushed for the institutional changes necessary to privatise 
economic life and free private capital from the state command economy, nonetheless, 
the strength of the socially constructed mental conceptions of Confucian culture 
amongst elite classes, coupled with their integration into tributary mechanisms of 
privilege, suggests significant further social struggles and transformations would have 
been needed to push China in this direction.  
In historical reality, China’s domestic crises did occur in consonance with the 
rapid rise of British power. The latter benefited from a privilege of backwardness in the 
form of technological transfer and trading links. In this regard, Hobson is quite right to 
argue that European and Chinese development from c. 800 AD was never ‘even and 
separate’ and thus there was no ‘pre-combination’ industrial Britain, whose 
development can be properly conceptualised as separate and apart from its relations to 
the East (Hobson 2011, 165). But he renders his own argument deeply one-sided by his 
persistent use of misleading empirical comparisons. Hobson argues, for example, that in 
1750 the Chinese ‘share of world manufacturing output was over 1600 per cent that of 
Britain’s, while by 1800 the ratio was as much as 670 per cent in favour of China, and 
215 per cent in 1830. Only as late as 1860 did the British share finally equal that of 
China’s’ (Hobson 2011, 163). Hobson sees this as correcting the widely held view of 
China as weak and passive, but even seen in his own terms these facts highlight the 
staggering competitive collapse of the Chinese economy – something that he barely 
acknowledges. Moreover there is no recognition of the dramatically altered socio-
economic foundation on which Britain’s rapid industrial rise was based. Whereas China 
remained mired in the ‘proto-industrial cul-de-sac’ (Pomeranz 2000, 206 – 207) of the 
agrarian-based tributary economy, Britain by the late eighteenth century had  undergone 
the Industrial Revolution, sociologically rooted not only in its absorption of Chinese 
technologies but the novel social relations of the capitalist mode of production. The 
need for new global markets generated a corresponding expansion in the scope and 
range of its geopolitical interests beyond European shores: in India, North America, 
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amongst the new Southern American states emerging out of Spain’s imperial 
disintegration, and the Chinese-dominated polities of East Asia. This precipitated a 
financial revolution in trade that made possible Britain’s systematic extraction of 
surpluses from the global economy, allowing it to realise the profits of Chinese tea 
exports by as early as the late eighteenth century – an economic dynamic of their 
combined development that is simply absent from Hobson’s comparative analysis. The 
genesis of the late Qing crisis thus began as the exhaustion of the economic structure 
established by the Manchu after 1644, but in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries its contours shifted with the imposition of unequal trade relations favourable 
to the new British hegemon. Ultimately, this would foster social forces that uprooted the 
institutions of tributary class rule. Counter-factual arguments – the possibilities we 
might perceive had Britain not imposed itself on China – can now be left to one side as 
we explore the eminently concrete process of combined development that saw a 
tributary economy ensnared by capital. 
 
3.5 Combined development as semi-colonial ensnarement: the rise of British 
imperialism  
The British East India Company had been trading in China since the first half of the 
seventeenth century, following in the wake of its modern day ‘opening’ by Portuguese 
merchants. Across this period it was widely accepted that ‘the westerner desired the 
goods of the East and was able to offer little merchandise in return’ (Greenberg 1979, 
1). The European pillaging of Latin American silver was therefore key to making trade 
economically viable in the absence of British or European goods that were able to carve 
out a market in the domestic Chinese economy. The reigns of William III, Anne and 
George I had all passed protective acts against the importation of Chinese textiles in 
order to shelter fledgling British industry, implicitly recognising China’s competitive 
advantage, and as late as the 1830s British traders heaped praise on the superiority of 
Chinese textile products vis-à-vis Britain’s cotton exports (Greenberg 1979, 1). Indeed, 
the sudden shift in the imagined conceptions of China from the ‘cult of emulation’ to 
racialized notions of Oriental inferiority correlated closely with changing power 
relations in the global economic system. These discursive shifts were rooted in a new 
intersocietal context that saw a transformation between two distinctive forms of 
combined development. The (i) catch-up of Britain with China (itself predicated on 
their asynchronous but interactive economic development) was transcended as a result 
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of its hegemonic rise, thus giving rise to (ii) intensifying social interaction that 
effectively subjected the tributary economy to the disciplining logics of global 
capitalism on decidedly unequal terms. In turn, this fostered the further typography of 
‘combination’: a (iii) sociological amalgam based on a capitalist logic of power within 
the shell of the tributary structure (i.e. the third of the three forms of combined 
development I discussed in chapter 2).  
Such was the importance of Sino-British trade that to claim these 
transformations emerged from a struggle over the relations of domination involved in 
the production and distribution of two key global commodities, opium and tea, is to 
only slightly exaggerate the point. China enjoyed a near-total monopoly on global tea 
production until the second half of the eighteenth century (Gardella 1994, 124 – 125) 
and between 1719 and 1833 tea is estimated to have comprised between 70 to 90 per 
cent of all Canton exports (Gardella 1994, 34). In the seventeenth century, the East 
Indian Company was impelled to focus on tea imports given the protections afforded to 
British manufacturers in the textile industry and the lack of markets for British goods in 
China (Greenberg 1979, 3). Opium imports from British Bengal would prove critical in 
allowing the East India Company to balance its books and thereby avoid a spiralling 
trade deficit with Imperial China. Britain established a colonial trade triangle in which 
its political domination of India, which ran a trade deficit to China, proved crucial in 
offsetting the trade deficit that Britain’s new found thirst for tea was creating with the 
Chinese (see tables 1 and 2). Seen in these terms, one can at least contextualise 
Hobson’s position as these facts underscore China’s domination of tea production. As 
well as colonising India, however, Britain also used financial innovation to profit from 
Chinese tea production. Indeed, it was not, Chinese officials or merchants, let alone 
peasants, who primarily realised the benefits of China’s tea monopoly but the British; in 
the last ten years of the East Indian Company’s monopoly of the trade (i.e. up to 1834) 
tea brought £3.3 million into the British treasury, a stunning tenth of its total revenue, 
and accounted for the entire profits of the Company (Greenberg 1979, 3). The question, 
then, is how Chinese producers, merchants, and officials, were denied these 
extraordinary revenues that tea brought to Britain.  The answer lies in how the 
commercialisation of the Qing-era tributary system intersected with the geopolitical and 
economic qualities of British expansion. 
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Table 1: India’s balance of trade with Britain 1828–29 to 1839–40 (Rupees 
‘000,000) 
   
Year Merchandise Bullion Balance 
1828–29 
1829–30 
1830–31 
1831–32 
1832–33 
1833–34 
1834–35 
1835–36 
1836–37 
1837–38 
1838–39 
1839–40 
18.9 
30.2 
11.4 
5.6 
14.0 
12.5 
13.9 
21.2 
23.9 
15.1 
15.7 
25.4 
3.1 
8.1 
5.3 
16.9 
11.6 
4.7 
0.5 
0.1 
0.0 
0.5 
–0.3 
–4.4  
22.0 
38.3 
16.7 
22.5 
25.6 
17.2 
14.4 
21.3 
23.9 
15.6 
15.4 
21.0 
 
Source: K.N. Chaudhuri, ‘India’s foreign trade with the cessation of the East India Company’s trading 
activities, 1828–1840’, Economic History Review, 2nd Series, vol. XIX, 1966, pp. 358 – 359  
 
Table 2: India’s balance of trade with China 1828-29 to 1839-40 (Rupees ‘000,000) 
 
Year Merchandise Bullion Balance 
1828–29 
1829–30 
1830–31 
1831–32 
1832–33 
1833–34 
1834–35 
1835–36 
1836–37 
1837–38 
1838–39 
1839–40 
21.0 
22.1 
21.2 
33.8 
29.0 
42.0 
31.4 
50.4 
61.9 
40.6 
40.7 
10.1 
–10.8 
–13.7 
–9.6 
–5.6 
–5.9 
–13.1 
–12.1 
–13.9 
–12.3 
–17.4 
–21.3 
–4.0 
10.2 
8.4 
11.6 
28.2 
23.1 
28.9 
19.3 
36.5 
49.6 
23.2 
19.4 
6.1 
 
Source: K.N. Chaudhuri, ‘India’s foreign trade with the cessation of the East India Company’s trading 
activities, 1828–1840’, Economic History Review, 2nd Series, vol. XIX, 1966, pp. 358 – 359  
 
  China’s rulers were hostile to capitalist logics of power, but its economy still 
exhibited capitalistic tendencies that were favourable to incorporation into international 
systems of credit and finance (see Banaji 2011). These basic contradictions were 
concentrated in the Canton system of trade, as its creation was an example par 
excellence of the rentier assumptions of the Qing officialdom. Yet by impoverishing 
merchant classes it helped foster a financial dependency on British capital, thus 
encouraging the formation of a domestic agency for colonial interests. This trading 
system was established by the decision in 1757 to confine foreign trade with Western 
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merchants to the port of Canton. The rationale, to allow efficient administrative 
oversight and taxation of the trade and keep a close watching eye on foreign merchants 
resident in China, was a natural development of tributary power (Pichon 2006, 10). But, 
as we have seen, the tributary mode of production also created antagonisms between 
domestic merchants and bureaucratic interests. In the Canton system the former were 
the Hong, Chinese merchants who provided the point of connection between producers 
and foreign exporters. The latter were represented by the office of the Hoppo (Hubu), 
the revenue commissioner, responsible for taxes, duties, and the granting of merchant 
licenses, which allowed for the extortion of large sums from the Hong (Cheong 1978, 
15 – 17). ‘The path to the security of official recognition was’, thus, as Cheong put it, 
‘for many also that of chronic indebtedness, for some, to bankruptcy’ (Cheong 1978, 
18). Even the coHong (Gonghang), an association formally designed to secure the 
interests of Chinese merchants through price regulation, became an instrument for the 
predatory practices of the administration, which ‘added little’ to the Hong’s 
‘commercial capacity but committed them to official policy’ (Cheong 1978, 17).  
It was this reality of tributary class rule that provided the opening for the power 
of foreign capital on the Chinese market (Isaacs 1961, 6). As early as 1770 the Hong 
became ‘financial wards of the East India Company, dependent on it for cash advances 
to secure their annual tea consignments’ (Gardella 1994, 35). Foreign bribery secured 
the dissolution of the coHong (Gonghang) in 1771 and by 1777 only four of the eleven 
Hong merchants were solvent, with British private traders having extended them credit 
on the egregious terms of 20 per cent per annum (Greenberg 1979, 21). The resultant 
intervention of the Crown to secure the contractual property claims of British traders 
foreshadowed the gunboat diplomacy that would lead to the two Opium Wars (1839 – 
1842; 1856 – 1860). Revealed time and again in these conflicts was the divergence in 
class interests that these states each defended: the Chinese state was concerned to 
constrict free accumulation in the name of social order, the British were committed to 
use military power to defend the liberty of their subjects’ commercial activity; i.e., in 
other words, the British state was prepared to use public force to coercively defend a 
private sphere of globalised capital accumulation.  
The shifting role of the East Indian Company itself reflected this transition 
towards a liberal conception of the relationship between state and society. It was of 
course a monopoly whose activity was sanctioned by the British Crown and, indeed, its 
formal organisational structure shared some of the cartel-like features of the coHong 
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(Gonghang). However, from the early eighteenth century it allowed the supercargos – 
the agents who managed the affairs of the Company in China and India – to engage in 
private trade on their own account, and a similar perk was also afforded to commanders 
and officers (Greenberg 1979, 18 – 19). This allowed them to accumulate capital that 
they then wished to reinvest in the trade. Indian Agency Houses formed in the 1780s 
were, as a result, effectively asset management trusts that reinvested officers’ deposits 
to generate greater returns (Pichon 2006, 5 – 6). British colonial annexation also 
provided avenues for officers to get considerably rich. The right of revenue collection in 
India known as diwani and the obtaining of a sinecure over farmland provided avenues 
for rapid wealth generation (Pichon 2006, 5). Significantly, these rentier practices, 
which would not be out of place within the Chinese tributary structure, fed into the 
private accumulation of capital for these British colonists. It is also the case that the 
British locked onto existing patterns of commercialisation within China and India, but 
these now became integrated into a global system of capital production and circulation. 
In this context, the East India Company represented a transitional form. Agency Houses 
undermined the Company’s monopoly and posited a reorganisation of the colonial state 
that removed it from the economy and coercively upheld individual rights to private 
capital accumulation. The India acts in parliament (e.g. in 1773, 1784, 1833, and 1858) 
reflected the playing out of this tension between the capitalist dynamic of accumulation 
and the anachronistic political form (fusing economic and political interests) that had 
provided the original catalyst for it. If the process being described here is the emergence 
of a fully capitalist world economy, then it suggests diverse forms of production and 
institutional innovation helped in its consolidation.   
The diverse mechanisms that were utilised to integrate the Chinese and Indian 
economies into this new economic order exemplify the way in which different 
development trajectories became subject to a process of mutual conditioning on the 
international terrain. World-systems theorists tend to identify how the Chinese and 
Indian polities were incorporated into international systems of trade, with its capitalist 
dynamic, and conclude that this offers prima facie grounds to ascribe a capitalist 
character to the overall process. Consequently, they eschew historical analysis of the 
divisions of labour in discrete polities that became incorporated into a generalised 
system of commodity production based on the exploitative extraction of unpaid labour 
as surplus value (Banaji 2011, 325 – 326, 332). In contrast, treating these trajectories as 
outcomes of combined development can help us to ascertain the variety of mechanisms 
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in discrete polities, whose mutual interchange led to the emergence of a distinctively 
capitalist economic order. To be clear, there was a world system whose economic 
relations were causally significant to capitalist development (Heller 2011, 215 – 242). 
British capitalist expansion was built upon the development of agrarian and industrial 
capitalism at home and its control of the Atlantic slave trade and the Asian trading 
system abroad. Its sovereignty over India was critical to offsetting its trade deficit with 
China. The Company had a monopoly on opium production in Bengal, which private 
traders illicitly shipped to China (defying the Imperial ban of 1799) and this led to a 
drain of silver out of the Chinese economy, which, in turn, deepened Chinese traders 
dependency on British finance (Cheong 1978, 5 – 21; Greenberg 1979, 1 – 40; Pichon 
2006, 1 – 20; Wong 2002, 412). Between 1828 and 1838 India’s trade surplus with 
China almost doubled (see table 2) thanks to its rapidly growing market in opium 
consumption and from 1817 to 1833 British private traders were running an average 
surplus of £2 million per year having established a series of Agency Houses in Canton 
that were modelled on already established operations in India (Pichon 2006, 13 – 14). 
Private traders put their capital back into Company bills of exchange, which the latter 
used to finance tea exports and the costs of India governance (Cheong 1978, 29 – 31; 
Greenberg 1979, 25 – 26). India was a net exporter of bullion to Britain as repayment of 
credit and interest on loans, even though it ran a net trade surplus (i.e. with all its 
trading partners) into the mid eighteenth century. Financialization, i.e. the use of credit 
to create dependency, added a ‘subtlety’ to this process, but ultimately these British-
dominated trading relations systematically siphoned capital abroad. China was reduced, 
in effect, to a semi-colonial client economy of Britain. 
The nineteenth century growth in world trade led to further financial innovation. 
The bullion shipment system came to an end partly out of the Canton liquidity crisis 
(1811 to 1815), which underlined the need for private bills of exchange as an alternative 
to the use of Company-backed paper money underpinned by occasional bullion 
shipment (Cheong 1978, 5 – 21). Its end was partly also determined by the geopolitical 
conditions created by the Mexican War of Independence and Napoleonic Wars. These 
conflicts bankrupted mainland Europe, resulting in the financial hegemony of the City 
of London, which was naturally grounded in Britain’s colonial interests and the growing 
power of its domestic industry (McMichael 1985; McMichael 2004, 1 – 34). British 
policy in the nineteenth century was committed to expanding global markets for its 
industrial products through a combination of force and consent. Capitalist expansion 
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was thus intimately bound up with its colonial policies of annexation, and semi-colonial 
trade and financial practices that advantaged British producers at the expense of the 
periphery. The overall dynamic of the accumulation process was rooted in a liberal 
conception of jurisprudence that promoted the privatisation of economic life.  British 
capital was thus ‘free’ to exploit resources found at its disposal in this international 
order ‘opened’ by its military and geopolitical mechanisms of raw power. Contrary to 
Political Marxism (Brenner 1977; 1997; Harman and Brenner; Wood 2002), then, the 
growth in wage labour – and the attendant role of relative surplus value production, in 
contrast to that played by absolute surplus value – was but one moment in a dynamic 
circuit of capital production and realisation, which included pre-modern modes of 
exploitation (Heller 2011). In this sense, the diversity of the Indian and Chinese cases 
illustrated the inherent pragmatism of capital as its moves through this circuit of 
accumulation. Modes of exploitation more commonly associated with pre-modern 
forms of surplus extraction were readily utilised. This should not, however, lead to a 
simple acceptance of the arguments of world systems theorists (Wallerstein 2011; 
Wallerstein 2011), i.e. that integration into the world market ipso facto renders a pre-
modern economy capitalist (Banaji 2011, 325 – 326, 332). In both China and India, 
British capitalist expansion integrated itself into existing patterns of capitalistic 
commercial activity. Indeed, as I have argued in relation to China, it is conceivable that 
these domestic processes could have resulted in a capitalist dynamic of expanded 
reproduction had the coercive apparatus of the state been transformed in such a way that 
it positively promoted private accumulation. However, the weakness of merchants in 
relation to the officialdom concerned only one strand of this real but obstructed 
tendency to capitalist development. The other strand extended into the sphere of 
production with the growth of commercial markets in cash crops and the rise of 
commoner tenancy, i.e. exploitation based on contract rather than status. The 
importance of China’s tea production to the global capitalist economy in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries is obvious, but the question is whether this integration into the 
global market elicited a corresponding transformation in its domestic class structure. 
Whether Chinese development in the nineteenth century took on a capitalist character 
will depend on the nature of the financing of the trade and if it had the character of 
capital investment seeking to generate surplus value: if, that is, Company loans were not 
simply a means of purchase according to the laws of simple circulation and exchange, 
but, rather, were advances of capital in money form that enabled the reproduction of 
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labour power (means of subsistence) and the means of production (seeds, etc) (Banaji 
2011, 304). In other words, a tenancy system might well be integrated into a circuit of 
investment, surplus value generation and realisation via sale, which renders the small 
producer dependent on the capital for their reproduction. 
In late Qing China tea-producing regions exhibited these features as they 
underwent export-led expansion. Earlier I described how the Canton Hongs were 
pushed into the hands of the Company, which, from the 1770s onwards, became their 
principal support and creditor in the Canton tea market, providing the cash advances 
necessary for procurement (Gardella 1994, 35). In most cases, Hongs did not own tea 
fields, but acted as brokers and purchased tea from smaller tea wholesalers. The latter 
also lacked sufficient funds to trade on their own capital so were dependent on Hong 
credit (Gardella 1994, 35 – 36). A clear hierarchy of debtor-creditor relations thus 
extended downwards from the East India Company. Moreover, this exhibited a fusion 
of the mercantile and usurer capital of the type that Banaji describes in British India: 
 
There was scarcely a ‘merchant’ who could not also be classified as a 
‘moneylender’, and vice versa. But it would be wrong to conclude, conversely, 
that such ‘merchants-cum moneylenders’ were pure agents of the circulation-
process (in the sense in which merchant’s and commercial capital are within the 
developed bourgeois mode of production). Precisely because the ‘occupational’ 
classifications of capital did not reflect a strict division of labour of the sort that 
prevails where industrial capital predominates, the concomitant distinction, 
between purely ‘parasitic’ and basically ‘productive’ types of capital, becomes 
somewhat misleading (Banaji 2011, 293). 
  
In Qing China, commercial capital gradually extended its control over production, but 
this did not generally take a managerial form of agrarian capitalism. In the Wuyi 
Mountains, part of the tea producing region of Fujian, merchants gradually purchased 
the mountain side real estate suitable for tea production from the eighteenth century 
onwards (Gardella 1994, 43). They would then let the land out to tenant producers and 
established production networks for processing and packaging that employed rural 
wage-labour (Gardella 1994, 45 – 46). It would have been difficult for tea wholesalers 
to establish fully modern capitalist forms of rural organisation, because they lived in a 
state of credit dependency to the Hong (and, ultimately, the Company) and thus lacked 
sufficient capital to reinvest in production. While there were some wealthier peasants, 
the majority were small petty producers who were forced to mortgage their goods in 
advance to buyers in order to subsist (Gardella 1994, 45 – 46). The picture that emerges 
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from these relations is a system of social reproduction dominated by the monied 
capitalist (and ultimately the Company) in which petty producers could not avoid 
market dependency because they were farming cash crops in a highly monetised 
economy. In these circumstances, rent and interest are forms of appearance of surplus 
value and the means of production belong only nominally to the petty-producer. 
Consequently, rent and interest become, thus, ‘the necessary forms of appearance of 
capitalist relations in the conditions of a small production economy where the process of 
labour remained the process of the small producer’ (Banaji 2011, 306 – 307). This was 
therefore a form of semi-colonial capitalism whose development had serious social 
consequences for the section of Chinese peasants this embroiled. Indeed, one source 
describes the situation in Fujian during the reign of Emperor Daoguang (1821- 1850) as 
follows:     
From the [time when] the Qing… traded with the foreigners, the din of 
numerous merchants enveloped the markets. Acting as if they were brokers, the 
Buddhists and Taoists in the midst of the mountains monopolized the trade. The 
worst ones are depraved and wild, and no better than cheap peddlars. They 
abscond and bilk their creditors; the smash up Buddha images, melt down bells 
and gongs, and sell their dwellings, monasteries, and mountain fields to the big 
merchants… Profits are such that wicked go-betweens cut down woods and 
remove many houses [to clear land for tea] (cited in Gardella 1994, 43).  
 
In this way, capitalist relations of production arising from afar were interwoven with 
existing patterns of commercialisation at home, in a contradictory inter-penetration of 
economic forms. With the intervention of the East Indian Company a system of credit-
debtor relations intersected with Chinese merchant capital – and the obstacles put upon 
its development by the tributary system - which allowed for the extraction of surplus 
value and siphoning of it abroad. The credit dependency of Chinese merchants on their 
foreign patrons meant that they lacked sufficient capital to reinvest in production that 
could have raised productivity and started to close the vast competitive gulf that had 
opened up with Britain. The result was systematic underdevelopment as the Chinese 
economy was subjected to this colonial practice.  
There was, however, a ‘new rich’ that developed in China’s urban centres. Often 
cited in this regard are the compradors, agents that worked for foreign firms as a ‘go-
between’ to Chinese dealers. They also traded on their own account and many grew 
exceedingly wealthy. It was these figures that took the first steps to establishing a 
Chinese presence in shipping, financial services and modern industry in the late 
nineteenth century (Feuerwerker 1980b, 56 – 57). But domestic industry suffered from 
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the lack of productivity improvements in the agrarian economy, as China could not 
generate the internal demand needed to develop large consumer markets for 
manufactured products. Agriculture remained blighted by low productivity with 
population increases, in the absence of a transformation in the division of labour, 
resulting in smaller farm plots and squeezed peasant incomes (Feuerwerker 1980b, 5 – 
6). Peasants adapted by shifting to crops that required greater labour inputs and less 
land, and by increasing their dependency on the market with the production of cash 
crops (Feuerwerker 1980b, 6 – 9). Such changes were perfectly possible without 
modifying the dominant smallholder tenancy system. The living contradiction of this 
process lay in how the persistent absence of wage-labour-based capitalist agriculture 
resulted from the domination of the monied capitalist over the economy, because returns 
from land were modest in comparison to those that could be garnered from commerce 
and moneylending, creating economic incentives for elites working against a 
concentration of large landholdings (Feuerwerker 1980b, 12 – 13). It was this enduring 
agricultural backwardness that placed important limitations on Chinese industry, and for 
that matter the domestic market per se, because the rural economy could not generate 
sufficient demand for manufactured products, making new ventures highly risk prone 
and often dependent on corrupt links of patronage flowing from official channels 
(Feuerwerker 1980b, 33 – 34). Entrepreneurial investors in these conditions were often 
dependent upon tributary rule and thus undermined private, market competition:    
Given a limited market, the lack of a modern banking system which could 
systematically channel savings into industrial investment, a central government 
whose financial resources were severely limited, and competition from imported 
goods and foreign-owned factories in China, it is perhaps not surprising that 
some regional officials and the entrepreneurs who were associated with them 
attempted to establish limited but protected industrial empires for their mutual 
profit. Few purely private ventures could expect success (Feuerwerker 1980b, 
34).  
This was a feature of a tributary economy that had been reduced to a largely 
institutional shell against a backdrop of capitalist activity whose substantive benefits 
were being siphoned abroad. The Qing government was ideologically and socially 
hostile to creating an institutional framework favourable to private capital accumulation 
(Feuerwerker 1980b, 38 – 39), i.e. a coercive structure that encouraged and defended a 
privately owned sphere of production and trade. Social actors did not emerge that could 
push for these transformations in the form of the state necessary to move China onto the 
course of development seen by other late developing powers. Accordingly, the class 
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structure established in late Qing China was novel in relation to the form of social-
historical combination often seen in ‘late developers’. There was no juxtaposition of 
rapid industrial development with archaic forms of state and modes of exploitation, but 
instead a specific form of capitalist development emerged in which predatory colonial 
practices intersected with existing forms of commercialisation to give the monied 
capitalist a semi-hegemonic role. British financial innovation in world trade intersected 
with Qing-era encouragement of markets, but without creating any security or incentive 
for domestic private capital investment in production. The resulting scale of its 
underdevelopment can be illustrated by a contrast with Tsarist Russia – a state whose 
economy was widely regarded as backward vis-à-vis the other European powers.  
Russia’s period of industrial ascent in the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century saw dramatic technical and social modernisation. It had a large-scale industrial 
manufacturing labour force of 3 million by 1913 (Crisp 1978, 350). A total of 10.4 
million workers, which represented 23 per cent of its active labour force, were in non-
agricultural employment in the same year (Crisp 1978, 333) and this was out of a total 
population of c. 139.9 million (Davies, Harrison, and Wheatcroft 1994, 59). Some two 
decades later, China, in 1933, could record only a fraction of this development with less 
than 1 million workers employed in its factories (Lippit 1987, 47) out of a total 
population of c. 500 million (Feuerwerker 1980a, 35). The historical role of handicraft 
industries in the tributary mode of production partially disguised this 
underdevelopment. In 1914 manufacturing and services constituted 20 per cent of 
China’s GDP, which was a similar proportion to the economy of Tsarist Russia at the 
time, but only a small proportion of this, estimated at between 3 and 7 per cent GDP, 
used modern industrial techniques with small handicraft production still playing a much 
larger role in the economy (Ekstein 1977, 12 – 13). China’s factories also remained 
small in comparison with Russia. One study undertaken in 11 provinces and the four 
most developed cities in 1935 found that 48.7 per cent of the factories employed less 
than 30 workers with only 5 per cent employing more than 500 (Riskin 1987, 21). 
Contrastingly, for the Russian industrial labour force of 1910, nearly two and a half 
decades earlier, around half were already employed in factories of more than 500 
workers (Bater 1987, 27). It seems reasonable on the basis of this contrast to argue that 
Tsarist Russia was ten times more industrialised than post-Imperial China, because for a 
country less than a third of the size its industrial labour force was three times larger and 
concentrated in large-scale, heavy industrial units rather than a plethora of small 
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factories. Although Russian statistics tended to exaggerate the proportion of large 
industrial units relative to small,10 it is clear relatively underdeveloped Tsarist Russia 
was significantly more developed than China. This difference in levels of development 
would prove crucial to the character of their respective revolutions and it grew directly 
out of the legacy left behind by tributary class rule. This, in turn, both reflected and 
gave added significance to its relative geopolitical independence on the world stage, 
because amongst the capitalist ‘late developers’ the state has always proven crucial to 
their success. It established discounted financial flows for industry, rendering capitalists 
dependent on the state but, nonetheless, creating conditions for secure productive capital 
investment (Feuerwerker 1980b, 59). In China, the British had a monopoly on the 
provision of modern banking services for forty years after 1848, and even the modern 
Chinese banks established in the 1900s were not intended for industrial investment, but 
focused on commercial lending and thus reflected the hegemony of the monied 
capitalist in the wider economy (Feuerwerker 1980b, 57). In short, a state that provided 
security for private industry remained an enduring enigma. 
 
3.6 Imperialist geopolitics and the ‘century of humiliation’  
The period from 1809 (attempt to ban export of silver) to 1839 (the first Opium War) 
can be seen as a decisive moment in China’s unequal incorporation into the modern 
capitalist system, for it exposed the increasing impotence of Imperial China in the face 
of colonialism. It was during this time, following the defeat of France in the Napoleonic 
Wars and the redrawing of the balance of power in Europe by the Congress of Vienna in 
1815, that the British established a system of political command and control over the 
international trading system based upon an unchallenged position on the high seas. Able 
to emerge from the conflict in a similar position of economic supremacy as the United 
States enjoyed in the West after 1945, Britain extracted a direct economic benefit from 
its naval and geopolitical supremacy. The British navy had successfully blockaded 
Europe and starved industries of international markets, even resulting in a degree of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10 In Russia very small factories were counted as part of the non-industrial manufacturing sector (Bater 
1987,  352), whereas China’s economy was so underdeveloped such factories were considered industrial. 
Tsarist state statisticians’ measurements tended to exaggerate the proportion of big industrial units with 
hundreds, if not thousands, of employees, and tended to neglect analysis of the more nimble, smaller 
manufacturing units, which actually grew sharply in the early twentieth century (ibid). The ‘traditional’ 
understanding of the Russian working class as articulated by Trotsky (Trotsky 1967) was based on these 
statistics, and therefore tended to downplay the importance of smaller manufacturing units to the 
economy as a whole. Nonetheless, even if the statistics were a little misleading, it was certainly the case 
that factories in the key industrial centres of Russia grew to vast proportions on the back of foreign 
investment and credit, and this tendency was far more immature, to put it mildly, in China.    
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deindustrialisation of the great port cities of Amsterdam, Bordeaux and Marseilles 
(McMichael 2004, 7). After the war, Europe’s now insolvent polities focused on 
economic reconstruction and their political reorganisation as modern states, meaning 
that the City of London from 1815 to 1850 enjoyed a ‘monopoly on the supply of 
capital to the world market’ (Hobson 1963, 98), and Britain could turn outwards 
building a commercial and trading empire in the global periphery (McMichael 2004, 7 – 
9). While the empire-building of the mercantilist age had also treated colonies as 
markets for goods, organised their labour forces for the extraction of commodities to 
accumulate merchant capital and accrue state revenue, British hegemony was based on 
its domestic industrial-commercial supremacy and thus uniquely ‘promoted the 
universal tendencies of industrial capital and its drive to continually revolutionise 
commerce’ (McMichael 2004, 3). The pioneering application of technological advances 
was central to these transformations as the British ‘led the adoption of large-scale mass 
production firms using coal-fired steam generators to produce textiles, machinery, 
steamships, and railroad equipment’ (Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer 2000, 81). This 
orientation led the British state to pragmatically combine policies of trade liberalisation, 
i.e. the breaking down of barriers to consumer markets for its products, with more 
classical forms of political colonisation. The latter included white colonial settlement 
and, where necessary, formal annexation of territories to establish fiscal and tariff 
regimes appropriate to its commercial interests. Key, in this regard, was establishing 
institutions that guaranteed the property, legal and trading rights of Britain’s burgeoning 
merchant trading community in the periphery. To put this realignment of global 
economic power in its favour on the necessary institutional footing, the British 
ultimately relied upon military might to consolidate economic control. They waged two 
Opium Wars (1839 – 1842 and 1856 – 1860), which were justified on the grounds of 
protecting British subjects’ liberty, i.e. their right to undertake commerce on foreign 
shores, in response to China’s attempt to close down the trade. These conflicts cruelly 
exposed the weakness of China’s military in the face of the foremost Western colonial 
power. As table 3 shows, these were just the first of a series of colonial interventions 
that beset China from 1842 to 1945. It became known as ‘the century of humiliation’ as 
China found itself almost universally defeated in these wars, making the polity 
especially amenable to militant nationalism. I discuss in the next chapter how Imperial 
China was unable, and it seems at times unwilling, to respond to these geopolitical 
pressures. The reason for this lay in how the existing social structure of tributary class 
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power had become incorporated as a de facto client economy of British capitalism. Each 
military defeat introduced new measures that attenuated the inability of the state to 
respond.   
Colonial powers’ technical superiority was also illustrated in these conflicts time 
and again. In this regard, Britain again led the way for others to follow in the First 
Opium War. Its new fleet of iron warships made use of steam, as well as sail power, and 
were armed with the Congreve rocket. The origins of the latter device reflected the 
global sources of Britain’s imperial might, for the forces of the East Indian Company 
had first encountered the technology in their humiliating defeat to the Indian Kingdom 
of Mysore in the Battle of Pollilur in 1780. In an exemplified rendition of combined 
development, the British took the original Mysorean designs and improved on them by 
applying modern engineering techniques (Cheong 1978, 40 – 43). The Congreve rocket 
became a fearsome weapon used to great effect on land and sea in their wars with 
France (1803 – 1815) and the United States (1812). The Chinese fleet was simply no 
match for these accomplishments, even though their deficiency can easily be overstated. 
Known as junks their large wooden sailing ships had a long history, ultimately 
stretching back to the second century AD, but they were comparable in quality to the 
European ships that dominated international trade between 1750 and 1800. At the time 
of the conflict Chinese junks had also become heavily armed with carronades, a short-
range cannon produced in Britain from the 1770s to the 1850s. China had actually 
invented the cannon (‘the eruptor’) in the thirteenth century (Needham 1987, 263 – 
270), but in the nineteenth century their engineers mimicked the design of the 
contemporary British weapon. One officer’s memoirs of the First Opium War even 
praised the high-standards of iron work in the Chinese version of the weapon 
(Narasimha 1985). If this illustrates how the Chinese state was not entirely 
unresponsive to the Western threat, the conflict nonetheless underlined the lapse in their 
competitiveness, for the British now used the Congreve rocket and long-range cannons 
from afar.  
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Table 3: China’s ‘century of humiliation’: military conflicts with foreign powers, 
1842 – 1945    
Conflict Against  Result Immediate Consequences  
First Opium War, 1839 – 
1842  
 
 
Taiping Rebellion, 1850 
– 1864* 
 
 
 
Second Opium War, 
1856 – 1860  
 
 
 
 
 
Sino-French War, 1884 
– 1885 
 
First Sino-Japanese War, 
1894 – 95  
 
 
 
Boxer War, 1900 – 1901 
 
 
 
 
Russo-Japanese War, 
1904 – 1905**  
 
 
First World War, 1914 – 
1918  
 
 
 
Sino-Soviet Conflict, 
1929 
Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria, 1931 
 
 
Sino-Tibetan War, 1930 
– 1932  
 
Kumul Rebellion, 1932, 
and Soviet invasion of 
Xinjiang, 1934 and 
1937.  
Second Sino-Japanese 
War, 1937 – 1945) 
 
Britain 
 
 
 
n/a 
 
 
 
 
Britain, France, 
United States 
 
 
 
 
 
France 
 
 
Japan 
 
 
 
 
Britain, Russia, 
Japan, France, 
United States, 
Germany, Austria 
Hungry, Italy  
Japan, Russia 
 
 
 
All major 
colonial powers 
and China and 
Japan (both sided 
with Allies) 
Soviet Union 
 
Japan 
 
 
 
Tibet (de facto 
independent 
1912-1950) 
Soviet Union, 
White Russians, 
and Xinjiang 
rebels  
Japan, China with 
some Soviet and 
US advisors 
Defeat 
 
 
 
Victory but at 
huge cost (est. 
range from 20 
– 30 million 
deaths).  
Defeat  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defeat  
 
 
Defeat 
 
 
 
 
Defeat  
 
 
 
 
De facto a 
defeat 
 
 
De facto a 
defeat 
 
 
Defeat 
 
 
Defeat 
 
 
 
Victory 
 
 
Defeat 
 
 
Chinese / 
allied victory  
Abolition of Canton system, opening of 
four further ports to foreign trade, 
British parity in formulation of tariffs, 
cessation of Hong Kong. 
‘Self-Strengthening’ movement, Qing 
Restoration, late Qing dependency on 
colonial powers.  
 
 
Opening of a series of further ports to 
foreign trade, permanent diplomatic 
residence for France, Britain and 
Russia in Beijing, 8 million Taels 
reparations paid to France and Britain, 
legalisation of Opium trade, 
establishment of freedom of religion in 
China. 
Destruction of Southern Chinese Navy, 
French annexation of Vietnam, opening 
of southwestern China to foreign trade.  
Korean independence from China, 
Japanese annexation of Taiwan, 
reparations of 200 million taels, 
Liaodong Peninsula leased to Japan 
(but passed to Russia, 1895).  
Provision for stationing foreign troops 
in Beijing, 450 million taels 
reparations, near-abolition of tariff and 
fiscal independence to guarantee 
payments.  
Russian withdrawal from Manchuria.  
Manchuria and Korea recognised as 
‘Japanese sphere of influence’ (Korea 
annexed formally by Japan, 1911), 
Liaodong Peninsula leased to Japan.  
Transfer of German possessions in 
Shandong to Japan and backlash of 
May Fourth Movement.    
 
 
Restoration of Manchurian Railway to 
joint Sino-Soviet control. Creation of 
Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, 
1932 ruled by last Qing emperor, Puyi.  
Status quo restored (i.e. Tibetan 
demands for redrawing of borders 
militarily defeated).   
Soviet control of Xinjiang 
 
 
Japanese withdrawal, second stage of 
Chinese Civil War begins (1945 – 
1949).  
* Included in this table due to the role of the ‘Ever Victorious Army’, made up of Chinese soldiers but led 
by European officers, in quelling the troubles. ** China neutral but war fought on Chinese territory to the 
shame of its increasingly nationalist urban populace.  
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British industrial power was therefore crucial to defeating the Chinese forces. 
Their technically proficient armoury decimated Chinese forces at the Second Battle of 
Chuanbi by fighting from long-range, leaving eleven out of fifteen Chinese ships sunk, 
as the carronade required close proximity combat. A British report put their combat 
fatalities in the war at 69, and 451 wounded, and estimated, possibly with a certain 
exaggeration, that Chinese deaths were in the region of 18,000 to 20,000 (Perdue 2010). 
It was due in no small part to the awesome impact of the Congreve rocket on Chinese 
vessels. A British officer’s account describes vividly its terrifying effect on the enemy:  
One of the most formidable engines of destruction which any vessel, particularly 
a steamer can make use of is the congreve rocket, a most terrible weapon when 
judiciously applied, especially where there are combustible materials to act 
upon. The very first rocket fired from the Nemesis [(the first British ocean going 
iron warship that used steam and sail power)] was seen to enter the large junk 
against which it was directed, near that of the admiral, and almost the instant 
afterwards it blew up with a terrific explosion, launching into eternity every soul 
on board and pouring forth its blaze like the mighty rush of fire from a volcano. 
The instantaneous destruction of the huge body seemed appalling to both sides 
engaged. The smoke, and flame, and thunder of the explosion, with the broken 
fragments falling round, and even portions of disserved bodies scattering as they 
fell, were enough to strike with awe, if not with fear, the stoutest heart that 
looked upon it (Bernard and Hall 1844, 271).11  
 
Both in its symbolism and legal outcomes the war represented the final rupture of the 
core assumptions of ‘the Middle Kingdom’ – the imagined centrality and celestial 
authority of the Confucian state – as harsher global realities were imposed, requiring a 
new set of institutional arrangements and a radical redrawing of mental-conceptions of 
the world. The Treaty of Nanjing (1842/43)12 that followed British victory granted them 
the island of Hong Kong in perpetuity, imposed swingeing reparations on the Chinese 
Court totalling $15 million, and, moreover, was the first of the infamous Unequal 
Treaties that gave European powers (followed in 1895 by Japan) increasingly unbridled 
access to the Chinese domestic market. The Canton system came to an end and five 
Chinese ports were opened up to foreign trade. A central concern of these treaties was 
the principle of so-called ‘extraterritoriality’; the issue of whether British subjects in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11 A British officer also gave an intriguingly similar description of their defeat at the Battle of Pollilur in 
1780 at the hands of the Indian-made Mysorean rocket on which the British rocket had originally been 
based: ‘The rockets and musketry from 20,000 of the enemy were incessant. No hail could be thicker. 
Every illumination of blue lights was accompanied by a shower of rockets, some of which entered the 
head of the column, passing through to the rear, causing death, wounds, and dreadful lacerations from the 
long bamboos of twenty or thirty feet, which are invariably attached to them’ (Narasimha 1985, 11). 12 The text of the treaty was drafted upon China’s defeat in 29 August 1842, but both sides only 
exchanged the ratifications at Hong Kong on the 26 June 1843.  
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China, principally merchants, should be subject to Chinese jurisdiction or alternatively 
that of the British Crown. ‘International settlements’ were also established by Western 
powers in the Treaty Ports where the imperial powers had substantial legal jurisdiction, 
with hybrid Chinese-foreign courts created which were in practice dominated by the 
colonists (Feuerwerker 2008, 129). For all these reasons it would be misleading to see 
this as a conflict over opium alone. It was rather an expression of the antagonistic 
‘combination’ of the capitalist world economy with the archaic tributary mode:  
In retrospect, it is apparent that opium was the immediate, but not the ultimate, 
cause of the war. Without it a conflict between China and the West would still 
have erupted as a result of their differing conceptions of international relations, 
trade and jurisprudence. Far deeper than the opium question was the 
incompatibility of the Chinese claim to universal overlordship with the Western 
idea of national sovereignty; the conflict between the system of tributary 
relationships and the Western system of diplomatic intercourse; and the 
contradiction between self-sufficient, agrarian China and expansive, industrial 
Britain (Hsü 2000, 192). 
 
China was not alone in having its old order unseated by British capital. A 
transformation in institutional relations was occurring globally as polities adjusted to 
the new realities of capitalist globalisation. As Britain’s economic interests 
encompassed the globe from the end of the Napoleonic wars to the mid-nineteenth 
century, the clamour for such ‘extraterritorial rights’ proceeded apace. Legally, the 
epitome of this process was the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1843 that stated ‘by treaty, 
capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance, and other lawful means, Her Majesty the Queen 
has jurisdiction within diverse foreign countries’ (Kayaoğlu 2010, 44). Though only 
applied to British subjects this authority was henceforth considered equivalent to the 
legal position of the Crown in formally annexed territories (ibid). But while this was 
couched as authority over British actors abroad, in reality it gave subjects of the Crown 
immunity from sanction by the existing jurisdictions of the Global South and East. From 
our modern standpoint we will spontaneously see this as an extraordinary infringement 
on national independence. Yet the historical polities to whom these laws were intended 
to relate did not always operate with a territorial notion of governance. In the Ottoman 
Empire, the legal code was based on Islam, but had always allowed for the existence of 
non-Muslim subjects of an Islamic state (dhimmī) that had their own legal systems. 
Extraterritoriality was therefore less culturally alien in its formal prescriptions for the 
Ottoman elites. Yet, as its practical reality, of rendering Westerners conducting 
exploitative trade practices unaccountable, became apparent, it elicited a rise in anti-
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Western sentiment. The cruel irony of the system lay in how it undermined states’ 
ability to develop the strong fiscal structures whose absence had originally been used to 
justify the imposition of extraterritorial legal authority, creating a cycle of intervention 
(Kayaoğlu 2010, 45 – 46).  
The Ottoman case illustrates how the response of elites was culturally 
conditioned by their existing understanding of the rules of governance and over whom 
these rules extended; how the polity conceived of its existence in ethnic, political and 
cultural terms, and the relationship of this to its territorial claims. Imperial China’s 
approach was thus novel. As Immanuel Hsü notes above, Confucianism held its state to 
be in a position of universal overlordship (Hsü 2000, 192) and this made 
extraterritoriality anathema to its conception of state authority. The Imperial legal code 
was not only considered absolute and universal across time, but was also not confined 
to a particular ethnic or spatial notion of China as such. Confucian legal strictures were 
accordingly not limited to one ethnic or religious denomination. On the contrary, 
Imperial China had proven capable of absorbing different ethnic invaders while 
retaining its core political structure. In essence, then, the system was relatively tolerant 
of aliens, so long as they submitted to the rules and authority of the Confucian order. 
But what certainly could not be countenanced was aliens within the territory of the 
empire refusing to submit to its absolute legal-moral code and accept the judgement of 
its authorities. This imperial logic of power thus had a strong territorial element to it 
and so it is unsurprising that military action was needed to impose extraterritorial 
principles.13  In spite of this cultural hostility to the imposition of extraterritorial 
principles, the Chinese state remained unable to rise to the ‘whip of external necessity’, 
i.e. the imperative in the face of military and economic pressure to undertake internal 
social reform in order to ‘catch up’ with its now radically more advanced British rival, 
and defend the polity from foreign incursions.    
 
3. 7 The humiliating imposition of ‘backwardness’  
Colonialism was therefore crucial to Chinese underdevelopment and not merely due to 
the informal subtleties of financialization. Backwardness was imposed by military 
force, concluding in the unequal treaties that established a free trade regime for foreign 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13 Many thanks must go to Maïa Pal for impressing upon me in conversation the significance of the 
divergent response of the Ottoman and Chinese political elites to the formal legal structures of 
‘extraterritoriality’ and the important implication that the notion of law in Imperial China observed a 
spatial/territorial logic of power.     
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goods. China’s industrial capital would thus enjoy none of the protections that native 
industry benefited from during Britain’s early capitalist expansion in the eighteenth 
century. Consequently, the domestic class structure following the British intervention – 
financially in tea production and militarily in gunboat diplomacy – was simultaneously 
capitalist yet remarkably unaltered. For the smallholding Chinese peasantry growing 
dependency on the market took place within the same contractual relations to landlords 
enshrined in the early Qing and the pressure of population growth on rural incomes they 
experienced would have been familiar to their ancestors. In this sense, we can 
summarise the combined social formation of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
as a post-tributary colonial-capitalist economy, a product of the interaction between a 
declining Qing Empire and ascendant British capital. While domestic Chinese actors 
intersected with foreign interest groups, in a certain sense China’s fate was determined 
by colonial intervention. It was this ‘whip of external aggression’ and the failure of the 
Confucian state actors to undertake reform in the face of it that created the opening for a 
distinctively new anti-colonial subject to emerge in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. In chapter 4 I chart the rise of this collective subjectivity that created a 
genuine, organic sense of Chinese national identity for the first time, one that was 
crucially dissonant from the collapsing Qing regime and therefore had the task of 
forging a nation-state afresh.  
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4 
The imagined community of ‘China’ as combined  
social development: from humiliation  
to the Chinese Revolution 
 Insofar as the past has been transmitted as tradition it possesses 
authority; insofar as authority presents itself historically, it 
becomes tradition 
Hannah Arendt 
 
The Chinese nation is known throughout the world not only for 
its industriousness and stamina, but also for its ardent love of 
freedom and its rich revolutionary traditions… During the 
thousands of years of recorded history, the Chinese nation has 
given birth to many national heroes and revolutionary leaders. 
Thus the Chinese nation has a glorious revolutionary  
tradition and a splendid historical heritage  
Mao Zedong  
 
4.1 Modernity as ‘a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal’ 
The story I sketched in the previous chapter outlined how China’s pre-modern division 
of labour became incorporated into the exploitative mechanisms of global capitalism. At 
this stage, when we move onto the terrain of consciousness, ideas and meanings, it is 
important to stress how the ‘scientific’ nature of the exposition hitherto might 
unwillingly disguise the deep feelings of social injustice and collective traumas that 
capitalist colonialism gave rise to within the polity. Largely due to British support for 
the ‘Open Door’, China was never formally incorporated into an empire at the high 
water mark of European colonialism in the late nineteenth century. Yet, nonetheless, the 
system of extraterritoriality the powers imposed on the polity led to it suffering 
appalling colonial practices, with a strict racial hierarchy of white privilege discernible 
in the life of the treaty ports. Each stage in the military and economic deepening of 
these colonial-capitalist relations, was thus accompanied by a parallel metamorphosis in 
the mental-conceptions of the world held by Chinese persons constructing narratives to 
resist this subordination. In their concrete forms such experiences were unique, but the 
‘foreign’ repertoires of intellectual thought Chinese actors latched onto and the 
injustices they suffered reflected a global sensibility; a set of feelings that emerged from 
social modernisation yet also reacted against the colonial and racist assumptions of the 
world order. Marshall Berman once described the sense of ‘being modern’ as a ‘mode 
of vital experience’ that arose from the acceleration of social change. Rapid 
development breeds social turmoil, yet also encourages new hopes and fears, giving rise 
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to great promises as well as harsh struggles. It is a global sensibility, because modernity 
ruptures all existing modes of thought, but the way in which it achieves this dominance 
is full of contradictions:  
Modern environments and experiences cut across all boundaries of geography 
and ethnicity, of class and nationality, of religion and ideology: in this sense, 
modernity can be said to unite all mankind. But it is a paradoxical unity, a unity 
of disunity: it pours us all into a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and 
renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish (Berman 1983, 
15).   
The seemingly unending convulsions of modern world history suggest that this 
transformed sense of ‘the possible and perilous’, is lodged deeply within the cultural 
and psychological reproduction of capitalist modernity. For this to be so, there must be 
more processes at work than simply a contradictory alignment between the universal 
values of liberal Enlightenment thought (and the hopes they generated when transmitted 
from the intellectual to the public sphere) with the harsher realities that capitalist market 
dependency imposes on our social reproduction. The way in which hope and fear 
become so directly intermingled in modern societies arguably reflects the risk-laden 
nature of the modernist enterprise; that, whatever our goals and aims may be, to aspire 
and strive in these new conditions is to endanger, as Berman puts it, ‘everything we 
have, everything we know, everything we are’ (ibid). To argue, as he does so 
eloquently, that this sensibility cuts across all boundaries of geography and ethnicity 
(ibid) is quite true. Yet, perhaps it is also an insufficiently radical appraisal of the way 
that modernity reshaped the anthropological assumptions of human communities the 
world over. How it forged, that is, newly imagined geographical and social boundaries 
and kindled entirely novel ethnic ‘memories’. It is this formation of collective 
subjectivity and the allure of mythological narratives of salvation that I am principally 
concerned with in this chapter. I wish to show how certain cultural and ideological 
impressions became imprinted on the minds of Chinese actors and how these 
assumptions underpinned its post-1949 state formation. By ‘collective subjectivity’ I 
mean not only the specific political actors whose conflicts characterised the Chinese 
Revolution, but also the formation of a culturally coherent and widely adhered to, yet 
inevitably contested and exclusive, notion of ‘China’ itself. For the sake of simplicity I 
have till now spoken apparently un-problematically of ‘Imperial China’, but, even 
leaving aside the Anglicism of this idiom, it should be noted that the implication there 
existed a geographically bounded conception of ‘China’ in the dynastic epoch is a little 
misleading. ‘The Middle Kingdom’, as its subjects termed it, may have observed certain 
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territorial logics of power, but it considered its domain universal a la ‘The Celestial 
Empire’. Its rulers thought of the polity as the cradle of civilisation according to 
celestial authority and not ‘Chinese’. As I argue below, a ‘Chinese’ national identity 
only crystalized in the late nineteenth century. To understand the circumstances in 
which this imagined community was constructed is to have understood a key aspect of 
the PRC. Crucially, from its first genesis this national consciousness existed in a 
dissonant relation to the Imperial state and, in light of the latter’s disintegration, fostered 
a strong desire for national unity that was reflected by political actors. The communists 
answered this aspiration for statehood, but simultaneously absorbed a nationalistic set of 
politics that powerfully foreshadowed its latter day trajectory (Johnson 1962). 
I argue in this chapter that China’s nationalist mythology constructed a 
contradictory and unstable anti-colonial ethos: for it was always predicated on a loss of 
Chinese privilege in international affairs and the attendant ambition to re-establish this 
geo-social power. It was the organic incorporation of this outlook into the Communist 
Party that created the Maoist amalgam of ideological forms, fusing Soviet Stalinism 
with Chinese nationalism. By turning to the politics of patriotism, the Maoists did not 
create a national imagery ‘from scratch’, but drew upon existing narratives and imagery 
that had emerged with the rise of Chinese identity from the 1890s onwards. One can 
therefore establish a line of continuity between features of Chinese political nationalism 
per se and the nationalist underpinning to PRC policy after 1949. I develop this 
argument through a critical appropriation of Benedict Anderson’s Imagined 
Communities (Anderson 2006), seeing the emergence of nation-ness as a features of the 
uneven and combined development of the modern international order. The argument 
develops through several stages. Firstly, I look at the transformation from ‘messianic 
time’ to ‘homogenous empty time’ in Imperial China’s encounter with global 
capitalism. Secondly, I reflect on the ‘culture of imperialism’ that plagued the world 
between 1870 and 1945, arguing that Chinese nationality emerged amongst a modern 
layer of society that responded to the intensification of colonial threats, but also saw the 
accumulation of colonial power as a measure of social progress. Thirdly, I locate the 
sociological conditions for this process within the spatially concentrated, expansive 
capitalist development of China’s Treaty Ports and highlight how this identity was 
formed externally to the existing Qing ruling class. Fourthly, owing to these historical 
conditions, I show a tendency developed to amalgamate the notions of ‘race’ with 
‘nation’ as minzu and draw out the significance of this for nation-state formation within 
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the PRC. Finally, the last three sections analyse cleavages in China’s conscious political 
nationalism; exploring the split between messianic and pragmatic discourses, the rise of 
the Kuomintang, and the use of political nationalism by the Maoists.  
 
4.2 Imagined national communities: transformation toward ‘homogenous empty time’  
All societies undergoing the transformation into nation-states created myths that reified 
their identity into timeless abstractions. ‘Nationalism’ as Ernest Gellner put it, ‘was not 
the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not 
exist’ (Gellner 1964, 169) and, indeed, the paradox of nation states lies, ultimately, in 
their ‘objective modernity… vs. their subjective antiquity’ (Anderson 2006, 5). In 
Imagined Communities; Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism 
Anderson’s attempt to solve the paradox involved a double process: a novel theoretical 
presupposition that fed into a thoroughly historical treatment of the problem. He 
presupposed, ‘in an anthropological spirit’, the imagined nature of all historical 
communities that go beyond mere face-to-face contact; arguing they inspire a shared 
sense of belonging and identity amongst individuals who could never possibly all meet 
one another (Anderson 2006, 5 – 6). He thus used a transhistorical abstraction, ‘the 
imagined community’, to demystify the specific nation-state form and deny it the 
transhistorical status that it claimed, exposing it as ‘a cultural artefact of a particular 
age’ (Anderson 2006, 4). Anderson emphasises the cultural aspects, but insists 
capitalism was central to nation-ness (Anderson 2006, 37). This is no contradiction, 
because with Marx, Trotsky, Gramsci, and others, he offers a non-deterministic 
treatment of the capitalist system, seeing it as a form of social reproduction, i.e. a 
system at once cultural and economic, which disrupted existing identities and provided 
the means and desire to reshape them around new territorially bounded forms of 
consciousness and political organisation. Print-capitalism – as a form of cultural 
production and sphere of capital accumulation – plays a central role in Anderson’s 
argument, intermingling with the expansive but centrifugal power of capitalist 
production, and the fact of linguistic diversity amongst human communities (Anderson 
2006, 42 – 43). While for Anderson there is a specific genesis of ‘nation-ness’ in the 
late eighteenth century, he does not offer a ‘big bang’ theory, instead arguing that these 
changes became interwoven with a long-evolving crisis of archaic dynastic identities.        
Anderson’s use of ‘imagined community’ as a presupposition has obvious 
methodological parallels with the re-articulated vision of ‘combined social 
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development’ as a transhistorical abstraction that captures the compulsions found in 
intersocietal processes (Matin 2012; Rosenberg 2006; Rosenberg 2010). In effect, 
Anderson argues that at a certain stage of development humans create imagined 
boundaries that apportion a collective identity to a social group regardless of whether all 
the individuals within the group ever meet one another. In his analysis of the modern, 
‘nationalised’ imagined community, Anderson also uses formulations that put stress 
upon the causally significant interactions across societies, in a manner also 
complimentary to the theory of uneven and combined development.  Nationality, 
nationalism, nation-ness, however one chooses to put it, was he argues, created in the 
collective imagination ‘towards the end of the eighteenth century’ as a result of ‘the 
spontaneous distillation of a complex crossing of discrete historical forces’ (Anderson 
2006, 4, emphasis added). Their universal dispersion across human territories and 
peoples reflected the fact ‘that, once created, they became modular, capable of being 
transplanted with varying degrees of self-consciousness to a great variety of social 
terrains, to merge and to be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and 
ideological constellations’ (Anderson 2006, 4, emphasis added). Given how nations 
have become the dominant, indeed universal, form of territorial organisation, they 
clearly have this duplicative quality. But it poses a question as to why this concept has 
proven so durable when so many others have not ‘modulated’. Indeed, Anderson tends 
to eschew analysis of the pressures and influences that led to societies creating a 
plurality of national imaginations. The Andersonian account of the origins of nations 
could therefore benefit from an intellectual encounter with the theory of combined 
development to capture the processes giving rise to this modularity.  
In chapter 3, I described how the uneven spatial dispersion of human 
communities across Eurasia had resulted in competing claims to cultural universality in 
lieu of the intensified form of interchange that has characterised capitalist modernity. 
Anderson helps us to augment this analysis further by probing the nature of archaic 
universal claims that were not, and could not be, rooted in a global claim of territorial 
jurisdiction – for no such knowledge, or even concept, of ‘the global’ really existed – 
but in a mode of apprehension of time that imagined the historical community to be 
eternal (Anderson 2006, 22 – 25). This feature of pre-modern societies, common to both 
Imperial China and Medieval Christendom, was founded upon their ascription of 
existence to a divine providence, and meant that time was apprehended as messianic 
time, where no distinction is drawn between the past and the future but both are instead 
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imagined to exist within an ‘instantaneous present’ (Anderson 2006, 24, see also; 
Auerbach 2003; Benjamin 1968, 263; Bloch 1989, 84 – 86). In other words, as Erich 
Auerbach puts it, ‘the here and now is no longer a mere link in an earthly chain of 
events, it is simultaneously something that has always been, and which will be fulfilled 
in the future’ (Auerbach 2003, 74). A feature of this socially constructed imagination is 
therefore the ‘juxtaposition between the cosmic-universal and the mundane-particular’, 
i.e. the dream of eternity existing alongside the harsh daily grind of agrarian villages for 
survival, and the divine authority claimed by fallible human elites (Anderson 2006, 23). 
These mythologies gave ‘certain meanings to the everyday fatalities of existence (above 
all death, loss and servitude)’ and offered ‘in various ways, redemption from them’ 
(Davidson 2007). As Benjamin argued, modernity radically unseats these apprehensions 
of time and space, replacing them with what he called ‘homogenous, empty time’ 
(Benjamin 1968, 261 – 262). In this new socially constructed imagination, time is 
measured by ‘clock and calendar’ (Anderson 2006, 26). Actors imagine the activity of 
others, whom they are likely to have never met, as a simultaneous movement of a 
shared sociological organism through time to an uncertain, i.e. ‘empty’, future. The 
sense that the shared identity – be it the nation, a class, and so on – can have a degree of 
agency over their destiny underlines this major disjuncture between the modern and the 
pre-modern. For Anderson it is this shift in the mode of apprehension that provides the 
cultural origins for the nation. The rise of nationhood is seen as conditional on the 
collapse of three imagined ‘certainties’ of dynastic societies: that (i) a script language 
offered special access to ontological truth; that (ii) society was naturally organised 
around ‘high centres’ (monarchs etc.) whose governance drew legitimacy from celestial 
sources; and that (iii) there was a fundamental unity between cosmology and actual life 
(Anderson 2006, 36). It does appear to be the case that these qualities, understood in 
general terms, were pervasive in the pre-modern world, but they varied in their concrete 
expressions and these historical specificities conditioned the form of their eventual 
rupture. In Imperial China the form of imagined certainties (i) and (ii) have a particular 
importance. Recall how it was believed that the divine only blessed rulers that upheld 
social order, denoting a conditional relationship between the dynasty and its subjects 
(Myers and Wang 2002, 606). This actually helped foster the appearance of structural 
permanence for the ‘high centre’, because dynastic transitions invariably left the core 
institutions of tributary rule intact. Moreover, entry into the ruling class was via an 
examination in Confucian scripture whose teachings were considered timeless and truth 
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absolute in the spirit of Anderson’s point (i). Together this gave the ‘certainties’ of the 
Confucian imagination greater durability, as they directly correlated with access to the 
class elite, and, as such, attenuated an apprehension rooted in messianic rather than 
homogenous, empty time.  
   Anderson argues that globally the erosion of these certainties took place across 
the longue durée. New discoveries in natural science and human life, economic 
development, expanding global communications, and a closer apprehension of the 
world’s geography, combined to drive ‘a sharp wedge between cosmology and history’ 
which required ‘a new way of linking fraternity, power, and time meaningfully 
together’ (Anderson 2006, 36). Nationalism is therefore seen as answering a deep crisis 
of meaning in Christendom encapsulated by the Reformation unseating the shibboleths 
of Roman Catholic authority. These cultural transformations were themselves 
intermingled with the nascent forces of capitalist modernity and for Anderson the most 
important of these processes was the rise of print-capitalism (Anderson 2006, 38 – 39). 
The novel ruptured the conception of time as simultaneity by introducing a calendrical 
mode of apprehension in narrative form (Anderson 2006, 25 – 26). But the newspaper 
was specifically critical, for its ‘single most important emblem’, the date at the top of 
the page, symbolised the ‘steady onward clocking of homogenous empty time’ 
(Anderson 2006, 33). ‘The very conception of the newspaper’ writes Anderson, ‘implies 
the refraction of “world events” into a specific imagined world of vernacular readers’ 
(Anderson 2006, 64). Crucially, printers were private entrepreneurs and sought to 
expand their markets, aligning with the protestant movement around the Reformation to 
break the monopoly of Latin script, which, in turn, made possible the creation of a 
literate public sphere that extended beyond the traditional clerisy (Anderson 2006, 40). 
This unity between a nascent form of mass culture and private capital was subjected to 
the mediation of a fragmented European geopolitics that was crucial in determining the 
form of national consciousness. Unlike in Imperial China where the state and ruling 
class were fused and the use of Confucian scripture was integral to their integrated 
system of administration, Latin penmanship did not correlate with a trans-European 
political form and consequently different states created their own administrative 
vernaculars (Anderson 2006, 40 – 41). These processes proceeded largely 
unconsciously – reflecting mutations in European life arising from the fusion of 
capitalism with the absolutist states (Anderson 2006, 44 – 45). The complexity of the 
European process, involving military conflict, centralising state tendencies, the rise of 
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mercantile capitalism, etc. arguably reflects a key difference to China: the absence of a 
relatively unitary dynastic empire. 
The relationship between Anderson’s account of the origins of nation-ness and 
uneven and combined development appears to be complex. In one sense, Anderson 
follows an intuitively similar methodological procedure. Advanced capitalist societies 
pioneered lexicographic reform, print-capitalism, and developed culturally cohesive 
national identities. These changes created new pressures on other societies and how they 
came to terms with them was rich with contingency. These ‘late developers’ sought to 
emulate the most successful within their own conditions. But they drew upon their own 
cultural history, reflecting the ethnic and social memories within their geopolitical 
community, in order to reimagine the social and geographical boundaries of their 
societies afresh. Anderson’s focus on the ‘modular character’ of nationalism usefully 
augments Trotsky’s conception of how late developers emulate more advanced powers 
with an explicitly ideological and cultural dimension. It emphasises the type of 
community that aspiring states ‘would like to be’. Imagined Communities however 
leaves the sociological processes that led to the differential repetition of ‘nation-ness’ 
un-theorised. Anderson writes, for example, that the concepts of ‘nation’ and 
‘revolution… are inventions, on which patents are impossible to preserve. They are 
there, so to speak, for the pirating’ (Anderson 2006, 156). He refers to the military 
conflicts between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Democratic Kampuchea 
(Cambodia), and the PRC (ibid) to illustrate the contradictory way different polities 
internalise and make use of these concepts for their own ends. Left open, however, in 
his remarks, is why some concepts become modular and others do not, and what 
pressures result in their differential use. Anderson does not offer a theorisation of the 
sociological dynamics of intersocietal competition, and the hybrid forms of cultural 
concepts and class relations that create national communities. An Andersonian vision of 
the origins of nations arguably requires an engagement with uneven and combined 
development to correct this intellectual absence. The reverse, however, is also true. 
Uneven and combined development needs a theory of ‘imagined communities’. As I 
show below, Chinese nationality can be seen as an Andersonian rupture with messianic 
time in which print-capitalism and lexicographic reform formed critical dimensions of 
the process. I analyse this, however, through the lens of uneven and combined 
development, moving from the whip of external necessity, through the combined 
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sociological conditions, and drawing out how the resulting national consciousness was 
an ‘ideological amalgam’. 
 
4.3 The messianic apprehension of time in Imperial China   
Imperial China testifies to how the crisis of absolutist states took place resolutely across 
the longue durée of history. Dynastic regimes still dominated the geopolitical landscape 
at the fin de siècle of the nineteenth century and the struggle against colonialism would 
be an even longer process. Whereas by the late eighteenth century Europe saw the 
beginnings of modern public society, with attendant forms of national consciousness, 
and in the New World consciously nationalist movements were establishing a novel 
republican form of governance, in China the strength of the Confucian imagination 
meant there was no similar development of a national imagery in this period. 
Considering its late Qing history ‘from below’ one can see visibly how Chinese subjects 
remained locked in a social imagination rooted in messianic time. Participants in the 
Taiping Rebellion utilised Western, Christian vernacular, which reflected the influence 
of missionaries long active in China. Their leader Hong Xiuquan, who obtained his 
copy of the bible from missionaries in Guangzhou, ‘claimed to be the reincarnation of a 
son of Jehovah and that in a dream Jehovah had given him a sacred sword and told him 
to cleanse the world of corruption and suffering’ (H.-F. Hung 2011, 186). However, 
despite this biblical appropriation – a cultural influence testifying, of course, to the 
growing intersection of Chinese and Western life –, and their creation of new figurative 
icons, the core narrative was almost identical to the White Lotus Rebellion (ibid). By 
invoking the Mandate of Heaven – and seeking to deprive the Qing of this celestial 
mantel – they perfectly encapsulated simultaneity in the apprehension of time; with past, 
present and future united by an instantaneous divinity. Little wonder, then, that once the 
Taiping rebels had conquered Nanjing they declared:  
…When disorder reaches the extreme, then there is order, when darkness 
reaches its extreme, then there is light; this is the Way of Heaven. Now, night 
has fled and the sun has risen! We only wish that all our brothers and sisters on 
earth would rush from the demon’s treacherous gate and follow God’s true way 
(cited in Hung 2011, 187).  
  
The rebellion was a vast anti-absolutist uprising and the Taiping shared with the White 
Lotus Rebellion some progressive discourse: they subverted traditional gender roles 
through women’s participation; they mobilised opposition to Qing tax rises on poor 
peasants; and, influenced by Christian social reformism, they declared themselves in 
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favour of equality (H.-F. Hung 2011, 186 – 187). However, ultimately, the conflict saw 
600 cities change hands, often with brutal massacres, and the Taiping record of 
governance once in power was atrocious (J. K. Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 209 – 
211). Remaining in besieged cities they made no attempt at rural management and their 
religiosity generally eschewed economic planning and foreign relations (ibid). They 
abandoned egalitarian practices by establishing pseudo-nobilities amongst leaders 
replete with private armies, hareems and new ritualistic costumes (ibid). Their time in 
power was largely characterised by the ‘slaughter and destitution’ they inflicted on their 
subjects (J. K. Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 211). In all these senses, their success and 
momentary appeal tells us much more about peasant hardship in the late Qing crisis, 
than it does about any political astuteness on the part of the Taiping leaders. In its 
melange of Confucian and Christian ritual this collective imagination was an amalgam 
of cultural forms, reflecting the particular constellations of thought thrown by a 
declining polity’s interchange with the West. However, one certainly does not find in 
the mental-conceptions conjured up by the Taiping rebels an imagined vision of 
Chinese identity. Instead we find a consciousness that was still rooted in the salvations 
of messianic time and therefore pre-modern in the Andersonian sense. 
Why this was so requires some explanation, particularly against the backdrop of 
integrative Qing-era reforms that developed a regional division of labour and vibrant 
internal market. To answer this riddle Anderson’s argument on nation state formation in 
the Americas is instructive. He argues that economic development and new mercantile 
interests coupled with the liberal values of the Enlightenment, were important anterior 
determinations for the rise of national consciousness – the latter above all provided ‘an 
arsenal of ideological criticisms of the imperial and anciens regimes’ –, but could not 
create ‘in themselves the kind, or shape, of imagined community to be defended from 
these regimes’ depredations’ (Anderson 2006, 65). In the New World, nationalism arose 
from the fusion of linguistically and culturally cohesive creole functionaries of the new 
statelets with print-capitalists (i.e. mass cultural producers) that played the decisive 
historical role in forming national consciousness (ibid). This is the most concrete 
element of Anderson’s explanation. Those agents, that is, whose activity provides the 
decisive final ‘push’ within a process that involves a series of contingent interactions 
between capitalist relations, the print medium, geopolitical fragmentation, and linguistic 
diversity, which together conspired to impel dispersed human societies to create a 
patchwork of unique national imageries (Anderson 2006, 42 – 43). Capitalist 
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modernisation confronted a politically and socially fragmented world of many societies, 
each with their own geopolitical identity. This historical context of uneven 
development, coupled with the centrifugal pressures of capitalist production itself, does 
impart a certain ‘fatality’ to the origins of nation-ness. However, a cautious stress on the 
contingent, historical nature of the process is needed, one that recognises the differential 
ways that actors can respond to these global realities. Some scholars have argued the 
relation between capitalism and nation-ness is simply one of necessity, owing to the 
spatially concentrated and uneven nature of capitalist production (Callinicos 2009a). 
The idea, in short, that ‘if states did not exist capitalism would have to create them’ 
(Harvey 2006, 164). It is not clear, however, how such statements account for 
contingency. How to explain, for example, why a plurality of statelets emerged in Latin 
America in contrast to the territorial cohesion of the United States. For combined 
development theory such contingencies are ‘anticipated’ by the theoretical framework, 
and explained by working through the ways in which agents responded to the pressures 
of the ‘outside’ world (Cooper 2013). This imparts an historical open-ness to the 
question, requiring empirical investigation to explain the contrast between the 
experience of southern and northern America in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Other scholars that have criticised Anderson’s for drawing a too ‘soft’ link between 
capitalism and nation-ness focus on the role played by internal markets within early 
modern polities. Davidson highlights how it was with ‘the creation of trade networks 
that merchant capital began to link up dispersed rural communities both with each other 
and with the urban centres to form an extensive home market’ (Neil Davidson 2007). 
This proliferation of exchange within a territorially unitary polity fostered, he argues, a 
national consciousness (ibid). Problematically, however, this description could easily 
apply to mid-Qing China. Yet, this expansion of inter-regional trade and a division of 
labour with a special role for merchants (and accordingly a thriving urban-life) did not 
give rise to national consciousness. It instead generated new, often subversive, archaic 
identities. Recall how I noted in chapter 3 that far from acting as a vanguard for a 
Chinese national identity the merchant diaspora promoted plague god cults, i.e. an 
imagination firmly rooted in messianic time. Both these actors and the doctrines of the 
Confucian state remained wedded to traditional consciousness and it was therefore new 
social agents that developed an imagined vision of ‘China’. Print-capitalists and the 
emergence of intellectual cultural producers outside of the state provided the critical 
‘push’ in the last decade of the nineteenth century. But the narratives of ‘nation’, ‘race’, 
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and ‘empire’, they drew upon weaved together a series of native and ‘foreign’ 
discourses. An interesting feature of its ‘late development’ of nation-ness lies in how it 
was undertaken consciously, rather than subconsciously, as these layers saw ‘a national 
spirit’ as necessary in order to react to external threats. Indeed, they were animated with 
concern by the threats that the outside world posed to China’s sovereignty, and 
understood this ‘whip of external necessity’ far better the Court that controlled 
economic policy and remained aloof from cultural transformation. 
 
4.4 Chinese national identity as combined development: (i) colonial fear, colonial 
emulation?   
Chinese subjects developed a series of narratives of salvation through their 
incorporation into international society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. A new urban-based class were alert to international realities as world events 
were now embedded in the consciousness of the polity thanks to the written vernacular 
and booming publications industry. A new reading public thus existed who felt deeply 
Chinese yet also shamed by their newly imagined community’s status in international 
affairs. Although, in this interplay between the local and the global, the polity’s imperial 
history weighed heavily on their minds, how they came to understand the vocabulary of 
nationality, colonialism, and race largely mirrored their use in international society. It is 
impossible to think of each these elements as anything but central to the world order 
that crystalized between 1870 and 1945, often referred to as the era of ‘High 
Imperialism’. In characterising this epoch, Hobsbawm’s observation that many felt the 
allure of ‘national chauvinism’, but ‘no doubt almost all’ were ‘deeply imbued with the 
fundamental racism of nineteenth century civilisation’ (Hobsbawm 1989, 160) is 
chilling yet largely apposite. But his conclusion that racism represented a means by 
which an inegalitarian international community with an egalitarian ideology, 
liberalism, reconciled itself to its inequalities (Hobsbawm 1989, 251 - 252) is, perhaps, 
only partly true. The social struggles and cultural changes the world has seen since, 
which have partially moved a still inegalitarian civilisation beyond the strict racial 
hierarchies of this age, and seen racism thereby mutate into different forms, suggests an 
important role for the cultural imagination. In any case, racism was certainly organic to 
the modern day, i.e., capitalist, colonialism pioneered by Britain. Indeed, the seemingly 
cosmopolitan ‘cult of progress’ that animated the minds of the new rich in the belle 
époque (Hobsbawm 1989, 262 - 276) was juxtaposed to, and fatally denigrated by, this 
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drive to colonial annexation. Whether justified by the ‘soft’ racism of the ‘civilising 
mission’ or ‘harder’ notions of white supremacy, the success of states such as Britain 
that pioneered capitalist empire building created a dangerous role model, which late 
developers sought to replicate. The zero-sum game that resulted had catastrophic 
outcomes for the world’s people.  
Britain established a ‘model of emulation’ for aspiring powers with several 
interlocking elements. It used force (‘gunboat diplomacy’) to open markets for its 
exports, encouraged financial liberalisation to secure the hegemony of the City of 
London under the aegis of ‘free trade’, and turned to empire building to boost its 
imperial prestige and create jurisdictions favourable to these capitalist interests 
(McMichael 1985; McMichael 2004, 1 – 34). This fusion of colonialism with a liberal 
integrationist approach to the world market gave British imperialism an ‘atavistic 
quality’, which incorporated ‘mercantilist relations despite its antimercantilist 
pretensions’ (McMichael 2004, 10). The other states aspiring to emulate Britain 
(France, Germany, the United States, later Japan and Russia) did so in the novel 
conditions this created. As such, there could be no ‘simple repetition’ of the colonial 
trade triangle between Britain, China and India or even something similar. By the early 
twentieth century, capitalism was not only more integrated spatially – it had also 
ascended to new heights developmentally. There had been a whole swathe of changes 
triggered by the Second Industrial Revolution: novel workplace management 
techniques, more depersonalised ownership structures, a new role for money capital and 
the stock market, labour-saving technology, and whole new industries (chemicals, wood 
pulping, etc.) (Hobsbawm 1989, 43 – 45). In this new global order, Britain still 
dominated but modernising competitor states could draw on its existing achievements 
and avoid repeating earlier stages by adapting existing achievements to native 
productive capacity. Consequently, the United States and Germany became more 
competitive in the new advanced industries (ibid). This unevenness in global production 
fed into a parallel connectedness in finance and trade as the City of London remained 
the preeminent source of investment. Britain accounted for 44 per cent of all global 
foreign investment – a dominance completely unparalleled either before or since – and 
boasted a steamer fleet alone that was 12 per cent larger than every other merchant 
shipping fleet in the world (Hobsbawm 1989, 51). In short, Britain fell behind 
industrially but its financial and trading strength made it central to the world economy. 
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This meant that Britain’s economic interests were more global than every before, going 
far beyond the more narrow commercial interests invested in its Empire.   
Britain’s shifting position testified to how changes within capitalism 
increasingly created a paradox in the dominant colonial worldview, because the 
advanced economies became very dependent on one another. Hobsbawm observes that 
around 80 per cent of European trade and investment across the nineteenth century was 
with other developed countries (Hobsbawm 1989, 73 – 74). Insofar as it was directed 
overseas it tended to focus on the rapidly expanding European settler colonies: e.g. 
Canada, Australia, South Africa, Argentina, and the United States (ibid). Colonies were 
integral sources of raw materials and export markets, but they were shunned by capital 
investment (Callinicos 2009b, 154). Indeed, the practices that inhibited the growth of 
Chinese industry were taken to new extremes in actual colonies. ‘Fear of emulation’ 
(Harvey 2005, 139 – 140) was a central concern of ruling elites in the imperialist 
countries. Opinion tended to divide between globalising financiers and protectionist 
industrialists, but, these arguments resolved themselves in practice with capital export 
only permitted in the carefully selected spheres that helped boost ‘home’ manufacturers 
(Webster 2006, 751 – 755). New railways opened up export markets and loans to the 
colonial states were used to import British goods. To this can be added, the advantage 
that local producers in India and other colonies were rendered uncompetitive by the 
tariffs and taxation regimes the British imposed (Parthasarathi 2010).  
Undoubtedly, the political economy of classical imperialism materially benefited 
ruling elites in the home countries. However, China illustrated its inherent 
contradictions. Since the 1870s a great dash for colonial possessions had taken place 
across the globe. Against the backdrop of the Long Depression colonies could guarantee 
preferential terms of trade for the colonial power and act as a buffer against 
protectionist moves by rivals. The ‘Scramble for Africa’ initially caught Britain off 
guard, but it soon led the way, adding 4 million squares miles to the Empire between 
1875 and 1914 (Hobsbawm 1989, 59). France would likewise add 3.5 million to its 
own, and Germany, Belgium and Italy around 1 million each (ibid). Hopes for large 
export markets were ‘often disappointed’ (Hobsbawm 1989, 66), but the dash for 
empire observed a perverse rationality. Empire building was woven into the cultural 
assumptions and institutional organisation of this evolving world system and this 
imposed a ‘zero-sum-game’ logic on international affairs; if colonial power x did not 
annex territory y then they would inevitably lose out to their rival z that did. China 
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illustrated the deep contradictions within the system, because capital largely flowed out 
of its economy to colonial powers and large export markets could never develop – at 
least not after the Second Industrial Revolution had brought a new array of expensive 
products to the world market – in conditions so heavily characterised by systematic 
underdevelopment. Chinese rural production accounted for 65 per cent of domestic 
product and 79 per cent of the labour force in 1933 (Feuerwerker 1983a, 63). Slow 
population growth rate reflected a high birth rate combined with a similarly high but 
fluctuating death rate. This was due to the peasantry’s very low standards of living, poor 
public health controls and 
susceptibility to natural and 
man-made disasters 
(Feuerwerker 1980b, 70). A 
large export market could not 
develop in these conditions 
without both new investment in 
industry and central state 
control of tariffs and fiscal 
policy that the Unequal 
Treaties largely precluded. 
Neither did the colonial powers 
funnel capital investment into 
industry within their spheres of 
influence. This meant the 
scramble for extraterritorial 
rights between 1897 and 1902 
(see table 4) anticipated a large 
future market that could not 
emerge given the deeply unfair 
constraints that rentier semi-colonial conditions put on domestic output.  
 In the most general sense, these contradictions signified a disjuncture between 
the needs of industry and finance for a world market and the ‘social imagination’ of 
colonial-racism that politically configured the world order. Global market integration 
was organically connected to the centralisation of capital in large firms that were 
intimately linked with the financial system – a process that many Marxists emphasised 
Table 4: The ‘Scramble for China’, 1895 - 1902 	  Flashpoint The ‘humiliating’ outcome 
Sino-Japanese War, 1894 – 
1895 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘The Triple Intervention’, 
and secret Qing alliance with 
Tsarist Russia, 1895 
The 1897 ‘Scramble for 
China’ gathers pace, ‘threat 
of partition’ looms  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Boxer War, 1901 – 1902  
 
 
 
Cession of Taiwan, 
Peasadores and the Liaodong 
peninsula, legalisation of 
foreign ownership of 
domestic industry, large war 
indemnities, Korean 
independence and the end of 
its status as tributary state.  
Intervention of France, 
Germany, and Russia restore 
Liaodong peninsula to China. 
Germany seizes Jiaozhou and 
granted 99 year lease; Russia 
occupies Liaodong peninsula 
on pretext of defending 
China from Germany; Britain 
secures 99 year mandate 
extend territories in Hong 
Kong to Landau Island and 
the Northern Territories, a 25 
year mandate in Weihaiwei, 
and Yangtze valley ‘sphere 
of influence’, France 99 year 
lease Guangzhou Bay and 
‘sphere of influence’; Japan 
Fujian ‘sphere of influence’.  
Huge war indemnities, 
stationing of troops in 
Beijing, legalisation of the 
‘Open Policy’ in China.  	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(Hilferding 2006; Hobson 2006; Lenin 1967). However, while these economic 
tendencies have proceeded apace over the last century, the world has also witnessed a 
parallel shift in the cultural and institutional assumptions underpinning the geopolitical 
organisation of the international economy. These changes underline the central role of 
colonial annexation, justified by racist narratives, to the period from 1870 to 1945 of 
‘high’ or ‘classical’ imperialism (Callinicos 2009b, 144 – 164). Empire building was a 
crucial measure of geopolitical standing and this suggests a suitably important role 
needs to be given to the culture of imperialism in determining the type of emulation 
aspiring powers sought. For Trotsky the ‘privilege of historical backwardness’ referred 
to how late developing states drew upon the achievements of the more advanced and 
therefore did not have to repeat the same economic stages afresh (Trotsky 1967b, 22). 
Capitalist integration made possible this ‘levelling out’ of ‘stages of development’, but 
in the process utilised such ‘anarchistic methods’ that it ‘set one country against 
another, and one branch of industry against another, developing some parts of world 
economy while hampering and throwing back the development of others’ (Trotsky 
1928). As a description of enduring features of the dynamics of capitalist development 
these remarks more than hold true. Capitalist states persistently compete with one 
another, levelling out disparities only to then intensify competition and heighten 
instability. However, the contemporary ‘model of emulation’ envisioned by aspiring 
states today has shifted in important ways. For late developers in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century the annexation of territory was seen as a necessity. Leading 
imperialist states extracted advantage from their empires, requiring colonial incursions 
on un-colonised territories to compete, and going hand in hand with the narratives of 
racial supremacy that justified such extremist sanctions. The concepts of ‘empire’, 
‘race’ and ‘nation’ – mental-conceptions with which subjects apprehended the world – 
were material realities that shaped, and gave meaning to, this epoch in global history. 
This suggests that one needs to weave into the conception of combined development 
how emerging powers not only draw upon the technical and social achievements of 
others, but also the cultural ideas and values specific to a particular historical form of 
the international system and its ‘pioneering’ states.     
In this sense, colonial-capitalism, like the nation-state, had a ‘modular character’ 
(Anderson 2006, 4). It was liable to be repeated, resulting in its differential repetition of 
the colonial enterprise by aspiring states. To explain why this was so, one needs to 
understand the ‘conditions of compulsion’ that existed within an international political 
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economy structured on concrete institutional and cultural lines. States that were seeking 
to emulate the prestige and power of the British Empire did so in the new conditions 
that colonial-capitalist integration had established (Anderson 2006, 156 – 157). These 
changes meant that ‘history’, as Trotsky put it, could ‘not repeat itself’ (Trotsky 1978, 
59). For whereas Britain imposed industrial capitalism on a world for which it was 
largely alien, now powerful capitalist-colonial empires confronted each other in a battle 
for markets, which, due to the role territorial acquisition played, increasingly came to 
resemble a zero-sum-game. An economically integrated world with a polycentric 
distribution of new industrial powers morphed into a series of territorialised colonial 
rivalries. Even the United States – often regarded to have eschewed empire – practiced 
it ‘at home’ on a vast scale, involving the annihilation of the native American 
population, and wars with Mexico and Spain (Boyce 2012, 82; Callinicos 2009b, 152; 
Overy 2011, 482 – 485). Indeed, arguably the ‘have not powers’, Germany, Italy, and 
Japan simply wanted to emulate in their own continents what the United States had 
successfully achieved in North America. In doing so, they developed their own versions 
of ‘manifest destiny’, of ethnic superiority analogous to ‘WASP’14 discourse and of 
settler colonialism mirrored on the European experience. In Japan, this took the form of 
a ‘divinely ordained Japanese cultural infallibility manifest in the august person of the 
Emperor himself’ (Sheftall 2011, 58). Given how deep these assumptions of colonial-
racism ran, it is difficult to imagine how the catastrophic breakdown between the two 
world wars could have been avoided. The ‘failed settlement’ at Versailles was, in this 
sense, but one feature of a deeper set of contradictions. The remarkable fluidity of 
international relations, and the tendency to view alliances as episodic, illustrates this 
deep geopolitical instability. The British hegemon, for example, pondered an alliance 
with Germany against the United States. The country initially formed an alliance with 
Japan to check Russian expansion in Asia only to then block with Russia and France 
against Germany and Austria-Hungry. It then experienced tense relations with France in 
the inter-war years over German appeasement, and played a key role in isolating the 
Soviet Union, but then allied with the communist state during the Second World War.  
China stood at the centre of these contradictions as the main site of geostrategic 
conflict in the decades prior to the First World War (Anievas 2012, 16). The polity was 
divided into formal ‘spheres of influence’, each one attached to a colonial overlord and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14 ‘White Anglo-Saxon Protestant’ referred to a closed group of elite Americans with English Protestant 
ancestry. 
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the rise of Japan destabilised the existing balance of power in East Asia. The fallout was 
ultimately global, as Japan’s defeat of Russia in 1905 emboldened German colonial 
ambition in Europe and formed part of the egregious slide into the First World War 
(Anievas 2012, 16 – 17). The intensity of this colonial encroachment around China and 
the seeming powerlessness of the Qing in the face of such a threat created a powerful 
impetus for Chinese subjects to push for revolutionary change. Modernisation was 
increasingly recognised as the only means by which China might be able to retain its 
territorial integrity. The Hundred Day Reform of 1898 was a response to defeat at the 
hands of Japan and the 1897 ‘scramble for China’ (see Table 4) that followed, both of 
which pushed the balance of power in the Court in favour of reformists (Tanner 2009, 
398 – 399). The Confucian examination was finally reformed, along with other 
measures designed to create a more efficient state administration, but these moves 
quickly led to a coup by conservatives around the Empress Dowager (ibid). Their fatal 
support for the Boxer Rebellion led to yet another military defeat, huge indemnities and 
the de facto end of China’s fiscal independence. So large were these repayments to the 
allied victors that even if the Qing had attempted a large-scale industrialisation drive in 
the 1900s they would have almost certainly lacked the capital to do so without 
defaulting on their external obligations (Riskin 1987, 15). Against the backdrop of this 
colonial encirclement a schism developed between the modernist ‘public society’ – i.e., 
those that imagined ‘China’ to be a shared agency and therefore firmly framed their 
consciousness within ‘homogenous empty time’ – and those, such as the Boxers, who 
aggressively struck back against colonialism but within the logic of messianic time and 
thus without credible methods or goals.  
It took a long period of socio-economic interaction between Qing China and the 
West to give rise to a modernist layer of intellectuals that were independent from the 
scholar-gentry ruling class, but when they did emerge they fostered the creation of the 
national imagination. The modernists saw the need to generate a public opinion with 
new means of cultural production, principally the magazine and newspaper, and to 
provide for themselves and their offspring a modern education with a global outlook 
(Lee 1983, 336). The turn to create these periodicals correlated extremely closely with 
the geopolitical events, in 1895, 1897, and 1904/5 (see Graph 1). This combination of 
colonial incursion and domestic radicalisation was undoubtedly crucial to the eventual 
disintegration of the Qing dynasty in 1911. Numerous newspapers emerged with the 
sole purpose of covering the Russo-Japanese war, a conflict of great interest to China’s 
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literati for it pitted a modernising Asian nation against a foe perceived to be one of 
Europe’s most powerful autocracies (Schiffrin 2009, 171). The humiliating reality – that 
China remained neutral in a conflict taking place on its territory – created a powerful 
‘whip of necessity’, but only the modern urban society, and not the collapsing Qing 
dynasty, proved responsive to it. This is why, as Graph 1 shows, many of the journals 
emerging in 1904 were explicitly revolutionary and fervently sought a Chinese – and 
not absolutist, dynastic and, crucially, Manchu – state to defend the newly imagined 
sensibility of ‘national interest’.  
 
Source: Kaske 2008, 184 – 185   
* Kaske also gives a reliability breakdown on the figures that I have not included in this version of the 
graph. 
 
The fear of an imperialist contagion, whose end point would be the total 
annexation of China, disturbed the thoughts of the ‘new Chinese’. This community was 
not only domestically located in the Treaty Ports: modern migration patterns had made 
it a ‘global’ identity. For whereas peasants could remain in this period relatively 
untouched by the social forces that were creating a sense of ‘China’, those who moved 
abroad, whether rich or poor, were immediately placed within this identity and could 
understand it relatively in a world of nationalities. The number of students studying in 
Japan grew steadily (see Table 5) and the successful modernisation undertaken by their 
neighbouring power provided a source of inspiration for the Chinese. Students studying 
in Tokyo formed the ‘Resist Russia’ movement, even attempting to establish a 
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volunteer corps to support the war effort, and their dark warning that ‘once Manchuria 
was lost foreign flags would soon be raised over the eighteen provinces of China 
proper’ (Harrell 1992, 135) reflected the angst-ridden nature of the new national 
imagination. Such concerns were hardly unjustified given 
the global context and they had an enduring impact on the 
national psyche.  
This intellectual layer of society that had a direct 
experience of ‘the outside world’ emerged in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. Overtime Sun Yat-sen 
became its most influential public figure. Born in a village 
in Guangdong, he moved to Hawaii at the age of thirteen 
and received an Anglican schooling (Jansen 1970, 60).  He 
returned to Guangdong as a Christian who associated 
Confucian ritual with social backwardness, and was 
promptly sent away to Hong Kong when he ‘scornfully 
broke two idols to show his contempt for them’ (ibid). 
Many of those like Sun that experienced the tumultuous energy and rapid change of the 
colonial nations, found the timeless bureaucratism of Imperial China, ‘deficient in 
government organization, scientific and education progress and material standards of 
living’ (ibid). The new nationalists aspired to be Chinese, but this identity was also 
forced upon them by their otherization as ‘alien’ within the foreign lands they 
encountered. They also developed a sense of Asian community and solidarity, reflecting 
both their shared Confucian heritage and a commonly held hostility towards Western 
colonialism. Indeed it was the indifference the Qing authorities showed to Sun’s 
petition urging them to adopt the Meiji slogan, fukoku kyōhei (‘rich country, strong 
army’) and pursue fiscal and economic reform, which pushed him to draw revolutionary 
nationalist conclusions (Jansen 1970, 61 – 62). Sun would live to embody all of the 
contradictions of the anti-colonial subjectivity as it became manifest within the 
imagined communities formed in polities that fell afoul of colonial-racism. He 
developed a passionate hatred for Western imperialism, but China’s ethnically Manchu 
rulers became the principal target of his anger as their leadership led to repeated 
humiliations, lacing his nationalism with a racial element that would come to 
characterise Chinese nation-ness (Jansen 1970, 204). He also looked to Japan as a 
potential friend, for they had successful withstood colonial incursions, even though their 
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‘pan-Asianism’ was heavily marked by the politics of colonial emulation – clearly 
manifested in Taiwan and Korea by the late 1890s. Sun’s hopes of a pan-Asian alliance 
would, of course, be more than disappointed. Significantly, however, the narrative he 
wove as late as November 192415, which dreamed of the rise of ‘Great Asia’ and 
stressed the superiority of Asian culture and virtues (Jansen 1970, 210 – 212),  
underlined how even anti-imperialists internalised the dominant outlooks of imperialism 
in international society by making the ‘rise to power’ of a new, obliquely colonial, 
system the central yardstick of progress for the anti-colonial struggle. Indeed, in The 
International Development of China, Sun openly advocated Han-Chinese settler 
colonialism in Tibet, Mongolia, Manchuria, and Xinjiang, and asserted this would 
allows the people of these regimes to come to terms with their common, Chinese, racial 
identity (Powers 2004, 104). Both in its appeal to race and seemingly expansive, 
colonial ambitions, Sun’s outlook symbolised enduring problems of Chinese 
nationalism that would characterise communist party rule too. In chapter five, I discuss 
how the CCP reengaged on its commitment to national self-determination shortly after 
taking power (see pp. 219 – 220). This position was rooted in the same narrative as 
Sun’s ‘Great Asia’ that emerged out of the cultural assumption of the colonial world 
where territory became ‘politicised’ as a source of power.   
The status of Taiwan in PRC geostrategic claims encapsulates this orientation 
and is worth reflecting upon when considering the origins of Chinese nationhood in the 
geopolitical context of the 1894 – 1911 period. Taiwan was ceded to Japan as a result of 
the first Sino-Japanese War in a state of extreme social underdevelopment and without a 
‘national consciousness’ in the Andersonian sense we are discussing here. Given the 
polity only won independence from Japan with the latter’s defeat in the Second World 
War, i.e. a half a century later, it was for several decades assumed that the anti-colonial 
struggle there would take a Taiwanese form. The Kuomintang government when it 
arrived on the island was, in some respects, alien and actually antagonised the local 
population, sparking mass social unrest in 1947 (Wachman 2008, 100). The Chinese 
communists were initially clear on the right of Taiwan to self-determination. Indeed, in 
1936, during his famous interview with Edgar Snow, Mao had described Taiwan in the 
same terms as Korea and stated, ‘we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their 
struggle for independence’ (cited in Wachman 2008, 85). It is telling that Mao did not at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15 Sun gave this speech on the 28 November 1924 and died on the 12 March 1925.  
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this time extend the principle to Japanese occupied Manchuria, which would have 
brought him and the CCP into significant conflict with the aggressive nationalist 
sensibilities of the polity at a time when the communists were arousing public 
sympathy. But, nonetheless, this makes for a striking contrast to his remarks from 1959 
that are couched firmly in colonial-style realism: 
We have thrown out the North American imperialists from this continent but 
they are holding out in Taiwan. We have warned them to get out of there but 
they refuse… The USA does not object to Quemoy and Matsu being given back 
to us, but in return it wishes to retain Taiwan for itself. This would be an 
unprofitable deal. We had better wait; let Chiang Kai-shek stay on Quemoy and 
Matsu, and we shall get them back later, together with the Pescadores and 
Taiwan. Our territory is spacious, and for the time being we can get along 
without these islands. It is unimportant if they do not return Taiwan to us for 
another hundred years (cited in Wachman 2008, 113 – 114, emphasis added). 
These remarks are heavily imbued with the assumptions of an earlier age, i.e. the 
classical period of colonial capitalism where territorial expansion, and the trading of 
colonial ‘possessions’ amongst the major imperialist powers, was an everyday 
occurrence. It illustrates the transformation that occurred in the CCP after the Long 
March and correlates closely with Mao’s own rise to power in the party.  A central 
conclusion to draw from this analysis is the role of colonial emulation in the formation 
of Chinese national consciousness. There were tendencies, far from absolute but real 
nonetheless, amongst the layers that created and reproduced a national identity to 
imagine it as aspiring to the same goals of territorialised imperial power as the colonial 
empires that they had set out to challenge. This reflected the nature of the transition 
from dynastic empire to imagined national community, for the latter stood in a 
paradoxical relation with the former. As we shall now outline, ‘China’ emerged outside 
of the Qing state for sociological reasons, reflecting its different relationship to urban 
capitalist culture. However, the new Chinese also identified with the polity over whom 
the Qing held sway, made a political claim on its territory, and identified the dynasty as 
‘foreign’ due to its Manchu ethnicity. This, as I will come on to discuss, laced the 
notion of ‘Chinese’ with an enduring racialized element.       
 
4.5 Chinese national identity as combined development: (ii) sociological conditions  
The Taiping Rebellion was not the only uprising to beset China in the mid nineteenth 
century. It was convulsed with a series of peasant rebellions with devastating human 
costs; the population of China in 1850 was c. 410 million but by 1873 it had fallen to c. 
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350 million, as social and economic hardship fed into vast violent uprisings (J. K. 
Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 215 – 216). The tragedy of the sacrifice lay in the archaic 
character of these failed revolutions. They lacked comprehension of the whirlwind of 
social forces now contributing to their hardship and with a dynastic conception of the 
world they could not be expected to develop a modern policy that materially answered 
their own social trauma. Put in contrast with other geopolitical communities faced with 
the challenges of modern capitalism globally this is not surprising. More puzzling is the 
inertia of China’s scholar-gentry ruling class despite the polity’s integration into global 
capitalist markets. Some sections of the Qing Court did become alert to the threat that 
colonialism posed as they suffered successive defeats in war, but their conclusion, at 
least in part, was to retrench into and emphasise dynastic fundamentals. The officers 
that had repressed the revolts of the mid-century initiated the ‘Self-Strengthening’ 
movement and won official backing from the Court in the Qing Restoration. But its 
support for modernisation was limited to military and technical improvements 
(armaments, steamships, etc.) and this was combined with seeking to strengthen 
Confucian institutional and kinship norms (J. K. Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 216 – 
218). This was a patently doomed policy from the outset. Military spending required 
expanded capital production if the policy was not to bankrupt the state and render it 
dependent on foreign credit – an outcome that ineluctably transpired (Tanner 2009, 
397). The problem was that the ruling gentry-bureaucracy remained deeply hostile to 
commerce and industry, fearing ‘mines, railroads, and telegraph lines would upset the 
harmony between man and nature (fengshui)’ and ‘disturb the imperial ancestors’ (J. K. 
Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 219). Even though provincial administrations tended to be 
more sensitive to new economic realities, the bureaucratic oversight of the Qing state 
continually thwarted modernisation. Large-scale capital investment projects required 
official oversight leaving them vulnerable to corrupt rentier practices (J. K. Fairbank 
and Goldman 2006, 219). One extreme example saw the equivalent of $50 million ear-
marked for the navy spent on the Empress Dowager’s palace – a material factor in its 
military defeat to Japan in 1895 (ibid). Stories like this abounded and with China 
forcibly ‘opened’ its domestic capital enjoyed no protections from foreign competition 
either. The economy was thus blighted by a post-tributary condition. It was integrated 
into global capitalism, but retained a bureaucratic ruling class at the apex of the state.  
Political concerns for tradition intermingled with class interests and together 
meant the state would play no role in forging a Chinese national identity. Ideologically, 
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China’s rulers did not adopt the principles of the Meiji slogan, ‘rich country, strong 
army’, which defined sovereignty in opposition to an aggressive world and sought to 
generate a public mood that inspired patriotic sacrifice. Instead the Imperial Court 
persisted with a Confucian worldview that claimed universal overlordship (Hsü 2000, 
192). This meant, for example, that in the First Sino-Japanese War a ‘modern state in 
which nationalism bound the government and people together in a common purpose’ 
was pitted against one for whom ‘government and people by and large formed separate 
entities’, dramatically altering China’s capacity to mobilise for the war effort (Hsü 
1980, 108 – 109). In the absence of such national cohesion the Qing state was unable to  
‘command the behaviour of citizens’ and – as a result of extraterritoriality – had 
partially given up its claim to ‘legal paramountcy’ (Rosenberg 1994, 129). By the close 
of the nineteenth century internal social order was restored, but only at the expense of a 
shift in power away from the Court towards local provinces. After the mid-century 
breakdown of order the provinces developed their own militaries, creating centrifugal 
sites of power that would later morph into warlordism (Liu 1978, 425 – 433). Two 
provincial naval squadrons even refused to fight in the war with Japan, pleading ‘self-
preservation’ (Hsü 1980, 340). These processes underline how there was an absence of 
sovereign capitalist power in conditions of capitalist penetration of the polity. 
Capitalist sovereignty implies that the state constitutes itself in an external relation to 
production and civil society as an ‘autonomous’ political sphere (Rosenberg 1994, 128). 
The result is not a ‘neutral’ standpoint, but a form of class power that consolidates 
capitalist rule by insisting upon, and coercively upholding, a privately owned and 
controlled sphere of production (Rosenberg 1994, 84 – 86, 126 – 139; Wood 1981). 
Instead Confucian power upheld the primacy of bureaucratic tutelage in relation to 
private production. Historically this had suppressed native capitalist tendencies. But by 
the mid to late nineteenth century it meant that new capitalist layers either looked to the 
provincial states or colonial powers for protection. The hybridity of this social amalgam 
– of a decaying archaic state form juxtaposed to semi-colonial capitalist penetration – 
formed through China’s combined development was undoubtedly unique, but the 
political conclusion was all too familiar. Like so many other of the polities in the south 
and east that were emerging out of struggles with colonialism, China was caught in a 
Catch-22 situation. It had a divided and weak capitalist class unable to establish the 
institutional basis, via either revolution or reform, for secure, native industrial 
development. Their ‘advantage’, if it can be called that, lay in the fact the Qing state 
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was disintegrating under the twin effects of geopolitical incursions and the centrifugal 
pressures unleashed by capitalist development. However, the form this took would 
result in decades of civil warfare amongst rival peasant armies. 
These sociological conditions of combined development played a decisive role 
in making the formation of ‘nation-ness’ dissonant from the Qing state. The actors who 
sought to inspire the procreation of a national sensibility were certainly bourgeois in the 
broad conception of the term: encompassing administrative elites, middle class 
professionals, as well as capitalist property owners (Wood 1984, 19). Most of all, these 
were modern urban classes whose purview was international in scope. By the 1890s the 
Treaty Ports had undergone a considerable transformation, and their regional economies 
exhibited an explicitly capitalist dynamic of expansive development and with it new 
social classes and spatial surroundings. To the fore came China’s new social groups: 
comprador-businessman, whose interests now straddled the new service and consumer 
economies as well as the traditional pastimes of foreign trade; salaried professional 
workers, such as teachers, journalists, accountants, lawyers, and doctors; not to mention 
a small but nonetheless visible urban proletariat (H. Chang 1980, 275). This 
transformation in the class structure elicited a parallel set of changes in spatial 
surroundings in the spirit of modern urban life: ‘Western-style buildings, street patterns, 
and city services of gas lighting and water supply, plus steamship transportation and 
foreign trade, were all connected with (or extensions of) the world outside China’ (J. K. 
Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 226). Remarkable, in some respects, is how slowly these 
changes took to translate into the cultural arena and create new modes of apprehension 
that could distil a national consciousness. Only by the 1890s did these shifts translate 
into a Chinese identity proper, despite the more rapid economic interchange with the 
West seen since the empire’s defeat in the Second Opium War.   
What accounts for so long a delay? The answer lies in the blockage the Qing 
state represented to what Anderson calls, in the European context, ‘the Lexicographic 
Revolution’: where local administrative script-vernaculars were adopted by absolutist 
states to meet practical needs of governance amongst their polities and thus broke the 
Latin dominance of script language (Anderson 2006, 84). In China, Confucian scripture 
still had a monopoly as the language of state administration, but it was not a spoken 
vernacular and was only learnt by those seeking a place in the officialdom (Kaske 2008, 
27). In medieval Europe, a similar situation had existed with the Latin lexicographic 
monopoly. A crucial difference lay, however, in the role that access to script knowledge 
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played in the class structure. In Imperial China, the ability to read Confucian script 
expressed ruling class power, not just a scholarly privilege. If one considers how the 
examination-system was the means of entry into the ruling class, then one can see that 
the purely lexicographic character served to sustain an elite dynastic status and 
identity.16 Steeped in Confucian teachings and ritual that preached a superior insularity 
(coupled with considerable socio-economic privilege this knowledge imparted), the 
Chinese literati connected the lexicographic status quo to their own social power. To 
introduce lexicographic reform that aligned the written word to spoken vernaculars 
would undermine their elite status. This jealous defence of the status quo also fed 
hostility to all things modern and Western. The Jiangnan Arsenal, which was 
established in the 1860s to translate the literary products of Western science, could only 
carve out a small market for its publications (H. Chang 1980, 276). Neither could the 
schools established at the same time (as part of ‘Self-Strengthening’) to offer training in 
Western language, sciences and technical expertise gain recruits amongst the youth of 
the ruling elite (ibid). Against these cultural and social constraints it took time for a 
national sensibility to emerge. Even within the treaty ports modernisation was inhibited 
by the semi-colonial and post-tributary condition. A ‘time lag’ in the maturation of a 
national consciousness and sensibility resulted, but it did ultimately emerge amongst a 
section of the new, cosmopolitan social groups at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Alert to global developments and shamed by the response of the Qing to the competitive 
challenges of the new world order, these intellectuals linked the failure of ‘Self-
Strengthening’ to the absence of a Chinese public opinion that could pressure dynastic 
power.  This national sensibility confronted the Qing order and would become a 
struggle against the gentry-elite and for the alignment of a written Chinese form with 
vernacular language.   
This layer was eminently a cultural feature of modern capitalism. Coastal cities 
now exhibited an expansive, capitalist cycle along with a ‘modern mass media—
Chinese journalists, newspapers, and magazines—and a new intelligentsia of writers 
and artists not oriented toward careers as government officials’ (J. K. Fairbank and 
Goldman 2006, 226). Intellectuals like Lu Zhuangzhang connected lexicographic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16 There are obvious parallels here with the relationship between Latin and the traditional Catholic 
scholarly elite in medieval Europe. But, in addition to the special class role of Confucian scripture in 
China, a further distinction lies in the territorial cohesion of the Middle Kingdom and the geopolitical 
plurality of Europe, which led dynastic states to establish their own administrative languages base on 
local vernaculars for practical purposes; ‘essentially a matter of unselfconscious inheritance or 
convenience’ (Anderson 2006, 84). 
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revolution to the development of the broad literacy needed for national cohesion (Kaske 
2008, 94). Lu ‘described the people as the vital organs of the state connected to its head 
(the ruler) and limbs (the officials) by virtue of their aptitude’ and so ‘only a literate 
people could make China stronger because it allowed the organism to function in a 
perfect way from top to bottom’ (ibid). Such remarks represent archetypical elements of 
modern conservative ideology, but they were revolutionary in the Confucian context. Lu 
had naturalised ruling elites into a single imagined organism, ‘China’, and the literary 
revolution he pushed for was designed to bring it into being and thus end the system 
where rulers and ruled were separate entities. Baihua, a simplified form of Chinese 
intelligible to those without a classical education, was promoted as the new script 
(Kaske 2008). A series of periodicals consciously concerned to ‘create a public opinion’ 
and generate pressure for reform were launched in the 1890s (Lee 1983, 452 – 453, see 
also; Kaske 2008, 161 – 232). But this aspiration alone was insufficient without the 
material basis for mass cultural production: capitalism. ‘Nothing served to “assemble” 
related vernacular’, in China like elsewhere, ‘more than capitalism, which… created 
mechanically-reproduced print languages capable of dissemination through the market’ 
(Anderson 2006, 44). In the small but growing market, the largest national newspaper, 
Shiwu Bao (‘The Chinese Progress’) sold more than 10,000 copies (Chang 1980, 334). 
Circulation figures would rise astronomically in the 1920s, but the conception of 
‘China’ was formed in this earlier moment as the new intelligentsia pioneered a 
vocabulary that cohered a national imagery. Indeed, this national identity formed in the 
1890s was sufficiently strong to survive the deep divisions of the next decades. This, it 
should be emphasised, is despite the paucity of China’s industrial development which 
remained sclerotic, even in the thoroughly capitalist Treaty Ports. Anderson is surely 
right to suggest that the strong industrial development achieved by the United States 
was an important factor in its development of a cohesive nationality (Anderson 2006, 63 
– 64) and the strength of the Chinese imagination is accordingly remarkable given its 
economic paucity. Rival national identities based on localities never seriously 
challenged it (pace Japanese attempts in Manchuria that were ridiculed), despite the 
polity’s post-1911 collapse into warlordism. 
The emergence of ‘China’ in the social imagination was eminently a process of 
combined development. It was neither a wholly socio-economic or cultural 
development. These two aspects existed in a dynamic inter-relation, which overtime 
gradually unseated dynastic forms of consciousness and hierarchy. This shift in the 
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apprehension of time – towards ‘homogenous empty time’ and a conception of China as 
a collective force moving through it – emerged through the polity’s interplay with the 
wider world. Britain’s crushing of the Qing in 1842 foreshadowed decades of foreign 
incursions. Considering these events from our contemporary standpoint it might seem 
surprising that a series of decisive military defeats would not quickly result in a political 
revolution or radical reform (as is well known, there are numerous examples of this in 
the twentieth century, notably Russia in 1905 and 1917). The ‘time lag’ illustrates how 
actors, i.e. new culturally modern social groups, had to emerge that apprehended the 
meaning of these events and the threats and opportunities found in the world beyond the 
Confucian realm. It was these changes that created the foundation for the political 
struggles of modern China. Sun and Mao are individuals that shaped the new China in 
dramatic ways, but they emerged within and out of this sociological process. Sun, for 
example, shot to prominence on the national scene in 1896 when he was captured by the 
Chinese Legation in London ‘and almost smuggled back to China for certain torture and 
death’, only escaping this fate thanks to the British authorities (Jansen 1970, 64, 203). 
The incident won him fame in China but, in doing so, underlined the degree of social 
change in the polity. If this incident had occurred two decades earlier then there would 
have been little apprehension of its significance inside the country. Occurring at a 
moment when the transformations in Chinese urban life had given rise to the 
newspaper, the world event could now be refracted into the minds of the newly 
emerging ‘imagined community’. As such, it was this urban capitalist transformation, 
with the associated revolutions in communications and media, concentrated global 
events into the localised community of the Treaty Ports to be apprehended by these new 
layers. But this modern ‘citizenry’ – in outlook, if not legal status – did not forge an 
imagined identity around ‘Shanghai’, or ‘Nanjing’, but considered themselves to be 
Chinese. Their choice reflected the territorial unity of the Confucian Empire, which 
provided a geographical reference point around which a new cohesive identity could be 
formed. These pre-existing territorial bounds and long history undoubtedly shaped the 
Chinese imagination. But the novelty of Chinese nation-ness lay in how the cultural 
heritage was now apprehended historically, rather than timelessly, and the identity 
assumed to be common to the whole community, thus transcending the stratified 
identities of the dynastic age. The creation of the written vernacular baihua was 
important to this process, even though the identity of ‘China’ allowed for a degree of 
linguistic diversity, with Mandarin the dominant language amongst the Han-Chinese 
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majority. The genesis of a nation, however, requires more than an identity statement. A 
mythology is needed to give meaning to this new collective imagination. As I will now 
discuss, such myths draw upon overtly modern repertoires of thought. However, the 
sensibility they construct is projected backwards into the past and the boundaries that 
are drawn between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ in this mythology are rich with potential 
for narratives of supremacy and ethnic difference to emerge.  
The New Culture Movement, which had its origins in the late nineteenth century 
turn to mass cultural production, but rose to real prominence in the 1920s with the rise 
of anti-imperialist agitation, was beset by uncomfortable juxtapositions between 
emancipatory discourses and the use of racist repertoires of thought. Once ‘politicised’, 
i.e. turned into active attempts at social change, then the scope for ethnic intolerance 
was naturally great. This was reflected in anti-Manchu racism, which was a pre-existing 
feature of Chinese society as a ‘natural’ consequence of the ethnically stratified political 
system but became spliced with the overtly modern racist discourses of ‘Social 
Darwinism’ imported into China from the West.  Before considering China’s political 
nationalism we should first reflect upon the precise nature of the mythology that gave 
meaning to the new national community.  
  
4.6 Chinese identity as combined development: (iii) ‘myth of descent’ as ideological 
amalgam  
If one irony of the genesis of nation-ness lies in its ‘objective modernity versus 
subjective antiquity’ (Anderson 2006, 5), then another, no less significant, contradiction 
lies in how the local character of the national identity – i.e. its imagined concentration in 
a specific space – emerges through intersocietal interaction (‘combined development’) 
as the community’s negation of ‘the outside’. Kees van der Pijl argues that this 
expresses a human community in a state of self-alienation:  
Humanity engages in the process of socialisation as distinct communities, the 
groups in which it emerges from nature. The transition from animal species to 
historical humanity relies on a myth of descent from another time; a cosmogony 
that is universal, even if each community has a separate story of how it got here 
from eternity. Alienation, then, is inherent in the ‘involuntary’ way in which 
humans enter into social relations – both in the productive sphere and in 
relations of ethno-cultural difference. Through the lens of alienation, different 
communities are perceived as foreign, a condition lifted out of history and 
naturalised. Once modern states assume the sole right of handling foreign 
relations on the basis of their territorial sovereignty, ‘international relations’, 
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understood as relations among states that are nominally equal, come to be 
viewed as the normal state of affairs (van der Pijl 2010, 4). 
 
Van der Pijl captures how societies treat their socially constructed boundaries, such as 
territorial sovereignty, as a timeless essence and not historical product. Consequently, 
the imagined inside/outside relations become attached to a mythology of the past 
considered external to history (‘the myth of descent’). These sensibilities reflect the 
fragmented nature of human existence (i.e., the existence of many societies) and by 
viewing others ‘through the lens of alienation’ can lead to dangerous forms of 
‘otherization’, such as pseudospeciation, ethnic generalisation and xenophobia. This 
darker side of the modern world has always been juxtaposed in our imagination to other 
dimensions pressing in the opposite direction: towards, that is, the breaking down of 
this alienated condition. Experiencing other cultures, cross-border solidarity, seeking to 
emulate the social achievements of other communities, and new internationalist 
identities, are also all part of ‘being modern’. The compressed way that we experience 
space and time in capitalist modernity – where an unprecedented scope for interaction 
amongst communities produces just as great a tendency for reifying ethno-cultural 
differences – has intensified how we comes to terms with ‘involuntary alienation’. To 
found a modern nation is by definition to create a ‘myth of descent’, which requires, in 
turn, a cultural amalgam of ‘foreign and domestic’, ‘archaic and modern’ discourses. In 
China, the ideals of sovereign territoriality, the rule of law, citizenship, and so on, 
trickled into the polity as it became conscious of international society, but other 
concepts of the modern world were equally manifested: its creation of racial hierarchies, 
exploitative economics and colonialist geopolitics.  
‘Race’ and ‘nation’ were concepts that were both bound up with the alienating 
dimensions of modernity, but they had different intellectual pathologies. ‘Nationalism 
thinks in terms of historical destinies’, writes Anderson ‘while racism dreams of eternal 
contaminations’ of a once ethically pure race (Anderson 2006, 149) and accordingly 
seeks some form of racial hierarchy or ‘purification’ of the polity. ‘Race’, when it 
emerged as a modern political category, actually obscured ethno-cultural differences 
with typographies such as ‘White’, ‘Black’ and ‘Yellow’. Yet, despite this, it was still 
able to integrate the new, modern cleavage of racial difference into pre-existing ethnic 
lines of demarcation. This could be seen in China where ‘theories’ of a hierarchy of 
races were drawn upon to justify, and give meaning to, the rising tide of anti-Manchu 
sentiment. Anti-Qing agitation had for centuries been laced with ethnic hostility to the 
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Manchu people and because ‘nation-ness’ emerged externally to the Qing/Manchu state 
there was a resulting tendency to identify ‘China’ with the Han-Chinese race. In other 
words, national identity became racially exclusive. As Rana Mitter explains:   
…The Chinese state and Chinese nation have both proved unstable, changeable 
and even elusive entities over the last century and a half. Notably, the 
introduction of “nation” as a form of political identity in China in the late 
nineteenth century was highly problematic. The neologism minzu, the term 
finally widely accepted as a translation of “nation”, was infused with a racial 
element which has led to its becoming a taboo term in contemporary Chinese 
political discussion. Yet that racial overtone, used by thinkers including Sun 
Yatsen, separated it from pre-existing terms such as guo or guojia, which 
encompassed a more territorially bounded, racially uninflected concept of 
“country” or “state” (Mitter 2003, 123).  
Minzu17 was attractive because the Qing dynasty insisted they were not Chinese. The 
situation makes for quite a contrast with Europe where ruling elites had naturalised into 
nations. Romanovs became Russians, Hanoverians discovered they were English, 
Hohenzollerns that they were Germans, and in each case the elite conceded that they 
were first amongst a community with a shared, common identity (Anderson 2006, 85). 
But the Qing dynasty was far too conservative to countenance a reimagining of their 
status. They had woven their Manchu ethnicity into the cultural and institutional life of 
the state and, until the mid nineteenth century, they had maintained an ethnic majority 
in their Manchurian homeland by force (Isett 2006). The Manchu elite was therefore 
considered to be, not only above, but also separate to the subjects over whom they 
ruled. Contrastingly, national identity is imagined as egalitarian, because there is no 
stratified hierarchy of identities within the nation. The expectation that the individual 
will sacrifice for the common good (due to the shared identity), in turn, fosters the idea 
of patriotism, and the possibility of being accused of lacking it. Once this imagination is 
in place even rulers can be accused of lacking patriotism. But this consciousness, and 
the corresponding forms of capitalist cultural production it is predicated on, was alien to 
the Qing regime. It was quite logical in this context (though not, of course, in any way 
progressive) for nationalists to define the nation on Han-Chinese ethnic lines. Feng Tzu-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17 Some writers have argued that the idea minzu implies a racial inflection is wrong. Shanshan Lan argues 
that min means people and zu means lineage, neither of which are necessarily racialized, and together 
minzu can mean nation, people or ethnicity. Translations of Sun’s work have instead tended to translate 
minzu as race when it does not automatically have this meaning. However, given that there was an 
association of nation with the Han-Chinese ethnicity, that Lan accepts Sun’s nationalism ‘contained a 
large dose of racial pride’, and that he often conflated minzu with zhongzu (racial lineage) in his own 
speeches, then the overall argument I make is unaffected by this controversy (Lan 2012, 38 – 39). 
   
 
146	  
yu, a writer of the new culture, perfectly expressed this widely held view after the Boxer 
War when he bemoaned the support the Boxer Rebellion had given to the Manchu 
regime:    
Our people constantly speak of the shame of being slaves to foreigners, yet they 
are not aware of the humiliation of being enslaved by the Manchus. They 
constantly speak of ousting the foreign races, yet they do not know enough to 
resist the alien Manchu race (cited in Harrell 1992, 104).  
 
Such was the allure of racialized nationalism it crossed the immature but real 
boundaries between left and right forming at this time. For instance, in 1903, in a quite 
shocking passage, Tsou Jang, a ‘leftist’ and radical author of the bombastic tome, The 
Revolutionary Army, declared himself in favour of the genocidal extermination of 5 
million Manchus in China:  
Let us sweep away the absolute monarchy which has lasted for thousands of 
years. Let us cast off the slave nature… Let us slay and exterminate more than 
five million of those beastlike Manchus. Let us wipe off the disgrace of this 
tranny and cruelty which has been going on for 260 years (cited in Harrell 1992, 
148). 
 
This appalling literary gesticulation did not simply reflect the fusion of ‘nation-ness’ 
with the ethnically laden social divisions of Qing China. Racialized narratives of 
domination were a ubiquitous feature of the modern world and this helps explain why 
the ethnically inflected concept of minzu survived the downfall of the regime and was a 
continuous theme of the New Culture Movement. Indeed, the Chinese inflection of race 
with nationhood consciously mirrored the growing popularity of Social Darwinist 
discourse across international society (Dikötter 1992). The writer Yan Fu imported 
Social Darwinism into China in the nineteenth century and it had an enduring impact on 
the New Culture movement (Dikötter 1992, 98 – 107). The pseudo ‘scientific’ doctrine, 
which animated the rising tide of global racism in the inter-war years, held a particular 
attraction for the polity’s nationalists, because of its superficially radical break with 
Confucian notions of social harmony. The world was now conceived as a raw struggle 
for survival and this reactionary ideology thus purported to explain the humiliation of 
the polity as lying in the ‘un-Chinese’ cultural characteristics of the Qing. This racism 
undoubtedly denigrated the moral development of China’s anti-colonial subject. Some 
New Culture writers openly engaged in pseudospeciation – treating the Manchus and 
other nomadic peoples as ‘sub-human’ – and argued the ability to colonize or withstand 
attempts at colonization indicated the superiority or inferiority of the race (Dikötter 
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1992, 106 – 107). Not only did this damage the anti-colonial argument by effectively 
ascribing substantial legitimacy to the colonial endeavour, but it also meant that China 
became envisioned as an aspiring colonial power. Like all such mythologies these 
racialized elements of the New Culture movement were highly contradictory. They 
combined a ‘totalistic antitraditionalism’, which was rooted in political and racial 
hostility to the Qing dynasty (Lin 1979, 55) with the elaboration of a timeless 
mythology of the Han-Chinese people. By rooting the anti-colonial subject in the idea 
that the Han-Chinese race had suffered a loss of power and prestige, national liberation 
became judged according to the restoration (or not) of that power within the 
international system. This process of nationality formation therefore perfectly 
encapsulates van der Pijl’s conception of the ‘myth of descent’ (van der Pijl 2010, 4). 
Each society develops their own story of how they ‘discovered’, rather than imagined, 
national consciousness, which then, in turn, establishes socio-ethnic boundaries to 
homogenise the identity as the negation of the outside and its ‘alien’ manifestations 
within the polity (ibid).  
It would be wrong, however, to view the New Culture Movement as one-sidedly 
‘racist’. It gave rise to a veritable plurality of political outlooks, progressive as well as 
reactionary. Anarchism, guild socialism, feminism, fascism and liberalism, ‘to name but 
a few’ all competed to win the hearts and minds of the urban masses (Mitter 2004, 104). 
In light of this diversity, and the presence of emancipatory hopes and discourses, it 
would be unfair to see racism as holding a vice-like grip on these cultural producers. 
However, equally, the hold of the ethnically inflected concept of Chinese nation identity 
as minzu and the ubiquity of political nationalism – with the imagery of humiliation 
combined with the goal of a strong nation-state – was extraordinarily strong. The 
movement ‘forced an argument about how China should deal with its Confucian past’ 
(ibid), but it was one characterised by unease and trauma due to the difficulties of 
constructing a ‘myth of descent’ in the context of the ‘century of humiliation’. 
Confucianism had, of course, been fundamental to the ordering of the stratified 
identities found in ‘the Middle Kingdom’. It was therefore lodged within the real history 
and collective memory of the polity, but modernisers would often see it as a defeated 
cultural order. Insofar as it was the form of appearance of the tributary class relations 
now swept away by capitalism, they were hardly unjustified in doing so. The New 
Culture Movement exhibited this existential tension; of what is and was the ‘new 
China’ being born or rediscovered (Mitter 2004). Different tracks were taken in 
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response; either to resurrect Confucian teaching in a modified form or emphasise how a 
radical rupture with the past was need to achieve national salvation. For both sides, 
however, Chinese identity was resolutely strong. Indeed, the identity established itself 
as a ‘necessity’, i.e. it became a social construction that imprinted a nationality onto 
individual agents.  
Nationalist ideology was, in contrast, discursively constructed through political 
argument, but its allure arose from the collective psychology induced by the colonial 
encirclement of China. In the Japanese context, Sheftall argues that a fear of 
‘desymbolization’ emerged out of the ‘psychological condition of existential 
bewilderment’ as the modernism of foreign shores was imposed on existing native 
lifeworlds (Sheftall 2011, 56). A similar process arguably occurred in China. Recall 
how Chinese students in Japan at the outbreak of the war with Russia feared ‘foreign 
flags would soon be raised over the eighteen provinces of China proper’ (Harrell 1992, 
135). This imagined future underlines how materially grounded fears of colonisation 
were expressed in desymbolization anxiety. A national imagery was formed in response 
to this threat and was therefore novel and modernistic yet looked to traditional imagery 
as a source of meaning in the face of ‘existential bewilderment’. Both Japan and China 
were ancient polities whose new national imaginations drew – in complex and often 
conflicting ways – on long historical lineages of development. This was important in 
giving these national imageries particular strength and cohesion. It also made these 
polities ‘hypersensitive’ to desymbolization threats (Sheftall 2011, 59) and the logical 
response of re-symbolization provided ample opportunity for racist and colonial 
aspirations for the nation. Reflecting the contradictions within the imagined community, 
the symbols were contested. Sun, for instance, opposed the Five Colour Flag used by 
the Chinese Republic government between 1912 and 1918, because each colour – 
including the yellow that was identified with Manchu rule – was thought to symbolise a 
separate ethnic identity which he held to be anathema to his project of minzu cohesion. 
These exemplifies the inherent tensions of forming a ‘myth of descent’ that tries to 
establish bounds for group cohesion. 
This outline is useful for understanding the ideological tasks of Chinese 
communism once they took power. For Mao the resymbolization of national identity 
through the creation of a powerful state with attendant national imagery was as 
important as economic reconstruction. Between 1949 and 1952 the CCP won 
considerable support amongst the middle class intelligentsia by delivering the 
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Kuomintang’s programme of reunification, reconstruction, national pride and territorial 
integrity. Resymbolization, therefore, achieved ‘lift off’ with ‘a national flag, a national 
anthem, the pervasive use of red as a symbol of communism, the creation and 
dissemination of images of revolutionary heroes, and most important, the figure of Mao 
Zedong, the “Great Helmsman”’ (Powers 2004, 105). However, in its standardisation 
this also closed down the plurality seen in the New Culture Movement (Mitter 2004). 
Neither was the process of instilling uniformity only political, i.e. simply reflective of 
the way that the communists mimicked the political form of ‘state socialism’ pioneered 
in Stalin’s Russia. It also gave rise to the same tensions of ethnic cohesion implied by 
Sun’s use of the term minzu – if national cohesion was understood as minzu cohesion, 
i.e. as ethnic cohesiveness, then where would this leave the identity of minorities? The 
logical outcome was to force adaption to Han-Chinese culture and this approach fitted 
organically with the monolithism of the Stalinist party:  
One of the problems the communists faced in their programme to instil a 
nationalist consciousness among the Chinese people was the fact that within 
China’s borders there were a number of minority peoples who did not identify 
themselves as Chinese and whose own emerging national consciousness 
emphasised their differences from the Han and resistance to assimilation. In 
combating this, the communists adopted the nationalists’ notion that all 
minorities constituted part of the Chinese race, and they embarked on a 
programme of cultural assimilation through which, it was hoped, the differences 
between the races would wither and disappear, leaving in the end a coherent, 
monolithic and unified culture that, naturally, was based on the Han model 
(Powers 2004, 109).       
 
This expressed the turn of the Chinese communists to political nationalism – a process I 
outline in the last section of this chapter. However, for now it is sufficient to note the 
symmetry between this CCP policy in power and the logic of Sun’s use of the ethnically 
inflected conception of the nation, which in its practical application had to involve 
assimilation. The cultural monolithism that the CCP already held to, due to the 
influence of Soviet Stalinism, complemented this approach. Having embraced 
nationalism and rejected plurality – i.e., rejected the concept there could be many 
different identities that could be incorporated into the Chinese nation – the CCP was left 
with no choice, but to impose a form of Han Chinese uniformity and assimilation in its 
resymbolization efforts. It is precisely because Mao adopted Chinese nationalism that 
Sun’s notion of minzu becomes important. The CCP did not start from a blank slate and 
imagine the nation afresh, but they inevitably ‘took’, so to speak, the China that was 
created in the 1890s. In the next section, I discuss how this Chinese nationalism also 
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exhibited a general tendency to the division between messianic and pragmatic 
discourses seen after 1949. Before exploring this historical schism, let us first 
summarise the origins and enduring significance of the emergence of Chinese 
nationhood on its political nationalism:  
 
• The ‘whip of external necessity’ in the form of the ‘scramble for China’ and the 
Russo-Japanese War led the new urban middle classes to consciously seek to 
‘create a nation’ that could stand up to the wider world.  
• These actors emerged out of urban capitalist development, which provided the 
means in the form of print-capitalism to cohere a national imagination. This 
process was, thus, external to the Qing ruling class, who were the same social 
stratum deemed to have betrayed the people.  
• The transition from tributary empire to semi-colonial economy conditioned the 
form of the Chinese national imagination: it aspired to the restoration of ‘lost’ 
power and identified the colonial project as the yardstick of social progress in 
much the same was as the Japanese did. Reclaiming Qing territory, including 
colonies such as Taiwan, was a logical result of this.  
• Furthermore, the Manchu ethnicity of the Qing dynasty led to Chinese 
nationhood being defined on anti-Manchu lines (reflecting the origins of ‘China’ 
as external to the dynasty), and this had implications for the Han Chinese 
assimilation imposed by the PRC after 1949.   
4.7 Two forms of Chinese nationalism: messianic idealism versus pragmatic 
paternalism  
China’s discourses of ‘national salvation’ emerged organically out of desymbolization 
anxiety and –like the concept of race – crossed divisions between right and left. The 
radical Lu Xun’s short story ‘Diary of a Madman’ (1918) became characteristic of the 
insecurity that blighted the emergent Chinese identity. He depicted the Chinese as a 
nation of cannibals, whose only hope lay with its children not yet assimilated into this 
immoral culture (Mitter 2004, 109 – 110). In this narrative, one finds therefore a myth 
of descent in which the imagined historical identity (‘China’) is considered wholly 
negative. A key message of Lu Xun’s work is the importance of not tolerating 
moderation in the face of evil, and, hence, the Chinese people are considered culpable 
for their acquiescence to corrupt dynastic rulers (ibid). Interestingly, young people are 
seen as the only hope for the nation’s salvation; their inexperience allows them to act as 
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a blank slate and remake the national community in their image. Denunciations of 
Confucian culture complimented this outlook and they suggest a real, genuine, feeling 
of self-loathing pervaded a section of the New Culture Movement (ibid). This is not 
unique to China’s experience, as national communities that emerged from dynastic 
empires in which their ethnic identity had been repressed have often constructed a 
similarly negative myth of descent. But the Chinese case was particularly acute. 
Extreme metaphorical representations could also easily justify a lack of toleration for 
‘moderate’ viewpoints, particularly those thinkers seeking to resuscitate Confucian 
values (ibid). These elements of the New Culture Movement are correctly regarded as 
foreshadowing the messianic discourses of Maoism, particularly during the Cultural 
Revolution. In the latter, the nationalist ethos can be seen as therefore appealing to an 
existing sensibility and outlook within urban society where the frantic mobilisations 
were concentrated. This illustrates the complexity, and potential instability, of 
nominally cohesive national narratives. Unable to find salvation in the past these actors 
instead intensified their promises and hopes for the future, encouraging themselves and 
others to make great sacrifices to realise it. This is an overtly modernist mode of 
apprehension in which the past and future can become radically dis-aligned as a ‘nation’ 
aspires to a radically different destiny (Benjamin 1968, 261 – 262). But, the irony, of 
both these earlier discourses and the fanaticism of the Maoist period, was their frequent 
use of traditional repertoires of thought, aesthetics, and narrative. Cannibalism, i.e. Lun 
Xun’s chosen metaphor, was, for example, the ultimate traditional sign of moral decay 
(Mitter 2004, 110). There was an element of irony in such literary choices, but they also 
reflected a fatality; the vernacular form and the substantive content could not be easily 
separated, and appeals to the familiar aided communicability. 
This element of Chinese nationalist discourse was heavily characterised by a 
secular and revolutionary form of millenarianism; the idea that out of great suffering a 
critical moment was approaching when the national community would be completely 
transformed (Yu 2009, 45 – 47). It drew obvious parallels with the long history of 
millenarian discourses in China that were rooted in messianic apprehension of time, but 
by apportioning agency to the people to recreate their own futures, rather than investing 
hope in a celestial coming, the discourse was given a modern content. Its paradoxes 
were illustrated during the Cultural Revolution. One of the consequences of Mao’s 
injunction to ‘energetically destroy’ the ‘four olds’ (ideas, culture, customs, habits) 
(cited in MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2008, 113) was the drive of the Red Guards to 
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change the names of manufactured goods where the Western term had simply been 
incorporated into the Chinese language, and replace them with ‘meaningful Chinese 
names’ (cited in ibid, 115). A further instruction stated that ‘those who have [personal] 
names with feudal overtones will voluntarily go to the police station to change their 
names’ (cited in ibid). A simultaneous opposition was therefore established that fused 
xenophobia with anti-traditionalism in the name of forging a radically new 
‘instantaneous’ present. As Raymond Williams observed such a ‘systematic utopia’ can 
easily spill into its opposite, a ‘systematic dystopia’ if, that is, it closes down cultural 
plurality, and thus leads, ‘its very processes and impulses, including above all planning, 
to the exact opposite, a more repressive, a more arbitrary, a more standardised and 
inhuman order’ (Williams 1983, 12). The messianic elements of the New Culture 
Movement, by conceiving the acceptance of a particular type of new, Chinese identity 
as the primary agency of political change, foreshadowed the intolerance that the 
Cultural Revolution showed to all forms of artistic and cultural expression that did not 
subscribe to the ‘Red China’ symbolism propagated violently by its Red Guards. In 
light of this trauma, it is hardly surprising that a shift towards a more pragmatic 
approach to Chinese national culture resulted.  
The more pragmatic, traditionalist nationalism also finds its roots in the New 
Culture process. Indeed, it was easier, perhaps, for those who strived for a form of 
nationhood that rejuvenated, rather than rejected, classical teachings to give a more 
internally consistent vision of Chinese modernity where the ‘myth of descent’ was 
founded in a critical appropriation of the polity’s history (Mitter 2003, 124 – 132). Zou 
Taofen, for instance, took a more conventional approach to the conjuring of national 
imagery. In the transition between the Qing and Republican eras he argued an identity 
with the country18 persisted across these ages which was based on fundamental Chinese 
qualities: loyalty, filial piety, trust and righteousness, benevolent love, and peace and 
stability (cited in Mitter 2004, 115). His mere invocation that these ethical principles 
should not simply be preserved but also ‘developed and expanded’ (ibid) indicate the 
amalgam of new and old, invoking as it did a conception of progress, change and 
ascending development through time. These themes would be taken up by Chiang Kai-
shek, who took over the Kuomintang in 1925 when Sun died, in the ‘New Life 
Movement’ launched in 1934, ironically coinciding with the repression of literary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18 In this extract he used the racially uninflected term guo and thereby referred equally to the pre-modern 
state. 
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commentators, including Zou (Mitter 2004, 115, xvi). Zou’s writings have a 
paradigmatic quality for the New Culture Movement because of the eclectic mix of 
influences that he drew upon. Like other writers, Zou was influenced by the Social 
Darwinism that had such a ubiquitous hold on the intellectual climate. However, 
adapting this doctrine to the social harmonist teachings of Confucianism was a 
challenge. Herbert Spencer’s Social Darwinism was, strictly speaking, amoral (Mitter 
2004, 130). Its original invection preached an inevitable clash amongst racially and 
cultural homogenous groups within which the individual was subordinate to the 
collective and moral values largely seen as an illusion (ibid). Zou therefore looked to 
Thomas Huxley for a flexible vision (ibid). This allowed him to incorporate the 
Confucian idea that the ‘cultivation of the self’ by the individual was essential to the 
ethical state of the collective (ibid). This, in turn, also permitted conceptualising 
international relations according to the familiar liberal-realist identification of the 
atomised ‘man’ with the geopolitical ‘state’ (Waltz 1954) and the conflict which is 
viewed as inherent within this realm provided a theoretical underpinning for the fear of 
China’s national ‘extermination’ – a la the native American peoples – that gripped the 
minds of the New Culture intellectuals (Mitter 2004, 130, 124). It might be difficult for 
us to view this as plausible – given the radically different sociological conditions of 
combined development, particularly in the form of colonial penetration, found in China 
and North America –, but such fears were not entirely ungrounded in the China of the 
1920s and 1930s. Zou was very far from a marginal figure and it is reasonable to see his 
writings as a partial indicator of the cultural mood in China’s urban centres. Indeed, he 
testifies to how national intellectual figures were able to emerge within an expanded 
public sphere and gain a considerable personal profile and following. Life magazine, a 
periodical on culture, politics and modern life, which Zou edited until 1933, had a 
circulation of between 1.5 and 2 million, and his popular ‘Readers Mailbox’ advice 
column propelled the magazine to this level of influence (Mitter 2004,  63, xvi, 55). 
Fear of extermination and the sense China was surrounded by ‘Social Darwinist’ 
enemies on all sides went far beyond a literary audience and became a corner stone of 
China’s national psyche (Hu 2000, 47). Indeed, in its essentials, Zou’s worldview was 
incorporated into the pragmatic nationalism of the CCP. The ‘shared memory of 
victimhood in a rapacious world’ fed into a resolutely realist approach to foreign 
relations; in this vision, the world is seen as conflict ridden, inter-state relations are 
conceived as zero-sum games of manoeuvring for national-interest, and economic 
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development becomes instrumental to national cohesion and unity (ibid). A traditional 
pragmatism rooted in a philosophy of moral cohesion is not, however, a modern day 
adaptation to political reality, but has origins in Chinese communism that precede the 
seizure of power. Most famous of these is Liu Shaoqi’s pamphlet, How To Be A Good 
Communist, which devoted several chapters to the moral ‘self-cultivation’ of the 
individual communist, which he saw as realised through obedience to the socialist 
collective, and employed classical notions of modesty, filial piety, loyalty and discipline 
– although equally was at pains to attack the ‘formalism’ of these qualities in Confucian 
thought (Liu 1939). In the Cultural Revolution, the pamphlet was heavily attacked in 
the spring of 1967 (Andreas 2009, 113 – 114) and Liu himself was effectively killed in 
1969 from illness after having been denied medication. Liu was posthumously 
‘rehabilitated’ in 1980 and his famous pamphlet declared ‘revolutionary’. This allowed 
a particularly conservative reading of his famous text – which, contrary to the attacks of 
the Red Guards was also replete with the normal ‘class struggle’ rhetoric – to underpin 
their modern-day policy (Dittmer 1998, 288 – 289). By identifying the one-party rule 
with national cohesion and socialism, the text promoted loyalty, obedience, hard work 
and modesty, amongst individuals within the polity as essential to the ethical mission of 
the collective. This was a nationalist posture in the conservative mould. However, the 
extent of the departure can be easily exaggerated, for it represented a return to the 
‘norms’ of Chinese communism prior to 1958. Recognising the split in the CCP during 
the Cultural Revolution as a schism that drew upon alternative varieties of Chinese 
nationalism – competing messianic and pragmatic varieties – should not, in this sense, 
blind us to the fact that they were contradictory elements of a single nationalism. This 
will become clearer, in the last part of this chapter, as I consider these themes of jiuguo 
in China’s two revolutions, and how the principal political actors, nationalists and, later, 
communists – both ultimately fighting for a strong and territorially cohesive nation state 
– would articulate them.     
 
4.8 Nationalism as combined development: (i) Kuomintang dreams of ‘China’s Destiny’ 
At this stage in the argument it is necessary to recall how in chapter three I described 
the centrifugal pressures unleashed by the semi-colonial integration of Imperial China 
into the global economy. By the turn of the nineteenth century, these processes were 
driving the Empire to destruction. The Qing did not pursue an aggressive strategy of 
modernisation, but, through the course of self-strengthening, they did de-centralise 
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military power to the provinces to stabilise their regime. This purely military, rather 
than economic, attempt at modernisation also led the Qing to create the New Army 
under general Yuan Shikai. He had 80,000 troops at his command in 1911 (Li 2012, 
316).19 Despite having been conceived as securing the power the Qing Court, each of 
these elements represented new concentrations of political and social power potentially 
hostile it. The ‘scramble for China’ and the creation of a public opinion in China’s 
urban centres that was dismayed by their failure led to the collapse of the Imperial 
order. ‘Internal corrosion’, as Harold Isaacs famously put it, ‘had already reduced the 
dynasty to a cipher. Only a tiny push was needed to erase it. The revolution of 1911 
generated enough energy to produce this tiny push, no more’ (Isaacs 1961, 19). China’s 
revolution of 1911 was indeed of an entirely different scale to 1949. It involved, at 
most, 10,000 followers of Sun in the Tongmenghui, China’s first revolutionary 
nationalist political party (Dillon 2012, 141). Their agitation amongst the rank and file 
of the New Army did play an important role, and once Yuan withdrew support from the 
Imperial Court, the end of the regime was inevitable. This decision, however, followed 
declarations of ‘independence’ from the provinces. Observing that the regime was 
disintegrating, Yuan could either launch a civil war to defend a collapsing and hated 
dynasty, or he could try and manoeuvre to secure his power – he chose the latter. He 
passed away in 1916 after having attempted to establish a new dynasty around his own 
primogeniture. His legacy was to hand China to marauding warlord armies, each one led 
by former military governors of the old regime. In the countryside, warlords reshaped 
the lives of the peasantry for the worst, leaving communities in ‘the grip of famine, 
flooding, banditry, warring generals, marauding soldiers, rioting peasants, opium 
addicts, and gamblers’ (Yeh 2008, 119) and cohering a national imagination gripped by 
anxiety and anger at systemic injustice. Systemic banditry by the warlords made internal 
economic reform impossible, leaving the Beijing centre dependent on international 
credit markets, whose support was conditional on meeting its egregious international 
treaty obligations (Feuerwerker 1983b, 102). Disintegration, thus, emerged out of the 
specificities of Imperial China’s combined development. Colonial capitalism had 
effectively manipulated elements of its existing class structure – specifically its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19 Compare these figures to the huge fighting forces assembled by both the CCP and Kuomintang three 
decades later. In the autumn of 1945 the communists commanded a regular army of 1.27 million troops 
and had, in addition to this, irregular militias numbering another 2.68 million (Li 2012, xxx). In the same 
year, following Japan’s sudden surrender and prior to the renewal of the civil war, the Kuomintang 
commanded 4.3 million troops (ibid). 
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commercialisation and rentier-bureaucratic state – to render the economy 
uncompetitive. After 1911, the same ‘clientelist’ imperialism proved favourable to a 
political economy of warlordism based on organised extortion, theft and banditry. A 
‘negative feedback loop’ resulted as internal divisions played into the hands of foreign 
powers. In short, nationalists that had longed for a strong China able to withstand the 
pressures of the wider world had won a merely nominal victory in 1911.  
Across this period, however, the national consciousness established in urban 
areas only grew stronger. The profound ‘feeling of national unity’ (Sheridan 2008, 320) 
even gripped the minds of the warlords that never attempted to create locally defined 
forms of imagined community to secure their power on a permanent basis. Beijing was 
a nominal constitutional centre prior to the formation of the Kuomintang government in 
1928 and its symbolic importance lay in how it created a sense there was a meaningful 
entity, China, which was legitimate, even if it was momentarily blighted by social 
disorder. None of China’s warlords had any interest in seriously challenging a foreign 
power, an action implying ideological motivation that they lacked, and this meant the 
Treaty Ports were partially protected from the worst aspects of the warlord era. Cultural 
industries flourished in the 1920s, the period where Life magazine (see p. 153) made its 
breakthrough. Warlords, in contrast, had neither the cultural producers nor the 
inclination to create positive propaganda around localised identities, but merely sought 
to manoeuvre for narrow self-interests. It was in these conditions where a fervently 
nationalistic public emerged that despaired at the plight of their country. Even during 
the ‘Nanjing decade’ of Kuomintang rule the country remained in a state of 
disintegration. As late as 1936, i.e. after successful campaigns against the communists, 
the Kuomintang only brought eleven of the eighteen Chinese provinces under the 
control of the central government (Eastman 1991, 149 – 150). 
Japanese imperialist intervention fundamentally reshaped China’s national 
consciousness and laid down an awesome challenge to the Kuomintang, which they 
failed, fatally undermining their authority in the eyes of Chinese public opinion. Until 
the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Chinese nationalism had relied upon a 
purely negative imagery: a backlash against the successive humiliations cruelly imposed 
on the nation by the ‘outside’ (Mitter 2000, 3). The invasion of Manchuria by Japan in 
1931, however, provided a new positive imagery of heroic Chinese resistance fighters 
opposing a specific colonial foe (ibid). It also meant that nationalist agitation had to 
shift from opposing the partial incursions of Western settlements to the actual colonial 
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annexation of Chinese territory. Anti-Japanese consciousness animated public society 
and numerous new movements emerged to campaign for resistance. The Northeast 
National Salvation Society  (NNSS) was formed in 1931 to lobby, petition, distribute 
propaganda, and provide practical support to the Manchurian resistance (Mitter 2000, 
133). It was groups such as these – at once political actors and cultural producers – that 
formed the ‘myth of Manchuria’, i.e. the vision of the struggle against Japan as a fight 
to save the nation and reclaim territory rightfully China’s. The NNSS also gave a 
progressive meaning to the concept of jiuguo (‘national salvation’) by combining it with 
the notion of datong (the commonwealth of nations) to appeal to an enlightened vision 
of China at peace within the international community (Mitter 2000, 161). The rise of 
this internationalist discourse in public society also led to critiques of the racism that 
characterised Japanese colonialism (Mitter 2000, 167). Once coupled with the fact that 
the CCP in this period also defended the principle of national self-determination, this 
illustrates how colonial aspiration was but one tendency in Chinese nationalism.   
How to negotiate the relationship between restoring internal order and 
confronting Japanese aggression was the central fault line for the Kuomintang. 
Achieving minzu unity was the defining aspiration and source of legitimacy for 
Kuomintang rule. Indeed, the way in which this trumped other objectives or 
considerations reflected many of the assumptions of the post-1890 nationalists China. 
Early nationalists were fascinated by Western states’ capacity to act ‘as one body’ and 
inspire patriotism to service elite power (H. Chang 1980, 281). Chen Zhi, for instance, 
praised the English parliament for its capacity to, ‘combine the monarch and the people 
into one body, and channel the ruling and the ruled into one mind’ (ibid). This formula 
is telling because it invokes a conscious hierarchy of values. Democracy is useful only 
insofar as it favours the goal of minzu unity, thereby exhibiting in an early form the 
tendency ‘to assimilate democracy into nationalism and to view the former as no more 
than an ingredient in the latter’ (ibid) that was exemplified by the Kuomintang. The 
need to defend the imagined community was therefore more important than individual 
rights and freedoms within it. Similar conclusions were also drawn when it came to 
staking out the borders of the imagined community of China. Propaganda routinely 
emphasised ‘that they not only sought to defend the far-flung borders that the Chinese 
Republic had inherited from the Manchu empire but also intended to reunify the whole 
nation and to defend its sovereignty’ (Lin 2006, 12). This dream of destiny, to 
‘eliminate China’s humiliating status and restore China’s glorious past’ (ibid), led them 
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to prioritise restoring internal, domestic order above all else. Despite its nationalist 
motivation, the policy of non-resistance in Manchuria alienated China’s nationalist 
public sphere and undoubtedly played into the hands of communists. However, despite 
their military impotence, Chiang developed colonial ambitions for the Chinese nation. 
In his pamphlet, China’s Destiny, written as China was accepted into the allied alliance, 
and nominally afforded ‘great power’ status, he rejected all minority national claims and 
gave an overtly racialized vision of ‘China’:  
… Our various clans actually belong to the same nation, as well as the same 
racial stock… That there are five peoples designated in China is not due to 
differences in race or blood, but to religion and geographical environment. In 
short, the differentiation among China’s five peoples is due to regional and 
religious factors, not to race of blood. This fact must be thoroughly understood 
by all our fellow countrymen (Lin 2006, 141).  
    
The ‘elasticity’ of the racist imagination lay in how it could permit such ‘adaptations’ to 
political expediency. Sun had initially argued that China was home to five races and 
envisioned the Han-Chinese as a leading element within a unified state including 
interior polities such as Tibet (Lin 2006, 13). Chiang had the same aims – the territorial 
unity of China embracing the historical boundaries of the Confucian empire –, but his 
crude intervention signalled to his allies that the principles of national self-
determination they were promoting amongst polities occupied by axis powers had no 
bearing in China. The denial of racial specificity was designed to undermine any claim 
to nationality, reinforcing the notion of the nation as minzu but on the lines of cultural 
assimilation. Chiang further argued that China’s territorial claims extended to ‘the 
Himalayas, the Pamirs, the Indochina Peninsula’, as well as Tibet, Xinjiang, Outer 
Mongolia, and Tannu Tuva (Lin 2006, 141). The backdrop to this colonial aggression 
lay in Chiang’s successful conquest of the ethnically Muslim, north-western territories, 
including the de facto independent Xinjiang, back into the KMT fold, emboldening the 
colonial ambitions of the regime (Lin 2006, 142 – 143). In essence, Chiang offered a 
vision of anti-colonial nationalism turned colonial nationalism and, in doing so, came to 
similar conclusions as Sun. Affection for the achievements of Japanese imperialism, 
had been a critical factor in Sun’s rationale, and this reflects the way in which colonial-
racism pioneered in the West was internalised ruling class ambitions in Asia. Indeed, 
back in 1905 a section of Chinese students had called for Sino-Japanese solidarity 
against Russia in explicitly racial terms as ‘Yellow-race solidarity against the White 
race’ (Schiffrin 2009, 172). Anti-Japanese consciousness generally hardened in the 
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period since and Sun was unusual in persisting with pan-Asian notions into the 1920s 
(Schiffrin 2009, 172 – 180). However, China’s Destiny illustrated that even having 
experienced appalling colonial injustice at the hands of Japan during the war, Chiang 
and other Chinese elites still dreamed of an Asian continent dominated by China. It 
illustrated how Chinese nationalism was heavily imprinted with the mythology of lost 
privilege in international affairs; this once powerful empire needed to be restored to its 
‘proper standing’. This was, of course, an imagined sensibility, a ‘myth of descent’, for 
China now confronted a radically different world: a capitalist international system of 
nation-states and competing empires – with each nation imagining their own place in 
the future, rather than the ‘messianic’ ordering of a universal celestial empire. Chiang 
Kai-shek would not live to realise the hopes of China’s Destiny. He died as leader and 
figurehead of the merely nominal ‘Republic of China’ whose Kuomintang government 
was now consigned to the island of Taiwan. But the significance of his remarks lies in 
the influence they had on the Chinese nationalist, as opposed to Kuomintang, political 
agenda.  
 
4.9 Nationalism as combined development: (ii) Chinese communism, Chinese 
nationalism?  
In this chapter, I have demonstrated how nationalism emerged in Chinese public society 
out of the polity’s combined development and subsequently dominated its political life. 
Notions of a ‘two-line’ struggle between the Kuomintang and the CCP are of only 
limited use, because they tend to camouflage the common ground that existed between 
the two parties. They both actively sought to provide an outlet and voice for the rising 
tide of nationalist sentiment. Nationalism, in this sense, did not emerge within the PRC 
as a ‘deviation’ from the internationalism advocated by conventional Marxist doctrine, 
but was always fundamental to the life-blood of Maoism. The themes of national 
salvation and the restoration of power and prestige in the international order featured 
prominently in the legitimising narratives woven by the CCP across the 1930s. Indeed, 
the relationship between the CCP and the ethos and politics of nationalism had an 
‘organicity’ which, as I will explore further in the next chapter, became interwoven with 
the class dynamics of the Chinese Revolution, giving it a significantly altered content 
and trajectory to its Russian inspiration. Communism in China emerged out of the New 
Culture Movement and often expressed the two forms of nationalist discourse I have 
outlined, i.e., a messianic anti-traditionalism (Lin 1979), occasionally bordering on 
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loathing for the national self, and a more conventional, conservative national 
mythology, both of which, in their differing ways, were used to give meaning and 
coherence to the imagined community. For Mao specifically nationalism appears to 
have been a continuous influence on his political thought, imparting to it a consistency 
and certain ‘novelty’, which distinguished it from the merely instrumental use of 
ideology for bureaucratic purposes that characterised Stalin’s relationship to political 
thought. There are numerous examples to testify to this influence of nationalism on 
Mao’s thought. In 1937 he recalled how he had come across a pamphlet in his school 
days, which opened with the sentence, ‘Alas, China will be subjugated’, and painfully 
outlined its losses to Japan and the threat of its total dismemberment (cited in Zhao 
2004, 96). Recounting this several decades later, Mao declared, ‘he began to realise that 
it was the duty of the people to help save’ China (ibid). A piece that he wrote in 1912, 
i.e. prior to his turn to communism, picked up on similar nationalist themes, expressing 
fear of China’s extinction, hostility to corrupt rulers, and dismay at the people’s lack of 
enlightenment (ibid). This typical expression of ‘desymbolization anxiety’ continued to 
characterise his writings after his turn to communism.20 In 1920, in a letter to Xiang 
Jingyu, one finds the same fear of China’s extinction, and his conviction that ‘blazing a 
new road and remaking the environment’ was the only possible pathway to national 
salvation (ibid). Mao, like Sun and many New Culture writers, used the notion of minzu 
unity, but gave it a class-based, rather than racial, emphasis (Mitter 2000, 130), 
constructing a mythology around the heroic struggles of Chinese peasants that 
symbolised the nation. However, despite not engaging in the open racial politics of Sun, 
Mao was willing to talk in terms of Han-Chinese ethnic superiority. In 1939, for 
example, he argued, ‘the history of the Han people… demonstrates that the Chinese 
never submit to tyrannical rule, but invariably use revolutionary means to overthrow or 
change it’ (Mao 1939). Mao qualified this by calling for a union of all China’s national 
peoples on the basis of equality (ibid), but he, nonetheless, identified the image of 
resistance and rebellion with an imagined ethnically defined community. Moreover, 
CCP propagandists’ use of the concept across the 1930s gradually closed down space 
for cultural diversity. The ‘myth of descent’ they propagated moved from the heroic 
struggles of the peasantry under the enlightened leadership of the communist party and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20 Mao became a Marxist in the winter of 1918 to 1919. See Schram 1986. 
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towards the birth of a socialist China, and it became a form of cultural life and imagined 
identity from which no deviation was allowed. 
Nationalist tendencies can be found in Mao’s political thought across the 1930s. 
However, a decisive change came with the consolidation of the Yan’an government in 
1936-37 and Mao’s defeat of Wang Ming, the CCP leader closest to Moscow, at the 
Sixth Plenum of the CCP CC in 1938. This gave the party the freedom to develop a 
monolithic ‘myth of descent’. Mao justified this in leftist terms by preaching the 
Sinification of Marxism. Although he couched this in the familiar categories of uneven 
social development (and a focus on peculiarities of circumstance that would not have 
been out of place in some of Trotsky’s writings), he turned the original meaning ‘on its 
head’: 
There is no such thing as abstract Marxism, but only concrete Marxism. What 
we call concrete Marxism is Marxism that has taken on a national form, that is, 
Marxism applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete conditions prevailing in 
China, and not Marxism abstractly used…. Consequently, the Sinification of 
Marxism—that is to say, making certain that in all of its manifestations it is 
imbued with Chinese peculiarities, using it according to these peculiarities—
becomes a problem that must be understood and solved by the whole Party 
without delay…. We must put an end to writing eight-legged essays on foreign 
models; there must be less repeating of empty and abstract refrains; we must 
discard our dogmatism and replace it by a new and vital Chinese style and 
manner, pleasing to the eye and to the ear of the Chinese common people (cited 
in Hung 1994, 226).  
 
In the hands of Trotsky and other internationalists, uneven development had 
problematized the dynamics of social revolution in backward countries by looking 
through the lens of intersocietal difference. This had, in turn, informed a strategy 
attuned to these particular circumstances, but one that retained substantively similar 
aims and goals. Mao’s innovation directly inverted the meaning of the original concept. 
By saying that Marxism had no general theoretical underpinning outside of the national 
context (the rejection of ‘abstract Marxism’), Mao was free to develop a ‘Sinified’ 
vision of Marxism in which ‘its manifestations’ were ‘imbued with Chinese 
peculiarities’ (ibid). In other words, the strategy was not made appropriate to the 
circumstances, but its substantive content would shift with the demands of national 
salvation. Opposition to dogmatism and the invocation of a ‘new and vital Chinese style 
and manner, pleasing to the eye and to the ear of the Chinese common people’ (ibid) 
expressed classical New Culture Movement themes, specifically the role of mass culture 
as a force for national cohesion. From the desire for an imagined national community 
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flowed the aim of a nation-state. For Lenin and Trotsky the Russian Revolution had 
partly been a ‘wager’ (L. Lih 2009) on the German Revolution coming to the aid of the 
fledgling workers’ republic (Rosenberg 1996, 10). ‘At all events, under all conceivable 
circumstances’, Lenin wrote quite emphatically, ‘if the German revolution does not 
come, we are doomed’ (cited in ibid). These internationalists took it as given that a 
transnational state would be formed, one encompassing both Russia and the German 
workers’ republic they hoped for. For Mao, in contrast, there was absolutely no 
possibility that the CCP would seek to establish trans-national forms of governance with 
the Soviet Union. In 1937, asked directly if a Sino-Soviet republic was his aim, Mao 
replied, ‘We are certainly not fighting for an emancipated China in order to turn the 
country over to Moscow!’ (Schram 1986, 844). In lieu of any workers’ democracy a 
Eurasian socialist republic would have required the domination of one national, 
monolithic party over the other, and, in this sense, Mao’s indignation is hardly 
surprising (especially given how, at the time of the interview, brutal purges and show 
trials were taking place in the Soviet Union). One can see in the PRC, like in its Soviet 
cousin, how one-party rule was inherently nationalistic. A dictatorial party rising to 
power within a nation then became dependent on sustaining that power via a nation-
state. In this respect then, as I argue in chapter five, it might be argued that Stalinism in 
China actively required a fusion with nationalism.   
Stalinist doctrine appealed to, and provided legitimacy for, an existing 
nationalist disposition within the polity. Both parts of this amalgam of ideological forms 
– the encounter of Chinese nationalism with Soviet Stalinism – existed in a 
complimentary, mutually reinforcing relationship to the other, particularly based upon 
the form of state they envisioned. Mao’s ‘On New Democracy’, for example, was 
explicitly ‘based on Stalin's theory’ and openly nationalist in its aims and goals, ‘to 
build a new society and a new state for the Chinese nation’ (Mao 1940). ‘Our aim in the 
cultural sphere’, he wrote in a similar vein, ‘is to build a new Chinese national culture’ 
(ibid). Mao’s piece was first published in the newly launched CCP magazine, Chinese 
Culture, and its central theme – breaking free from the past and imagining the national 
community on new and enlightened lines – was entirely consistent with the wider 
oeuvre of the New Culture Movement. Despite his focus on the peasants, Mao retained 
a formal commitment to ‘proletarian leadership’ in the national revolution, but he 
defined this purely in terms of party leadership, allowing him to ‘import’ a doctrinal 
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attachment to a one-party state that was then fused with the premises of Chinese 
nationalism. 
Communist rule in the ‘base areas’ permitted the CCP to put this outlook into 
practice long before they assumed power. Newspapers and journals played their part, 
but, to reach out to the illiterate masses, spoken forms of cultural production, such as 
drama and storytelling, were utilised. By the Yan’an years a systematic ‘drama 
movement’ existed to inspire patriotism and foster socialist consciousness amongst the 
people. It drew upon famous New Culture plays, such as Cao Yu's Thunderstorm and 
Ouyang Yuqian's and The Death of Li Xiucheng (Li Xiucheng zhi si) as well as foreign 
works, such as Gogol's The Inspector General and Ostrovsky's The Storm (C.-T. Hung 
1994, 223 – 224), reflecting the patchwork of local and global influences that had 
become concentrated in the ideology of Chinese communism. The CCP’s new cultural 
producers put a socialist twist on the ‘myth of Manchuria’ (Mitter 2000) that allowed 
them to foster a national consciousness in the areas relatively untouched by Japanese 
occupation. In his visit, Edgar Snow described seeing a play called Invasion, which 
brought to life tales of Kuomintang cowardice and the people’s resistance against Japan 
in Manchuria. In one scene, he recalled how ‘farmers rush forth with their spears, 
women and children come with their knives, and all swear to “fight to the death” against 
the Erhpen-kuei [Riben gui ]—the “Japanese devils”’ (cited in Hung 1994, 223). After 
the Rectification Campaign of 1942 putting on a play of foreign or urban providence 
became strictly forbidden (Hung 1994, 224 – 225). The new policy was justified by a 
series of dictums, such as ‘learn from the masses’ and ‘all correct leadership is 
necessarily from the masses, to the masses’ (Hung 1994, 224). This allowed Mao to 
cultivate a romantic vision of the peasants ‘as the font of virtue and struggle’  (ibid) and 
the policy was designed to encourage a sense of self-worth by infusing familiar 
experiences of Chinese peasant life with a positive imagery of moral purpose and 
heroism. Its nationalism romanticised a distinctive form of Chinese peasant 
traditionalism as the basis of minzu unity. And its Stalinism ensured that it was imposed 
monolithically as the only permissible imagined community. 
Mao’s peasant upbringing and relative dissonance from the global communist 
movement put him in a position to capitalise on the nationalist tendencies within the 
polity, but also became a means to associate his individual persona with the mythology 
of rising peasant resistance to Japanese aggression. Mao took total control of the CCP 
with the Rectification Campaign of 1942 and a ‘cult of personality’ developed around 
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him (Vajpeyi 1994, 19). He was now venerated as an equal of such luminaries as Marx, 
Lenin, and Stalin, and, in 1945, the new party constitution even declared that the party 
guides its work, ‘entirely by the teachings which unite the theories of Marxist-Leninism 
with the actual practice of the Chinese Revolution – the thought of Mao Zedong’ (cited 
in ibid). In a similar manner to how Chinese nationalists’ assimilated democracy into 
nationalism, Mao assimilated communism into nationalism, and, in the process, 
identified the Chinese nation with his own all-powerful personality. However, the type 
of minzu community Mao’s CCP imagined purported to look to the cultural experiences 
of the peasant classes and generalised from them rather than seeking to resurrect elite 
Confucian norms. Even though in works such as How To Be A Good Communist, the 
Confucian influence was palpable and useful insofar as it provided a theorisation of 
obedience and loyalty (Liu 1939). In ‘Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art’, 
Mao advocated a renaissance in traditional yangge – a popular form of song-and-dance 
based folk entertainment from North China (Hung 1994, 230). This went hand-in-hand 
with the repression of critically minded intelligentsia, the use of participatory 
phraseology served to disguise how a propagandistic vision of cultural production was 
imposed. The ‘learn from the masses’ notion did, however, indicate a real shift towards 
the resurrection of traditional art forms, those familiar to peasants’ daily life, which 
were now ascribed a positive moral purpose. Traditional Beijing operas were also 
revived. The Beijing Opera Society sought to challenge the ‘out dated idea that Beijing 
opera has nothing to do with revolution’ and ‘infused the old dramatic form with new 
political content’ (C.-T. Hung 1994, 233). The incorporation of communist aesthetic 
into these nationalist performances, with tales of heroic anti-imperialist struggle for the 
socialist cause, symbolised the overall amalgam. However, it also expressed the 
classical New Culture problématique of trying come to terms with China’s past 
traditions and modes of life in the face of such extraordinary social change. It therefore 
encapsulates the potential complexity of the national imagination with its ability to 
amalgamate contradictory elements. Whereas Zou, in his original attempt to revive past 
traditions, focused on old elite discourses, Mao looked to subaltern layers. One can see 
why amongst a desperately poor peasantry tales that invoked a proud history of 
rebellion and deep moral rectitude provided a degree of redemption from their daily life. 
But the cultish and messianic aspects of this re-symbolization process would only grow 
once the CCP took hold of the reigns of state power. 
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4.9.1 The rise of Chinese nationalism in the longue durée  
In the next chapter, I explore the sociological conditions – moving from the global to 
the local – that allowed the Maoists to triumph out of the crisis of colonial capitalism, 
arguing that the intervention of Japanese imperialism coupled with Mao’s turn to the 
countryside propelled them to power. I also locate this within an explanation of the 
seemingly modular character of Stalinist ideology – its capacity, that is, for repeated and 
differential repetition across the world order in the last century. For reasons that I have 
only touched upon in this chapter – the ‘special relationship’, so to speak, between the 
‘state socialist’ regimes and the nation-state system – Stalinism was an ideology of 
particular amenability to the rising tide of nationalism amidst the fracturing of the 
colonial empires. In this chapter, I have illustrated the origins and typography to which 
Mao and his followers assimilated their ideology. In doing so, their ability to introduce 
modifications in the imagination was real, but nonetheless limited. There was an 
existing national imagination, the contours of which emerged within the conditions of 
combined development that drove the Qing Empire into the abyss of history. The upshot 
of this was simple: by taking the course of political nationalism, the Maoists were 
choosing to adopt a programme for change involving assumptions and aspirations that 
were crystallized in China during the geopolitical crisis of the 1890s. These can be 
summarised thus:  
• An end to ‘humiliation and suffering’, a desire for a strong and powerful 
nation-state able to stand up the wider world, and to ‘restore’ the stature of 
earlier imperial times. 
• A commitment to winning back all China’s lost territory from colonial 
aggressors. 
• A resulting tension in the recognition of the right of self-determination for 
national minorities within China that was resolved in practice by de facto 
abandoning the commitment upon taking power.   
• A further tension between a millenarian, revolutionary nationalist vision, and 
the pragmatic, paternalistic conceptions that involved a realist approach to 
international relations. 
• A reciprocal interrelationship between the cultural monolithism flowing from 
the adoption of the norms of Stalinism and the assimilationist logic of a Han-
Chinese notion of minzu.  
   
 
166	  
This nationalist evolution emerged within the complex conditions of compulsion and 
emulation established by combined development; as capitalism confronted a de-centred 
world of multiple territories and peoples, it compelled and inspired their re-forging 
around the nationally bounded identities that were made possible by new forms of 
cultural production. In the next chapter, I show how nationalist politics was intimately 
connected to the rise of ‘state socialism’ – so much so that one could reasonably claim, 
‘if Chinese nationalism did not exist then Chinese Stalinism would have to invent it’. 
This would, however, elide the real historical process; for the ‘stickiness’ of national 
identity, with its dark, nascent potential for nationalism, was crucial to the failure of the 
Soviet experiment itself. It was an irony of history that China’s revolution in nationalist 
consciousness in the 1890s and after – once it fed into the politics of Chinese 
communism – actually disadvantaged leaders of the CCP that were prepared to accept 
Moscow’s dictates, i.e. those who were more Stalinist than nationalist. Instead it 
benefited those, principally Mao, prepared to assert the ‘national interests’ of Chinese 
communism more assertively. Reflecting upon the Chinese Revolution in these terms 
sheds light upon the legitimising narratives that continue to shape politics in the PRC. 
Indeed, the achievement for which Mao is still revered in today’s China is national 
unity. The politics of ‘national salvation’ continues to shape and underpin the discourse 
of political elites. In the next chapter, I explain the sociological process that has resulted 
in this being the case, and thus show why an undefeated communist party would 
introduce a series of capitalist market reforms in China.   
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5 
The long march of Maoism in the age of extremes:  
‘market socialism’ and the search for national salvation  
Socialism isn't only about defending against one's enemies,  
against the old world it is opposing; it also has to fight  
within itself against its own reactionary ferments 
Victor Serge 
 
Modern China is the product of nineteenth-century western 
imperialism, crossed with the influence of the Russian 
revolution. Unfortunately it was not the Chinese workers who 
laboured in the western-owned factories in the treaty ports, or in 
the South African mines, or on the western front in the  
First World War, who have survived to enjoy whatever glory or 
profit may have accrued from the Chinese revolution 
E. H. Carr 
 
5.1 Legacies of combined development in the longue durée  
Across the previous two chapters, I mapped the class and cultural dimensions of 
China’s interchange with capitalist modernity. The significance of these conditions to 
our research question lies in how they shaped the politics and sociology of the Chinese 
Revolution and the contradictory form of state that the founders of the PRC established. 
I have until now focused on the interchange between the class structure and the mental 
conceptions that actors formed to give meaning and cohesiveness to the life of the 
polity. In other words, I have moved from ‘class’ to ‘nation’, showing how Chinese 
national consciousness emerged under the hammer blows of colonial aggression, and in 
conditions of systemic underdevelopment. The final turn in the argument takes us to the 
contradictions of twentieth century ‘socialism’, building upon the intimations developed 
hitherto on the nature of Maoism. The argument I have presented throughout has 
developed according to an ‘ascending’ narrative explanation; neither element of the 
conceptualisation – deep underdevelopment and the vice-like grip of Chinese 
nationalism on actors – is ‘dispensed with’ as one moves closer to 1979. Longue durée 
historiography seeks to trace the historical processes that led to the emergence of a 
particular constellation of social relations. Once these historical linkages have been 
established one should continually question and appraise how these long-maturing 
elements continue to shape latter-day events. For this exercise to be worthwhile, 
however, one has to identify, with sufficient concreteness, the specific conditions and 
mental-conceptions that had such an enduring hold and then assess how they relate to 
the moments of ‘grand historic rupture’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 67). The 
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Chinese Revolution is categorically such a transformative shift. It decisively altered the 
arc of historical development by reconfiguring China’s class structure and international 
relations. Yet, in the narratives the CCP drew upon and the class actor, the peasantry, 
that played a decisive historical role, it emerged out of the unique circumstances of 
China’s combined development. Chinese nationalism provided the dominant visual 
imagery and discursive repertoires legitimising the seizure of power. In this regard, it is 
useful for us to recall how Marx argued that at great moments such as these – when 
individuals ‘seem to be occupied revolutionizing themselves and things, creating 
something that did not exist before, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis’ – 
human subjects so often tend to ‘anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their 
service’ (Marx 1969, 398). Marx is intimating here at the allure of resymbolization in 
the face of desymbolization anxiety, which so heavily characterised how Chinese 
persons came to apprehend modernity. The dramatic and relatively ‘compressed’ 
transition from powerful dynasty, to impoverished nation, and, then, to people’s 
republic, provided no shortage of inspiration for the ‘conjuring’ of past spirits to the 
‘service’ of resymbolization. Mao’s founding proclamation of the PRC reflected this, 
because it was the resurrection of ‘China’, and not socialist goals, which formed the 
preeminent narrative:  
The people throughout China have been plunged into bitter suffering and 
tribulations since the Chiang Kai-shek Kuomintang reactionary government 
betrayed the fatherland, colluded with imperialists, and launched the counter-
revolutionary war. Fortunately our People's Liberation Army, backed by the 
whole nation, has been fighting heroically and selflessly to defend the territorial 
sovereignty of our homeland, to protect the people's lives and property, to 
relieve the people of their sufferings, and to struggle for their rights… (Mao 
1949).  
 
To make this address on the steps of the Gate of Eternal Peace, the entrance to the 
Forbidden City, gave a deliberately symbolic impression that the greatness of China’s 
dynastic past had been realigned in its revolutionary present. From this point on the 
CCP no longer merely gave an organic expression to the nationalist aspirations of the 
polity. Its leaders could point to the actual achievement of territorial cohesion and a 
strong state able to stand up to the West. This gave them genuine legitimacy. But, 
although they had put an end to warlordism and the domination of the landlord class, 
they inherited a desperately poor, war-ravaged economy. How to achieve the desire for 
national greatness – i.e., for the restoration of prestige that was such an elementary part 
of the country’s nationalism – within these conditions, was the challenge that the 
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Maoists set for themselves. How they answered it, and the resources they had at their 
disposal, reflected the sociology of the Chinese Revolution. As I will show, Maoism, 
seen as a fusion of Stalinism and Chinese Nationalism, contained the seeds of its crisis-
ridden relationship to ‘socialist’ production and the resolution of it as capitalist 
nationalism. CCP-rule endured despite these changes because it put ever-greater stress 
on its position as the living embodiment of national unification. This was an ideological 
choice made to discursively construct legitimacy for one-party rule, but it provided a 
compelling justification for their power to millions of people due to China’s real, 
material history. The Qing Empire had left behind a polity that was extraordinarily 
underdeveloped and, to a considerable degree, lacked economic control of its own 
destiny. An industrial working class, the traditional gravedigger of the classical Marxist 
imagination, was almost, though not entirely, notable by its absence. These conditions 
pushed the communists towards a peasant-war strategy. But their success was heavily 
dependent upon the decision of the Japanese to invade Manchuria in 1931 and China in 
1937. This allowed the Maoists to seize the mantel of ‘national saviours’ and take 
power. 
In broad outline, this is the argument put across in the next three sections. I 
develop it through the work of Deutscher, despite his writings on Maoism being far 
from extensive. They consist of two short essays, ‘Maoism its Origins and Outlook’ and 
‘The Meaning of the Cultural Revolution’ (Deutscher 1984b, 181 – 220) and, in 
addition to this, some fragmentary remarks contained in his three-volume biography of 
Trotsky (Deutscher 2003a, 265 – 283; 2003b, 421 – 424). However, arising directly 
from his use of the concept of uneven and combined development, his writings had the 
considerable merit of looking for the source of Maoism’s unique physiognomy in the 
web of interactions and processes found in global politics. Deutscher also considered it 
elementary that to understand Maoism ‘in power’ the historian had to trace the anterior 
conditions from which it emerged, thus throwing light upon its implicit departure from 
orthodox Marxism and its inevitably contradictory relationship with Soviet Stalinism. 
Despite the brevity of his analysis, this approach makes for a striking contrast with 
Western Sinologists that have tended to focus wholly on analysing the social context 
after 1949 to explain the dynamics of Chinese politics in the communist era. Deutscher 
was more ‘distant’ from China and its history than these writers; he was no China 
specialist and the exceptional insularity of the PRC in its first three decades imposed 
obvious limits on his understanding. But Deutscher was also closer to the conflicts 
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within the communist movement that spawned Maoism as a distinctive current. He 
placed Mao within the debates on strategy that were epitomised by the Trotsky-Stalin 
split, and thus analysed Maoism through the lens of socialism.   
It was quite inevitable that the Chinese Revolution drew immediate comparisons 
with its Russian predecessor, for its political system was directly and consciously 
modelled on the one-party Soviet state and the new regime readily availed itself of this 
ideological inheritance. For critically minded Marxists, such as Deutscher, who were 
concerned to understand, rather than legitimate, this new power, the commonality and 
difference of the two revolutions was the central enigma. The Russian Revolution was 
primarily a workers’ insurrection – with backing from the peasants largely coming in 
the form of the army rank and file’s rebellion – whereas its Chinese successor was a 
peasant war in which the working class played little part. This contrast naturally 
reflected a disjuncture in circumstances and not merely the political choices made by 
the communists. Recall how, in chapter 3, I discussed the radical disparity between the 
late Tsarist industrial revolution and economic development in the Qing and Republican 
periods (see pp. 106 – 107). Whereas the landscapes of Petrograd and Moscow were 
transformed as they established themselves as centres of heavy industry, Chinese 
industrialisation was insignificant in comparison. I will not repeat the comparison I 
have already provided except to say that late Tsarist Russia was as much as ten times 
more industrialised than Republican China. To capture this underdevelopment through 
comparison is potentially distorting. But, nonetheless, keeping in mind this important 
qualification, China was probably still less developed in 1933 than the United States 
had been in 1820 when 70 per cent of its labour force worked in agriculture 
(Feuerwerker 1983b, 35) and 35 per cent of the population of the southern states were 
enslaved (Bergad, 119). China’s contractual mode of rural exploitation naturally 
diverged from America’s capitalist slavery, but hardship still abounded. Peasant 
indebtedness – with interest at rates of 100 to 200 per cent per annum – was chronic and 
debt was used to meet basic subsistence needs and pay rent (Feuerwerker 1983b, 87). 
This reflected how the subsumption of labour to usury-capital I discussed in the tea 
industry (see pp. 103 - 104) was now generalised across rural China. Industry was 
concentrated in the coastal regions and not labour-hungry, so there was no wave of 
urbanisation with only steady, not mass, migration into the cities (Feuerwerker 1983b, 
62). Due to the historical inheritance of smallholder tenancy system and the pressures of 
   
 
171	  
over-population this created an explosive condition: a very large ‘egalitarian’, i.e. 
almost universally poor, peasantry.  
In these conditions there was, indeed, a remarkable evenness of poverty across 
rural China. But this was overlain, in turn, by the contradictory division of China into a 
series of warlord territories that deepened further the injustices of peasant life. Warlords 
were ‘neither Confucian generals ... [with] allegiance to the throne nor officers of a 
national army pledged to defend the country's honor and interests’ (Chen 1972, 214) 
and terrorised the peasantry as a new rentier class. Military accumulation, not 
traditional status, was the basis for their power. They sought funds for their own 
‘personal aggrandizement’, to cultivate patronage networks and ‘provide the army with 
its weapons, supplies and pay’ (Sheridan 2008, 291). Taxes, administrative charges, the 
formation of monopolies, simple extortion, opium and gambling, became the favoured 
means of warlord rule (Sheridan 2008, 291 – 292). Provincial administrations 
consequently existed in an almost perpetual state of near-bankruptcy across the warlord 
period (ibid). Warlord armies became a visible, ‘modern’ agency in rural communities, 
which uprooted time-honoured conceptions of authority and power, only to 
simultaneously displace them with a violent form of organised banditry. Many peasants 
joined them in the face of grinding rural poverty. The warlords at least guaranteed food 
and for the aspiring but uneducated military service offered the prospect of self-
betterment (Sheridan 2008, 291). By 1916 there were half a million soldiers serving 
warlords in China, but over the next decade this would rise to 2 million by 1928 (ibid). 
This patchwork of decentred regional warlord fiefdoms provided a wealth of 
opportunities for foreign powers to manipulate political life and made the question of 
establishing a unified and cohesive form of governance quite critical for the nationalist 
actors. In a sense, the two competing nationalist forces, the Kuomintang and the CCP, 
shared a desire for genuinely ‘combined’ Chinese development in the face of the 
anarchic divisions that blighted the country. Modern in their provenance, emerging in 
the spatially concentrated cosmopolitan city-life and wanting a legitimate, unified 
nation, the two nationalist forces had much in common. But they took a radically 
different approach to the injustices of the countryside. The Kuomintang feared the 
peasants and sought to subjugate their mobilisation through coercion. In contrast, the 
communists saw in the chronic suffering of this vast peasant class a great opportunity 
for revolutionary agitation.  
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It is worth reflecting upon the significant contrast between these sociological 
conditions and those that pushed the Russian polity towards revolution between 1914 
and 1917. Trotsky repeatedly emphasised in The History of the Russian Revolution the 
role the highly centralised state power of Russian Tsarism played in shaping the 
country’s industrialisation. Capitalist layers were dependent on the state for protection 
and as a source of loan-capital, but their private property rights were securely upheld in 
the late Tsarist period. This secure investment environment did not exist in Republican 
China to anything like the same degree. Rentier bureaucratic interests hindered capital 
accumulation and the state structure was characterised by an extreme decentralisation of 
power. Challenging this rentier ruling class and creating a unified state were therefore 
two sides of the same coin, and it made sense to look to the peasants to achieve these 
aims through insurrectionary struggle given they were the majority class. This 
perspective of armed agrarian revolution was quite compatible with a ‘bourgeois’ 
programme for modernising the country. Indeed, communism made no special claim to 
lead the peasants. Neither was the CCP decision to model the political economy of the 
new state on the Soviet Union pre-determined. A peculiar outcome of combined 
development – a genuine concatenation of local and global processes – resulted in a 
victorious Maoist Revolution appropriating the Stalinist model of development and 
putting it to the service of Chinese nationalism.  
In this chapter I outline this historical process through five steps. Firstly, I begin 
by showing how the decay of the Russian Revolution was a tragedy of uneven and 
combined development. Bolshevism’s success in the country owed to the disjuncture 
between its small, spatially concentrated, but economically powerful and politically 
radical, working class, and its ruling, backward Tsarist aristocracy, whose wealth and 
power was rooted in agrarian backwardness. These conditions contrasted with Western 
Europe, but this ‘Russian exceptionalism’ also laid the seeds for the Soviet Union’s 
isolation and decay. Secondly, I go on to argue that Stalinism embraced the politics of 
social patriotism and national egoism and, consequently, its core ideological 
assumptions proved particularly amenable to the flowering of national imaginations in 
the last century. Thirdly, I analyse Stalinism’s contradictory relationship to Chinese 
communism; from the origins of Asian socialism and its speedy radicalisation; to the 
‘dress rehearsal’ of the revolution of 1925 to 1927; and the enigmatically Maoist ‘turn 
to the countryside’. Through these processes Maoism crystalized as Chinese peasant 
nationalism spliced with Soviet Stalinism. Fourthly, I show that the success of Mao’s 
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strategy was conditional on the deep crisis of colonial capitalism and, as such, power 
‘fell into the hands’ of the Maoists in much same way as it had done for the Bolsheviks. 
Fifthly, moving to the record of Maoism in power, I argue that the divisions within the 
CCP are best understood as conflicts within Chinese nationalism, reflecting a schism 
between the messianic and conservative discourses of the New Culture Movement. 
Bureaucratic command planning succeeded in industrializing China, but it could never 
fulfil the goal of national greatness that the CCP so fervently desired, and this made a 
shift to market capitalism logical and necessary.  
 
5.2 A challenge to colonial power: the hope and decay of the Russian Revolution 
No single event in the twentieth century would prove to have more significance for its 
overall trajectory than the Russian Revolution. ‘It is not an accident’, remarked of his 
own work, ‘that the history of the Short Twentieth Century’, as he defined it,21 
‘virtually coincides with the lifetime of the state born of the October Revolution’ 
(Hobsbawm 1994, 55). Seen in the longue durée the rise of Bolshevism emerged out of 
a particular condition of combined social development. Socialist consciousness, which 
had developed rapidly amongst Europe’s working classes since the end of the 
nineteenth century, infused into Russia carried by a cosmopolitan layer of Marxist 
intelligentsia. The latter found in their home country a new working class seething with 
radicalism amidst the rapid industrial modernisation of the late Tsarist period. 
Modernity had reshaped urban life and provided the raw material for a new way of 
thinking that was diametrically opposed to absolutist rule. There are, however, good 
reasons for why Hobsbawm extended the remit of the Age of Extremes a mere three 
years to encompass the eruption of the world’s first ever ‘Total War’. A conflict fought, 
that is, not for short-term, episodic goals, but for the fundamental reordering of the 
international balance of power and for this reason had almost ineluctably extended to 
the global arena by the time of its conclusion in 1918 (Hobsbawm 1994, 21 – 53). The 
disintegration of Russia in the face of the extreme ravages of the First World War 
provided the circumstances that led to power falling into the hands of the Bolsheviks. 
But it also testified to an epochal change that undermined the social imagination of 
colonial racism. Until 1914 colonialism was already widely seen as an unjust and, at 
least potentially, a barbaric enterprise, but the scale of the bloodletting introduced an 	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anti-colonial and pacifistic sensibility amongst the domestic populations of the home 
countries. This also provided the opening for the revolutionary left. Chauvinism, 
expressing the dark grip of the national imagination, had characterised the reaction of 
the European social democratic parties to the war, but the bloody conflict soon uprooted 
this consciousness. By 1917 the Russian radical movement was infused with 
internationalism – a mindset quite different to the Chinese Revolution that would be 
partly inspired by it. In China, for historical reasons with which we are now familiar, a 
quasi-colonial form of nationalism emerged in response to the injustices the polity had 
suffered at the hands of colonial powers. Whereas in Russia, the discourse of ‘Great 
Russian’ chauvinism, while certainly still present in the minds of broad swathes of the 
urban, as well as rural, population, was nonetheless identified with the bloodbath of the 
world war. Lenin’s address to the German workers, published in the anti-war newspaper 
Jugend Internationale in 1918, gave a straightforward and typical expression of this 
internationalist imagery and vision. ‘The socialist revolution that has begun in Russia is, 
therefore, only the beginning of the world socialist revolution’, Lenin argued, before 
proceeding to list its aims as ‘peace and bread’, the overthrow of capitalism, recovery 
from the war, and ‘the complete victory of socialism’ (Lenin 1918). This radically 
democratic ideal of the new world order was encapsulated in the revolutionary slogan, 
‘All Power to the Soviets’. In this vision, the soviets, a form of direct democracy rooted 
in the workplace, were to provide the basis for a new type of public state that coercively 
upheld, not the privatisation of economic life, but its radical socialisation on the basis of 
human need. This idealism, in the positive sense of the term, i.e., the idealism of the 
utopian visionary, was to be severely tested by the Russian Civil War, its appallingly 
destructive impact on industry, and the isolation of the new regime as the European 
workers’ upsurge dissipated in defeat. 
It was, indeed, with the isolation of the state that the seeds of the revolution’s 
social decay were born. Social revolution was possible in Russia because, as Trotsky 
put it, the Tsarist Empire was ‘the weakest link in the chain of imperialism’ due to ‘its 
extreme backwardness’ (Trotsky 1932). But the unevenness of social development that 
had once provided profitable avenues for these revolutionaries now revealed different 
qualities. The division of the world order into a series of fracturing empires and 
emerging polities, each with newly imagined national aspirations for sovereignty, posed 
a challenge to the aspiring transnational state. It was a test amplified further by the rise 
of fascism and the intensification of antagonisms amongst the colonial powers in the 
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inter-war years. The fledgling Soviet state sought to navigate these new conditions by 
creating bonds of political solidarity with anti-imperialist movements. Meanwhile, the 
imperial powers placed a cordon sanitaire around the revolutionary state, denying it 
trading links and the normal protocols of international diplomacy. Given these states 
dominated the global economy and, with their formal and informal empires, regulated 
access to its markets, this exclusion was a serious material problem for the workers’ 
state. Externally imposed isolation compounded the internal corrosion of soviet society. 
The social and economic backwardness that had paradoxically made the path of 
socialist experimentation possible now put considerable barriers in the way of its 
progressive realisation. The economy remained overwhelmingly rural, making it harder 
to develop a cosmopolitan culture with a global outlook and creating steep difficulties 
for industrial modernisation. It is hard to exaggerate the social costs the Civil War had 
inflicted upon an already war-ravaged society; the price of victory was enormous. 
Inflation was out of control and state finances suffered from extreme dysfunction. A de 
facto barter economy had developed with wages paid in kind in response to 
hyperinflation (Carr 1966, 233). There were no state budgets from mid-1919 to early 
1921 (Carr 1966, 251). Attempts by the state to impose its monopoly on distribution had 
failed utterly with the black market responsible for two thirds of the food supply and for 
four times as much food grain as the official sources (Nove 1969, 62). Industrial 
production had collapsed to just 21 per cent of 1913 levels. Agricultural output was at 
60 per cent of the 1913 level (Nove 1969, 68, 94). The population of 40 provincial 
capitals had plummeted by an average of 33 per cent since 1917. In the urban heartlands 
of Moscow and Petrograd this measure came to 44.5 and 57.5 per cent respectively 
(Carr 1966, 197 – 198). In these conditions, the survival of the state increasingly came 
to be seen as an end in itself and source of justification for the deep bureaucratisation 
that fostered a new form of elite power.   
The impoverished political and economic landscape created organic tendencies 
for an authoritarian form of rule; a ‘temptation’, so to speak, arising from the need for 
‘order’ in the face of disintegration. The tragedy of twentieth century socialism lies in 
the way that a general vision of socialism, which involved highly authoritarian one 
party rule, became established and justified according to general principles, despite 
emerging in these barren and exceptional circumstances. This took shape in the period 
of ‘War Communism’, which was a policy of extreme centralisation of power (military, 
economic and political) within the hands of the Communist Party in face of the 
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exigencies of the Civil War (see Flewers 1997). War Communism, as the above 
description of the economy testifies, was a failure. Sweeping nationalisation and the 
creation of a myriad of institutions were unable to raise output in the economy. Many 
Bolsheviks hoped that War Communism would realise a rapid advance to collectivism 
under the steel discipline of a party-state. Although the New Economic Policy (NEP), 
which restored a state-led form of capitalist development, recognised that a step back 
from such ambitions was needed, the political architecture of one-party rule survived in 
tact. Soviet democracy was at best sporadic during the Civil War. Its multi-party 
element was de facto abolished in 1918 when the Mensheviks and SRs were semi-
illegalised (Brovkin 1991, 231 – 232). A drive to state professionalization in the 
organisation of the economy went alongside eroding democratic freedoms.22 The more 
idealistic elements of the Bolsheviks reacted against the new authoritarianism.23 Some 
dissidents also took up arms. An uprising of sailors at Kronstadt demanded democratic 
rights for the workers, free elections to the soviets, and a fairer agreement for the 
peasantry. They invoked the discourse of a ‘Third Revolution’ that had been 
popularised amongst the discontented by a new layer of anarchist agitators (Deutscher 
2003c, 426). Rejecting the ‘last warning’, made by Trotsky himself, for an 
‘unconditional surrender’, the rebels were duly crushed by the armed power of the 
Soviet republic (Deutscher 2003c, 427). Caught in the ineluctable logic of their ardent 
belief that only Bolshevik rule could deliver a socialist transition a wave of repression 
soon ensued. The SRs and Mensheviks, who had only been half-repressed in the Civil 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22 A rapid contraction in the size of the urban working class and the deadly sacrifice that its more 
socialistic layers had made in the Civil War eroded the material basis for working class control of 
industry (Flewers 1997). Labour discipline was increasingly enforced ‘from above’ through a series of 
coercive labour codes, concluding in 1920 with a forced labour scheme, in clear contradiction to socialist 
principles (Flewers 1997). Trade unions were operationally integrated into the People’s Commissariat of 
Labour and membership of them made compulsory for all workers (Barry 1979, 267). 23 In 1920, Alexandra Kollontai and the Workers’ Opposition formed a minority faction in the Bolshevik 
party opposed to these infringements. They called for the unions to be fully independent bodies, for the 
return of workers’ control in industry, highlighting how a new layer of unaccountable technocrats had 
coalesced in the state (Kollontai 2009). Importantly, Kollontai directly linked the attacks on freedom of 
speech to the social decay of urban life fostered by top-down control. ‘The harm [of bureaucracy]’ she 
wrote, ‘lies in the solution of all problems, not by means of an open exchange of opinions or by the 
immediate efforts of all concerned, but by means of formal decisions handed down from the central 
institutions’ (Kollontai 2009). Workers in the production line were excluded from decision making in 
favour of the rule of ‘one person or…an extremely limited collective’ above them and ‘freedom of 
thought and opinion’, encouragement of ‘self-activity’ (ibid) was effectively proscribed. In prophetic 
remarks, she concluded that this erosion of the democratic life of the Soviet state was the ‘greatest danger 
to the future existence of the Communist Party itself’ (ibid). Whether Kollontai imagined a bureaucratic 
take-over of the party from within or its overthrow by this new elite from without, her basic concern that 
the emancipatory vision of the revolution was being extinguished proved to be a prescient one.  
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War, were punished for openly supporting the uprising and outlawed for good 
(Deutscher 2003c, 431 – 432). Isolation on the world stage fed a deep paranoia towards 
the people as a siege mentality developed in the ruling party. Even the mildest forms of 
opposition were seen as a potential incubator for counter-revolution and could not, 
therefore, be tolerated (ibid). Following the unravelling of this logic, oppositions within 
the party were banned and their literature became contraband in wider society (ibid).   
Trotsky would become a famous critic of this bureaucratisation. However, his 
anti-Stalinism would always be coloured by the fact he not only provided direct 
oversight for many of these early policies, but had also given them a theoretical 
justification in various writings from this period. For example, in his pamphlet 
Terrorism or Communism, Trotsky celebrated how the Labour Ministry, ‘collects 
numerous staffs of employees, to a considerable extent from the ranks of the 
bourgeoisie and the bourgeois educated classes’ (Trotsky 1920), which oppositionists 
had warned was running out of control, cementing careerism and creating a nascent 
privileged elite that inhibited the self-activity of the working classes (Kollontai 2009). 
More significantly still, Trotsky argued that ‘general control’ is ‘concentrated’ in the 
‘hands of the party’ and ‘the last word belongs to the Central Committee of the party’ 
(Trotsky 1920, emphasis added). He insisted that ‘the exclusive role of the Communist 
Party’ in the state ‘is quite comprehensible’, legitimising this with the type of tautology 
that would become all too common in the ‘official’ justifications for Stalinism across 
the twentieth century: ‘the revolutionary supremacy of the proletariat pre-supposes 
within the proletariat itself the political supremacy of a party’ (ibid, emphasis). Trotsky 
would spend the last seventeen years of his life challenging such assertions, but in the 
debates following the Civil War, he argued, without hesitation, that the dictatorship of 
the party leadership was the main defence of the revolution. Deutscher would later rue 
how ‘at the very pinnacle of his power, Trotsky, like the protagonist of a classical 
tragedy, stumbled. He acted against his own principle and in disregard of a most solemn 
moral commitment’ (Deutscher 2003c, 405). Deutscher added, by way of explanation, 
how it was ‘circumstances, the preservation of the revolution and his own pride’ that 
‘drove him into this predicament… yet in acting how he did he shattered the ground on 
which he stood’ (ibid). Indeed, Trotsky would personally experience the corrosive 
potential of the one party rule he once advocated. How important this one moment, this 
set of connected political choices solidifying one-party rule, was to the wider course of 
history is an open question. Deutscher may well be right that free soviet elections in 
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1920 ‘would have certainly swept the Bolsheviks from power’ (Deutscher 2003c, 420). 
In any case, twentieth century history does, however, testify to the legacy established by 
this precedent. The defining feature of the new ‘state socialism’ was a one-party state, 
and the absence of democratic mechanisms of control resulted in dictatorship. In Russia, 
this took hold extremely quickly once democracy was annulled. Stalin was appointed 
general secretary of the party a year later to enforce the ban on factions and assumed 
wide discretionary powers (Deutscher 2003a, 30). Overtime – indeed, in as little as two 
years – Stalin had transformed the system of central appointment of party officials by 
the general secretary into a system bureaucratic patronage (Deutscher 2003a, 90 – 91). 
Officials were not accountable to the base units, over which they presided, and instead 
owed their position and privileges within the bureaucratic structure to Stalin alone. As a 
consequence, state power was narrowed to the dictates of one man and the idealism of 
the October Revolution was destroyed. This model went ‘modular’ in the twentieth 
century, as aspiring communist actors embraced the Stalinist one-party state system.  
Although one party rule was consolidated in this earlier phase, bureaucratic 
command planning only properly took hold in Russia during the 1930s, and required a 
radical shift from the NEP policy. The latter had, by reintroducing capitalist market 
principles, created a class of wealthy peasants (‘kulaks’) and petty traders (‘NEP men’) 
outside of the direct control of the state. The Bolsheviks had conceived the NEP era as a 
compromise that risked the creation of class inequalities deeply antithetical to 
collectivist principles. With tragic irony this had led them to put ever-greater stress on 
the role of the authoritarian party-state as the guardian of socialist principle against the 
‘alien’ class forces created by the retreat into NEP (Deutscher 2003c, 431 – 432). Stalin 
and the state bureaucracy had initially persisted with this policy until 1928. However, 
having allowed free market tendencies to take flight, he made one of his characteristic 
‘turns’ with the first Five Year Plan in 1928 that abolished private property in land, 
imposed agricultural collectivisation and launched a rapid programme of industrial 
modernisation. The plan succeeded through a brutally enforced ‘revolution from above’, 
turning a subsistence level predominantly rural economy into a modern industrial one in 
just a matter of years (Hobsbawm 1994b, 381 – 385). This constituted a state-led variant 
of what Marx, in the chapter on ‘so-called primitive accumulation’ in Capital described 
‘as nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of 
production’ (Marx 2013, 786). David Harvey has since re-elaborated the concept to 
encompass the plurality of processes involving theft, pillage or expropriation that 
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characterises the most predatory dimensions of capital (Harvey 2005). In Russia, in the 
1930s, a distinctive form emerged that was both closer to and more distant from these 
conceptions. Rather than the gradual process of surplus redistribution to fund industrial 
development violent coercion rapidly drove peasants from their land, seizing grain and 
destroying livestock in the process. Their relation to the means of production had been 
uprooted and was now mediated by an alienating social power. But, unlike in the origins 
of capitalism, they were not rendered dependent on the market for their reproduction. It 
was, instead, the dictates and brutal coercion of the Stalinist state that determined these 
labourers’ relations to production. This provided the economic element of ‘state 
socialism’, which existed in a reciprocal relationship to one party rule. Taken together 
this political can be summarised as the centralisation of political economic power under 
the auspices of an authoritarian state (Saull 2001; Saull 2007). 
 
5.3 Understanding the rise of Stalinism: substitutionism, nationalism and the ‘Third 
World’   
It was through this historical process of uneven and combined development that Soviet 
Russia, cut off and isolated from the wider world by a cordon sanitaire, gave rise to a 
new, despotic elite. Combined development was not experienced as the successful 
consummation of international revolution, but through a colonial intervention designed 
to lock the polity out of global networks of production, trade, communication, 
diplomacy and media. The architecture of bureaucratic rule was justified by the need for 
internal order in the face of internal and external threat. The absence of democratic 
control in the system of political and economic centralisation led to a structure of 
privileges for a bureaucratic elite, of the kind of described in China in chapter one. 
Russia gave ‘lift off’ to this political economy that proved particularly attractive to post-
colonial states. The Soviet elite readily utilised the discourse of communism, but were 
deeply conservative in practice; above all else, they were concerned to uphold their 
power, which meant sustaining the status quo. Stalinism was, thus, born out of Russia’s 
social and economic isolation. The new elite derived their privileges from the 
centralisation of economic and political power within the state, and this conditioned 
their economic policy. Once NEP had created social and class forces hostile to the 
statist development on which the new bureaucracy depended, they used military 
coercion to impose the command planning. Trotsky’s writings from 1919-1920 set the 
tone for future justifications: the party elite were acting on behalf of a working class 
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movement that could not speak for, and organise, itself. In his youth, Trotsky had, 
ironically, actually coined a term for this: ‘substitutionism’ (Trotsky 1904). Defined by 
Deutscher as, ‘the action of a part of a group of leaders which represents, or stands in 
the stead of, an absent, or inactive, social class’ (Deutscher 1984a, 199), substitutionism 
was a central feature of Stalinism, which was grounded in an elitist philosophy party 
leadership.  As such, Trotsky’s polemic against those who warned of this danger in the 
‘War Communism’ debate (Trotsky 1920) was a barely concealed attack on his younger 
self. Back in 1904, amidst bitter divisions in Russian Marxism, Trotsky claimed Lenin’s 
vanguard party model would extinguish the democratic, self-activity of the working 
class, displacing it by a party elite. His words prophetically described the process of 
Soviet bureaucratisation that developed rapidly in the 1920s:  
These methods lead… to the party organisation “substituting” itself for the 
party, the central committee substituting itself for the Party organisation, and 
finally the dictator substituting himself for the Central Committee (Trotsky 
1904, also cited in; Deutscher 2003c, 74).  
 
Whether this was a fair critique of Lenin (Lenin 1902), or was confirmed by the practice 
of the Bolsheviks’ in the years prior to the October Revolution, has been contested (L. 
T. Lih 2006).24 However, it is indefatigably the case, that the decision to close down 
soviet democracy and put faith in the party leadership alone, even if it was only meant 
as an emergency measure, was certainly ‘substitutionist’. Regardless of the intentions, 
the fact remains that the likelihood ‘of dictatorship is implicit in any regime based on a 
single, irremovable party’ (Hobsbawm 1994, 389). The one-party regime took shape in 
Russia in the years after the Tenth Congress in, but its pace quickened once Lenin died. 
This saw Stalin turn communism into a secular religion that worshiped a single leader. 
In other words, this Stalinization provided a consummate realisation of Trotsky’s 
warning of 1904, and established a model, at the level of actually existing state power, 
for others states and communist movements to emulate. 
China would take this course in 1953. It centralised political power into the 
hands of the party upon taking power and moved to a system of bureaucratic planning 
after the Korean War. I discuss the specificities of this political economy in the last 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24 Hobsbawm’s observation that the ‘Bolshevik Party… behaved much less like a military staff and much 
more like an endless debating society’ (Hobsbawm 1994, 386) arguably more closely resembles the real 
history, which saw a plurality of tendencies and opinions coalesce within Lenin’s fighting organisation. 
The Marxist centre of German social democracy (L. T. Lih 2006), and not the Jacobins of the French 
Revolution, was Lenin’s greatest influence, even if he had been willing to embrace the charge of 
‘Jacobinism’ Trotsky had levelled at him in 1904 (Deutscher 2003c, 74 – 75). 
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section of this chapter. For now, having outlined the core features of the Stalinist 
paradigm as it was constructed in the Soviet Union, some general, preliminary remarks 
are necessary. This political economy differed radically from the capitalist states of the 
West. In this regard, it is useful to recall one’s earlier discussion of the nature of state 
power in capitalist societies (see page 138). I argued that a capitalist state establishes a 
clearly defined boundary between a private sphere of economic life, embracing 
production, consumption, and ownership relations, and a political sphere of state 
management (Rosenberg 1994, 84 – 86, 126 – 139; Wood 1981). In this political 
economy, the norm for virtually all states today, the state does not claim special 
ownership rights over production, but, in general, only uses tax and monetary policy to 
encourage (private) economic activity. The mirage this involves presents economic life 
as de-politicised, yet, at the same time, the ‘political’ sphere of society upholds private 
property rights through a monopoly on the use of legitimate force. The state in Stalin’s 
Soviet Union operated according to radically different economic assumptions. A 
bureaucratic dictatorship utilised command planning to incorporate all three domains of 
the political, economic and military into the orbit of a single, despotic state (Saull 2001; 
Saull 2007). This affords no right of privately owned production, and, thus, no freedom 
for capital to exploit labour by rendering individuals dependent on markets for their 
social reproduction. If seen in these terms, then the historical antagonism between 
‘East’ and ‘West’ during the twentieth century had an obvious material basis in the fact 
these economic models were mutually antagonistic (Saull 2007, 16 – 48). Two further 
consequences of this concentration of political and economic power follow. Firstly, the 
bureaucracy idealised the autarky that had initially been imposed upon the Soviet Union 
by foreign powers. They looked with suspicion upon any interchange with the wider 
world (production networks, migration flows, information sharing, media openness, 
etc.) that could not be controlled by the state, seeing it as a potential source of 
instability. Secondly, the relationship between Stalinism and nationalism was an organic 
one. Stalin had launched an apparently doctrinal debate over whether socialism could be 
achieved in Russia alone after the defeat of the revolution in Germany. However, 
standing behind this seemingly semantic dispute was the emergence of a new, and 
‘Russian’, bureaucratic elite inside the Soviet state. What could be more destabilising to 
their power than new revolutions that resurrected the tradition of radical soviet 
democracy? It was natural that concern for internal security, with a related use of 
Russian chauvinism, soon became paramount. The Soviet Union was in formal terms a 
   
 
182	  
multi-national state, but a Russian bureaucracy, who utilised patriotic and nationalist 
discourse to provide legitimacy for their rule, nonetheless dominated the polity.   
China was one amongst several regimes that adopted this form of political rule. 
Article 2 of the 1982 PRC Constitution perfectly expressed the substitutionist logic 
Trotsky had warned against back in 1904. Indeed, its formal description echoed 
Trotsky’s prophecy almost word-for-word:  
Subordination of the individual [party member] to the organisation, 
subordination of the minority to the majority, subordination of lower levels to 
higher ones, and subordination of the whole Party to the Central Committee 
(cited in P. R. Baehr 1994, 163).  
 
In all likelihood this was an unwitting parroting of the young Trotsky’s fears. But it 
naturally poses a striking question of why a communist movement having taken power 
proceeded to create a state whose constitution so closely paralleled his dark warning. 
Observing the revolutions in Cuba, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, China, and several other 
states, one cannot be anything other than struck by how the monolithic one-party state 
was seen as so eminently appropriate by its leaders. Back in 1904 Trotsky was 
critiquing the Leninist notion of vanguard party, and it is certainly the case that the 
concept of a professional elite standing ‘above’ the people and embodied in the 
Bolshevik leadership provided an important source of justification for closing down 
democratic mechanisms after 1920. The Trotsky of 1904 was evidently correct after this 
point. But before this change the Bolsheviks were prepared to base their new form of 
rule on multi-party soviet democracy. Regardless of this controversy, for us a different 
but related issue is posed; namely, why the new revolutions bypassed the democratic 
stage and moved straight to a ‘post-1920’ view of the one-party state that substituted the 
activity of the masses for the dictatorship of an elite. The answer, I believe, lies in three 
features of the uneven and combined development of the world order in the last century, 
all of which were visible in China: (i) a welter of new national imaginations and the 
mutability of Stalinism faced with the rise of nationalism; (ii) the challenge of 
modernisation, requiring a degree of ‘primitive accumulation’, in predominantly rural 
societies; and (iii) the logic of substitutionism that became etched into the doctrine of 
the communist movement. Let us briefly digress these elements.  
The international structure I have called ‘colonial capitalism’ – i.e., the post-
1870 world order characterised by the empire-building endeavours of rival great powers 
– entered a major crisis in the inter-war years. Most of all, this expressed how the 
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advanced economies had ‘outgrown’ their own colonial domains and therefore required 
a genuinely global market. Yet this is not how the ruling political elites of the imperial 
powers, conditioned by the cultural assumptions of an entire epoch of history, 
understood their economic plight. Instead colonial expansion, or the protectionist 
retrenchment into existing empires with trade privileges, characterised the prevailing 
responses. Intersecting, however, with this structural crisis was a shift in consciousness 
amongst the subjugated peoples; growing demands for political rights and freedoms, a 
challenge to the legitimacy of the racial narrative, and the kindling of a plethora of new 
national imaginations all over the world. The Easter Rising in Ireland and the 
establishment of the Irish Free State, the push for home rule in India, and the 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and conflict over the future of Palestine, all 
foreshadowed the post-war process of decolonisation. It also illustrated a general shift in 
‘public mood’ within colonial and semi-colonial states of the kind that I have 
highlighted in China from the 1890s onwards. In light of these developments and 
anticipating anti-colonial struggles would become a major cleavage in global politics, in 
1920, the Second Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) declared its 
intransigent opposition to imperialism and unconditional support for the rising tide of 
anti-colonial struggles (Trotsky 1953; Trotsky 1973). This position was developed at 
the Fourth Congress into what they called the ‘united front tactic’, which committed 
communist parties to initiate alliances with reformist parties, unions, or any other 
grouping engaged in a progressive struggle, for action to improve the conditions and 
rights of the subaltern classes (Riddell 2011). However, Stalin modified this approach in 
the mid-1930s (see Trotsky 1979). Whereas the united front tactic advocated the unity 
of workers and peasants in action against ‘the capitalist front’ (Riddell 2011), Stalin 
remoulded the concept as the ‘people’s’ or ‘popular’ front (Trotsky 1979). In addition to 
common ‘action’, such as strikes, boycotts, and so on, Stalin instructed the official 
communist movement to politically align with liberal or nationalist parties in their own 
countries. ‘Popular front’ governments, in effect coalitions of nationalists, liberals, 
communists, and social democrats, depending on the national context, were the 
crowning goal of this perspective. Although only formalised as official doctrine in the 
mid-1930s, the policy was effectively trialled in China during the revolution of 1925 
and 1927 (more on which below). Left critics of this turn emphasised how the new line 
involved suppressing social and economic aspirations of the subaltern classes in favour 
of unity with ‘patriotic’ sections of the bourgeois class (Trotsky 1979). However, the 
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turn also exposed the organic nationalism that came to shape Soviet doctrine under 
Stalin proved to be complementary to the global flowering of new national imaginations 
in the south and east (Kautsky 1971; Von Laue 1987). The Soviet Union shared with the 
post-colonial states of the so-called ‘Third World’ the view that a strong nation-state 
was an end in itself and that each national community had to find its own pathway to 
development (ibid). This carried with it an implication that was rarely acknowledged. In 
a world characterised by political multiplicity, competitive pressures and national 
antagonisms were seen as normal and so the naturalisation of the nation state along the 
lines of realism in International Relations was effectively adopted. The more radical 
aspiration to transcend the national community was consequently forced to one side. 
This was an unexpected outcome of the Russian Revolution’s combined development. 
Trotsky’s belief that socialist revolution was possible in backward Russia had been 
predicated on a German Revolution coming to the aid of the fledgling state and 
establishing a transnational federation. In contrast, the new world order that was coming 
into view during the inter-war years, but was only fully consummated after the Second 
World War, accelerated the growth of ‘nation-ness’ and territorialised state sovereignty.   
According to the schema of the people’s front national liberation was the 
priority, maximum unity was essential to stand up to imperialism, and once in power the 
nation could only turn to socialist tasks if a foundation for it had been laid in a long 
period of capitalist development. This led Moscow and the official communist parties to 
actively promote the most infamous (e.g. Gaddafi, Idi Amin, Robert Mugabe25) and the 
most celebrated (e.g. Ghandi, Mandela, Sukarno) icons of twentieth century nationalism 
in equal measure. In power these nationalist movements, with the exception of Cuba, 
rarely ‘took the Soviet road’. Despite their left wing discourse, they pursued state-
capitalist26 models that were hostile to socialist policies, particularly those involving 
radical forms of democracy, and utilised economically sclerotic ‘import substitutionist’ 
models. Affinity with the Soviet Union brought nationalist leaders prestige in their own 
countries, cloaking their politics in the language of communism and class struggle. 
‘Third World’ nationalism was often ambivalent, even hostile, to democratic rights, and, 
indeed, the assimilation of democracy into nationalism in China provided an early 
example of a trend that would become pervasive across the multiplicity of new national 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25 Strictly speaking, Robert Mugabe’s ‘African National Union’ was actually backed by the PRC whereas 
the Soviet Union supported Joshua Nkomo’s rival, ‘African People’s Union’ (Liebenow 1986, 135).  26 I am referring here to a state-dominated market economy and not the ‘state-capitalist’ theory of the 
Eastern bloc states. 
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imaginations. Stalinist ideology was much more mutable in response to this than the 
original ‘transnational’ communist vision, and many states came to identify with the 
Soviet Union. An official list of non-European countries compiled in 1982 illustrates 
how it assumed a substantial degree of ideological hegemony. There were ‘core 
communist party ruled states’ (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cuba, Laos, Mongolia, 
Vietnam); ‘independent communist party ruled states’ (China, North Korea); ‘leading 
states of socialist orientation’ (Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Yemen); 
‘less advanced states of socialist orientation’ (Algeria, Benin, Burma, Cape Verde, 
Conga-Brazzaville, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Libya, Madagascar, São Tomé, Syria, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe); and, finally, the ‘marginal states of socialist orientation’ 
(Burkino Faso, Ghana, Seychelles, Surinam) (cited in Halliday 2010, 119). Despite the 
Stalinist parties’ capacity for great militancy and sacrifice, their organic nationalism 
was inherently conservative, and their socialism was largely defined as positive 
identification with the Soviet Union. For Trotsky and Lenin uneven development had 
been confronted as a problem for a universal transition to a socialist mode of 
production. In contrast, Stalinism’s allure lay in its embrace of unevenness. The 
division of the world into nations – each engaging in competition to expand power, 
prestige and influence – was treated as a natural, and not imagined, process. ‘Socialism’ 
was not only relegated to a distant future, but it was actually reconceived as a path that 
nations, and not humans, could choose to tread.   
Stalinism had a special ability to integrate into this flowering of national 
imaginations, which ‘internationalist Marxism’, so to speak, shirked. In doing so, 
‘Marxist-Leninism’ effectively became a religious scripture that cloaked state policy, as 
nationalism was now the operative ideological basis for the decisions of state leaders. 
As I discussed in chapter one, this was acknowledged within the discipline of 
International Relations, but only in the terms stipulated by realist theory. In contrast, 
sociological accounts tended not to acknowledge the role of nationalism in policy-
making, and this fed into a symbiotic relationship existed between the two. Realism 
held international politics to be autonomous and not subject to ‘domestic’ causes, 
leaving the way open for sociological accounts to develop a purely internalised 
conception of the political life in these states. This elided the organic connection 
between these regimes and nationalism, owing to their attachment to the nation-state 
form as the source of their bureaucratic social power. Furthermore, the nature of the 
economic structure of Stalinist nationalism, which was rooted in an authoritarian party-
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state, struggled to extend its reach globally. The bureaucratic elite was qualitatively 
more dependent on the nation-state as the source of its social power, than capitalist 
ruling classes were at the time or since. Unlike the latter, states that were practicing 
bureaucratic command planning under the auspices of a one-party political system 
lacked any effective means to project economic power across borders (Saull 2001; Saull 
2007). They were exclusively dependent instead on the ‘brutish’ forms of diplomacy 
and military force. As Richard Saull explains:  
Soviet expansionism took the form of the domestic character of the Soviet state 
– centralised, authoritarian, coercive and militarised and centred on the 
communist party’s monopoly of socio-economic political power. [In contrast, 
US expansion rested] …on the bourgeois separation of state and economy, 
permitting political influence and power through international capitalist 
economic relations (Saull 2007, 55).   
 
A disparity can be clearly seen between the overwhelming character of Soviet 
‘intervention’ in Eastern Europe and the weak, elastic bonds of affinity it developed 
with left nationalist regimes. Even at the high point of Soviet influence in 1976 it had 
just 5,000 military personnel, spread across some 37 different countries, outside of the 
Warsaw pact zone (Saull 2007, 153, 225). Dependency on a nation-state practicing 
bureaucratic autarky consequently established very visible limits on the ability of the 
Soviet Union to compete geopolitically. The hierarchical power relations between the 
Soviet bureaucracy and its satellites in Eastern Europe also illustrate how supra-national 
associations amongst these types of regime could only exist if one bureaucratic elite was 
militarily and politically dominant.27 In comparison, the communist parties that came to 
power in revolutions ruled genuinely sovereign states. These parties proceeded 
nonetheless to model their political economy very closely on the Soviet Union. The 
complementary fusion between nationalism and Stalinism is critical to explaining why 
they took this route. In the first place, membership of the ‘official’, i.e. Soviet-
sponsored, communist movement was conditional on supporting Stalin’s authoritarian 
regime inside the Soviet Union. Dissidents who opposed this were purged from national 
parties and this undoubtedly played a role in making the party leadership unaccountable 
regardless of whether they had any prospect of taking power. For those that won power, 
creating a Soviet-style political system was a logical consequence of the ‘substitutionist’ 
model of party organisation they already adhered to. Their leaders had no intention, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27 In this regard, perhaps Stalinism’s biggest single legacy – as a colonial aggressor and supporter of 
nationalisms – is the post-1991 ‘proliferation of nations’.    
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even when they enjoyed genuine popular admiration, of allowing those below them to 
control their actions, let alone ultimately remove them from power in elections. 
Moreover, this logic of substitutionism was ideally suited to the condition of political 
multiplicity, i.e. the existence of many nation-states within the world order. A single 
leader could not dominate the plethora of global societies, or even the nationally 
fragmented Eastern bloc, but could autocratically rule a despotic, one-party nation-state. 
Put in these terms, the causal relationship moves from substitutionism to 
nationalism, but China’s experience suggests a two-way, dialectical relationship 
between these aspects. In other words, despotism could just as easily arise out of 
nationalism. As I showed in chapter four, nationalist ideology was ascendant in China 
for the whole period after the Russo-Japanese War. Chinese communist leaders 
generally had a background within the country’s nationalist movement, even if Mao’s 
own personal predilection for the discourse of patriotism was particularly pronounced. 
Stalinist politics was therefore able to connect with these indigenous tendencies; 
‘subjectively’ the worldview of many CCP cadres was nationalistic, and ‘objectively’ 
an imagined community that was strongly inclined to militant nationalism existed. 
Assimilating democracy into nationalism was also a central characteristic of China’s 
national movement and, in this sense, is arguably indicative of many of the post-
colonial movements. It might appear perplexing from our contemporary perspective that 
political activists and writers who sincerely believed in some form of emancipation 
would countenance creating dictatorial regimes on normative grounds. But it reflected 
problems of industrial modernisation in extremely underdeveloped societies. Peasant 
surpluses had to be appropriated to fund industrial modernisation and this encouraged 
paternalistic conceptions. The same writers also observed that democratisation only 
came to the West long after the industrial revolution. Sun and Chiang used such 
arguments with a degree of sincerity. A similar logic also pushed communists towards 
bureaucratic command planning. Despite its record as an economic system being 
overwhelmingly negative, command planning had one dispensation. It proved capable 
of undertaking a rapid transition from a rural to an industrial based economy within a 
matter of years (Hobsbawm 1994, 382 – 385; Flewers forthcoming; Kautsky 1971; Von 
Laue 1987). An authoritarian party-state was a suitable vehicle to impose the primitive 
accumulation necessary for this on the peasantry. If the latter looked to the party, if they 
saw it as their saviour for whom they would sacrifice, then this only provided further 
justification for a development trajectory that took the ‘Soviet road’. The bourgeoisie 
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could not achieve fast-paced industrialisation on this scale and, particularly if the party 
had taken power in a civil war, were nearly hostile to the new regime. Bureaucratic 
planning allowed the ruling party to dispossess the capitalist class economically as well 
as politically, and centralise social power completely, with the logic of substitutionism 
then vigorously asserting itself to create a personal despotism. 
  This digression identifies the global conditions of uneven but combined 
development that proved, only for a short period of time in the long sweep of history, 
extremely favourable to the Stalinist paradigm. Each of these processes was eminently 
present in China; its transition from tributary empire to capitalist semi-colony unleashed 
the powerful forces of the nationalist imagination; the challenge of modernisation was 
extraordinary given the levels of rural hardship and persistent failure of ruling elites to 
industrialise; and the substitutionist model of the Stalinist party infused into the polity 
from the outside world, influencing both the Kuomintang and the CCP. One can see 
then the ascending link between the narratives I have sketched out in the previous two 
chapters; together they locate Maoism as an answer to the problem of 
underdevelopment on the road to national salvation. Having outlined these general 
conditions of the world system in the decay of colonial capitalism, we can now move 
explicitly back onto China’s national terrain. I trace the emergence of Maoism through 
four steps: the origins of Chinese Bolshevism, the ‘dress rehearsal’ of the Chinese 
Revolution, the emergence of the peasantry as revolutionary subject after the defeat of 
the working class, and the rise of Japanese imperialism.   
 
5.4 Ideological infusions: the origins of Chinese Bolshevism  
Stalinism’s global expansion was inevitably subject to a high level of political 
unevenness; all such international movements will exhibit this given that they operate 
within a world made up of a polycentric distribution of diverse yet interacting 
communities. However, the Stalinized communist movement openly embraced 
unevenness due to its deep commitment to the politics of social patriotism, allowing it 
to adapt to the global flowering of national imaginations. The Chinese communists’ 
desire to blend their ideas with the prevailing national spirit of their own country was 
therefore hardly unusual amongst the global movement. For the Soviet Union, however, 
this approach flowed from their commitment to realism in international relations 
(realism, that is, in the discipline of ‘International Relations’ sense of national interest). 
This, in turn, implicitly reflected the ruling elite’s attachment to the status quo, i.e., the 
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Russian nation-state as the source of their bureaucratic power, which new revolutions 
could potentially threaten. Moscow did not intend to encourage successful ‘struggles for 
power’ – an outlook illustrated by their use of stadial concepts of social development, 
with long periods of capitalist development seen as necessary before any move to 
collective control of production. In numerous polities globally, communist hegemony 
over the working class component of the people’s front saw the successful suppression 
of more militant demands for an offensive on capital in favour of unity with ‘patriotic’ 
sections of the capitalist class. Even in Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe, Stalin had 
initially pursued a popular front policy – envisioning a periphery of market economies 
with friendly relations to the Soviet Union – but soon found that bourgeois class interest 
groups in these war-ravaged states were hostile to membership of a Soviet-led security 
bloc (Main and Hughes 2012, 121 – 122). The Soviet-occupied countries of Eastern 
Europe, in spite of the hardships of war, retained strong bourgeois traditions and 
interests hostile to the political economy of the Soviet Union and this led to Stalin 
exporting the authoritarian party model. Underdeveloped polities with weak capitalist 
interest groups exhibited a different dynamic. If power fell into the hands of the 
communists following a civil war, then what were they to do with it? How could they 
develop a strong economy and achieve the national salvation that they had promised in 
their rise to power? The conclusion drawn observed the same logic as Stalin’s decision-
making process in Eastern Europe, but in quite different social conditions; native capital 
was abominably weak and hostile to the communists, and so bureaucratic planning 
appeared to offer a viable alternative to the popular front policy.  
The Chinese Revolution would pose these questions to the communists. Despite 
global tendencies favourable to the rise of the CCP, there was nothing ineluctable about 
their triumph. It reflected a particular constellation of social and class conditions; of 
ideological infusions, adaptions, and modifications; and no shortage of good fortune. 
Communism in its Bolshevik form held a powerful allure in China due to the polity’s 
wrenching backwardness. Russia’s failed revolution of 1905 had given energy and 
gusto to the formation of the Tongmenghui as they sensed a global crisis of absolutism 
was developing. In a similar spirit, 1917 appeared to open up a world of previously 
unimaginable possibilities; that a revolutionary shift from a society of great paucity, 
strangled by semi-colonial subjugation, to one taking tentative steps to a socialist future, 
was quite realistic. ‘Marxism found a way to China via Russia’, writes Deutscher, ‘the 
lightening speed by which it did so’, and ‘the firmness with which it struck down roots 
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on China’s soil, are the most stupendous illustration of the law of combined 
development’ (Deutscher 1984a, 182). He added, ‘here we see the most archaic of 
nations avidly absorbing the most modern of revolutionary doctrines’ (ibid). There was, 
however, another source of Asian radicalism that provided part of the groundwork for 
China’s Bolshevik experience. Deutscher’s evocative argument that China skipped a 
series of historical stages in the intellectual evolution of Marxist thought involves an 
internally logical set of claims, but is not entirely aligned with the real history. The first 
translation of the Communist Manifesto was not, as Deutscher claimed, produced in 
1920 (ibid), but has been dated to 1907 (Tian 2005, 57). It should be remembered that 
this was a time of intense intellectual upsurge triggered by the Russo-Japanese War and 
reflecting the radicalisation of the new cosmopolitan intellectuals in China. Indeed, here 
once more, the question of the Chinese following in the footsteps of Japanese pioneers 
resurfaces, for the island state that had responded more rapidly to modernity also gave 
rise to Asian socialism. In a fashion typical of modernisation, the emergence of radical 
thought was conditional on the reshaping of urban life and rupture with messianic 
discourse. ‘Japanese Socialism’ emerged amongst those avidly concerned with the 
injustices of industrialisation (Shichor 2009, 199 – 200). Socialist thought was freely 
pirated as these subjects looked to the wider world for theories to answer social 
problems:  
The absorption of socialist thought in Japan was determined by a process of 
selection – conscious and unconscious – from the rich reservoir of ideas that had 
gradually aggregated in the West during many decades, but that reached Japan 
almost instantly (Shichor 2009, 199).   
 
Mirroring socialist thought in early nineteenth century Europe, Japanese leftists reacted 
in similarly moral terms to rampant individualism and social injustice, utilising 
traditional concepts of social harmony to render their ideas palatable to the Japanese 
cultural imagination (Shichor 2009, 199 – 200). Japan’s ruling elite took no notice, 
however, of this moderation. These heretics were repressed and their gradualist vision 
of reform appeared hopelessly out of touch as the Russo-Japanese War inspired the 
country’s colonial ambitions (ibid). Socialism emanated into China by way of this 
influence and, thus, ‘when the vibrations of the Russian Revolution reached East Asia, 
socialism had already become familiar to intellectuals and activists’ (ibid). The Russo-
Japanese War (see Anievas 2012; Kowner 2006) pushed Asian leftism away from the 
pacifistic reformism that had characterised Japanese Socialism, as it appeared at odds 
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with the intensifying colonial conflicts that polarised ideological debate. Proto-fascist 
and chauvinist outlooks emerged on the political right and leftist movements reflected 
these broader cultural changes by turning to violence and taking up the imagery of 
nationalism (Shichor 2009, 201). Deutscher’s insistence that ‘lacking any native 
Marxist ancestry, Chinese communism descends straight from Bolshevism’ (ibid) thus 
occluded the shift from reformist to revolutionary outlooks, an evolution analogous to 
Europe’s socialist thought. The earlier moment, 1905, which emerges as key, confirms 
that the ‘Russian connection’ was important but not in the way that Deutscher 
conceived it, i.e. the developmental possibilities the Soviet regime posed for Eurasia. 
China’s socialist ideology emerged from a process of intermingling with militant 
nationalist discourses inflamed by the Russo-Japanese War. Meanwhile, the Russian 
Revolution of 1905 inspired these early radicals’ pursuit of a revolutionary, anti-Qing 
agenda, which was also laced with the racialized nationalism discussed in chapter 4. 
Across East Asia, consequently, the reformist moderation promoted by ‘Japanese 
Socialism’ could not connect to this growing sense of geopolitical crisis that created 
strong tendencies towards a much more militant form of political nationalism.  
This contextualisation – locating the origins of Chinese socialism in the same 
‘moment’ of middle class radicalisation from which revolutionary nationalism sprung – 
is not only a correction of the historical record, but reflects a basic absence in 
Deutscher’s work, which elides the nationalism that formed an organic part of Maoism. 
Once 1905 is recognised as the stimulus to the turn towards leftism – with the 
Communist Manifesto translated two years later – it is possible to visualise the overall 
context as one in which a powerful ‘push’ was exerted on Chinese subjects towards 
nationalism but in the complexity of this process they latched on to a variety of radical 
ideologies. Marxism could, naturally, find a hearing at this time, for the obsession with 
the ‘fate of China’ fed into utopian depictions of the a ‘future-orientation and modern 
content’, an intellectual imagination which expressed the ‘general social temper for 
accelerated change’ (Lee 1983, 459). Moreover, this indigenous culture was pregnant 
with radicalism, as ‘reformism’ was satirised as a ‘hackneyed style shorn of intellectual 
substance and political gravity’ (Lee 1983, 460). However, the same cultural conditions 
that provided openings for militant varieties of socialism also created pressure for them 
to assimilate into Chinese nationalism.   
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5.5 China’s dress rehearsal: counter-revolution and the origins of the Maoist road  
Having witnessed the post-war revolts in Europe subside the attention of the Comintern 
shifted to China as a potential site of social upheaval. Trotsky, for instance, argued 
rhetorically, but, in some respects, quite reasonably, ‘We know that in China, toiling 
people, who have probably never in their life read a single one of Lenin’s articles, 
ardently gravitate towards Bolshevism for such is the might of history’s breath!’ 
(Trotsky 1924). This optimism found its confirmation in the rapid growth of the 
Chinese communists. The CCP was born in 1921 with just a handful of converts – 
twelve delegates attended the ‘First Congress’ representing a mere fifty-seven members 
(Deutscher 1984a, 183). In just four years it had grown exponentially, claiming 1,000 
members in May 1925 and growing to 10,000 just six months later (Wilbur and How 
1989, 184). ‘Leninism’, wrote Deutscher, ‘offered its Chinese adepts a few great and 
simple truths’ (Deutscher 1984a, 183): revolution would come from below through the 
masses’ own power; the communists should distrust reform and look for no 
accommodation with colonial powers or warlords; the working class represented the 
consistently revolutionary subject with no interest in small-holder, property-owning 
democracy; and China, like Russia, could move in an ‘uninterrupted’ fashion from anti-
colonialism to anticapitalism (ibid). These were the dictums that Bolshevism initially 
taught its Chinese converts. Debates at the CCP’s First Congress between those 
advocating a literary focus, and those who felt it was vital to reach out energetically and 
speedily to the urban proletariat, were resolved decisively in favour of the latter (Saich 
and Yang 1996, 4 – 6). Amongst the urban working classes in Shanghai and Guangzhou 
(Canton), whose workplace conditions were appalling, the communist message found a 
natural resonance. For both communist leaders at the time and Marxist historians 
looking at this process in retrospect, the temptation was always to read the unfolding 
Chinese Revolution through the lens of the Russian process. Trotsky and Deutscher 
therefore, looked upon, the Chinese Revolution of 1925 to 1927 alike, as ‘the dress 
rehearsal’ in a similar spirit to the 1905 revolution in Russia. In a sense, it was, but not 
only did the CCP draw radically different conclusions – developing out of the ashes of 
defeat a peasant-war strategy –, the initial sociological conditions also diverged a great 
deal. 
China’s combined development gave its failed revolution a quite different 
character to its Russian equivalent. China’s industrial workers lacked the social power 
of the working class in the Russian ‘dress rehearsal’. Financing for modern industry was 
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chronically bad in Republican China and the state could not offer private capital 
sufficient security or protection from foreign competition (Feuerwerker 1983b, 61). The 
limits this placed on growth naturally found expression in the size of the industrial 
working class and Marxists at the time and since have tended to understate this. The 
best figures for the size of the industrial labour force, taken from a national census, put 
it at around 1 million in 1933 (Lippit 1987, 47). Even taking into account that the Great 
Depression hit China in 1933, the estimate, from 1927, of 3 million cited by Isaacs 
(Isaacs 1961, 33), and Mao’s estimate of 2 million cited by Deutscher (Deutscher 
1984a, 185), both significantly overstated the size of the industrial working class. 
Factories were small, technologically backward and formed only a small proportion of 
the economy. This contrasted with the great combines of Russian industry (see pages 
106 to 107) and made the social power of the Chinese industrial working class 
considerably weaker. There was, however, a real potential for ‘urban revolution’ 
broadly defined, as a wider mass of precarious proletarian layers occupied the cities. 
Workers in Chinese factories toiled in appalling conditions, with wages for unskilled 
workers low and 12-hour days the norm (Feuerwerker 1983b, 61 – 62), and this gave 
ample scope for radicalism, even if – as was the case in Russia – low paid workers did 
not look for jobs for life and retained links with the villages. The concentration of the 
industrial working class in a handful of cities provided them with a visibility that belied 
this weakness, and appalling conditions led many to quickly assimilate communist ideas 
and join unions. This urban socialist radicalisation was, however, spatially located in 
the major cities, notably Shanghai and Guangzhou, whereas the countryside remained 
mired in warlordism, posing the vexing question of whether a struggle for power was 
possible. Russian Marxism’s textbook problem – of how to make socialist revolution in 
conditions where capitalist industry was underdeveloped – was amplified in the Chinese 
setting and posed obvious challenges of the CCP. Indeed, adherents of all the ideologies 
that won a hearing in the urban centres had to address the question of how to conquer 
the countryside, extinguish the plague of warlordism and establish a state that was able 
to confront colonialism. Uneven development – both in terms of China’s socio-
economic paucity and its division into rival warlord fiefdoms – was confronted as a 
problem to be overcome. Combined development with the wider world had, in some 
respects, introduced a communist ideology that was ‘too advanced’ for the Chinese 
setting and, in turn, amplified the difference between urban and rural consciousness. 
Meanwhile, the isolated Soviet Union was keen to develop geopolitical allies regardless 
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of whether they had any socialist orientation. These tensions were manifested during the 
period 1923 to 1927 when communists worked inside the Kuomintang and won 
significant influence.   
Communist entry into the Kuomintang was heavily determined by the 
prescriptions laid down by the global movement, particularly the turn to the ‘united 
front’. The Kuomintang struggle for national unification and against the unequal treaties 
and the plague of warlordism was rightly deemed progressive, and, if successful, would 
open up avenues for economic relations with the Soviet Union. Initially, no 
communists, including Trotsky, thought that a social revolution in China was a short-
term prospect. For example, in 1924 he discussed, with excited anticipation, the 
capitalist potential of Kuomintang rule and the role this would play in giving rise to a 
stronger working class subject:   
There is no doubt that if the Chinese Kuomintang party manages to unify China 
under a national-democratic regime then the capitalist development of China 
will go ahead with seven-mile strides. And yet all this will prepare the 
mobilization of the countless proletarian masses who will at once burst out of a 
prehistoric, semi-barbaric state and cast themselves into industry’s melting-pot, 
the factory. Consequently there will not be the time to conserve and accumulate 
the rubbish of past ages in the consciousness of the toilers; a guillotine will slice 
through their consciousness as it were, cutting off the past from the future and 
forcing them to seek new ideas, new forms and new paths of life and struggle 
(Trotsky 1924). 
 
Trotsky was, however, aware of the contradictions underpinning this outlook. A class 
antagonism was lodged firmly within the Kuomintang with the entry of the communists 
and the rising tide of rural and urban class struggles. The Chinese nationalist 
bourgeoisie, who were excluded from the governance of the colonial ‘International 
Settlements’ in Shanghai and elsewhere, formed a key social base for the Kuomintang 
(Isaacs 1961, 79 – 80). These layers wanted a state that could offer security for their 
investments and protection from foreign capital, and were alarmed at the decision to 
permit the communists to enter the nationalist movement (ibid). The way these class 
tensions in the alliance resolved themselves cruelly exposed the law of uneven and 
combined development’s tragic qualities. Soviet military advisors persuaded Chiang 
Kai-shek to reorganise the Kuomintang as a disciplined centralised force rooted in mass 
struggle and with a standing army modelled on that which had brought the Bolsheviks 
victory in the Civil War (Isaacs 1961, 64). ‘The Kuomintang’, wrote Isaacs with only 
slight exaggeration, was thus ‘transformed into a rough copy of the Russian Bolshevik 
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Party’ (ibid). It appears likely that Chiang was also impressed with the stability and 
order that one-party, centralised rule had brought to the Soviet Union when he 
undertook a six month visit and returned to China hailing the ‘world revolution’ (ibid). 
Chiang did not share any of the communist goals that Stalin and the Soviet bureaucracy 
formally adhered to. Yet he drew upon the model of a one-party nation-state and used it 
instrumentally to channel the wave of struggle towards his personal dictatorship. He did 
so with Moscow’s blessing, providing another indication of how complementary 
Stalinism was to twentieth century nationalism. From 1926 to 1927, paralleling closely 
Stalin’s own moves against Trotsky’s and the oppositionists in Russia (1923 – 1928), 
Chiang shut down the communists and other lefts in the Kuomintang. This concluded 
with their annihilation in the brutal Shanghai massacre of 12 April 1927 that saw 
thousands killed (Isaacs 1961, 175 – 185). 
It was a tragic outcome of combined development. Not only had the Soviet 
Union given Chiang the weapons and the training to crush the movement, but the 
Stalinist ideology of the monolithic party-state had also become interwoven with the 
existing tendency of Chinese nationalists to identify the ‘rule of the people’ with the 
liberation of the nation, i.e. to assimilate democracy into nationalism (see discussion on 
p.157). This ‘authoritarian imagination’ was crystalized into the institutional fabric of 
the new Nationalist government by 1928. China’s Marxist revolutionaries had 
undoubtedly benefited from their entry into the Kuomintang. By the close of 1925 they 
found themselves at the head of mass social struggles (Isaacs 1961, 68 – 73). This was 
the golden moment of Kuomintang entryism as CCP membership increased tenfold in 
the space of six months (Wilbur and How 1989, 184) and Guangzhou, Shanghai and 
Hong Kong were beset by strikes, riots and labour protests (Isaacs 1961, 68 – 73). It 
was met with predictable hysteria on the part of the local and foreign bourgeoisie alike, 
pushing these old foes to unite against the subaltern classes (Isaacs 1961, 74 – 80). The 
movement therefore polarised on class lines sooner than the communists predicted. The 
CCP were very far from naïve faced with this change of circumstances, and argued 
forcefully to Moscow that Chiang was preparing to crush them by force. They requested 
at the close of 1925 and again in the spring of 1926 that the Communist International 
give them permission to break with the Kuomintang and for the flow of Soviet arms to 
be used to develop independent working class militia (Deutscher 2003a, 267 – 268). 
Moscow denied the request and instead urged the CCP to hold worker and peasant 
protests ‘in check’ in the name of national unity. Mikhail Borodin, the Soviet Union’s 
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attaché in China, was alarmed at the enveloping mass movement and insisted that ‘the 
left’ – a term that, for the bureaucratic Soviet elite, included Chiang and the whole 
Kuomintang leadership – continue to ‘present a united opinion’ (cited in Isaacs 1961, 87 
– 88). It was recognised that the nationalist party was of ‘mixed class composition’ and 
could not ‘undertake the confiscation of private property’ (cited in Isaacs 1961, 88), and 
that the maintenance of a ‘united opinion’ of ‘the left’ inevitably entailed abandoning 
the workers’ immediate social demands in order to conciliate the patriotic bourgeoisie. 
In a country where political violence was an everyday occurrence it was never likely 
that having converted warlords to the cause, the Kuomintang in power would tolerate an 
active, radical workers’ movement. The Guangzhou Coup of 20 March 1926 was a 
critical moment that saw Chiang curtail the mass movement, substituting it for his 
standing army and launching the Northern Expedition (Isaacs 1961, 89 – 110). Chiang 
consolidated his control of the Kuomintang military, arrested scores of communist 
dissidents, and replaced the party structures with a de facto personal dictatorship (ibid). 
But it was shortly after this dramatic turning point that the Soviet Politburo ratified the 
decision to accept the Kuomintang as a supporting sympathiser section of the 
Communist International with only Trotsky voting against (Deutscher 2003a, 271; 
Isaacs 1961, 117). Chiang even took up an honorary position on the international 
leadership. Forgotten, it seems, was Lenin’s warning, made when he announced the 
Communist International’s unconditional support for the anti-colonial struggle in 1920, 
of ‘quasi-communist revolutionists’ that ‘cloak the liberation movement in the 
backward countries with a communist garb’ (cited in Isaacs 1961, 48). ‘In preparing 
himself for the role of executioner’, Trotsky would later remark, Chiang yearned for, 
‘the cover of world communism – he got it’ (cited in Isaacs 1961, 117). The Chinese 
Revolution of 1925 to 1927 came at a time when Stalinism was still in its infancy, both 
in its state form and core ideological moorings. The Trotsky-Stalin split had until this 
point been a purely Russian affair. But Moscow’s policy in China’s revolutionary days 
provided an early insight into the global implications of Stalin’s rise: state security, and 
not social revolution, was now his paramount concern. Stalinism would, across the 
twentieth century, habitually support nationalist leaders, but in China it had a novel and 
shocking quality. Its impact on Maoism was contradictory; never again would Moscow 
be able to instruct in such absolute terms the Chinese communists to pursue a given 
line, yet, at the same time the defeat pushed Mao to intensify his efforts to find a 
specifically Chinese route to the social revolution. As such, the tragic paradox of 
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Stalin’s insistence that the communists should support the Kuomintang nationalists at 
all costs lay in how it pushed the CCP towards political nationalism.  
 
5.6 A revolutionary subject? The role of the peasantry in China’s combined revolution  
In spite of his general advocacy of an uninterrupted movement from political to social 
revolution in the backward countries (Trotsky 1978), Trotsky, as we have seen, initially 
believed a longer period of capitalist development was needed in China (Trotsky 1924). 
He had good reasons for thinking this, due to the sheer scale of its underdevelopment. 
When the masses rose up in 1925 he was also slow to react to the historicity of these 
developments, and, even once his critique of the Comintern strategy was in place, he did 
not speak out on the issue between April 1926 and March 1927 (Deutscher 2003a, 271). 
Since Trotsky most ‘Trotskyist’ writers (Deutscher 1984a; Isaacs 1961) have implied 
that a healthy soviet system might have been established if the CCP had broken with the 
Kuomintang when its leaders had wished to, and if the Soviet Union had materially 
supported splitting Chiang’s army and launching a workers’ insurrection. There are 
reasons, however, for treating this assessment with a degree of caution. Saull argues that 
the failure of the Hunan peasants’ uprising and the workers’ insurrection in Shanghai in 
the spring of 1927 were rooted in material realities, i.e. not in the political failure of the 
CCP, under the strict tutelage of Moscow, to break with the Kuomintang earlier (Saull 
2007, 39 – 40). Saull puts his case too categorically and fails to acknowledge the 
Shanghai insurrection was initially successful and only defeated once Chiang arrived 
and massacred the communist-led workers’ movement (J. K. Fairbank and Goldman 
2006, 284). Nonetheless, there is no doubt that it would have been very difficult for 
armed workers’ communes to survive in what passed for an industrial core of China in 
Guangzhou and Shanghai. The Northern Expedition only succeeded because Chiang 
incorporated the vast warlord armies as entire units into his command structure. 
Warlords that submitted to his authority were granted the official title of regional 
governor within the new Nanjing regime. There were 2 million soldiers serving China’s 
warlord armies in 1928 (Sheridan 2008, 291) and the Kuomintang had begun the 
campaign with an initial fighting force of just 100,000 soldiers in 1926 (Joes 2006, 
195). The politics of the Kuomintang, which sought a strong, bureaucratic state able to 
stand up to the colonial powers and assert China’s national interests, was politically 
amenable to the incorporation of the warlords. The CCP could hardly match this offer 
and grant warlords formal control of whole territories. The Soviet Union might have 
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been able to buy time through bribery, but their attempt to do this after the Shanghai 
massacre suggests it would have ended in failure. Feng Yuxiang, a leading warlord, had 
been cultivated as a Soviet ally in the 1920s, and even visited the Soviet Union for an 
extended period. The hope of Stalin and the Soviet elite that he would support the 
communists after the Shanghai massacre was not entirely naïve, but it was soon dashed 
in any case (Sheridan 2008, 306 – 307). He ‘promptly came to an understanding with 
Chiang and advised the Russians to go home’ (Sheridan 2008, 307). In addition, to this 
problem of the military balance of forces, the threat of colonial intervention cast a long 
shadow over the revolution. Britain had some 58 warships stationed in Shanghai 
supported by a garrison of 5,000 troops (Elleman 2009, 59). Since the fall of 1926, the 
British government had made preparations to intervene militarily in China and had 
openly stated its intention to act if colonial interests were threatened (ibid). The North 
China Herald, the mouthpiece of China’s British settlers, saw the revolutionary upsurge 
as a Soviet conspiracy against the Empire and openly called for immediate ‘retaliation’ 
and ‘reprisal’ (Elleman 2009, 57). Had the working class successfully taken power into 
its own hands in Guangzhou and Shanghai it seems extremely likely that the British 
would have intervened to protect their colonial power. Only the rallying of considerable 
sections of the rank and file in the warlord armies to defend a workers’ insurrection in 
these cities could have averted their speedy military defeat. In the absence of the still 
small CCP’s material ability to undertake agitation for this, it seems unlikely that they 
could have held onto power. A ‘Paris Commune scenario’, i.e. when an urban 
revolution is smashed by a Bonapartist peasant army, would have been the most likely 
conclusion had the communists pursued Trotsky’s line. Alternatives to this pessimistic 
appraisal must assume that neither the warlords nor the British would have moved to 
retake Shanghai or Guangzhou if the working class had established soviet power.  
Trotsky would have likely seen no great shame in heroic defeat; the question for 
him was whether a consciousness could be kindled in the working class that was 
determined to settle scores with their persecutors in the future, and that looked to the 
communists for guidance. Whatever the rights and wrongs of this view, in China an 
altogether different approach to Marxist practice was pioneered. Chinese Marxism, 
wrote Deutscher, sadly fell prey to ‘Moscow’s opportunism and national egoism’:            
… Being dependent on Moscow for inspiration, ideas and the sinews of their 
activity, finding themselves raised by events of dizzy suddenness from the 
obscurity of a tiny propaganda circle to the leadership of millions in revolt, 
lacking political experience and self confidence, bombarded by an endless 
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stream of categorical orders, instructions, and remonstrances from Moscow, 
subjected to persuasion, threats and political blackmail by Stalin’s and the 
Comintern’s envoys on the spot, bewildered and confounded, the pioneers of 
Chinese communism gave in (Deutscher 1984a, 186 – 187).  
 
There was a certain tragic fatality to this process. China’s combined development with 
the Russian Revolution had introduced a political vision to the polity that was, in some 
respects, ‘too advanced’ for its sociological terrain, yet also captured the imagination of 
the urban working classes and steeled them for a resolute struggle with colonial 
capitalism. This same infusion of revolutionary momentum from the outside world gave 
the Russian ‘teacher’ its political authority as the global centre of anti-colonial struggle, 
but Stalin’s tutelage left the masses literally unarmed in the face of Chiang’s army. 
Having previously preached complete subordination to the Kuomintang, the Comintern 
shifted its position after the Shanghai massacre, impelling the Chinese party to launch 
absurdly adventurist armed uprisings in urban centres despite the movement having 
dissipated in defeat. Although adhering formally to the idea that China’s revolution 
remained bourgeois in character these were in effect futile attempts to seize power 
(Deutscher 1984a, 190). This dangerous revolutionary posturing pre-empted the post-
1928 ‘Third Period’ hailed by Moscow as a new phase of imminent global revolution. 
In China, just as in numerous other polities, there was no such radical uprising after the 
defeats of 1926 and 1927. The strategy of ‘permanent insurrections’ merely served to 
justify the authoritarianism of the Kuomintang regime. Not only were the effects of this 
approach catastrophic for the core membership of the CCP and its standing amongst the 
people, but its imposition from the outside also had important implications. Stalin’s 
dictatorship in the Soviet Union led, in turn, to colonial-style direction of national 
leaderships in the global communist movement. This dictating of strategy to serve 
Russian national interests was very far removed from democratic internationalism and 
there could be few better ways to push these parties towards nationalism. In this sense, 
the CCP leadership’s decision to find their very own road to power – though never 
formally breaking with Moscow – was unsurprising. More surprising is why so few 
other communist parties did not embark on similar journeys, but instead remained more 
orthodox components of the official communist movement. It might plausibly be argued 
that this simply illustrates the high regard the Soviet Union was held in which gave its 
leadership authority. However, a further factor can arguably be seen in how the strategy 
of the ‘people’s front’, which the Russian party generally promoted, complemented the 
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rising tide of political nationalism in the Global South and East. ‘History’, in this sense, 
was on the side of the politics the Soviet Union promoted, as it actively encouraged 
national parties to adapt to the flowering of national identities. Maoism’s distinctiveness 
therefore emerged twofold out of (i) the CCP’s experience of the ‘people’s front’ and 
(ii) the weakness of the industrial working class in the Chinese setting. China’s 
impoverished peasantry had a long history of radicalism conducive to a strategy of 
agrarian revolution. The country’s expansive geography had also long provided fertile 
terrain for the marauding bandits of Imperial China and afforded the same protections 
for modern guerrilla warfare. A struggle for power based on the peasantry allowed the 
CCP to introduce a class antagonism into the national struggle that the industrial 
working class was too weak to provide. This, in turn, meant that the party could be 
identified both as the leadership of the subaltern classes and as national saviours. The 
latter, of course, required a successful struggle against colonialism, and this opportunity 
was provided by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria (1931) and Mainland China 
(1937) – both of which represented key events for the slide into the Second World War.  
It would be wrong to present the turn of the CCP to nationalism as simply a 
political choice made by Mao, for this turn reflected the extraordinary pressure within 
the Chinese polity to adopt the discourse of national chauvinism. Amongst the peasants 
the adaption of traditional imageries to the modern context – to generate a national 
imagination pushing for minzu-unity – might not have been a condition for a successful 
peasant struggle, but it certainly helped foster legitimacy for the CCP in the base areas. 
Mao’s own predilection for social patriotism arose out of and consciously deepened this 
pervasive nationalist sensibility amongst the people. This point is curiously notable by 
its absence from Deutscher’s analysis. Yet it is more than implied by his recognition 
‘that the Chinese Revolution, which in its scope is the greatest of all revolutions in 
history, was led by the most provincial minded and insular of revolutionary parties’ 
(Deutscher 1984a, 182). In the period that Deutscher describes as one of ‘undiluted 
Leninism’ in the Chinese party, from 1920 to the opening of the national revolution in 
1925 (Deutscher 1984a, 183), and even throughout the revolution and counter 
revolution of 1925 to 1927, the party was firmly ‘internationalist’ in its outlook, and its 
loyal observance of Comintern positions perfectly expressed this. It was only as Mao 
assumed growing influence in the party in the 1930s that the nationalist ethos, and the 
insularity of the party from world events, fully takes hold. Mao successfully positioned 
himself as an advocate of a distinctively Chinese strategy based on rural ‘Red Bases’, 
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but importantly cloaked this with unquestioning support for the Soviet Union, and total 
opposition to critics of the authoritarian regime. His manoeuvre against Wang Ming and 
the pro-Moscow faction was, however, implicitly justified by the latter’s distance from 
Chinese affairs (see Rue 1966). As I have discussed, Mao’s early writing developed 
themes ‘of his thought and action’ that would be present ‘throughout the whole of his 
subsequent career: nationalism, or patriotism, and admiration for the martial spirit’ 
(Schram 1986, 791). While there is consistency in his use of this discourse, he was also 
a successful pragmatist in his approach to the inner-party struggle, careful to never 
openly oppose Moscow. He remained aloof and disinterested from international affairs, 
and his ‘interventions’ on this terrain were often even cruder than his domestic writings. 
The two articles (Mao 1926; 1927) that Deutscher cites as evidence for labelling Mao a 
‘Trotskyist Jourdain’ (Deutscher 1984a, 188) are heavily laden with what sociologists 
today would term ‘methodological nationalism’, i.e. they assume a pristine development 
of the nation as an organic whole, logically independent of the external world. Neither 
article approaches China’s development from the standpoint of the polity’s place within 
‘the world revolution’, even if they do not contain the explicit nationalist ideology of 
some of his other writings. Mao did come into conflict with the CCP leadership over 
these pieces, because he stressed that the peasants struggle should not be held back in 
order to save the alliance with the Kuomintang (Rue 1966, 47 – 48). But Deutscher’s 
remark that ‘by this time in the Soviet Union only the Trotskyists and Zinovievists still 
spoke such language’ badly overstates their political affinity (Deutscher 1984a, 188). 
Mao had no knowledge of Trotsky’s criticisms of the CCP policy, but there is no 
evidence he would have responded positively to them, ‘because his awareness of the 
wider horizons of the world communist movement had little or no affect on his tactics, 
nor did the shifting alignments in the CPSU [i.e., the Russian Party] on the policies he 
worked out and recommended’ (Rue 1966, 116). Mao’s reasoning was located purely in 
China’s national circumstances and not, as was the case for Trotsky, the role a 
triumphant revolution could play in rehabilitating a transnational conception of the 
workers’ state by ending Russia’s isolation and encouraging its democratisation. 
Deutscher’s use of the analogy ‘Jourdain’, which recalls Molière’s Le Bourgeois 
gentilhomme, reveals the extent of his exaggeration. In the play, Monsieur Jourdain is a 
bourgeois, who ardently longs to be an aristocrat, and thus dons splendid clothes and 
engages in aristocratic pursuits, but lacks the lineage and title defining the aristocracy. 
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In Deutscher’s analogy, Mao could only nominally cloak himself in the discourse of 
Stalinism, because the approach he took had a Trotskyist substance.    
Maoism, however, was distinguished from Trotskyism in a radical fashion. 
Deutscher himself notes how Trotsky ‘bluntly ruled out the possibility of a 
consummation of the Chinese Revolution without a previous revival of the 
revolutionary movement amongst the urban workers’ (Deutscher 1984a, 198). The 
diverse paths taken by Maoism and Trotskyism in China illustrate their dissonance. 
Trotskyism gained a not entirely insignificant foothold in China around the ousted CCP 
general secretary, Chen Duxiu, who was expelled from the party in 1929 after siding 
with Trotsky’s Left Opposition (Alexander 1991, 201 – 223). The Comintern 
scapegoated Chen for the policy of the CCP in counter-revolution, and this naturally 
inclined him to reflect upon the critique of Trotsky’s Left Opposition that was now 
taking on an international significance (ibid). He got no support from Mao who joined 
the rest of the party in denouncing Chen and his supporters as ‘liquidationists’. Indeed, 
Mao took advantage of the Central Committee’s call to purge the party of ‘non-
proletarian elements’ as a cover to secure his control of the Front Committee and Fourth 
Red Army (Rue 1966, 166 – 172). As for the Trotskyists, various small groups were 
fused to form the Communist League in 1931 and the new organisation claimed a 
reasonable following in urban areas as it recruited scores of Communist Party cells, 
splitting away half the membership of the party in Shanghai (Alexander 1991, 209 – 
210). Their persecution by the Kuomintang regime was, however, immediate – quickly 
extinguishing hopes of a rapid growth –, and the repressive climate remained in place 
throughout the 1930s. Communist guerrilla movements in the countryside were at the 
time looking to establish a rural soviet republic centred on their stronghold in Jiangxi 
and, despite the purges, were not yet, in 1931, entirely dominated by Mao. However, as 
E. H Carr notes, these efforts were ‘ridiculed’ by the Trotskyists, who held it to be 
impossible that ‘Chinese peasants, without the participation of the industrial centres and 
without the leadership of the communist party, had created a Soviet government’ (Carr 
1982, 326). The CCP leadership, whose strategy had been focused on urban 
insurrection, initially shared this view, but, having suffered crushing losses, conceded 
defeat and joined Mao in Jiangsi in 1933. A seemingly tactical retreat in fact signified a 
radical strategic shift:  
… The Central Committee was obliged to get out of Shanghai and move to the 
central base in Jiangxi, of which Mao Zedong was head. There they outranked 
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him but became immersed like him in peasant life and its problems. From this 
time on the personality and mind of Mao became a central factor in the CCP 
revolution (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 302). 
 
At the time, Trotskyist criticisms of the turn to the countryside appeared to be borne out 
quickly, as the agrarian insurrectionists suffered a series of defeats at the hands of 
Chiang’s ‘extermination campaigns’. In 1934, this led to the ‘Long March’ that became 
a cornerstone of CCP folklore and enduring source of ideological legitimacy. Some 
80,000 troops were led thousands of miles from the Jangxi base area to Yan’an. The 
difficult mountainous terrain resulted in devastating losses of personnel and Mao 
concluded the march in Yan’an with just 8,000 troops in 1935 (Li 2012, 243 – 245). 
Trotsky’s criticism and alternative strategy therefore appeared to be justified in 1935. A 
long-term orientation to illegal work amongst the urban proletariat, gaining a foothold 
that could be built upon and developed once a democratic space opened allowing the 
movement to revive, seemed a far more profitable and less hazardous strategy than a 
permanent rural insurrection against the Kuomintang. The crisis of colonial capitalism 
intervened abruptly, however, to disrupt such a gradual development, and pushed the 
polity on a trajectory that would ultimately see the Maoists take power. Out of the ashes 
of revolutionary defeat, Mao was able to lead the CCP on a new path, turning to the 
peasants, increasing the independence of the party from Moscow, and pushing a much 
more overtly nationalist line. Meanwhile, the fate of the Trotskyists encapsulated the 
fate of China’s industrial working class; their small forces were heavily repressed and 
unable to influence the life of the country. Even so, if the Great Depression had not hit 
and the Japanese not invaded China’s most populace regions, to add to Manchuria, in 
1937, then Maoism too would have been defeated. In short, the intensifying global crisis 
of capitalism shifted China onto a fundamentally different course.   
 
5.7 Power falling into the hands of the Maoists amidst the crisis of global capitalism  
Kuomintang rule extinguished hopes of the rapid industrial expansion needed to 
resuscitate the proletariat. The Great Depression was an obstructive factor, which hit 
China between 1933 and 1936. But it also compelled the Kuomintang to reorganise the 
currency system, finally replacing the silver teal (weights and measures) system with a 
single state-backed paper money produced by a modern mint in 1933 (Shiroyama 2009). 
A package of long overdue fiscal reforms were also achieved; tariff autonomy was 
recovered, the lijin tax on inter-regional trade was abolished, and the financial crisis of 
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1934 led to the creation of a central bank able to manage the money supply (ibid). 
Overall, however, Nationalist rule was an economic failure. The industrial boom 
necessary for the emergence of the proletarian ‘gravedigger’ of the communist 
imagination did not develop. One estimate put the annual rate of growth at 6.7 per cent 
from 1931 to 1936 (Eastman 1991, 40). Today, many countries would envy such growth 
figures. However, in the China of the 1930s it amounted to very little in absolute terms 
(ibid). Electrical power generation, for example, doubled during the Nanjing decade 
(ibid). But, in 1928, the country’s electric-power output was just 0.88 million mega-watt 
hours, compared to 5 million in Russia in the same year, and 88 million in the United 
States (ibid). This was steady growth rather than rapid ‘catch up’. Ultimately, the new 
regime stood in an ambiguous relationship to capitalist modernisation. It came to power 
in a revolution but soon lost its radical drive and impetus. After the Shanghai Massacre 
of 1927 mass organisation was discouraged and membership of the party totalled barely 
550,000 in 1929 with 280,000 of these military personnel (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 
286 – 287). For a one-party state in such a vast country these were small figures, and the 
party’s support was concentrated in the bureaucracy and the police. The Stalinist 
principles around which the party was reorganised in 1924 became spliced together with 
the political economy of the warlord era and the country’s ancient ruling class tradition. 
Warlords restyled as regional governors were granted the freedom to keep the land tax 
in 1928 (Eastman 1991, 42). In a stroke, this handed them de facto control of the bulk of 
China’s economic output and legitimised their clientelism (see p. 171). Modernising the 
agrarian-dominated economy required the transformation of peasant surpluses into 
capital for investment in industry, but the rentier elite was risk-averse and favoured the 
time-honoured destinations for embezzled funds, such as usury and land. Kuomintang 
rule in the cities also discouraged capital investment. Crippling tax burdens were 
imposed on private capital that drove many firms out of businesses. For example, 
between 1927 and 1930 two thirds of cigarette companies closed down (Eastman 1991, 
42). The Nanjing regime was also debt dependent and absorbed 70 per cent of the 
country’s banking investment capital (ibid). In competition with the state for loan 
capital, industry was expected to pay 18 to 20 per cent in interest per annum, and, this, 
in turn, created a climate that encouraged asset price speculation over long-term 
industrial investment (ibid). In Shanghai, business associations were incorporated into 
the state and gangster methods used to extort funds to be channelled into military 
spending and bureaucratic self-aggrandisement (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 287). In 
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short, this was a regime that was very far from ‘business-orientated’ (ibid) and 
effectively gave warlord-like practices the legitimacy of a cohesive state. Not only did 
industry suffer as a result, the scope for a radicalisation in the face of this failure was 
considerable, as many youth and intellectuals grew disillusioned with the party. The 
Kuomintang failed to deliver the industrial miracle achieved by Japan, not only in the 
late nineteenth century, but also, indeed more importantly, during the rapid growth of 
the 1920s. This would have been politically damaging in any context given the history 
between these two Confucian polities, but it was ruinous in the context of the Japanese 
invasion. This shift in the geopolitical context coupled with economic failure created the 
ideological and material basis for the CCP’s rise. 
In the mythology of Chinese communism, the Long March is seen as a glorious 
defeat. It plays an equivalent role in the dominant ideology of modern China as the 
Battle of Alamo does for America, or the retreat from Dunkirk does for Britain. In each 
of these examples the narrative imagines triumph against adversity; of the brave groups 
of individuals prepared to fight on regardless of circumstances. All of them abstract, in 
ways designed to cohere a certain ideological mythology, from the material realities that 
proved favourable for the perspectives of the victors. The Chinese Revolution may have 
involved a quite different strategic project to that advanced by the Bolsheviks, but it 
shared a basic feature of their triumph. In China, as in Russia, power fell into the hands 
of the communists as the polity disintegrated; yet for one, the peasant war came after 
the initial seizure of the cities, for the other, the opposite held true, as Mao urged the 
CCP to, ‘gather strength in the villages, use the villages to encircle the cities, and then 
take the cities’ (Mao 1992, 138). Despite this strategic contrast, both of these 
revolutions were essentially born of the destruction of the colonial-capitalist world order 
that had been constructed around 1870. And it is in this epochal crisis that the secret of 
Mao’s success is lodged. ‘What saved Maoism’, wrote Deutscher candidly, ‘and 
decisively contributed to its further evolution were, apart from its own determination to 
survive, two major events or series of events: the Japanese invasion, and the deliberate 
de-industrialization of coastal China by the invader’ (Deutscher 1984a, 194). Japan had 
strolled into Manchuria in 1931 with virtually no Kuomintang resistance. Between 1931 
and 1937 Chiang prioritised defeating the communist foe within, as opposed to the 
militarily much harder task of expelling Japan from the now restyled ‘kingdom’ of 
Manchukuo, nominally run by the last Manchu emperor of Imperial China. This was a 
rational enough response to the military balance of forces, but given the nationalist 
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sentiment in the polity it proved to be politically fatal. The Long March was a genuine 
victory for Mao in the same way that Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain was for the 
British Empire: to survive at the point when their foe appeared ready to crush them was 
a victory. For Mao personally it consolidated his total control of the CCP. As Roderick 
MacFarquhar put it, ‘the greatest strategic retreat in military history turned Mao into a 
living legend’ (interviewed in Davidson 2005). Having survived the retreat, Japan’s 
invasion of China now transformed the standing of the CCP. The Kuomintang ended the 
Civil War and restored the CCP to the status of anti-colonial allies. Once it was defeated 
by Japan in 1938 and Chiang moved his wartime capital to Chongqing, the nationalists 
could no longer claim any overwhelming military superiority over the CCP. The new 
united front may have had only a nominal character, but, crucially, it presupposed, in 
ideological terms, a relationship of equivalence between the two sides in far more 
explicit terms than the 1920s. Moreover, the war had a transformative effect on the 
consciousness of the CCP’s core social base: the peasantry that appeared to perfectly 
verify Mao’s orientation. The ‘war totally destroyed the traditional social order and 
sensitized the Chinese peasantry to a new spectrum of possible associations, identities 
and purposes’ foremost amongst which was ‘China’ itself (Johnson 1962, 5).  Maoism 
suddenly appeared to have history on its side. The peasant war strategy could connect to 
this new consciousness with its organic nationalist ethos and programme of agrarian 
social revolution. 
Utopian is not a word that should be used lightly, implying as it does structural 
impossibility, but the Japanese project, nonetheless, had this character. To say that the 
invasion of China ‘saved Maoism’ is to make a strong but justified claim: the Japanese 
were fighting an unwinnable war. Defeat, and the disintegration that Japan left behind, 
passed power to the CCP. To understand why the CCP won out, the admiration they 
enjoyed in a fiercely nationalistic polity once they took power, and the colossal task of 
post-war reconstruction, let us briefly outline the impact of Japan’s imperial policy. 
Amongst the zealously imperialist Japanese military elite there was actually an 
ideological hostility to capitalism (Coble 2003, 35). These layers saw the colonial 
enterprise in China and Manchuria as a means not only of purifying these polities of 
evil, but also renewing the moral fibre of the Japanese race (ibid). Finance capital, it 
was thought, formed part of this decay and should therefore be excluded from the 
economic management of the colonies (ibid). Inevitably reality ‘intervened’ into these 
ideological discourses and concrete Japanese policy represented compromises between 
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bureaucratic interests in the state, ideological aspirations for the future, and the interests 
of business elites. But across all of these groups and outlooks, there was a common 
cultural assumption that colonial empire building was a prerequisite for national wealth 
and power. Japan’s elite was hardly unusual in approaching the economic crisis of the 
1930s in this way. Modern capitalist development had integrated the colonial empires 
into an inter-dependent system, but, perversely, ruling elites tended to see the dash for 
colonial annexation to secure market privileges as the answer to the Great Depression. 
Japan’s dystopian vision of East Asia illustrated this destructive psychosis. From 1935 
to 1939 the United States was Japan’s largest trading partner with the balance firmly in 
favour of the former (indeed, the US claimed a quarter of all Japanese imports) (Beasley 
1987, 211). Japan saw this not as the reality of economic inter-dependence, but as a 
weakness that empire could end. The high costs of modern warfare, however, created a 
logic of escalation; more punitive privileges for Japanese industry in the colonies 
weakened demand for exports; the military hunger for raw materials led to new 
demands for expansion to meet these needs; all the while making a backlash from rivals 
more likely.28 A cabinet paper of 12 December 1941, i.e. shortly after the bombing of 
Pearl Harbour and prior to their conquest of most of S.E. Asia, outlined the vision with 
admirable forthrightness:  
… To fulfil the demand for resources vital to the prosecution of the present war, 
to establish at the same time an autarkic Greater East Asian Co-prosperity 
Sphere, and to accelerate the strengthening of the economic power of the 
Empire’ (cited in Beasley 1987, 245).   
 
Japan’s ruling elite took the course of colonial emulation having seen Britain 
successfully conquer just under one fifth of the world’s population and nearly a quarter 
of its total land mass. Why could Japan not carve out a much more modest empire for 
itself in Asia? One answer is that Japan might well have achieved exactly this had its 
rulers, driven forward by a military elite with a suicidal belief in their own invincibility, 
not invaded China in 1937 and instead consolidated their gains in Manchuria, Taiwan 
and Korea. However, although Japan’s economic remedies were flawed, the nation’s 
economic problems were nonetheless real and gave the semblance of ‘necessity’ to their 
colonial actions. Responding to the Great Depression with colonial conquest appeared 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28 An American oil embargo on 1st August 1941, which cut off Japan’s main supply line, created a spiral 
of events resulting in war. Diplomatic avenues broke down on the 1st December and six days later Pearl 
Harbour was bombed (Beasley 1987, 232). It may well have been the least surprising ‘surprise attack’ in 
modern world history. 
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eminently logical given the culturally conditioned assumptions that had underpinned 
international politics since the ‘Scramble for Africa’. It was the same cultural logic that 
led Chiang, from a position of extraordinary weakness, to imagine China’s Destiny 
lying in the domination of Asia, dreaming in essence of the same colonial future. 
Japan’s attempt to carve out a regional empire equally illustrated, however, the 
gargantuan costs of colonialism in new conditions of modern production. Britain had 
imposed its authority on a world that was not capitalist and whose communities, in their 
great variety, did not imagine themselves as nations with a shared future. Whereas the 
British humiliated Imperial China in the First Opium War with a mere 19,000 troops 
(Martin 1847, 81 – 82), Japan set out to conquer an altogether different world. Decades 
of military accumulation and the consolidation of a fiercely patriotic national 
imagination had made even enfeebled China a powerful enemy. Indeed, Japan was 
shocked by the scale and ferocity of China’s resistance to its colonisation. At the Battle 
of Shanghai, at the time the bloodiest conflict the world had seen since the First World 
War, the Japanese faced seventy-two divisions totalling 500,000 soldiers (Coble 2003, 
11). They lost 50,000 soldiers, a quarter of their expeditionary force, by the end of 1937 
alone (ibid). China was now a national entity – a fact that made for a striking contrast to 
the First Sino-Japanese war (p.88) – and this transformation in social consciousness 
dramatically altered the ability, and inclination, of the people to resist Japanese colonial 
subjugation. All of which underlines the overall significance of the sequential character 
of combined capitalist development. Different polities aspiring to ‘catch up’ with the 
more advanced can draw on their technical achievements and do so rapidly, but the sum 
total of this interaction amongst states introduces changes in the overall character of the 
system. In this context, they can remain wedded to a cultural model of development that 
cannot be achieved in the new global environment they helped to create. And it was this 
dynamic that one can see play out in the epochal crisis of the colonial capitalist order in 
the inter-war years. Japanese imperial advance could not be reconciled with new 
material realities. 
China bore witness to the destructive costs of this degenerate utopia. Having 
conquered the country’s economic heartland by 1938, the Japanese plundered the 
economy. Under the slogan, ‘using the war to sustain the war’, the military attempted to 
render the occupation self-sufficient; factories were looted, equipment was seized for 
scrap iron, and the army was fed off Chinese land (Coble 2003, 38). Needless to say, 
these policies did immense damage to an economy already reeling from the war. 
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China’s small industrial sector had been devastated, as one estimate from 1943 put it, 
‘within the greater Shanghai area (including the foreign concessions) 52 per cent of 
industry was destroyed, in Nanjing, 80 per cent was lost, in Wuxi 64 per cent, and in 
Hangzhou only 28 per cent’ (Coble 2003, 13). In Shanghai alone, the Japanese are 
thought to have looted 10,000 tons of iron and steel commodities worth $1.5 million 
and 7 million yuan of copper coins were exported in the first twelve months of the 
occupation (Coble 2003, 15). The Japanese took near-total control of strategic industrial 
sectors, such as mining, electrical power, and smelting, and even in textiles over 50 per 
cent of cotton textile spindles in central China were requisitioned (Coble 2003, 42). The 
military also imposed price controls and took full control of internal trade, allowing it to 
procure food stuffs at below market prices through force and sell at inflated prices in the 
cities (Coble 2003, 40 – 41). Even in the short term these measures were counter-
productive as they drove Chinese investors out of the market. The occupiers looked for 
collaborators amongst China’s capitalists but they were obviously reluctant. This was 
not just a patriotic reaction, but reflected the fact Japan could not provide plausible 
security for even short-term investments. Meanwhile, in Japan itself, military 
accumulation burdened the economy with vast debts and drained capital away from the 
production into military waste. It is hard to imagine a more comprehensive attempt at 
pan-Asian self-sufficiency and insofar as it failed abysmally it confirmed the utopian 
character of the whole enterprise. Once added to the overall destructive character of the 
war itself, these policies also destroyed the Chinese industrial working class, and thus 
provided a material, and not just ideological, source of strength for the Maoist project.  
Despite a formal agreement between the CCP and the Kuomintang signed in 
October 1945 it was apparent to all that civil war would strike the moment Japan 
withdrew. Both parties engaged this ‘make-believe’ of peace so as not to be seen as 
responsible for plunging China into yet another conflict (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 
329). War soon transpired and political economics, not grand military strategy, arguably 
determined the outcome of the conflict. If Japanese imperial strategy can be understood 
as a mental conception of the world that could not align with its living reality, then the 
same can be said of the Kuomintang’s post-war policy. The sense of what to do and 
how to achieve it was badly out of kilter with the material realities of the situation. It 
should be recalled that Chiang’s actions were framed by China’s Destiny that attached 
great emphasis to the aesthetic, i.e. emotion-inducing symbolism, of Chinese power. His 
forces outnumbered the communists by two-to-one at the close of the war, but rather 
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than concentrate them where they were strongest in the south, Chiang retook the capital 
cities in order to claim the mantle of national unity, even if his forces then found 
themselves besieged (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 331). This forced his army to defend 
the north eastern cities without securing control of the communist controlled north 
(ibid). This choice, however, was a feature of an anterior set of political and economic 
failures. The Kuomintang was still scarred politically by their appeasement policy 
towards Japan in the 1930s. When the CCP advanced in the north, Chiang actually 
appealed to the Japanese forces not to surrender to them and carry on fighting until the 
Kuomintang could relieve their positions (ibid). Once again the Kuomintang was seen 
to prioritise anti-communism over national salvation. Chiang’s reaction to the peace 
movement campaigning for an end to the civil war in urban areas, which represented a 
sincere liberal body of opinion, was to heavily repress their demonstrations (ibid). More 
seriously still, the retaken cities soon experienced a politically induced economic 
catastrophe. The Kuomintang elite took control of the rentier economy left by the 
Japanese, used it for their own embezzlement and actually increased the burden of 
taxation and requisition (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 332). To complete this abysmal 
record, the Kuomintang introduced a so-called ‘currency reform’ in 1948 that saw 
prices increase by a multiple of 85,000 in six months (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 
334).  Kuomintang post-war governance was such a total failure that it seems likely that 
China would have disintegrated into warlordism again had it not been for the Maoists. 
China’s combined development created material conditions pushing the Maoists 
to power: (i) the general crisis of colonial capitalism was expressed in Asia with the 
utopian project of Japanese imperialism; (ii) the Kuomintang politically, economically 
and militarily failed to address the competitive ‘whip of necessity’ thrown down by 
Japan; (iii) they did not expand the size of the working class that was then decimated by 
the war itself; and (iv) their policies were characterised by a desire for self-preservation, 
rentier capitalist interests, and anti-communism, none of which was able to foster a 
sense that they were national saviours. In contrast to this litany of failures, CCP policy 
was driven by a sense of practicality. Even the agrarian revolution against landlords – 
who were often wealthy peasants rather than large monied capitalist interests – was 
undertaken cautiously, once a base had been consolidated in the area and trust 
accumulated with locals. An enlightened form of despotism, which for the peasants was 
a clear improvement on warlordism, imbued the Red Bases. Mao’s strategy for CCP 
controlled territories above all else emphasised order, welfare and security:  
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… First of all, local peace and order; second, an army of friendly troops who 
helped in peasant life, harvesting crops when necessary and fraternizing with the 
villagers; third, a recruitment of local activists who might very well be found at 
the upper level of the poor peasantry, people of ability who felt frustrated by 
circumstance; fourth, a program for economic betterment partly through 
improved crops but mainly through agricultural cooperation in the form of 
mutual aid, organized transport, and production of consumer goods in 
cooperatives (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 318). 
 
One can see, then, why, first in Northern China during the Japanese occupation, then 
moving to the North East, the peasants responded energetically to the Maoists’ call for 
social revolution and an end to the old order. Given the repeated failure of ruling elites 
to industrialise China, the peasant war strategy offered an alternative route to power. 
Mao also had genuine abilities as a guerrilla leader, tactician and agitator, and for the 
CCP to survive the extermination campaign at all was a remarkable success. Mao’s 
conquest of power was ultimately, however, conditional on the global crisis. The full-
scale Japanese invasion in 1937 allowed the CCP to become identified with the project 
of national salvation that was so ingrained in the collective psyche of the polity. In lieu 
of this intensification of colonial conflict in the world order, the ‘from the country to the 
cities’ approach would have ended in failure, or at least been permanently confined to 
the interior. The formation of the PRC in 1949 consummated the project of national 
emancipation, which Chinese subjects had long yearned for, and Mao’s persona became 
the icon of the fatherland that had now achieved minzu-unity. Nationalism was the 
consistent thread of CCP policy in power and the goal of strengthening China was 
always fundamental. It is difficult to exaggerate the extent of the legitimacy that the 
CCP could garner from the mantle of having put an end to the appalling suffering of the 
Chinese people at the hands of imperialism. Given this history and the nationalism that 
the Maoists had promoted on their rise to power, there was never any question that they 
would seek to make China a strong and powerful country. More ambiguous, however, 
was the position of China’s classes in the new economic order that they would establish. 
In the final section of this chapter, I analyse the contradictory shifts in policy in the 
search for a ‘Chinese road’ to development. Material constraints, particularly the 
unviability of bureaucratic command planning, coupled with failed attempts, rooted in 
messianic nationalist discourse, to indigenise the economic model would ultimately 
result in the triumph of a more pragmatic nationalism; one taking ‘the capitalist road’ to 
a powerful nation-state.  
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5.7 In search of national salvation and global power: the nature of Maoism in power 
China’s revolution formed but one moment in a general crisis of colonial rule. The 
Second World War hastened this overall process, and in China’s case proved decisive in 
determining the form of its revolutionary rupture, but the overall pattern reflected the 
exhaustion of the colonial capitalist order. Soviet influence was able to penetrate this 
uneven and combined breakdown of the old world:  
Soviet expansion took place entirely in the underdeveloped world in the 
aftermath of decolonization. For the creation of a hundred-odd new states over a 
thirty-year period did not simply increase the mathematical complexity of power 
balancing. It also generalized across whole regions of the globe, and in a 
hundred new ways, the classic conditions of combined development: 
independent states locked into the dynamic imperatives of development by their 
incorporation into the world market and states system, but based internally on 
unstable amalgams of capitalist and non-capitalist society, and tending towards 
more and more authoritarian political forms. Decolonization replaced a world of 
unsustainable European empires with a states system full of potential mini-
Czarisms, any of which might explode and drag other similar states down its 
new path of combined development (Rosenberg 1996, 12). 
 
China’s ‘explosion’ saw power fall into the hands of Mao’s peasant army. The CCP 
were suddenly free to reshape the national imagination; providing it with the 
institutional and political cohesion its people had long desired. The Chinese Revolution 
could not reasonably be termed a mini Tsarism, for its vast scale exceeded all previous 
revolutions in human history, but it was nonetheless similarly rooted in the long crisis 
of absolutism that capitalist development had created. China’s post-tributary colonial 
capitalist economy fostered the pattern of disintegration, which, in turn, morphed into 
warlordism, thereby creating the sociological basis for the Maoist revolution that was 
‘detonated’ by the Japanese war. None of this was a merely ‘indigenous’ process. 
Moreover, how the CCP institutionally reshaped the polity’s political economy reflected 
their melange of nationalist and Stalinist ideology.   
This revolutionary process exemplified, in its own unique and complex terms, 
the general characteristics of the crisis of colonial capitalism I outlined earlier: the 
proliferation of new national imaginations, the challenge of modernisation in extremely 
underdeveloped societies, and the logic of substitutionism that became written into the 
DNA of the communist movement with the rise of Stalinism. This last point, the 
despotic logic of substitutionism, indicates how the tragedy of Russian socialism had 
altered, in ways that were quite fundamental, the ideological contours of future 
revolutions. For whereas in the Soviet Union authoritarianism emerged in a process of 
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decay, in China, and the other states where the communists took power, one-party 
despotism was anticipated and prepared for in advance. Indeed, in several respects, the 
Chinese appeared to be emulating the Russians ‘in reverse’ by skipping the earlier, but 
brief, stage of democratic idealism seen after 1917. Stalin turned to Great Russian 
chauvinism only tentatively after Lenin’s death, but Chinese communism was openly 
nationalist long before its seizure of power. In Russia, the peasant war had occurred 
after the revolution that seized hold of the cities; in China the reverse was true. Stalin 
only attempted rural collectivisation and industrialisation eleven years after the 
revolution, whereas Mao, encouraged by Soviet aid, turned to this model more quickly 
in 1952. And, most of all, Mao’s personal power had effectively ‘substituted’ for the 
party leadership after the Long March and was actually constitutional by the time of the 
revolution. Stalin, in contrast, had only achieved this by cultivating a police state to first 
isolate, and then exterminate, his rivals from 1923 to 1936. These points of comparison 
each illustrate how the Russian experience offered a series of ideological precedents 
that the CCP could either draw on or reject, and, equally, how the existence of the 
Soviet state shaped the world order, providing incentives and securities in return for the 
PRC’s filial piety.  
China, like the other social revolutions in Cuba, Vietnam, and elsewhere, thus 
skipped an ideological stage by applying the Stalinist model pioneered in the Soviet 
Union directly to its own conditions. Insofar as the amalgam they created assimilated 
communism to nationalism, it underlined the overall complementary character of 
Stalinist ideology to the new national imaginations. Three elements of the emerging 
sociological organism are crucial to explaining why the CCP would turn to the use of 
markets in the late 1970s. Firstly, there was the search, motivated by the desire for 
national salvation, for a development strategy that could make China a great and 
independent nation. And the ensuing split with the Soviet Union illustrated the 
contradictions of Stalinist nationalism. Secondly, there is the specific way in which the 
CCP appropriated the model of the substitutionist, Stalinist party. In this adaptation, 
Mao was invested with supreme authority over, above, and in potential opposition to, 
the bureaucracy. The latter formed below him within the party-state, and he did not treat 
his grip on power as conditional on the support of the security apparatus in the manner 
that Stalin did. Thirdly, there were the inherent problems of bureaucratic command 
planning that made it an ultimately unsuitable vehicle for the nationalist project. Each of 
the shifts in economic policy after 1949 reflected the contradictory tension between 
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these three elements. The turn to Soviet-style rapid industrialisation, focusing on heavy 
industry, created a sclerotic, unsustainable bureaucracy analogous to the Soviet Union; 
the search for a Chinese road to development, though in part a potentially rational 
recognition of the country’s concrete development problems, became bound up with the 
millenarian desires of Mao and brought the nationalist antagonisms with the Soviet 
Union to the surface; and the economic catastrophe of the Great Leap Forward that 
followed from this turn created a backlash amongst critics that saw Mao utilise his 
supreme political authority to attack the bureaucracy below him. After Mao’s death a 
pragmatic nationalism was allowed to assert itself that valued order, stability and 
gradualism, but was also prepared to unleash capitalist tendencies within the polity if 
they would further the overall goal of national greatness. I develop this argument 
through three steps in this last section: exploring the class structure of the economy 
from 1949 to 1979, the specific nature of Mao’s substitutionism, and the unbroken 
thread of Chinese nationalism.  
To begin the analysis of the PRC’s class structure it is useful to recall that 
Trotsky had categorically ruled out the possibility that the Maoists could carry through a 
social revolution against capital in lieu of an active proletariat. In essence, ‘he feared 
that Maoism, despite its communist origin, might become so completely assimilated 
with the peasantry as to become nothing buts its mouthpiece’ (Deutscher 1984a, 198). 
In doing so, Trotsky assumed an instrumental relationship between the peasantry and 
the CCP that made the latter little more than the vehicle for the class interests of the 
former. However, state, or ‘quasi-state’, power has, on many occasions in history, 
shown its capacity to seemingly rise above class antagonism and impose by force a 
particular social order on an entire people. Marx termed this ‘Bonapartism’ and Trotsky 
had once called it ‘substitutionism’. The CCP assumed this posture in a Stalinist 
manner, i.e., claimed a monopoly on political and economic power for the party 
leadership, prior to the revolution, ‘and Mao and his followers did this without any of 
the scruples, compunction and crises de conscience that had troubled Lenin’s party’ 
(Deutscher 1984a, 199). Despite giving little emphasis to Mao’s overtly nationalist 
worldview, Deutscher recognised that above all else the new regime ‘was determined to 
turn China into an integrated and modern nation’ (Deutscher 1984a, 200). In the Red 
Bases the CCP replaced the old order with their own enlightened despotism, which 
dispossessed the landlords and fused political and economic power into the hands of a 
quasi-state. From 1949 to 1952 they moved gradually, but their course affirmed the 
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logic of substitutionism of the Stalinist party and ultimately centralised all levers of 
economic and political power into their own hands. This naturally poses a question of 
how exactly to classify the class nature of the regime that they proceeded to establish. 
Deutscher’s argument for Mao as a ‘Trotskyist Jourdain’ rests on the view that the 
social order the CCP constructed, while not being fully socialist, represented ‘a socio-
economic framework indispensable for socialism’ (Deutscher 1984a, 201). Despite the 
absence of any democratic control by the subaltern classes in the one-party system the 
Stalinist states were seen as creating a basis for socialism to be built upon in the future, 
rather than entirely rejected. Trotsky similarly argued that the bureaucracy within the 
state was ‘not an independent class but an excrescence upon the proletariat’ within a 
workers’ state (Trotsky 1934a, 24). Despite the working class having no control over 
any aspect of society, from the factory floor to the high echelons of state power, they 
were held to be a ruling class due to the purely formal, i.e., ‘legal’ existence of 
collective ownership (ibid). China’s experience provides but one of many illustrations 
of the wholly flawed nature of this claim: the party-elite ruled the Stalinist system. 
Trotsky’s argument arguably related to the positions he took in the Soviet Union 
in 1919 and 1920 that might be summarised as underscoring his incomplete break with 
substitutionism. For in the Soviet Union, and the states that adopted political and 
economic models that were carefully modelled on its regime, the working class had not 
succeeded in developing a democratically planned economy that was then ‘usurped’ by 
a bureaucratic elite (Flewers forthcoming). It was, in fact, the party-state that forced 
through rapid industrial modernisation and this consolidated the existence of an elite 
that derived privileges from their bureaucratic control of the economic structure. No 
stage of this process involved working class control over production and this renders the 
formal socialisation of property, on which Trotsky and Deutscher’s position hinges, 
merely nominal vis-à-vis the actual, substantive control of the economy by the 
unaccountable party-state elite. To say otherwise involves, ‘the wrenching apart of the 
economic infrastructure from the political superstructure, as if there is no essential 
interrelationship between them in a Stalinist society’ (ibid). Stalinist economies were 
not, however, capitalist, but organised according to ‘top-down targets, commands and 
allocations’ that ‘specifically excluded the involvement of the working class other than 
purely as subordinates’ (ibid). The bureaucratic elite was therefore an ‘indispensable 
part’ of the ‘socio-economic formation, as it created it, dominated it and managed it on 
a day-to-day basis to the exclusion of all other social strata’ (ibid). In The Revolution 
   
 
216	  
Betrayed, Trotsky did recognise many of the inherent problems that blighted the 
Stalinist economies, emphasising how the narrow self-interests of the managerial 
bureaucracy rendered the system sclerotic and incapable of dynamic renewal (Trotsky 
1936). He was right to do so, for these states’ problems were perennial: including, for 
example, disproportions between sectors, a lack of effective cross-sectorial co-
ordination, ‘falsified statistics, poor product quality resulting in vast quantities of 
defective goods, poor labour discipline, lack of skills, lack of innovation, 
discouragement of initiative, and poor maintenance and storekeeping’ (Flewers 
forthcoming). Despite these fundamental failings for the post-colonial states that took 
‘the Soviet road’, it seemed to provide a suitable structure for underdeveloped societies 
to rapidly modernise: for coercive one-party rule made it easier to appropriate peasant 
surpluses to fund industrial growth. In this extensive phase of development, the 
system’s congenital malfunctions were less apparent. However, in the intensive phase, 
which required technical sophistication to modify and refine output, they were 
particularly pronounced. Even during the prestigious phase of 1930s industrialisation, 
Stalin appointed Gosplan super-commanders who were granted sweeping powers to 
push forward major projects, which, in effect, tacitly acknowledged the chronic inertia 
of the bureaucracy (Main and Hughes 2012, 516). In contrast, capitalist markets require 
the continual modification and refinement of production to boost efficiency, a process 
Marx and Engels referred to as the ‘constant revolutionising of production’ (Marx and 
Engels 2008, 12). No such force existed in the Stalinist states and over time they 
exhibited extreme levels of stagnation that made them ultimately unviable (Titkin 
1992). The competitive pressures of the wider system were experienced in more diffuse 
cultural and geopolitical forms, owing to the autarkic character of these economies, but 
they were real nonetheless. Conceived as national projects in a world characterised by 
political multiplicity, the drive for geostrategic power tended to be expressed in the 
Soviet Union in military terms, but its people also developed desires and aspirations 
based on their apprehension of the wider world. These systems of political 
authoritarianism and economic autarky could not respond to this global confluence of 
pressure, influence and aspiration. Soviet collapse was, thus, inevitable given this 
correlation of ‘combined’ historical forces in the international order.  
China’s history confirms the ephemerality of bureaucratic command economies. 
However, the CCP shifted to a market based development strategy ‘early’, i.e. when the 
planning structure was still economically viable. The collapsing economy of the 
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Brezhnev era in the Soviet Union, in contrast, exhibited extreme exhaustion. To explain 
the motivation of CCP leaders and, to a certain degree, their historical foresight, one has 
to locate the turn within the overarching nationalist agenda – the search for a Chinese 
road to development – that was a continuous feature of Maoism in power. The Chinese 
communists inherited an economy in a state of hyperinflation; its ‘private sector’ 
consisted of monied-capitalists and landlords subjecting the people to the torture of 
rentier exploitation. It should be recalled that neither the Japanese nor the Kuomintang 
pursued expansive industrial policies; both had brought whole swathes of the economy 
under the auspices of the state, but used the state as a vehicle for rentier practices rather 
than industrial investment. This meant the economy was already, to a considerable 
degree, ‘state-dominated’ and the changes the CCP introduced specifically targeted the 
rentier elite profiting from the hyperinflation. They took over the banking sector and 
monopolised state control of credit; established a state monopoly on internal trade on all 
major commodities; and introduced an emergency system for paying personnel in 
‘market-basket’ terms (so much grain, so much oil, etc.) rather than in cash (Fairbank 
and Goldman 2006, 348). This level of state intervention into the economy was really 
quite tentative from a communist standpoint, especially in comparison to the huge 
levels seen under ‘War Communism’ in the Soviet Union. Indeed, the CCP’s ‘Common 
Programme’ of 1949 emphasised gradualism and committed the new government to 
protect the private property rights of the patriotic bourgeoisie and middle class:  
The People's Republic of China… must confiscate bureaucratic capital and put it 
into the possession of the people's state. It must systematically transform the 
feudal and semi-feudal land ownership system into a system of peasant land 
ownership; it must protect the public property of the state and of the 
cooperatives and must protect the economic interests and private property of 
workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. It must 
develop the people's economy of New Democracy and steadily transform the 
country from an agricultural into an industrial one (CPPCC 1949). 
 
Such statements reflected the ‘popular front’ aspect of Maoism, but they were also very 
similar to the reassurances to the private sector that Lenin had made during the retreat 
into NEP in Russia.29 By monopolising credit and banking services and taking hold of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29 Indeed, Lenin freely admitted that his policy would bring into being a state-capitalist economy: ‘The 
New Economic Policy means substituting a tax for the requisitioning of food; it means reverting to 
capitalism to a considerable extent—to what extent we do not know. Concessions to foreign capitalists 
(true, only very few have been accepted, especially when compared with the number we have offered) 
and leasing enterprises to private capitalists definitely mean restoring capitalism, and this is part and 
parcel of the New Economic Policy; for the abolition of the surplus-food appropriation system means 
allowing the peasants to trade freely in their surplus agricultural produce, in whatever is left over after the 
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the already state-dominated productive economy, the CCP gained control of the 
commanding heights of a state-capitalist economy. Mao and the CCP leadership 
predicted that it would take three years of economic recovery along these lines, and the 
course of economic development after 1949 correlated closely with this anticipation 
(Teiwes 1987, 69). There was plainly a class tension lodged within this initial phase, 
just as there had been in NEP era Russia, between the desire for a centralised 
programme of state reconstruction and the concessions granted to the private sector 
(ibid). However, these were mitigated by the type of economy that the CCP had 
inherited: private capital was extremely weak and their agrarian and financial reforms 
targeting ‘bureaucratic capitalism’ hit the rentier ruling class. In effect, this popular 
front was largely an appeal to the middle classes of urban areas. It succeeded in 
bringing inflation down to the manageable level of 15 per cent per annum, and thus 
cohered the alliance, for ‘this was literally the salvation of the salaried class’ (Fairbank 
and Goldman 2006, 348). Taken together with the achievement of peace, order and 
unification, the prestige of the CCP rose enormously:  
The initial phase of public sentiment… was one of euphoria, based on growing 
confidence in the CCP. Here was a conquering army of country boys who were 
strictly self-disciplined, polite, and helpful, at the opposite pole from the looting 
and raping warlord troops and even the departing Nationalists. Here was a 
dedicated government that really cleaned things up—not only the drains and 
streets but also the beggars, prostitutes, and petty criminals, all of whom were 
rounded up for reconditioning. Here was a new China one could be proud of, 
one that controlled inflation, abolished foreign privileges, stamped out opium 
smoking and corruption generally, and brought the citizenry into a multitude of 
sociable activities to repair public works, spread literacy, control disease, 
fraternize with the menial class, and study the New Democracy and Mao Zedong 
Thought (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 348 – 349). 
 
CCP rule tapped into the desire of the Chinese people for national salvation. For the 
first time since its formation in the late nineteenth century, China’s national imagination 
had a state that appeared to have satisfied its desire for an end to colonial humiliation. 
Many young and ambitious idealists flocked into the ranks of the CCP, only as time 
passed discovering ‘that the Promised Land was based on systematic control and 
manipulation’ (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 349). This initial adulation was real, 
nonetheless, and post-war CCP policy was characterised by the expediency and 
pragmatism on the road to a strong China that the party would turn back to after the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
tax is collected—and the tax~ takes only a small share of that produce. The peasants constitute a huge 
section of our population and of our entire economy, and that is why capitalism must grow out of this soil 
of free trading’ (Lenin 1921, emphasis added).  
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trauma of the Cultural Revolution. Not only were petty capitalists appeased but a huge 
layer of Kuomintang officials were incorporated into the new state, totalling some 2 
million (Teiwes 1987, 72). They continued to receive their salaries and undertake their 
administrative work – a policy that was key to order and stability in urban areas where 
the CCP had no track record of governance (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 348). CCP 
membership increased from 2.8 million to 5.8 million between 1949 and 1950 (Teiwes 
1987, 71 – 72). In part this reflected the public mood, but it also underlined how, as a 
bureaucracy came into being, party membership played a new role; it became a conduit 
into the state for the career-orientated. This system had already taken shape in ‘the 
liberated areas’, which, on the eve of the final stages of the Civil War, accounted for 
around a quarter of China’s entire population, and were governed with clearly defined 
‘career lines with cadres versed in finance, commerce, and education, as well as 
agriculture and military affairs’ (Teiwes 1984, 71). A degree of bureaucratic specialism 
was, of course, inevitable but the new political economy was built on wholly top-down 
lines, creating the same opportunities for nepotism as existed in Stalin’s Russia. 
 
Poster: Celebrating the People's Republic of China's National Day, 1950  
 
This poster was produced for China’s National Day, the 1st October 1950.   
 
A colonial outlook formed a crucial part of this new authoritarianism, for the remit of 
the party was considered absolute over the entire territory of the old Confucian empire. 
Chinese nationalism was, as I have argued, always laced with a colonial element, 
reflecting the racial concept of minzu and the polity’s imperial history. However, the 
communists had initially reacted against this prevalent public mood. Conscious of the 
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chauvinism that use of Han Chinese nationalism entailed, the CCP had once insisted 
upon the right of self-determination of all China’s national minorities (Zhao 2004, 174). 
As late as 1934, admittedly at a moment of great weakness for the party that saw them 
in desperate need of allies in any form, the CCP backed the principle of 
‘unconditionally recognising their rights of national self-determination, namely their 
free right of politically separating from the oppressive nation, the Han, at will’ (cited in 
ibid). In the late 1930s, more ambiguous statements began to predominate. Instead of 
speaking of the Han Chinese as an oppressor nation, Mao would frequently praise their 
heroic struggles across history against foreign domination in line with the concept of 
minzu (see p. 160). However, it was only upon seizing power that they fully reneged on 
their original commitment and announced the abrupt withdrawal of the right of self 
determination (Zhao 2004, 175 – 176). In itself this might not seem significant but it 
was a telling indicator of China’s new nationalism. The CCP had recognised a strong 
territorial dimension to its geostrategic interests. ‘When we say that China has vast 
land, rich resources (di da wu bo) and a huge population (renkou zhongduo)’, argued 
Mao, ‘what that actually means is that Han Chinese nationality has a huge population 
and ethnic minorities and rich resources’ (cited in Zhao 2004, 178). Zhou also made the 
same point but in more overly racialized terms, praising the Han for its cultural 
superiority and calling on the Han people to develop the interior to save the 
‘motherland’ (cited in ibid). This quite conscious embrace of the brutal history of Han 
settlement in the interior underlined the extent to which the notion of minzu-unity had 
been incorporated into the assumptions of the state. One can therefore see the enduring 
impact of the specific forms of nationalism I identified in chapter four, as the CCP in 
power adopted almost identical ideological vernaculars to those that Sun Yat-Sen had 
employed in imagining a future ‘Great Asia’ where Han-Chinese culture would be 
allowed to flower. Propaganda too repeatedly emphasised this. One example can be 
seen in the poster above; produced for China’s national day in 1950 it illustrates the 
country’s new nationalism. Traditional peasant folk performance dominates the street in 
the foreground and the industrial areas are pushed to the background, symbolising the 
intrusion of rural life on the centre of the polity. And, perhaps most significant of all, is 
the image of Sun alongside Mao. Both are idolised as historic figureheads of the 
fatherland, with the implication that the CCP is building a China befitting Sun’s 
nationalist dream.   
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The ‘United Front’ declared at the People’s Consultative Conference differed in 
one important respect from NEP-era Russia. For it granted minority ‘democratic parties’ 
a place in government, and the majority of the new ministries were nominally held by 
non-CCP members (Teiwes 1987, 77 – 78). Mao even engaged in the following polemic 
in mid-1950, in remarks that made for a stark contrast with how he would later justify 
the Great Leap Forward, ‘The view… that it is possible to eliminate capitalism and 
realise socialism at an early date is wrong and does not tally with our national 
conditions’ (cited in Teiwes 1987, 77). But these policies towards Chinese small 
capitalists were all predicated on the absolute principle of one-party communist rule that 
was secured by the armed power of the PLA. Given the extraordinary weakness of 
industrial capitalism in China, state intervention backed by a credit monopoly squeezed 
out and subordinated the private sector to the dictates of the ruling party even in this 
early phase of reconstruction. Prior to the establishment of a planning commission on 
Soviet lines, in 1952, the state dominated the economy: it controlled 70 to 80 per cent of 
heavy industry, 40 per cent of light industry; its cooperatives and trading agency 
accounted for 50 per cent of business turnover; and government lending to the 
remaining private sector and establishment joint operations had left it firmly 
subordinated (Teiwes 1987, 93 – 94). Between 1952 and 1955 the CCP moved 
decisively towards a command economy: the planning ministry was established in 1952, 
one-party rule was formalised with a new constitution in 1954, the commencement of 
socialist reconstruction and the end of New Democracy was declared, and the First Five 
Year Plan adopted in 1955, although it covered the period from 1953 to 1957. Soviet 
emulation was crucial to this new turn in policy. The constitution was closely modelled 
on the Soviet Union’s and formally centralised power into the hands of the party elite. 
Economic plans were drafted with the assistance of Soviet advisors; a typically Stalinist 
model was adopted with ‘high rates of reinvestment, emphasis on capital-intensive high 
technology projects, agriculture as a major source of funds for industrial growth, and 
priority investment in heavy industry’ (Teiwes 1987, 96). The Korean War encouraged 
this shift by confirming China’s position within the Eastern bloc and imbued the CCP 
with great confidence. For the first time in modern history, a united Chinese state had 
fought one of the world’s great powers to a standstill, and the wave of patriotic 
enthusiasm for the elite, in a fervently nationalistic polity, was hardly surprising. An 
economic strategy modelled on the Soviet road also provided technical and scientific 
expertise, at a time when no such help would be forthcoming from the major capitalist 
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states. This was the peak time for the discourse of Soviet emulation, encapsulated by 
Mao’s statement, ‘There must be a great nationwide upsurge of learning from the Soviet 
Union to build our country’ (cited in Teiwes 1987, 96). However, even at a time of 
Soviet friendship, Mao’s remark, ‘our country’, underlines the nationalist ethos of his 
regime. These were ties between two sovereign regimes, with separate ruling cliques, 
that each jealously guarded the basis of their own power in the nation-state. 
In its initial phase, the path of Soviet emulation appeared profitable for China. 
The First Five Year Plan was largely a success. National income grew on average by 8.9 
per cent per annum, which was an improvement on Kuomintang era and also compared 
favourably to other post-colonial economies (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 358). China, 
however, became heavily dependent on Soviet assistance with half of industrial 
investment ploughed into 156 Soviet-backed projects in heavy industry (Fairbank and 
Goldman 2006, 359). This came at a cost as the aid came in the form of loans at the rate 
of 60 million yuan a year, which ultimately had to be repaid (ibid). Copying the Soviet 
model so directly gave rise to similar problems to those that blighted Stalin’s industrial 
drive: funds for investment in heavy industry had be redistributed from rural surpluses 
and, unless agriculture was made more productive, this meant deepening rural 
exploitation. The CCP collectivised agriculture, moving speedily from cooperatives to 
full-scale ‘communes’ between 1952 and 1958. This crudely paralleled the Soviet 
industrial drive post-1928 that, by forcing the peasantry into collective farms, gave the 
state almost total control of rural surpluses. However, China’s economy was much less 
developed in 1952 than the Soviet Union had been in 1928 and its rural life was much 
more impoverished. While vast amounts of capital were invested in heavy industry, 
rural collectivisation failed to increase production of grain and other farm products. 
Given the level of rural underdevelopment and the preponderance of the sector in the 
economy, this was a considerable problem. All that could be said for the Chinese 
attempt is that it achieved a dramatic transformation in peasant life without the 
bloodbath of forced collectivisation in the Soviet Union. In part, this reflected the 
CCP’s astuteness and its experience of work amongst the peasantry, but it was also a 
feature of the pervasiveness of rural poverty. Land redistribution to this relatively 
egalitarian peasant class had already dispossessed its richer layer between 1949 and 
1952, and, there was, therefore, little in the way of a Chinese equivalent of the kulak 
with economic interests deeply antagonistic to the commune system. Collectivisation 
created an intricate, multi-layered rural bureaucracy to represent the interests of the state 
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as the single, monopolistic landlord and patron (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 356 – 
357). At each administrative tier there existed ample scope for nepotism, corruption and 
false accounting, as these newly created party-elites were not subject to any form of 
democratic control (ibid). These problems were becoming evident towards the end of 
the plan and were recognised by party leaders at the Eighth Congress of the CCP in 
1956 (Solinger 1993, 13 – 26).  
Brought into focus at the end of China’s First Five Year Plan were general 
problems that blighted twentieth century command planning. The issue was how to 
create incentives for the improvement of output by both factory and agrarian managers 
when this layer enjoyed their position of privilege thanks to nepotistic ties to those 
above them. Given that the system was characterised by the centralised top-down 
control of a party-state, this became a question of how to create economic dynamism 
without challenging the monopoly of power enjoyed by the CCP: markets, and not 
democratisation, were therefore seen as the answer. At the Eighth Congress, Vice 
Premier Chen Yun’s proposals were to restrict the role of central dictate and embrace 
‘indirect planning, enterprise autonomy, fluctuating prices, and response to the market’ 
(Solinger 1993, 16). In short, he proposed initial market reforms almost identical to 
those introduced in 1979 and after. The abortive Liberman reforms from 1965 in the 
Soviet Union also made a series of very similar proposals (Pejovich 1969) and the 
comparison between the two cases is instructive (Flewers forthcoming). In Russia, the 
proposals ran up against the nomenklatura, the bureaucracy that stood at the top of the 
stagnant economy. In the mid-1960s, when the economy still had a degree of life in it, 
these reforms may well have replicated the success of China’s capitalist development 
model after 1979 (ibid). In the Soviet Union, the political will was not sufficiently 
strong enough to overcome the obstruction of the bureaucratic elite in the 1960s, but in 
China in the 1950s and in the 1970s its ruling stratum did not represent the same 
obstacle. In the interim period, it was the intervention of Mao that led the CCP to 
attempt a quite different strategy.  
Before considering the origins of Mao’s turn to messianic nationalism and his 
opposition to the pragmatic nationalism behind the market reform proposals of 1956 
and 1979, it is worth emphasising that amongst all parties in this discussion the search 
for a Chinese road was absolutely paramount. Many of China’s leaders could see the 
problems of Soviet command planning and the difficulties presented by a crude 
imposition of them to an overwhelmingly agrarian polity presented. This view was 
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spliced with a concern not to be subordinated to the Soviet Union, and not to be widely 
viewed as if they were. China’s episodic commitment to market reform in 1956 
exemplified this independence of mind. In fact, a close alliance with the Soviet Union 
and a political economy wholly based on emulating its bureaucratic infrastructure only 
enjoyed a momentary hold on Chinese policy. Given the complementary fusion of 
substitutionist authoritarianism with organic nationalism in Stalinist ideology, national 
antagonisms with the Soviet Union were always very likely to flare, and this was made 
all the more so by China’s modern history. After all, the CCP would not have taken 
power had they followed Stalin’s lead, and his belief they would not win the Civil War 
was underlined by the bilateral agreement he signed with the Kuomintang in 1945 
(Heinzig 2004). In the Korean war, China shouldered the substantial military burden, 
committing well over 1 million troops – 152,000 of which were killed (Li 2009, 111). 
Although North Korean losses were greater, it was neither China nor Korea but Stalin 
that took charge of the war effort despite the Soviet Union only committing military 
advisors (Shen 2012). China’s junior status was also indicated by its economic paucity 
that fed into its geostrategic dependence via its lack of nuclear weapons, rendering the 
country implicitly dependent on the Soviet Union in the event of an American nuclear 
attack (Whiting 1987). In short, the country was, in economic and strategic terms, a 
junior partner in the Sino-Soviet alliance. For a nationalist elite that governed the 
world’s largest polity, with a national imagery imbued by its proud imperial history, this 
disparity in its international relations represented a new, if less serious, source of 
‘humiliation’. As such, the rift that opened up in less than a decade after the revolution 
should not have come as a surprise. Several concrete ruptures between the two polities 
emerged in the 1950s. The ‘post-Stalin Thaw’ in American-Soviet relations and 
Khrushchev’s trumpeting of ‘peaceful co-existence’, implied an acceptance of the status 
quo in East Asia, and recognition of the American commitment to Taiwan in the event 
of a PRC invasion (Whiting 1987, 479 – 480). Soviet overtures to India by-passed the 
issue of its border dispute with the PRC that involved armed clashes in 1959 inspired by 
the Indian-backed Tibetan uprising, and spiralled into a border war in 1962 (ibid). China 
pursued an independent foreign policy in the Third World, effectively in competition 
with the Soviet Union, and even extended this into the Eastern Europe by developing a 
close alliance with Albania (ibid). In summary, the Soviet Union and the PRC’s 
national interests aligned till 1958 but departed thereafter. The doctrinal conflict was 
largely instrumental to this process with one important exception. Khrushchev’s de-
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Stalinization speech – and specifically its attacks on Stalin’s ‘cult of personality’ – 
potentially threatened, and certainly undermined, Mao’s own monopoly on power inside 
the PRC.     
These geopolitical tensions within the Eastern bloc hastened the search in China 
for an independent development strategy that was attuned to its own circumstances. A 
split emerged within the CCP but it was largely denied an open, critical expression due 
the assumptions that underpinned political discourse within the party: it was not 
permissible to make even tentative and oblique criticisms of Mao. It was Mao that 
pushed for the Great Leap Forward and then the Cultural Revolution that both drew 
upon the tradition of messianic, millenarian discourses within modern Chinese 
nationalism. This pushed to one side the pragmatic, paternalistic approach of Chen Yun 
and others that backed market reforms in 1956. In other words, this unspoken split was 
between two different forms of Chinese nationalism, both of which had origins in the 
New Culture Movement. In his rise to power, Mao had often urged pragmatism and the 
policies that he supported in power largely reflected this orientation from 1949 to 1957, 
i.e. both the united front announced at the People’s Consultative Conference and to turn 
to Soviet emulation were seen as necessary practical steps to build a strong China. A 
key shift in his political evolution came with the Hundred Flowers campaign in mid-
1957 (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 365 – 367). Mao encouraged the urban intellectuals, 
who had largely and sincerely flocked to the banner of communist China in the 1950s, 
to critically discuss the country’s future under the dictum, ‘Let a hundred flowers bloom 
together, let the hundred schools of thought contend’. These were the strata of 
freethinking, urban intellectuals of the New Culture, which was characterised as much 
by ideological plurality as it was by a common nationalist conviction and ethos. Despite 
being well aware of this critical history, Mao was shocked by the criticism of China’s 
new, stultifying bureaucracy and monolithic culture, which the Hundred Flowers 
campaign inspired. At his behest, the Anti-Rightist Campaign was launched and it 
signified Mao’s turn against the urban intellectual elite, and as such those that were 
identified with the more moderate nationalist tradition (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 
365). This included many educated CCP members that had been encouraged to take 
professional jobs in the Kuomintang held areas back in the 1930s (ibid). From this point 
on, until the end of his life, Mao became vehemently hostile to critical discourse and 
increasingly argued that the intellectuals were a reactionary social class. But the 
trajectory of one individual leader could not explain the carnage that was unleashed in 
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China from the Great Leap Forward through the Cultural Revolution. A sociological 
basis to this new, anti-intellectual movement was needed. Mao appealed to the 
xenophobic and parochial impulses of the vast peasant bureaucracy that the CCP’s 
collectivisation programme had brought into being. He heaped praise on 
fundamentalism over pragmatism, and went on to commit economic mistakes that, if 
they were permitted to speak, the intellectuals cast out by the new turn could have saved 
China from (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 366). This illustrates how Soviet-style 
planning combined with China’s rural paucity to create a social basis in an uneducated 
peasant bureaucracy for Mao’s turn to messianic nationalism. And this socio-economic 
amalgam existed in a reciprocal inter-relation to the ideological and political dimension: 
the ‘imported’ substitutionist model of the party-state that gave Mao absolute authority. 
This concatenation of global and local factors explains why Mao enjoyed the 
power to push for this dramatic change of course within the Chinese party: it reflected 
the particular way that the Chinese communists had appropriated the Stalinist model of 
the substitutionist party. Khrushchev’s attack on Stalin’s ‘cult of personality’ in the 
secret speech was a cause of considerable discomfort for Mao, who had long enjoyed a 
similar enforced adulation. Mao gained absolute power – as opposed to merely personal 
leadership – within the CCP from the Rectification Campaign in 1942 to April 1945 
when ‘Mao Zedong Thought’ was actually enshrined in the party constitution (Schram 
1986, 860 – 861). Somewhat ironically, this appropriated and took to a new extreme the 
Stalinist notion of the substitutionist party pioneered in the Soviet Union, despite Mao 
having risen to this position of supreme power by defeating the pro-Moscow party 
faction. This historical lineage opened up an important contradiction in Mao’s 
relationship with the post-1949 bureaucracy. For whereas Stalin’s leader cult emerged 
through a process of decay within the Soviet state, Mao’s imitation was already in place 
prior to the seizure of power in 1949. Stalin was therefore much more dependent upon a 
security apparatus to impose his absolute authority through the purges. In contrast, 
amongst the CCP leadership it was largely accepted that even implied criticisms of Mao 
were not acceptable. Once the urban intellectual class had raised criticism having been 
encouraged to, this led Mao to a deep distrust of the ‘elite’ bureaucracy, as opposed to 
the vast peasant bureaucracy that had been created through collectivisation. Mao was 
therefore able to use his extraordinary personal authority, which was codified into the 
overtly substitutionist party CCP constitution, to impose a messianic nationalism on the 
Chinese people. The Great Leap Forward, which saw somewhere between 20 to 30 
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million lose their lives through malnutrition and famine, was the first result of Mao’s 
backlash against elite nationalism (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 368 – 378; Lieberthal 
1987, 293 – 359).  
The Great Leap Forward emerged out of a dispute in the CCP, which had seen 
the party initially back market reform, and the primary advocate of this turn, Chen Yun, 
had also proposed extending the same policy to agriculture through a programme of 
market incentives very similar to those which would eventually be adopted in 1979 
(Lieberthal 1987, 300). The Chinese leadership recognised that Soviet industrialisation 
could not be un-problematically reapplied in the Chinese setting due to the sheer depth 
of rural paucity. Per capita income was so low that there was an insufficient agricultural 
surplus to fund industrialisation, making the failure to increase agricultural productivity 
during the First Five Year Plan therefore a severe problem (Lieberthal 1987, 299 – 300). 
Chen Yun’s market-drive approach was brushed aside by Mao, whose alternative 
answer to this conundrum contained several elements: (i) to turn China’s poor capital-
labour ratio into an advantage through the mass mobilisation of unskilled labour, in 
effect to use fanatical appeals for self sacrifice amongst the rural population to boost 
output; (ii) to restrict ‘planning’ to the setting of ambitious goals for economic output 
and encourage ‘innovation’ by any means necessary to meet the targets, in effect 
dismantling the capacity of the central planning apparatus to allocate resources; (iii) to 
decentralise power to local bureaucracies, mobilise the new rural communes for 
industrial output, and encourage them to use traditional methods – resulting in the 
infamous ‘backyard furnaces’ whose steel product was normally worthless; and, in all 
areas, (iv) to disregard the technical norms advocated by the intellectual elite 
(Lieberthal 1987, 299 – 305). It might have been possible to apply some of these ideas 
in a manner that did not result in an economic catastrophe, but the pursuit of absurdly 
adventurist targets in steel production pushed rural labour away from agriculture and 
resulted in one of the twentieth century’s most disastrous human-made famines. In its 
essence, however, and in a cruel irony given the search for an alternative to the Soviet 
road, the Great Leap Forward attenuated and deepened the inherent problems of the 
bureaucratic command economies: systematic falsification of statistics, lack of cross-
sectorial co-ordination and, most of all, gross disproportions between industrial sectors 
(Titkin 1992). This led some writers to argue Stalinist economies exhibited 
‘planlessness’ (Flewers forthcoming; Titkin 1992). Whatever the merits of this as a 
general claim, the Great Leap certainly exhibited just such a complete, planless 
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breakdown in central coordination. A human catastrophe on this scale inevitably led to a 
backlash in the leadership, but the form this took illustrated the specific nature of the 
substitutionism in the CCP. Peng Dehuai denounced the ‘petit bourgeois fanaticism’ of 
the Great Leap and, because this was interpreted as an oblique attack on Mao, was 
promptly sacked – leading, in turn, to the fatal continuation of the policy for another 
year (Lieberthal 1987, 295). Even carefully veiled criticisms of Mao were not permitted. 
This inevitably distorted discourse amongst the CCP, but also, in its own way, 
encouraged Mao’s own paranoia. As positions could not be openly stated, what CCP 
leaders ‘really thought’ was subject to his suspicion. 
The Cultural Revolution formed the next and last cataclysm in this struggle 
between the two souls of Chinese nationalism: one rooted in a messianic philosophy of 
mobilisation that identified Mao’s person with the liberation of the nation, and the other 
drawing on the paternalistic pragmatism that was prepared to utilise market forces in the 
goal to build a strong China. That this distinction was far from mutually exclusive could 
be seen in the Chinese rapprochement with the United States in the early 1970s, which 
Mao supported. This exposes the utopian character of the messianic fanaticism Mao and 
his supporters advocated during the Cultural Revolution, for once the initial hysterical 
mobilisations he unleashed – which saw the masses encouraged to rise up and ‘bombard 
the party headquarters’ – subsided, then a retrenchment into the norms of dictatorial one 
party rule resulted. Some have estimated that 60 per cent of party officials were purged 
and as many as 400,000 people died from maltreatment (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 
387). In this sense, it was reminiscent of Stalin’s purges, but, reflecting the specific 
nature of Mao’s non-bureaucratic despotism, it relied upon popular mobilisation, rather 
than the armed might of the security services. It is understandable given Mao’s power 
that the CCP’s acquiescence to the Cultural Revolution has been explained thus:  
Only if we regard him as a monarch in succession to scores of emperors can we 
imagine why the leadership of the CCP, trained to be loyal, went along with his 
piecemeal assault on and destruction of them (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 
386). 
 
Yet, despite Mao’s authority reigning supreme and his move against the elite 
bureaucracy resembling an emperor bringing a nobility to heal, there was something 
distinctively modern about the Cultural Revolution. Its discourse drew heavily on the 
‘totalistic anti-traditionalism’ (Lin 1979) of the most messianic sections of the New 
Culture Movement, encapsulated by Mao’s encouragement to the masses to eliminate, 
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‘old ideas, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting classes’ (MacFarquhar and 
Schoenhals 2008, 113 – 116). The Cultural Revolution is remarkable for the extent to 
which this struck a chord, and inspired a genuine outpouring of emotion and belief. Its 
paradox lies in how it tapped into a very real hostility with the monolithic bureaucracy 
that the CCP had created, while Mao and the group around him were idolised as 
saviours from it. Its two sides could be seen in different moments of this so-called 
revolutionary process at its peak in 1966 to 1967. One side – the cultish, mass worship 
of Mao as the great idol – was symbolised by eight vast Nuremberg-style rallies in 
Beijing where millions flocked to glimpse a sight of Mao, culminating in a 12 million 
strong gathering on 26 November 1966 (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2008, 106 – 
110). The same cultish, fanaticism could be seen in the destructive offensive on the 
treasures of classical culture; for example, 4,922 of the 6,843 ‘places of cultural of 
historical interest’ in Beijing were destroyed and the Forbidden City was only saved 
thanks to the personal intervention of Zhou Enlai (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2008, 
118 – 119). Mass mobilisation to carry through a dramatic purge of the bureaucracy 
invoking the language of the revolution – but without uprooting the principle of a one-
party, Stalinist state – was the other dimension that took real hold in the summer of 
1967. In its darkest hour the country appeared on the brink of, if not full-scale civil war, 
certainly a complete breakdown of civil order, as a section of the bureaucracy actually 
fought back against the Red Guards in Wuhan, organising a million supporters into an 
impromptu army (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2008, 119 – 214). This was one of 
numerous armed clashes, at the time encouraged by Mao under the slogan ‘arm the left’ 
(ibid, 214 – 216). As the situation grew completely out of control, Mao eventually 
abolished the Red Guards by decree in July 1968 and mobilised the PLA to restore 
order. The price of this dependence on the PLA was that military personnel dominated 
the party that had survived (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 395). If, in its ultimate nature, 
the Cultural Revolution should be understood as, ‘an unprecedented wave of state-
instigated persecution, torture, gang warfare, and mindless violence’ (Fairbank and 
Goldman 2006, 402), against Mao’s opponents within the party, then it follows closely 
the substitutionist logic that led to Stalin’s great purges of 1936. However, in its 
distinctive elements – its use of genuine, as opposed to coerced, mass mobilisation and 
its cultish fanaticism – it was firmly rooted in the messianic discourses of Chinese 
nationalism.  
 
   
 
230	  
5.8 Two souls of Chinese nationalism in the Maoist amalgam  
Deng Xiaoping, the ‘arch-unrepentant capitalist-roader’ (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 
2008, 379) was brought back into the fold by Zhou with Mao’s blessing in 1975, a year 
before the Chairman died. It symbolised a dramatic reversal for the radical wing of the 
party, but the motivation illustrates the overall logic that led the CCP towards capitalist 
market reform. Mao was concerned to curtail the power of the PLA over the party, as 
the Cultural Revolution had left them in control of whole swathes of China, and Deng’s 
return sent the message to the military that ‘a Long March veteran with strong party and 
military credentials’ would guarantee stability (ibid). This appeared to be Mao’s shift 
back to the pragmatism that had motivated the 1956 proposals for market reform. Yet he 
changed course yet again allowing the Cultural Revolution Group to launch the 
‘Criticise Deng No Rehabilitation for Rightist Elements’ campaign, after the Tiananmen 
Incident of 1976 had seen supporters of Deng come onto the streets (Burianek 2009, 
14). Only with Mao’s death could the pragmatic nationalism of the CCP party elite fully 
retake control.   
Understanding the turn to market reform as representing a pragmatist ethos 
within Chinese nationalism accords with the most famous ideological justifications for 
the new turn. Deng’s dictum, ‘It doesn't matter whether it's a white cat or a black, I 
think; a cat that catches mice is a good cat’ (cited in Goodman 2002, 68) became so 
well known precisely because it perfectly encapsulated the philosophical ethos of the 
reform era. It was rooted firmly in the assumption that China must become a strong 
nation and any number of means might be utilised to realise such ends. Its origins, in a 
speech to the Young Communist League in July 1962 (ibid), are also particularly 
telling. At this time, the CCP was searching for a way out from the catastrophe of the 
Great Leap Forward and Deng and others were trenchant in their criticisms of the 
‘leftist’ dash into the commune system. There was continuity here with the positions the 
party had taken in 1956 and the Cultural Revolution (along with the ‘education 
campaigns’ that preceded it) was Mao’s backlash against this oblique criticism from the 
pragmatic nationalists. There was an overriding theme in these positions, one that is not 
captured by the term of abuse in Chinese communism, ‘capitalist roader’, of the need to 
build a strong nation-state. This is what Sollinger aptly calls ‘the statism behind the 
reform effort’: 
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[Reform offered]… a set of tools to be manipulated in the service of a few 
fundamental and overarching statist ends: the modernization, invigoration, and 
enhanced efficiency of the national economy and its continued heightened 
capacity to boost productivity and returns to the central state treasury (Solinger 
1993, 3 – 4). 
 
The nature of political discourse within the CCP that ruled out open statement of 
ideological differences, reflecting the disguised nature of the intra-bureaucratic struggle 
within the Stalinist party, obscures the continuity between 1956, 1962 and 1979. 
However, at each of these moments the search to create a strong Chinese nation-state 
was paramount above all else for the group of key CCP leaders. Indeed, so strong was 
this conviction that it was largely taken for granted rather than openly discussed. Even 
the Cultural Revolution distortions of this debate firmly emphasised the class cleavage 
above all else, the ‘proletarian revolutionary line’ versus the ‘bourgeois reactionary 
line’. Notions of China’s geopolitical relations with the United States and the Soviet 
Union were only introduced through this lens of supposed class antagonism. Liu 
Shaoqi, for example, was denounced for ‘three reconciliations and one reduction’: to 
‘capitalist imperialism’, ‘social imperialism,’ (the Soviet Union) ‘reaction’ (domestic 
‘class enemies’) and ‘reduction’ of aid to national liberation movements (Dittmer 1998, 
184). The choice of enemy foes registers a terrain of geopolitical conflict but the 
implication is that these betrayals follow axiomatically from an absence of a class line. 
Accusations of ‘Soviet revisionism’ also abounded during the Cultural Revolution, and 
implied a similar betrayal of Chinese national independence. Yet the primary cleavage 
in the split did not draw on a patriotic narrative. It could be argued that this was a 
logical form of reasoning in an otherwise irrational discourse; for it recognised a shared 
nationalist foundation and goals with only the means to this end substantively contested. 
Deng and the other leaders of the post-Mao era articulated a nationalism that was rooted 
in pragmatic paternalism. It was also one that Mao had on many occasions articulated, 
an ethos that ‘learnt true from facts’ rather than ‘bombarded the headquarters’. This 
image of China as a powerful nation-state – a myth of descent rooted in a desire to 
restore ‘lost’ power in international affairs – did not ‘fall from the sky’ but was based 
on the national imagination that emerged from the 1890s through the 1920s and 1930s. 
One final remark should, however, stress the limitations of the distinction between 
revolutionary, millenarian nationalism, and the cautious pragmatic ethos that has since 
displaced it. These are not internally logical programmes that can be simply aligned 
with two different methods and pathways. They are essentially forms of aesthetic – i.e. 
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emotion-inducing symbolism – that served to provide legitimacy for a culturally 
conditioned form of political economy rooted in a concrete relationship of class 
power.30 Mao’s ‘vision’, if it can be called that, lacked a sustainable economic basis, for 
it was rooted in a specific form of substitutionism in the Chinese party that gave him a 
pre-eminent position outside of, and in potential hostility to, the managerial 
bureaucracy. For the party elite their state-capitalist political economy was sustainable 
and successfully turned China into a powerful global actor. The common assumption 
amongst both was, in this sense, more important: a ‘strong China’ nationalism based on 
the party-state form. And both sides in this split were capable of drawing on a 
millenarian discourse. Indeed, this can be seen in the way in which it has resurfaced in 
contemporary China. As Yu Haiqing explains, however, it has assumed a ‘traditionalist 
form’ upon its return to the Chinese ideological scene:  
At the turn of the twenty-first century, revolutionary millennialism was being 
replaced by rejuvenation millennialism. This referred to a this-wordly 
transformation of livelihood – not the existing social-political order – that would 
enable the glorious return and a second coming of the ‘dragon culture’ in the 
new millennium. Unlike revolutionary millennialism, rejuvenation millennialism 
did not promise total transformation but revitalisation and regeneration of a 
culture whose revitalisation was pre-determined by its history and pre-existent in 
its collective memory (Haiqing 2009, 47).  
 
Today’s millenarianism therefore invokes a myth of descent firmly rooted in the 
traditional: a final flowering of the long awaited Chinese prestige, only ‘momentarily’ 
lost in the crises of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and now rediscovered in a 
new age. This encapsulates perfectly how market reform should be seen as an answer to 
the desire of national salvation that has occupied the imagination of China’s nationalists 
since the First Sino-Japanese War. Furthermore, it underlines the relative stability of the 
pragmatic nationalism that won out in the ‘two-line’ struggle, for it is rooted in a 
‘sustainable’ political economy of dynamic state-capitalist development.      
 
5.9 Closing a chapter in world history: the rise and fall of ‘state socialism’  
In the conclusion, I will return to the ‘paradigm debate’ over Chinese economic reform, 
drawing out the implications of this longue durée analysis for the existing literature. For 
now, let us briefly summarise the argument presented in this chapter:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30 Thanks to Ishan Cader for impressing the importance of this conception of aesthetics in conversation.   
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• ‘State socialism’ emerged out of the death agony of colonial capitalism. This 
involved the breakdown of dynastic empires; the flowering of a plethora of national 
imaginations; and the extreme consequences that followed from the pursuit of 
colonial empire as an answer to the slump in the highly integrated world economy. 
These cultural qualities shaped the ‘colonial imagination’ of Japanese imperialism, 
whose actions ultimately handed power to the CCP. 
• Stalinism’s attachment to the politics of national egoism, and the corresponding 
preference for pursuing geopolitical state interests (‘realism’) in international 
relations, made the ideology particularly amenable to the flowering of national 
imaginations. Nonetheless, due to the specific conditions of the Chinese ‘dress 
rehearsal’ of 1925 and 1927, the strategy of the people’s front became inoperable in 
China and the politics of national egoism resonated powerfully with the nationalism 
of public society. Maoism, thus, represented a fusion of the politics and 
organisational principles of Stalinism with Chinese nationalism.   
• The Kuomintang’s double-failure – both to modernise the economy and to 
politically confront colonialism – allowed Mao to claim the mantle of national 
salvation and appeared to confirm the ‘turn to the countryside’, peasant war 
strategy.  
• Faced with extreme level of underdevelopment and already operating with a 
Stalinist party form replete with leader cult, the CCP turned to bureaucratic planning 
to centralise political and economic power in a one-party state.  
• The search for a ‘Chinese road’ to development was a continuation of the 
nationalism that underpinned the CCP’s struggle for power. It resulted in a conflict 
between two varieties of Chinese nationalism, the messianic and the pragmatic; 
emerging out of Mao’s break with the modernist intelligentsia in 1957, it was made 
possible by the specific form of substitutionism in the Chinese party (‘a leader cult 
without bureaucracy’).  
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Conclusion 
Only 20 years ago all the schoolbooks taught that the mightiest 
factor in producing wealth and culture is the worldwide 
division of labour lodged in the natural and historic conditions 
of the development of mankind. Now it turns out that world 
exchange is the source of all misfortune and all dangers. 
Homeward ho! Back to the national hearth! A correction 
must… be made of… Christopher Columbus [for] so 
immoderately extending the arena of human culture. 
Leon Trotsky 
 
In this thesis, I have developed a longue durée analysis of the causes of Chinese 
economic reform, applying the framework of the theory of uneven and combined 
development. How, then, does this aid our understanding of the overall problématique – 
of why, that is, an undefeated communist party would embark upon a process of 
capitalist market reform? It allows us to conceptualise the decision as an answer to the 
historical problem of Chinese modernity. The turn announced by the Third Plenum in 
December 1978 is now recast within a longer process of ‘nation building’. I have 
located this policy within the post-1894 ‘project of China’: the aspiration of a new 
public society emerging within a decaying ancient empire to find a place for itself in the 
modern world that was befitting of a lost, glorious past.  
The radicalism of Chinese nationalism lay in the nature of its genesis; it 
emerged within a dynastic polity that had experienced a sudden and rapid loss of 
competitiveness faced with the challenge of British industrial capitalism. This descent 
from powerful tributary empire to semi-colonial client economy, which lacked 
territorial sovereignty and fiscal independence, created a peculiar condition, establishing 
the sociological basis for a modern national imagination – and, in that sense, inventing 
‘China’ – yet instilling this new nation with a fervently anti-colonial ethos. Just as 
China’s ‘myth of descent’ was imbued with an intense desymbolization crisis, so 
resymbolization was imagined as the restoration of ‘lost’ power. From these aesthetic 
qualities of emotion-inducing symbolism there evolved the political programme of 
Chinese nationalism, which the communists have actively pursued since taking power: 
the end to ‘humiliation and suffering’; a strong and powerful nation-state with an 
international stature befitting its imperial history; and an assertion of claims to the 
territory of Qing China as part of a single nation-state, with implications for Tibet, 
Xinjiang, and Taiwan. The pragmatic nationalism that triumphed after Mao’s death 
identified economic prosperity as fundamental to achieving these goals. In this regard, 
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the return of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999 were of huge symbolic and 
material value for the overall project. The reform era could now be aligned with the 
historical project of the country’s nationalism as the epoch of Western colonialism in 
China finally came to an end. This reciprocal unity between Chinese nation-building 
and economic development was drawn out explicitly by Jiang Zemin in his speech at 
the handover ceremony for Hong Kong back in 1997:   
 
July 1st 1997 will go down in the annals of history as a day that merits eternal 
memory. The return of Hong Kong to the motherland after going through a 
century of vicissitudes indicates that from now on Hong Kong compatriots have 
become true masters of this Chinese land, and that Hong Kong has now entered 
a new era of development… Hong Kong compatriots have a glorious patriotic 
tradition. Hong Kong’s prosperity today, in the final analysis, has been built by 
Hong Kong compatriots. It is inseparable from the development and support of 
the mainland… (for the full speech see Rudowski 2012). 
 
The speech perfectly encapsulated the assimilation of ‘state socialism’ to the project of 
national salvation through capitalist means. Jiang Zemin oversaw the final dismantling 
of the planning apparatus following the decision of the party congress of October 1992. 
However, in another historical irony of modern Chinese politics, Jiang had frequently 
endorsed leftist positions in the period after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989 and was 
forced to do a dramatic volte-face, replete with ‘self-criticism’, after Deng’s ‘Southern 
Tour’ (Baum 1996, 350 – 351). Such a shift in position – and the parallel change that 
Chen Yun had made against market reform, which I discussed in the introduction (see 
pp. 8 – 9) – brings one full-circle back to the ‘paradigm debate’ over Chinese 
capitalism. The theory of uneven and combined development offers an incorporative 
approach to the causal analysis of this process. I have emphasised the role of 
nationalism, but not as a derivative of the ideology-based theorisation. Instead I have 
located the rise of Chinese nationalism – and its competing forms of political economy 
– within a materialist analysis of the contradictory process of capitalist 
internationalisation. The rise of Chinese nation-ness was a direct result of the 
geopolitical compulsions of colonial capitalist order, while the search for a 
developmental model attuned to national circumstances was part of a drive to ‘catch up’ 
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with the more advanced powers. This social analysis of the reproduction of the global 
system allows us to incorporate its cultural, ideological, and economic aspects.  
The theory of uneven and combined development therefore offers an Aufhebung 
of the classical dichotomy between ‘power’ (P. H. Chang 1978; MacFarquhar 1974; 
MacFarquhar 1983; MacFarquhar 1997a; MacFarquhar 2011; Pye 1968; Pye 1981; F. 
Teiwes C. 1984a), ‘policy’ (Barnett 1967; Harding 1981; Lewis 1966; Solinger 1984), 
and ‘institutional’ (Lieberthal 1992; Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Lampton 1992; 
Shirk 1992; Shirk 1993) approaches. Factional and ideological conflicts, which involve 
inconsistencies and shifts in position, are explicable within the amalgam of Soviet 
Stalinism and Chinese nationalism that Maoism represented. Ideological argument takes 
place within the parameters laid down by these historical assumptions; its ‘state 
socialist’ element became identified with the party-dictatorship and the nationalist 
programme pursued through capitalist means. Factional intrigues are inherent within 
the ‘substitutionist’, Stalinist party, which was culturally appropriated by the CCP in a 
manner that amplified the role of the ‘leader cult’. As power is strictly concentrated at 
the top of the party with no democratic mechanisms it tends towards personal 
dictatorship. The special role for the ‘leader cult’ in the Chinese model created tension 
between elite figures and sections of the bureaucracy, as illustrated by Deng’s ‘Southern 
Tour’ as well as Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Institutional hierarchies in the party state 
system were socially stratified by class contradictions and the developmental model of 
command planning was ultimately judged against the dynamism of global capitalism – a 
test that it failed in China and elsewhere. A materialist analysis of China’s combined 
development, thus, visualises each of these dimensions of the analysis as part of a 
contradictory historical process.    
The decision of the Third Plenum in December 1978 amounted to a turn to state-
capitalist development. ‘In the absence of an indigenous bourgeoisie’, writes Kevin 
Gray, ‘the Chinese state took upon itself the leading role in the reorganisation of social 
relations commensurate with a restoration of capitalism’ (Gray 2010, 456). Treating this 
process, however, as one fundamentally rooted in a nationalist response to the 
competitive challenge of the modern world recognises the degree of ‘unconsciousness’ 
that it involved, which was rooted in a desire to develop a strong and powerful nation-
state rather than strictly ‘capitalist’ aspirations. It was commensurate with, rather than 
motivated by, a capitalist logic of power. Solinger is therefore correct to see statism – 
the utilisation of market measures to strengthen the power of the state – as a driving 
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force of reform (Solinger 1993, 3 – 4). As a consequence, the reform process was 
initially based upon a coalition of forces, some of which saw it as augmenting the 
planned economy, rather than replacing it (ibid). This understanding imparts a 
consistency to the positions that Chen Yun took in 1956, 1978 and 1992: he supported 
reform only insofar as it did not threaten a ‘state socialist’ centralisation of political and 
economic power. In addition, it allows one to capture the class contradictions that 
emerged in the course of the reform process between pro-market sections of the state 
bureaucracy with material interests in the reform drive, and less competitive 
bureaucratic units (Shirk 1993). A decisive political intervention was needed (ibid) in 
favour of the pro-reform wing of the state and was possible due to the nature of the 
substitutionism in the CCP. However, the key anterior assumption, around which there 
was an absolute consensus in the ruling party, in these decisions, was the political 
programme of Chinese nationalism – i.e., the drive to build a strong and powerful China 
– and this, in turn, emerged out of East Asia’s interface with Western colonialism in la 
longue durée.  
The politics of nation-ness (Anderson 2006) had an extraordinary impact on the 
socialist project of the last century. The proliferation of national identities, each aspiring 
to sovereign territoriality, and engaged in processes of mutual interaction and 
competition, proved to be antithetical to the realisation of a transnational transition to 
the socialist mode of production that Trotsky and others had seen the Russian 
Revolution as a step towards. Revolutions that followed afterwards were heavily 
characterised by the rising tide of political nationalism in the Global South and East. 
Lenin’s injunction, that ‘At all events, under all conceivable circumstances if the 
German revolution does not come, we are doomed’ (cited Rosenberg 1996, 10) – and its 
assumption of an internationalist orientation – would not, therefore, find an echo in the 
movements led by Marshal Tito, Fidel Castro, or Hồ Chí Minh, any more than they did 
in Mao’s regime. The tragedy of twentieth century socialism thus lies in the following 
dilemma: the same wrenching processes of capitalist internationalisation that had 
brought the communists to power also created forces favourable to the collapse of these 
movements into authoritarian nationalism. By explicating the sociological origins of 
this process in the uneven and combined development of the global system, the thesis 
highlights the enduring challenge of socialist transition in a world of many societies. 
However, by recognising this, it may equally aid the development of effective 
anticapitalist strategies committed to democracy, internationalism, and human freedom.  
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Appendix 
List of sources for beginning-of-chapter quotes.   
 
Introduction  
Describing reform and opening as the importation 
and development of capitalism and viewing the 
main danger of peaceful evolution as coming from 
the economic field are leftist manifestations. 
Deng Xiaoping 
cited in Zhao 1993, 746 
 
As we can see now in retrospect, the strength of 
the global socialist challenge to capitalism was 
that of the weakness of its opponent.  
Eric Hobsbawm 
Hobsbawm 1994, 8 
 
Chapter 1 
What do people want from the Communist Party? 
First to be liberated, and second to be made rich.  
Deng Xiaoping  
cited in Jeffries 2010, 18 
 
If today we still do not set about the task of 
improving the socialist system, people will ask 
why it cannot solve problems that its capitalist 
counterpart can.  
Deng Xiaoping 
cited in Jeffries 2010, 18 
 
Chapter 2 
The class struggle… is a struggle for the rough 
and material things, without which there is 
nothing fine and spiritual. Nevertheless these 
latter are present in the class struggle as 
something other than mere booty, which falls to 
the victor. They are present as confidence, as 
courage, as humour, as cunning, as steadfastness 
in this struggle, and they reach far back into the 
mists of time. They will, ever and anon, call every 
victory which has ever been won by the rulers 
into question.  
Walter Benjamin 1940 
 
Chapter 3 
China offers an enchanting picture of what the 
whole world might become, if the laws of the 
empire were to become the laws of all nations. Go 
to Peking! Gaze upon the mightiest of mortals; he 
is the true and perfect image of heaven.  
- Pierre Poivre, cited in Clarke 1997, 42 
 
There is no sin to which they are not prone, no 
crime which is not common among them. 
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
cited in Clarke 1997, 53  
 
 
Chapter 4 
Insofar as the past has been transmitted as 
tradition it possesses authority; insofar as 
authority presents itself historically, it becomes 
tradition. 
Hannah Arendt  
cited in Calhoun and McGowan 1997, 58) 
 
The Chinese nation is known throughout the 
world not only for its industriousness and 
stamina, but also for its ardent love of freedom 
and its rich revolutionary traditions… During the 
thousands of years of recorded history, the 
Chinese nation has given birth to many national 
heroes and revolutionary leaders. Thus the 
Chinese nation has a glorious revolutionary 
tradition and a splendid historical heritage.  
- Mao Zedong  
cited in Apter and Saich 1994, 53 
 
Chapter 5  
Socialism isn't only about defending against one's 
enemies, against the old world it is opposing; it 
also has to fight within itself against its own 
reactionary ferments. 
Victor Serge  
Serge 2012, 133 
 
Modern China is the product of nineteenth-
century western imperialism, crossed with the 
influence of the Russian revolution. Unfortunately 
it was not the Chinese workers who laboured in 
the western-owned factories in the treaty ports, or 
in the South African mines, or on the western 
front in the First World War, who have survived 
to enjoy whatever glory or profit may have 
accrued from the Chinese revolution. 
E.H Carr  
Carr 1965, 104) 
 
Conclusion  
Only twenty years ago all the schoolbooks taught 
that the mightiest factor in producing wealth and 
culture is the worldwide division of labour lodged 
in the natural and historic conditions of the 
development of mankind. Now it turns out that 
world exchange is the source of all misfortune 
and all dangers. Homeward ho! Back to the 
national hearth! A correction must… be made 
of… Christopher Columbus [for] so immoderately 
extending the arena of human culture. 
Leon Trotsky  
Trotsky 1934b 
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